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Introduction
It must give great Concern to any considerate Mind that when this whole
Continent at a vast expence of Blood & Treasure is endeavoring to establish its
Liberties,... there are Men among us so basely sordid as to Counteract all our
Exertions for the Sake of a little Gain.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, APPEAL TO NEW YORK (1775)
Jail? You want me to go to jail?... Who worked for nothin' in that war?... When
they work for nothin', I'll work for nothin'. Did they ship a gun or a truck outa
Detroit before they got their price?... Half the Goddam country is gotta go if I go!
JOE KELLER, IN ARTHUR MILLER'S ALL MY SONS (1947)
In the evening of what otherwise had been a bright and promising April day in
1607, a band of native warriors concealed themselves upon a spit of land
known to others as Virginia. After secretly observing the strangers who had
rowed ashore that morning, they decided, correctly as it turned out, that the
uninvited callers were not simply casual visitors but were instead the danger-
ous vanguard of an occupying force. The bowmen crept within close range of
the trespassers, loosed their arrows, and stained the sand with English blood.
The English detachment answered with a fusillade of musketry and then pru-
dently withdrew to the safety of their squadron. American history, defined as
commencing with the arrival of the first permanent English settlers in North
America, was only a few hours old, but it had already experienced its first mili-
tary engagement. Two Englishmen had been wounded.1
Over the next four centuries, countless skirmishes, raids, invasions, and
similar acts of war would follow. Millions of contestants would be engaged,
and costs and casualties would rise geometrically. "War" in its many forms—
aggressive or defensive, Revolutionary or Civil, colonial or general, declared or
undeclared, low-intensity or limited, hot or cold—was fought, threatened, or, at
the very least, prepared for almost continuously as the American story un-
folded. Mars called on the North American community regularly, and each time
he exacted a terrible toll in blood and treasure.
When English settlers first fought Indian warriors along the Atlantic coast-
line, both sides maintained firmly established military customs, derived from
centuries of experience, about why and how to engage in warfare. Although
both had goals that were broadly economic, Europeans had long fought for
purposes that were, in varying degree, more explicitly monetary. Romans were
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skilled in the art of plunder, and looting and booty remained common features
of the Middle Ages. The capturing of prisoners for ransom was a well devel-
oped industry in Europe.
Both sides soon realized that a very different enemy who fought in different
ways required a modification of strategy and tactics. An American way of war-
fare must necessarily develop. But although it was soon apparent that New
World conditions would dictate a new way of fighting, it was less obvious (but
equally inevitable) that these new circumstances would change the way that
soldiers would be supplied with the sinews of war. The military customs of
feudal Europe must gradually give way to more American and ultimately more
democratic means of waging warfare.
While much has been written about the evolution of American military
strategy and tactics, economic mobilization in support of the troops has re-
ceived comparatively little attention. This book addresses three aspects of this
topic: the form and appearance of American traditions of mobilization, the
ethical problems associated with mobilization, and the growth and success of
administrative procedures intended to ensure that mobilization is carried out
with efficiency and equity.
The first issue considered is how Americans have striven to distribute the
burden of mobilizing economic resources for military purposes differently
from their European ancestors. Since the first colonial settlements, Americans
have never fully agreed on how, if at all, vital military supplies could be pro-
cured fairly and practically under American conditions. Nevertheless, they very
early acknowledged that the ways of Europe by which feudal lords richly bene-
fited from war while the lower and middle classes sacrificed must cease. The old
military system must certainly be transformed, which they agreed would be a
welcome step, but a question lingered: Could the New World find a way to share
war's economic burden more equitably? Could the economic cost of war be dis-
tributed among the population so that no one paid unjustly and no one ac-
quired undue gains? In short, could war be financed in an American way?
There were several reasons why an American tradition of funding the cost
of war must necessarily appear. In contrast to populous Europe, military
participation in America generally engaged a broader spectrum of the com-
munity. America possessed no monarch, no feudal nobility, no powerful legis-
lature, no crown official, and no standing army capable of compelling ample
financial support for military service. Instead, the American population was
widely dispersed, prosperous, literate, and independent. In America, more so
than in Europe, wars could be neither fought nor funded without substantial
public consent. If wars were to be fought by Americans, at the very least a lim-
ited consensus in support of both a war's aims and its means was required.
Americans who have been critical of military purposes have often found
it more convenient to censure the price of a conflict, as measured in bloodshed
or in appropriations or both, than to assail its aims.
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The second purpose of this book is to examine the history of the American
struggle with a fundamental moral problem: Can one rightly profit during
wartime? If this question could be answered affirmatively, as it eventually
would be, a corollary issue appears: how much or in what degree can one
rightly profit during a war disaster? These are enduring problems, which like
war itself have threaded their way through American history. While they are
by no means a central issue in American history, like Indian-white relations,
the evolution of participatory democracy, sectionalism, or the rise of the wel-
fare state, the story of the struggle against war profits is as revealing as it is en-
during.
As the American community prospered, its people established distinctions
about how wealth could be ethically acquired. There were ways of accumulating
wealth that were recognized as acceptable and others that were regarded as ille-
gitimate. Americans have always generally recognized that wealth extracted
from the land through agriculture or animal husbandry or earned from fair
competition in the commercial marketplace was legitimate. Conversely, wealth
obtained by theft or fraud has always been stigmatized. But between these dis-
crete categories, an island of middle ground gradually formed. War profits have
normally been regarded as falling within a special category of semilegitimate
wealth—although not specifically illegal, war profits are not entirely ethical,
either. This separate, odd classification affords an opportunity to deepen the
understanding of how Americans have measured the respectability of wealth
accumulation.
Americans have generally honored wealth obtained slowly above that
obtained quickly. They have also normally valued earnings derived from the
manufacture of tangible articles more than invisible earnings acquired from in-
ventory appreciation. Earnings gained in supplying civilian markets have usu-
ally commanded more respect than those obtained in defense contracting.
Because war wealth has often been acquired quickly, through price inflation or
through the manufacture and sales of weapons of destruction, it has often
borne a streak of impropriety. Neither honest wages nor ill-gotten gains, war
wealth has generally displayed a gray veneer.
Several ethical problems associated with the accumulation of wealth
during war-time help to explain this ambiguity. Is it proper for an individual
to gain or enlarge a private fortune while the community at large faces great
peril and while some of its members are sacrificing life and limb for its protec-
tion? Is that kind of wealth legitimate? If so, is all of it legitimate or only part of
it? Some wartime gains were obtained by methods that would be illegitimate
in peacetime, whereas others were ethically indeterminate. What of wealth ob-
tained by stealing from the enemy, as privateers did? Was that wealth, which
would be illegitimate in peacetime, honorable in war? In short, what role did
extraordinary wartime circumstances play in establishing the propriety of ac-
quired wealth?
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War was (and is) an exceptional occurrence which had (and has) a peculiar
capacity to distort the wealth curve so that those whom society deems least
deserving can become economically advantaged and vice versa. It is well recog-
nized that there is a stochastic or random element that affects wealth distribu-
tion. The political philosopher Hal R. Varian has described this factor as "acts of
God, depressions, [and] accumulations of fortunes that maybe transferred to
new generations."2 In other words, both natural and social events produce
random but unintended changes in wealth holding. A society that seeks to dis-
tribute its assets in a just and equitable fashion cannot ignore stochastic ele-
ments. (The economist Lester C. Thurow estimates that they account for 70 to
80 percent of the variance in individual earnings. )3 War is one of these random
elements, no less than drought or earthquake or epidemic. That horror, death,
and destruction fall on some while others profit is a cruel injustice.
This wrong has seldom gone unnoticed. The recurring controversy over
war profits serves to illustrate the perennial American concern about the fair-
ness of the race to wealth. By skewing the peacetime distribution of wealth
unfairly, wartime circumstances reveal an ability to defeat the search for
economic justice. Although Americans have generally shared a fundamental,
perhaps excessive, trust in the fairness of the race, there has also existed a con-
comitant, deep-seated suspicion of the tactics of some of the competitors.
Warfare has an odious but undeniable ability to negate an equitable distribu-
tion of life's blessings, one of which is wealth.
Behind many, perhaps most, of the public controversies that serve to
define the American past lurk subtle disagreements about wealth distribu-
tion. Despite its importance, Americans generally choose not to address the
question directly, preferring that it creep into public discourse indirectly.4
Following each of America's major wars, the distortion of wealth distribution
introduced by the contest has become a subject of earnest discussion, varied in
form but always passionate. Usually the issue has been a matter of political
debate, but another avenue by which this issue has gained entry into public
discourse is cultural. The legacy of wartime gains forms a minor but tenacious
theme in American literature. Although not a main topic of this study, the lit-
erary dimension receives some discussion.
There has been little or no precise consensus about what constitutes a just
and honorable division of wealth. This study does not presume to answer the
question of what composes an ethical wealth distribution, which is a compli-
cated, controversial, and perhaps impossible enterprise. Even determining
whether wealth distribution has changed, and why it has changed, is an excep-
tionally difficult problem in itself, although recent works by the economist
Peter McClelland and the historian James L. Huston testify to the growing in-
terest of social scientists in this question.5 Nevertheless, normative judgments
about the distribution of wealth have been made regularly, both explicitly and
implicitly.
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Although the importance of the pattern of wealth distribution has waxed
and waned, Americans have never been shy about government intervention in
economic matters in time of war. During wartime, wealth distribution has
seldom been unimportant, for that is when public issues have direct, com-
pelling importance for the everyday life of ordinary people. Nevertheless, the
experience of war has attracted scant attention from scholars interested in
wealth distribution. The goal here is to trace the continuing American disap-
proval of war profiteering and thus to establish that Americans have consis-
tently, although sometimes furtively, judged that an equitable distribution of
wealth must take into account how the wealth was acquired.
Successive generations of Americans have grasped this reality in varying de-
grees. As they grappled with the problem of defining, preventing, or restricting
war profits (with varying success), they devised numerous ways of implement-
ing their ethical ideas about shared sacrifice. The third purpose of this book is to
outline the development of the administrative science of managing war profits.
The national will to control war profits has been constant (in varying degree),
but changing circumstances have required the fabrication of new methods for
expressing it. The need for these institutions was a subordinate (but not in-
significant) reason for the rise of the modern state.
The problem of controlling war profits offers an excellent opportunity to
sketch the evolution and maturation of the administrative procedures em-
ployed to put into effect the practical and ethical principles of war leadership.
In colonial America, war profiteers were exercised by moral exhortation, price
controls, and legal intervention in the form of fines and incarceration. The
Revolutionaries hoped by appealing to civic virtue to win their independence
without gain by either soldier or civilian, but found to their chagrin that it was
necessary to add open competitive bidding as a protection against avarice. The
Federalists built state-owned armories so as to obtain arms on a nonprofit
basis, but many Jeffersonians thought even this modest measure unwise. The
Jacksonians found that laissez-faire might have its limits if it meant large prof-
its on supplies for the war with Mexico.
During the Civil War Lincolnian nationalists supplemented these proce-
dures by appeals for patriotic sacrifice, by an income tax, and by financial pay-
ments to citizens who reported fraud. Late-nineteenth-century liberals fought
profits on arms sales to France in 1871, on naval armorplate in the 1890s, and on
supplies for the Spanish-American War. Progressives railed against profits on
powder sold to Britain and France before the United States entered the Great
War and against price increases in basic commodities after Americans joined
the alliance. In the 1920s and 1930s the question of how to restrict war profits
seemed nearly as important as how to prevent war itself, and both Hooverian
associationalists and Rooseveltian New Dealers anguished over how to contain
profiteering. In the twentieth century, the administrative art of controlling war
profits included government-owned weapons plants, legal profit restrictions,
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civilian audits of military contracting, contract renegotiation, and excess prof-
its taxes. The economic managers of World War II possessed both the finest ar-
senal of weapons against war profits and the greatest national resolution to use
them, but they too could report only qualified success.
A legion of American luminaries have agonized over war profits, including
General George Washington and Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow
Wilson, Warren Harding, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In this
respect as in others, Washington and Franklin Roosevelt were the greatest
leaders, but even the less highly regarded Dwight D. Eisenhower was impelled
in part by a concern about war profiteering when he circulated his famous
warning against the "military-industrial complex." (Eisenhower was himself
a veteran of World War I and thus a member of the generational cohort
most concerned about war profits. As a junior staff officer in 1930, Eisen-
hower became directly engaged in the war profiteering controversy. He was
assigned to the Hoover administration's War Policies Commission as chief
military aide.) In 1967 he intimated that his specific ideas about a military-
industrial complex—which he defined generally as "the role of pressure
groups in every area of our social and economic life"—formed during his
presidency of Columbia University from 1948 to 1951. "The aggressive de-
mands of various groups and special interests, callous or selfish, or even well-
intentioned," Eisenhower contended, "contradicted the American tradition
that no part of our country should prosper except as the whole of America
prospered."6
There are two main difficulties with studying war profits. The first hazard
is its scope—what can be gained in comprehensiveness can be lost in depth. To
minimize this problem, this study concentrates on the United States and
excludes Europe.7 The four major American military mobilizations—the
Revolution, the Civil War, and World Wars I and II—receive primary atten-
tion. The smaller conflicts—the colonial wars, the Indian campaigns, the War
of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War—are less empha-
sized. The "limited" wars of the cold war period, the Korean, Vietnam, and
Persian Gulf conflicts, remain open for another study.
Also omitted is the history of profiteering by enemies of the dominant
Anglo-American culture: Indians, French, British Loyalists, and Mexicans.
There is some reference to the profiteering problems of the Confederacy,
but this subject is not fully developed. The term used in the title, warhog,
applied solely to men, and the present investigation applies mostly to them.
Although there was a concordant term for women, warsow," no evidence has
been found of howfemale profiteers differed from their male counterparts (if at
all). The gender dimension remains unexplored, and there is no known ethnic
dimension.
The second hazard is definitional. The word profiteering is disturbingly im-
precise and nearly as pejorative as the term military-industrial complex.
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Although it would be preferable to avoid such a slippery term, profiteering is in
common parlance and has been so since the early twentieth century.9 It con-
veys a generally recognized (albeit vague) meaning. It can be defined with
reasonable precision, but nevertheless must be used with considerable care.
The term selected for the title, warhog, originated during the Great War. It is a
successor to (but less archaic than) eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ex-
pressions such as engrosser or forestalled It is less well known, less sweeping,
and therefore less limiting than profiteer.
Nevertheless, profiteering deserves a definition. It maybe defined as a gain in
economic well-being obtained as a result of military conflict. The gain is usually
monetary, but it may also come in the form of appreciated stock prices or pay-
ment in kind, such as the acquisition of government facilities.10 The assets are
usually acquired during wartime, but the term wartime presents definitional
problems of its own. In colonial America the delineation between war and
peace was less distinct than in later periods.11 In the twentieth century the great-
est "war" profits were obtained during the preparedness period before the
United States entered the Great War. The postwar reconversion immediately
after World War II was also a time of substantial economic gain.
Normally an adjective is attached to the gain, as in "fair profit," "reasonable
profit," or "just profit." The opposite case is referred to as an "unreasonable
profit," "excessive profit," or "exorbitant profit." Thus a distinction is conven-
tionally drawn between a remuneration that is normal, necessary, and custom-
ary and one that is unusual, unwarranted, and abnormal. This differentiation
invariably conveys an ethical judgment, implying that the level of benefit ob-
tained exceeds that which is proper. As in all ethical judgments, war profiteer-
ing is more easily defined conceptually than empirically.
War profiteering has appeared in many different forms, and for centuries
Americans have struggled to find a satisfactory way of identifying them in
practice. The best-known type occurs when a vendor raises his prices to take
advantage of a seller's market arising from the sectoral shifts that develop as a
result of military purchasing. For the purposes of this study, this type of profi-
teering is termed "extortionate pricing" or, more colloquially, "price gouging."
It involves an increase in profit above a prewar standard; profit rates that are
above a general or industrial standard; profits that are unrelated to levels of
risk or investment; and profits that exhibit evidence of unusual market power.
More than one of these factors maybe present.12
After the Pequot War of 1636-37, a Puritan divine offered what was un-
doubtedly the first American attempt at defining this kind of price gouging.
According to John Cotton, a merchant might raise his price "when there is a
scarcity of the commodity," but otherwise he must maintain the "current
price." In modern terms, Cotton meant that "demand-pull" inflation associated
with wartime conditions must be resisted by an ethical merchant; to raise
a wartime price above the going peacetime rate for personal benefit was
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improper. On the other hand, Cotton saw "cost-push" inflation as an irresistible
Act of God. Cotton may be excused for failing to realize that the difference be-
tween these two types of inflation is often blurry.13
In 1776 a new attempt at precision emerged. The Secret Committee of
Trade of the Continental Congress declared itself "willing to allow what might
be a reasonable compensation without being willing to submit to extortion."
But what was a "reasonable compensation"? The Secret Committee defined
"reasonable" as a 2.5 percent markup on each sale. This may or may not have
been the first attempt at a quantitative definition of reasonableness, but it es-
tablished the known record for the all-time low figure.'4
The quantitative definition varied continually, but after rising later in
the Revolution it followed a variable but revealing trendline. In 1917 the Pro-
gressive-oriented American Committee on War Finance made perhaps
the first distinction on wartime profits made on weaponry—limited to 3.5
percent—and on agricultural commodities, where 6 percent was acceptable.
The American Legion thought that 7 percent was allowable, splitting the dif-
ference between railroads, which were making 6 percent, and public utilities,
which were at 8 percent. Definitions of acceptable profits (on sales after costs)
used during the Progressive era by the Congress and by the Army Ordnance
Corps were 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Military officers generally
approved of somewhat higher figures than did civilian managers; the record
for the lowest known figure endorsed by a military leader was 6 percent (by
General Douglas MacArthur, 1935). In 1934 a congressional compromise limi-
ted nominal profits on warships to 10 percent but set the limit on warplanes
at 12 percent. The discrepancy was cleared up in 1940 by cutting both to 8
percent.15
In the early twentieth century, the giants of American politics took up the
quest for a working definition of reasonableness. Theodore Roosevelt, who was
part-militarist and part-Progressive, expressed that duality well. He wrote, "It
is criminal to halt the work of building the Navy or fitting out our training
camps because of refusal to allow a fair profit to the businessman who alone
can do the work speedily and effectively; and it is equally mischievous not to
put a stop to the making of unearned and improper fortunes out of the war."
Herbert Hoover, serving as food administrator in 1917, advised his superior,
Woodrow Wilson, that the law prevents "unjust, unreasonable, unfair . . .
profit." Hoover was perplexed by the predicament of applying this vague rule
to practical situations, which, he warned, "is arising daily." Hoover proposed
as a definition of these terms "any profit in excess of the normal pre-war
average profit of that business and place where free, competitive conditions ex-
isted." Wilson responded by defining a "just price" as one that would maintain
efficiency, provide a living for those who conduct military business, and enable
them to pay good wages and to expand their enterprises. With customary elo-
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quence (but with misplaced confidence) Wilson declared: "No true patriot will
permit himself... to grow rich by the shedding of [soldiers'] blood. He will
give as freely and with as unstinting self-sacrifice as they. When they are giving
their lives will he not give at least his money?"16
Less frequently, critics of munitions profits quantified what they meant by
excessive or unreasonable gains. In 1778 a Revolutionary patriot denounced a
vendor for charging "a most exorbitant price... nearly one quarter more than
the market price." He advised his commander that "if you are not under a press-
ing necessity for provisions, prudence & policy dictate that we should discover
some indifference in the purchase of this Cargo 'till they fall to a more reason-
able price." Another principled compatriot denounced a "Clothier [who] has
placed three hundred Per Cent upon the Stirling Cost. This is totally repugnant
to the Act of Congress. And to be an Accessory to an Act deviating from the
Decisions of that August Body might be Construed into high Treason."17
In 1918 Robert S. Brookings, a business executive serving on the War
Industries Board, said that a 25-30 percent after-tax return on capital was im-
proper. In 1935 Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri affirmed that a 30-35
percent markup on the cost of constructing a warship was "excessive." In 1924
an official with the Department of Justice whose duty was to resolve disputes on
military contracts left over from the late war submitted perhaps the most per-
fectly rounded of profiteering's many circular definitions. He defined an "un-
conscionable consideration" as "that which shocks the conscience of the
chancellor." "But," lamented the befuddled bureaucrat, "such definition is most
elusive when one seeks to apply it to a particular case."18
Although price gouging has been the most consistently recurrent form of
profiteering, there have been many others. Throughout American history, con-
tractors with a keen if shady view of the main chance have been engaged in
fraudulent dealings with the nation's military forces. Materiel furnished to the
troops has often been of degraded quality, sometimes necessarily, sometimes
not. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wartime gains could also be
obtained by plunder, privateering, ransom, and trading with the enemy.
During the Civil War, stock speculation and the price and quality of trans-
portation were special concerns. In the twentieth century, many of these types
continued, but large corporate salaries, commodity speculation, excessive con-
struction costs for military posts, black market trading, evasion of price con-
trols, and gains from postwar reconversion sparked new controversies.
Despite the great longevity and numbing regularity of American military
action, warfare remains fortunately only a subordinate experience in American
history. Nevertheless, the story of how Americans have endeavored during
their many wars to assemble resources equitably in the American way, to define
the ethical questions of mobilization, and to manage economic sacrifice re-
sponsibly is a revealing aspect of the American struggle to achieve a just society.

A Provoking Evil
Engage in War, only in a just Cause. Not to gratify Pride, Avarice and Ambition, to
increase and enlarge our Possessions.
REVEREND WILLIAM WILLIAMS, BOSTON (1737)
Elizabethan England, poised to plant English culture in the North American
wilderness, presented a striking example of the interrelationship between war
and wealth. England's first attempts at colonization confronted twin chal-
lenges. One was how to assemble the enormous financial resources necessary
to sustain a colony. The other was how to mobilize and transport the military
forces necessary to meet powerful adversaries—French, Dutch, and, most im-
portantly, Indians. Raleigh's Roanoke failed surely because of lack of money
and probably because of military weakness. The English settlements estab-
lished in Virginia and Massachusetts after 1600 survived (if only narrowly) be-
cause they were able to find the means of prevailing against one military
challenge after another. They did so by adapting the militia customs of
England to a system of collective self-defense suited to the New World. After a
century of experience in America, the military policy of collective self-defense
was gradually replaced by a policy based on individual self-interest.1
In the early seventeenth century, England was less militaristic than most of
its European rivals, yet its eventual supremacy as a colonial power rested upon
triumph in a series of highly successful wars. While the Continental powers
were experiencing a military revolution that would produce professional
armies, England continued to rely on a centuries-old tradition that empha-
sized amateur soldiery.2 Elizabethan troops, scoffed a military historian, were
unprofessional: "very unsatisfactory gatherings of haphazard material," with a
"terribly deficient organization," and whose training was "usually con-
temptible." For the student of military tactics, he maintained, "the whole
period is singularly dull."3
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For the student of the relationship between war and wealth, however,
American colonial history has much to offer. The American experience was a
blend of war and peace, of soldier and civilian, of licit and illicit gain. The
English settlers imported from the Old Country established ways of financing
war and transformed them to suit the colonial conditions. They created
American versions of plunder and ransom, of fraud and smuggling, and of
deep conflict between public authorities and defense contractors.
The American military tradition sprang from the English penchant for a
citizen army. The English preference for amateur soldiers is so ancient that it
has baffled scholars seeking to identify its origin. There is agreement, however,
that the tradition was in existence long before the Norman Conquest.4 The
English dislike of mercenaries and the high taxes associated with them was one
of the grievances against King John that led to the signing of the Magna Carta.5
In place of a professional army, England developed a tradition of universal
military service based on the concept of a nation-at-arms. Although this gen-
eral obligation to accept military service was better observed in theory than in
practice, it nevertheless became the foundation upon which the seventeenth-
century American colonists organized their defense. Tracing its lineage back to
the English fyrd, the colonial militia was an institution better suited to the re-
quirements of colonial defense than it was to defending the home island.
By 1400 the original concept of the English militia had been modified.
It was expensive and inconvenient to train the entire male population, there
was no serious danger of invasion, and militiamen objected on constitutional
grounds to service abroad. As a result only a minority of the population re-
ceived military training, although this training was supposed to be more in-
tensive. The older idea of the militia was replaced by a new institution, the
trained bands or simply "trainbands," which became the immediate ancestor
of the American colonial militia.6
In England, the trainbands were militia companies whose members had
other occupations but who would form occasionally (usually four times a year)
and would perform simple military maneuvers with crude weapons. They
functioned primarily as a law-and-order body rather than as a true fighting
force. During the eighteenth century Britain turned toward a professionalized
army, but the colonies lagged. In America, where the primary opponents were
Indians who might strike at any time and then melt into the forest but who
seldom conducted a prolonged engagement, the trainbands were a modestly
successful arrangement. England was unwilling to spend the money to protect
the colonists from Indians, so the colonists had no choice but to defend them-
selves. Because there were so few colonists and because they often lived sepa-
rately, it was vital that each of them become a citizen-soldier. Only New
Netherlands and New Sweden relied primarily upon professional soldiers. Of
the English colonies, only Pennsylvania, the Quaker colony, omitted a militia
(until 1755).7
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Although seventeenth-century American colonies lacked a professional
military, and although many of them were settled as religious societies, they
were nevertheless quite warlike (with the exception of the Quakers). In 1607, of
the 104 settlers in the new colony of Virginia, six held the military rank of cap-
tain. This military background proved useful immediately, as Indian arrows
struck the first English targets on the very first day in 1607 that white men ar-
rived in Virginia. When in 1628 the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay
Company laid plans for the new settlement that would harbor the Great
Migration, it hired Samuel Sharpe at the rate of £10 for three years "to have over-
sight of the ordnance to bee planted in the ffort to bee built upon the plantation
and what ells may concerne artilery bisines to geeve his advise in." The Bay
Company also hired Thomas Graves, a miner, and assigned him the duty of dis-
covering lead and saltpeter deposits. It is arguable, therefore, that a close work-
ing relationship between civil and military authorities originated in England
before colonization and was transported across the ocean in the first ships.8
Englishmen had few qualms about fighting. They believed that most wars
were fought for selfish ends or, as the Reverend Roger Williams put it, "for
greater dishes and bowls of porridge." But they distinguished between wars
for avaricious purposes and "just" wars. The latter included both Indian wars
and defense against the king's troops. In 1634, when the Massachusetts Bay
Colony was still very new, it prepared defenses against a possible invasion by
government forces seeking to revoke its charter, as recommended by the
Puritan archenemy, the Anglican bishop William Laud. In 1637 the first great
Puritan-Indian conflict occurred (the Pequot War) and Roger Williams, who
was certainly no friend of Massachusetts, deemed it a justifiable "defensive
war." In 1675 the Reverend Increase Mather similarly justified King Philip's
War, which he said had been provoked by the Indians' "insolencies, and out-
rages, Murthering many persons, and burning their Houses in Sundry
Plantations."9
The military discipline of the trainband resembled the religious discipline
that Puritans sought to inculcate into their community. In 1653 a dedicated
and militant Puritan prophetically exhorted his companions to "see that with
all dilligence you incourage every Souldier-like Spirit among you, for the
Lord Christ intends to atchieve greater matters by this little handfull then the
World is aware of." A later cleric likened soldiers to Puritans because both
shunned "Idleness and Sloth, Carelessness and Inactivity." And in 1694 the
Reverend Moses Fiske went so far as to claim that "'tis utterly impossible to be
Christians without [war]; they must fight their way through the wilderness of
this world, or lose Heaven." New England clergy opened and closed militia
training days with prayer, voted in militia elections, delivered prebattle ser-
mons, and accompanied militiamen into combat.10
Of course, not all colonists were Puritans. But English settlers shared simi-
lar views on the morality of war. The Reverend Gilbert Tennant, Pennsylvania's
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famous Presbyterian leader, called for military preparedness by reminding his
followers, "The Lord is a man of War," quoting Exodus 15:3. Only the Quakers
demurred, and even they were willing to compromise their pacifist opposition
to military service. Quakers consistently appropriated money for war, but they
would claim that the funds were only "for the King's Use," "for the Governor's
Use," "for the Use of the Crown," or some other such euphemism. On one oc-
casion Quakers even boasted that they had contributed more money for de-
fense than "what is given in some neighboring colonies."11
By modern standards, the American militia was an extremely crude system
of defense. When it was established in the early seventeenth century, the long
bow, which had been England's national weapon for centuries, had only re-
cently been superseded by firearms. Guns were scarcely an improvement in
killing ability over bows, but they made noise and gave off clouds of smoke
that temporarily frightened Indians. The lance remained in use (due to its
cheap price) until 1676, when its worthlessness in the wilderness was finally
established. Firearms were approximately ten times as expensive as wooden
weapons, and their introduction coincided with the first examples in Ameri-
can history of fraudulent practices in defense procurement.12
The American militia was a simple social system. Following English prece-
dent, colonial militia laws customarily required that each man of military age
report on muster day equipped with his own musket, balls, and powder. The
only responsibility resting upon colonial authorities was to provide a few
cannon and to ensure that each militiaman was adequately equipped. The
latter was more difficult than it seemed. Militiamen frequently failed to pro-
vide themselves with firearms, and if they did so their guns were often broken
or obsolescent. Their supply of powder and balls was commonly neither fresh
nor ample.
Firearms were expensive. In Virginia a settler was expected to furnish him-
self with a musket, sword, bandoleer, twenty pounds of powder, and sixty
pounds of shot. This equipment constituted about one-fourth of the total
cost of the settler's tools. Fathers were expected to furnish muskets for their
military-age sons, and masters were required to arm their servants. Since colo-
nial families were large and masters often had several servants, expenses could
mount quickly. Sometimes weapons were available only from the organizers of
a colony. Prices in the American wilderness were normally higher than in
England, but bitterness about costs was nearly unavoidable when settlers were
dependent upon a single provider for a major part of their equipment. Faced
with these considerable expenses, refusal to pay on grounds of poverty was
common.13 But how could colonial leaders determine whether this excuse was
legitimate? And if the reason was sound, how could arms be provided, since to
leave men unarmed was extremely dangerous?
Colonial authorities used a number of methods to ensure that militia re-
quirements were met. The most popular technique, derived from English prac-
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tice, was to assess a fine for noncompliance. Imposing fines was a simple
matter, but collecting them in the cash-starved wilderness was difficult. Crafty
militiamen sometimes passed arms back and forth so that it would appear
to an unwary inspector that everyone had one. Inspectors frequently shirked
their duty by failing to impose fines upon their friends and neighbors. Rhode
Island's sad experience with this problem was typical. In 1658 the Gen-
eral Court attempted to clamp down by ordering the "Town serjant of each
Towne . . . to pay all the fines hee neglects to take." This reform failed, so eight
years later the Court turned over authority to magistrates, also threatening
that "in case of opposition" the magistrates could "require and take sufficient
ayde" to collect the fines. But by 1680 the Court was still attempting to fine of-
ficers who failed to collect fines. North Carolina tried the opposite approach,
offering a 5 percent commission to collectors, but this led to corrupt sheriffs.
Maryland allowed the captain of the militia to make house inspections, and if
muskets were not present, he was to sell them to the soldier at not more than
100 percent profit.14 But nothing worked well.
The earliest approach to this problem was to declare that poverty was no
excuse. In case a person pleaded inability to contribute to defense on grounds
of poverty, his magistrate was to provide him with a musket at public expense
and then bind him out as a servant until he had repaid the cost. But this did
not answer the questions of whether the man was truly indigent, what wage he
should receive while working off the payment, or how the town was to obtain
the money to buy him the gun in the first place. To avoid cheating on the ques-
tion of indigency or wages, committees to decide the issue were established.
Funds for initial purchase of weapons were usually obtained from militia fines,
but Rhode Island granted an annual subsidy of nine shillings per company to
provide arms for the poor or, as the law read, "for the encouragement of the
meaner sort." Since many of the poor were recently released servants, by 1700
some colonies began to require that masters provide ex-servants with a musket
upon their release from indenture.15 This was an early example of the applica-
tion of the principle of providing for defense according to the ability to pay.
Assurance that guns were provided solved only one aspect of the general
question of defense. There were associated problems of providing powder
and ammunition and ensuring that weapons were maintained in good repair.
Again, fines were imposed for failure to maintain on hand the minimum
required supply of powder (usually one or two pounds), and again the system
was difficult to enforce as powder was extremely scarce in the colonies and
was needed for hunting. Musket balls were so dear that they were used as coin.
In 1635 the Court of Assistants of the Massachusetts Bay Colony declared them
to be legal tender at the rate of one farthing each. Anticipating the problems
of using a soft metal such as lead for money, the Court specified that each
ball must be "of a full boare." Musket balls shaved to substandard diameter
must have been among the first instances—there would be many more—of
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profiteering by degrading the quality of military goods. Keeping an adequate
supply of ammunition was so important, moreover, that in 1632 two
Massachusetts men were fined by the court "for their wastefull expense of
powder and shot." Alexander Miller and John Wipple thus had the dubious
distinction of becoming the first defense providers in American history to be
prosecuted for waste.16
If guns, powder, and ammunition were available, there was still no cer-
tainty that militiamen were adequately equipped. The reason was that colonial
firearms were chronically in poor repair. The first muskets shipped to the
colonies were obsolete matchlock models. These were slow to load, heavy, and
inaccurate and the match went out in wind or rain. The smoke from the match
could reveal the soldier's position in daylight, and so could the glow of the
match at night.17 Matchlock weapons were soon replaced by doglocks and
flintlocks, which were more suitable for Indian fighting. But repairing them
in the wilderness was difficult. There were few gunsmiths present, and they
charged a premium price for their work.
Colonial leaders struggled constantly to control gunsmiths. Establishing a
reputation that would plague defense contractors for centuries, colonial gun-
smiths were charged with being slow to complete their assignments, doing
poor work, and charging high prices.18 They were even suspected of preferring
to fix muskets owned by Indians. The Indians were quick to obtain firearms
(usually by illicit trade), but they were much slower in learning to repair them.
The colonial leaders were well aware that the ability to repair malfunctioning
weapons was (then as now) a major military advantage, and they were prop-
erly concerned that their gunsmiths might compromise it. During the Pequot
War, the Court of Assistants of Massachusetts Bay felt it necessary to order
"that no man within this jurisdiction shall, directly or indirectly, amend,
repair, or cause to be amended or repaired, any gun, small or greate belonging
to any Indian."19
The tone of other colonial orders was similarly accusatory. In 1650 Rhode
Island ordered that the colony's six gunsmiths, "all excuses sett aparte, shall
mend and make all lockes, stocks and pieces .. . presented to them, for just and
suitable satisfaction in hand payed, without delay, under the penalty of ten
pounds." Massachusetts similarly directed that "all smiths and other workmen
are to attend the repairing of armes and other necessaries and may not refuse
such pay as the country affords." But perhaps South Carolina's experience with
Thomas Archcraft, a local gunsmith, is most indicative of early governmental
helplessness in the face of a private technological monopoly.
In September 1671, the Grand Council of South Carolina commanded
Archcraft to stop manufacturing Indian hatchets without a license, to cease all
other work, and to repair all arms brought to him. A month later, the council
threatened that if he continued to "disobey or unnecessarily prolong the per-
formance of such directions" he would be "severely punished." Nine months
A P R O V O K I N G E V I L I 17
passed before he was again ordered "imediatly to sett about the [repairs] and
that he doe interpose noe other worke till such armes be compleatly fixed
and finished." A month after that, the council complained that "the Smithes
worke . . . is held at such unreasonable rates that many inhabitants in this
Province are altogether disapoynted in getting their Armes well fixed and in
good Order to the great danger of this settlement." Finally, after five more
months, the council lost its temper. In December 1672, it moved that "for as
much as complaints doe come unto the Grand Councill dayly against Thomas
Archcraft... [that] he either, altogether neglects, the mending of them, or else
returnes them as ill, sometimes worse then when he received them . . . and
for as much as the said Archcraft now hath many Armes lying by him as use-
less . . . it is therefore ordered the said Archcraft remaine in the Marshall cus-
tody, untill he has sufficiently fixed up all the defective Armes he hath received
into his care."20 Archcraft thus became the first American defense contractor
jailed for poor workmanship and nonfulfillment of a contract.
One of the most common forms of military fraud was cheating on military
payrolls and provisions for the troops. This practice was pervasive in Europe,
frequent in England, and not unknown in America. The earliest evidence ap-
peared during the Pequot War, when some Connecticut warriors evidently
began to observe a hoary old English tradition of stealing government-
provided supplies at the conclusion of a campaign. It was easy to claim that a
weapon or other utensil was lost in battle, when in actuality it had been sold
(sometimes to the enemy), gambled away, traded to the captain in return for
a discharge, or simply secreted home. The tightfisted Queen Elizabeth had
gone so far as to proclaim the death penalty for such pilfering, but to no avail.
The Connecticut General Court was unwilling to go that far, but in 1637 it
did direct "that if there be any armor, guns, swords, belts, bandoleers, kettles,
pots, tools, or anything else that belongs to the commonwealth, that were lost,
landed or leafte (behind)... they are to be delivered into the hands of the Con-
stables . . . and if there be any things found in any man's house or custody...
they shall be subject to the censure of the Courte for their concealing."21
Censure evidently was not strong enough, for in 1704 Connecticut imposed
a stiff fine upon soldiers who sold or embezzled ammunition, and as late as
1747 the colony was still trying to identify its embezzlers. Massachusetts sol-
diers who claimed to have lost ammunition were ordered to ride the wooden
horse for an hour and to have the cost of replacement deducted from their pay.
Soldiers who reported that they had lost their musket in action were not to be
discharged but were to remain in service at no pay until the colony was com-
pensated for the loss. During Queen Anne's War, England sent arms to Virginia
and Maryland for their defense, but according to the complaints of crown of-
ficials, the colonists stole most of them.22
Military payrolls were tempting targets for officers with larcenous minds.
In the first place, some people wanted to be on the muster list, whereas others
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wanted to avoid service, and both were willing to pay for the privilege. One lu-
crative practice was to sell commissions in British army units operating in the
colonies, often to the dismay of better qualified Americans. Vendible commis-
sions were customary in England, and any rank up to colonel could be bought
or sold. Since holding a military appointment offered opportunity for profit
beyond the base salary, purchase of a commission could be a good investment,
as some Americans discovered. One such source of profit was the sale of false
certificates of medical disability that disqualified the bearer from military ser-
vice. Although there were hefty fines against this bribery, in 1702 the General
Court of Massachusetts Bay observed that "divers persons fit and able for ser-
vice, by corrupt and fallacious means do obtain such certificates."23
A more common device, one that was very widespread in Europe, was fal-
sifying or padding the military payroll. This was so common in the British
army that a word was even coined to describe the practice. When a captain
continued to collect and pocket a soldier's wages well after his death or deser-
tion, the soldier was called a "dead-pay." The practice was so widespread that it
even became accepted; Elizabethan captains negotiated with the government
to raise the limit of dead-pays from 6 to 10 percent of a company's strength.
This form of fraud was less frequent in America than in England, but not
absent. Americans sometimes enlisted blind, deaf, or otherwise disabled men
into military service to fulfill their quota of troops.24
The most serious scandal involving payroll padding in the American
colonies occurred over several years in New York. Four companies of regular
troops were stationed on the New York frontier from 1690 to 1705. The full
complement of each company was ninety-nine men, but in reality only about
half of them were normally present. The remainder were either dead, deserted,
or working at much higher wages in civilian jobs. As long as the absentees re-
ported once a year and allowed their captain to pocket a percentage of their
pay, they could come and go as they wished. Since half of the troops were miss-
ing, the provisions account offered inviting opportunities for sticky-fingered
officers. Between the payroll and the provisions, the total stolen amounted to
as much as £1,500 to £2,000 per year.25
This kind of fraud could succeed because of the involvement of low-paid
Crown officials. In 1705 Captain John Nanfan, the lieutenant governor of New
York, was jailed briefly for participating in the scheme. In 1698, the governor
of New York, the Earl of Bellomont, stated that the opportunities for cor-
rupt profit among the "factious," "impudent," "insolent," and "cocksure" New
Yorkers were extremely tempting. Bellomont wrote, "If I would make New
York the mart of piracy, confederate with the merchants, wink at unlawful
trade, pocket the off-reckonings, make £300 a year out of the victualling of the
poor soldiers, muster half-companies, pack an assembly which would give me
what money I pleased, and pocket a great part of the public moneys, I could
make this government more valuable than that of Ireland, which I believe is
A P R O V O K I N G E V I L I 19
reckoned the best in the King's gift." New York may have been the best place
for stealing within the British Empire, but there is evidence that payroll
padding also occurred in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
South Carolina.26
The well-established European custom of ransoming prisoners for profit
crossed the Atlantic, but it did not become firmly established in the wilderness.
In 1609 Pamunkey warriors were shocked when Captain John Smith held a
pistol to the head of their werowance Opechancanough and demanded a
ransom paid in maize. In 1613 the Indian princess Pocahontas was captured
by Captain Samuel Argall of Virginia and held for ransom. Argall demanded
the release of all men, weapons, and tools taken by the Indians. Powhatan,
the Indian sachem, offered seven prisoners and seven muskets, but the offer,
even at seven to one, was unacceptable to the British. By 1676, however,
Massachusetts was less demanding. The New England settlers ransomed 188
prisoners for a price of £397 13s. Indians learned from this that English
colonists would often pay ransom for white prisoners.27
The English colonists modified the Old World system of ransoming pris-
oners for profit to meet the peculiar defense needs of the wilderness. The
whites preferred not to return Indian captives to their tribes, so some Indian
prisoners were either executed or sold into slavery. These practices were even-
tually replaced by a more coldly effective convention that derived from wilder-
ness practices—the policy of paying bounties for Indian scalps. As in Europe,
the purpose was to give soldiers a financial incentive to fight and also partially
to defray the cost of military action. The scalp bounty plan varied from colony
to colony, but the earliest and simplest form was simply to pay a flat rate
for each scalp delivered. North Carolina required only that a soldier display
a captured warrior or his scalp for verification by two justices of the peace.
This entitled the soldier to collect a bounty of £30. During King Philip's
War, Massachusetts and Connecticut paid bounties for the head of an adult
Indian, but by King William's War a quarter century later a scalp alone was suf-
ficient.28
As the scalp bounty system matured, it became more complex. Colonial
legislatures learned to discriminate among the Indians whom they considered
to be dangerous. The scalp of an adult male generally commanded a greater
price than that of an adult female, and the scalps of adults were more prized
than those of children. In 1696 Massachusetts paid £50 for the scalp of an adult
male, £25 for a female, and £10 for a child. In 1764 (over Quaker protests),
Pennsylvania paid 134 Spanish pieces of eight for the scalp of a male Indian
and 50 pieces of eight for a female's scalp.
As their experience with Indian warfare increased, colonial authorities re-
considered the way they paid their troops. At first, soldiers received both regu-
lar wages and financial incentives (scalp bounties). Later, colonial leaders
questioned why they should pay twice. Their solution was to devise a sliding
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scale. Soldiers could choose whether they wanted regular wages, piecework, or
a combination, but they could not receive both full wages and the maximum
scalp bounty. In Queen Anne's War, Connecticut troops could collect wages
plus receive £20 for each Indian scalped or captured, or they could provide
their own subsistence and receive £40 per scalp. Massachusetts had a scale that
ranged from £10 to £50 a scalp; a soldier generally received a higher payment
only if he furnished his own provisions. Only New Hampshire remained gen-
erous; it set its rate at £100 a scalp and once paid a bounty even though only a
blood trail was found.30
Although the scalp bounty system seems cruel by modern standards, it was
not a violation of the standards of western civilization in the seventeenth cen-
tury. According to the legal scholar Hugo Grotius, the killing of prisoners of
war was lawful, as was assassination (as long as it was not accompanied by per-
fidy). Since the colonies lacked the facilities to hold prisoners, and since it was
difficult to transport Indian prisoners through the forest, the scalp bounty
system was a practical if gruesome response to new conditions. Of course, it
too was open to fraud. It was difficult to distinguish between a friendly Indian
and an unfriendly one by the scalp alone, as it was difficult to tell an adult from
a child or a male from a female. The scalp bounty system also intensified the
violence. It encouraged colonists to go scalp hunting—in other words, to seek
out Indians and to kill them for scalp money alone. Some of this was deliber-
ate: in South Carolina in 1712 John Barnwell led a small army made up mostly
of friendly Indians against hostile Indians. Barnwell requested that the colonial
legislature enact a scalp bounty, in part because he feared that the friendly
Indians would refuse to kill the hostiles unless a financial reward were avail-
able. Although scalp hunting continued well into the eighteenth century, as
early as 1704 a French commander insisted upon live prisoners, describing
scalp bounties as "too inhuman."31
Plunder was another long-standing European practice that was imported
to the English colonies nearly intact. As early as the fourteenth century,
England had employed the practice. During the Scottish Wars (1334-36), sol-
diers were paid at the rate of 4 pence a day plus all they could plunder. Three
centuries later, when Englishmen established colonies in America, they relied
partially on plunder as a way of compensating troops. Plunder was a conve-
nient institution for the New World because the Indians possessed valuables
that were highly coveted by whites. In 1609 English settlers ravaged Indian
camps along the James River in Virginia, plundering pearls, copper, and
bracelets.32
In the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay colonies, early settlers donned
heavy corselets to deflect Indian arrows. But when they found that the weight
of the armor interfered with the amount of corn they could plunder from
Indian villages, they abandoned the corselets in favor of lighter leather or
quilted armor. By the time of the Pequot War, they often fought without the
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cumbersome protection. Plymouth also used plunder against the French. In
1635 a ship captain was offered seven hundred pounds of beaver pelts plus all
the plunder he could seize to attack a settlement on Penobscot Bay. In 1676,
during King Philip's War, Connecticut troops were promised "all the plunder
as they shall seize, both of persons and corn or other estate." Captured Indians
could be sold as slaves or scalped for a bounty. The troops were cautioned that
plunder was not to be taken from "innocent persons," although that term was
not defined. And in the same year, a squabble over plunder formed one of the
grievances of Nathaniel Bacon in his famous rebellion against Governor
William Berkeley of Virginia. Bacon and his followers hoped to plunder Indian
settlements for profit, but Berkeley was against the idea.33
The practice of plundering continued to be accepted as a legitimate means
of warfare by the American colonies at least until the Revolution. In 1702 South
Carolina asked young men to join an invasion of Spanish Florida, promising a
share of the plunder. In 1740 Governor George Thomas of Pennsylvania re-
cruited prospective soldiers for an expedition that he claimed would lead to
"Attacking and Plundering the most valuable Part of the Spanish West-Indies."
(Seven hundred men joined up.) As late as the French and Indian War, the
governor of Pennsylvania proposed paying American troops in land seized
from the French. This was to be divided on a sliding scale that went from two
hundred acres for a private to one thousand acres for a colonel. This was a de-
parture from usual American practice, however. By the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury the egalitarian American colonies usually gave equal shares of plunder to
all soldiers and sailors, regardless of rank.34
The most lucrative form of plunder during the colonial period was nauti-
cal. During wartime (which was much of the time), privateering was one of
the colonies' leading industries. Privateering was an ancient custom, entirely
permissible under international law (until 1856), and it became an ancillary
reason for colonization. Nevertheless, the practice of legitimizing capture at
sea by issuing letters of marque created a blurry ethical distinction between
piracy and legalized theft.35
New York and Newport were the ports where privateering was most res-
olutely practiced. During King George's War (1740-48), 466 privateering
voyages originated in the British colonial ports, about half from New York
and Newport alone. Many more Americans served in these private navies
than served in the king's ground forces, and the reasons were assuredly eco-
nomic. Sailors who went privateering could earn twice as much as merchant
seamen and six times as much as a sailor in the Royal Navy. American mer-
chants could obtain a return of 130-140 percent of their investment in a single
successful voyage. During King George's War alone, privateers captured 829
prizes worth about £7,561,000. Toward the end of that war, the limiting factor
on profitability was the absence of French and Spanish vessels in sufficient
numbers to warrant investment in a profiteering voyage.36
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The English settlement in America spawned a legion of competitors. The
adversaries included pirates, several kinds of Europeans (Spanish, French, and
Dutch), and, most frequently, Indians. But paradoxically, these groups were
also the favored trading partners of the English colonists. In theory, when war-
fare erupted, trade between the erstwhile customers and suppliers was sup-
posed to cease. But in practice the urge to profit often overcame the sense of
obligation to the community. Trade continued, but now on an illegitimate
basis. No form of profiteering was more robustly condemned than trading
with the enemy. A North Carolinian denounced illicit traders as "leeches who
are sucking our blood to enrich themselves, and then spue it up into the pos-
session of our enemies."37
Charges of trading with the enemy appeared everywhere. Only a year
after settlers first arrived in Virginia, sailors from English ships were conduct-
ing "Night Marts" with the Indians, exchanging stolen weapons for Indian
goods. Captain Christopher Newport defied Captain John Smith by exchang-
ing twenty swords for twenty turkeys. In 1628 the most disliked person in
Plymouth Colony was a trader named Thomas Morton, who offended his
Pilgrim neighbors by dancing around a Maypole with Indian women. More
dangerously, Morton sold guns to his Indian friends. Plymouth and nearby
towns asked Captain Myles Standish to arrest Morton and send him back to
England. Morton was captured and sent home on the next ship, but he re-
turned a year later and resumed his trade.38
Trading with the enemy proved to be an exceptionally difficult form of
profiteering to control. In 1629 Massachusetts Bay began to consider what
could be done about "reforming so great and unsufferable abuses," but found
little success. When the General Court of Connecticut first met on 26 April
1636, the very first topic taken up was a charge against Henry Stiles for trading
a gun to the Indians for corn. The court ordered Stiles to retrieve the weapon
"in a faire and legally waye, or els this corte will take it into further considera-
tion." Two months later, Stiles had not complied, so they directed that he "per-
sonally . . . appear to answer his neglect." In 1640 Connecticut also fined
George Abbott, a servant, five pounds "for selling a pystoll & powder to the
Indeans." Half a century later Massachusetts was still seeking to punish traders
who "put knives into the hands of those barbarous infidels to cut the throats of
our wives and children."39
But trading with the enemy, like other forms of profiteering, raised nettle-
some questions. There were no simple solutions to such problems as these:
Which Indian (if any) was the enemy? Who was a pirate? What did "trading
with the enemy" mean to a Quaker, who believed he had no enemies? Was
trade with a neutral port on Spanish Hispaniola improper because the ulti-
mate destination of the cargo was probably (but not necessarily) the enemy
end of the island? And how could trade violations be discovered and pun-
ished?
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Aside from the fact that trading with the enemy was an ancient English
practice that even the death penalty could not stop, a major problem was that
most of the colonial wars originated in Europe. An American commitment to
victory existed but with less intensity than in England. Similarly, American
colonists who were not directly endangered by an outbreak of violence with
the Indians were often uncooperative about suspending commerce.
Albany, New York, acquired the worst reputation as a center of illegal trade
with the Indians. Increase Mather claimed that during King Philip's War,
Dutch traders at Albany supplied the Indians with powder. "Men that worship
Mammon," declared Mather, "notwithstanding all prohibitions to the contrary,
will expose their own and other men's lives unto danger, if they may but gain a
little of this world's good." Even Massachusetts Bay did not wish to suspend all
trade with Indians during the war. It inaugurated a system of licensing, the first
such in American history. But Albany remained a thorn, even after the Dutch
demise. During Queen Anne's War, an English prisoner discovered that illegal
trade was "constantly carry'd on" at Albany. "It was customary for the Indians,
in their return from a trading journey to Albany, to go upon some of the fron-
tiers of Massachusetts, and do great spoil and mischief." But Albany was by no
means the only place where a load of furs could be exchanged for a musket and
powder.40
Although arms trading with the Indians was of greatest concern to the
colonists, wartime trading with the French, Spanish, and pirates was more
deeply troublesome to British officials. Most of the colonies were accused of
wartime trading at one time or another, but New England harbored the largest
concentration of smugglers, with Rhode Island being "notoriously guilty."41
Royal officials were disturbed by the American willingness to sell weapons
to Britain's enemies, but what angered them most was the openness by
which Americans flouted the law. In 1688 the lieutenant governor of Barbados
charged that pirates were able to walk the streets of Newcastle, Pennsylvania,
"with as much confidence and assurance as the most honest men in the world,
without any molestation whatever." One British admiral told of discov-
ering forty-two American ships at once trading illegally with French Haiti
during King George's War. During the French and Indian War, the governor of
Jamaica submitted affidavits to show that ten New England ships were trading
with the Spanish port of Monte Christi (for transshipment to Haiti), selling
lumber, fish, and barrels and buying sugar and molasses. His estimate was un-
doubtedly low: in 1760 400-500 ships visited Monte Christi in order to trade
with French customers.42
The British also claimed that Americans of both high and low station were
aiding the smugglers. In 1696 the governor of Pennsylvania was charged with
entertaining pirates, and in 1702 the British secretary of state objected to the
appointment of seven men to the Governor's Council in New York on grounds
they were known or suspected to have traded illegally with pirates. In 1702 the
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lieutenant governor of New Hampshire was charged with illegally selling mast
trees, a vital resource for the Royal Navy. Perhaps typical of these complaints
was that of Governor Robert Hunter of Pennsylvania, who during Queen
Anne's War notified his British superiors of "very black practices lately perpe-
trated in Pensilvania by one Parks, master of the ship St. John Baptist." The
Baptist was seized while "impudently loading provisions for Petit Guave
[French West Indies]." The sheriff of New Castle, Pennsylvania, freed Parks and
his men, and allegedly after a "sham tryall" was held, "all was smother'd in a
country Court, which acquitted ye traitors."43
Americans responded to these charges either by denying that illegal trade
existed or by minimizing its extent. In 1709 the governor of Massachusetts,
Joseph Dudley, pointed out that there were only four customs agents stationed
in his colony, and there were forty harbors to police. (This would not be the
last occasion in American history in which a campaign against profiteering
suffered from lack of enforcement officials.) The key to enforcement, however,
was whether or not legal proscriptions enjoyed public support, and in the case
of wartime trade embargoes it was evident that American colonists did not re-
spect them deeply. One exasperated customs official summed up the frustra-
tions of his colleagues when in 1702 he wrote of Americans: "The people do
seldom or never pay any taxes for the support of the Church or State; they en-
tertain and encourage pirates; they carry on all manner of illegal trade, violate
all the Acts made to prevent those evils; they affront the King, his Laws,
Authority and Officers, and by all these disloyal and unjust actions grow rich
and get estates, and have hitherto excaped the punishment and just reward of
their wickedness."44
Besides trading with the enemy, the most enduring and controversial form
of profiteering during the colonial period concerned the pricing of war
materiel. Abrupt changes in the level of military activity always bring sectoral
shifts in the economy, and when prices rose there were frequent charges of ex-
tortionate pricing—in colloquial terms, price gouging. The moral problem
this presented was tangled. There was no sharp distinction, but only a fine
shading, between prices that reflected the natural scarcity of a wilderness set-
ting and prices that were deliberately inflated in order to gain an abnormal
profit. America's premier moralizers, the Puritans, were the first to grapple
with the enigma.
Even before leaving for the New World, the General Court of the
Massachusetts Bay Company discussed the question of how to control defense
costs. In 1629 the court ruled that investors in the company should provide
cannon, powder, and ammunition at cost. Once the colony was established, a
magazine could be established by the proprietors as long as the selling price
was not more than 25 percent greater than the cost of the commodity. By the
time of the Pequot War of 1637, the leaders of the Bay Company were disturbed
by sharply rising prices for ammunition and armour, particularly in the settle-
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ments lying outside Boston. They appointed a three-man committee to "speak
with" defense providers about their prices. Unfortunately, informal persuasion
proved ineffective as a price control measure. In the future, many other
Americans would try, but few would succeed in controlling profiteering by
moral injunction.45
The problem of high prices led Puritans to deep soul-searching. The center
of the controversy was Captain Robert Keayne, who was one of Boston's most
prosperous merchants as well as the founder and commander of its trainband
company. In 1637 (and periodically afterward) Keayne was charged with exces-
sive profit seeking. He was fined £80 and told not to be so acquisitive, since (1)
he was a professor of religion; (2) he was a man of eminent ability; (3) he was
already wealthy and had only one child; (4) he had come to America "for con-
science's sake"; and (5) he had been warned against doing so. In a tearful mea
culpa, Keayne asked forgiveness.46
During the following week, the Reverend John Cotton delivered a lecture
in which he attempted to set forth principles which ought to guide the profit-
seeking Puritan businessman. Cotton argued that no one should sell above the
"current price," meaning the price that was usual in that time and place. A
businessman also ought not to attempt to make up in one transaction what
was lost in another, and especially he should not seek to recoup losses from ca-
sualties at sea (since "it is a loss cast upon himself by Providence, and he may
not ease himself casting it upon another"). But Cotton left a large loophole.
"When there is a scarcity of the commodity," Cotton wrote, "there men may
raise their price, for now it is a hand of God upon the commodity, and not the
person." Of course, there was little reason to raise a price other than that a
scarcity existed. Cotton's theories simply justified the working of the market
and offered no practical guideline for restraining profit making. Many years
later, Robert Keayne included John Cotton in his will.47
Despite Cotton's admonishments, the dispute over arms prices remained
unresolved. The Puritans claimed not to mind the high cost of defense.
Captain Edward Johnson, a trainband commander, legislator, and militant
Puritan, exhorted his co-religionists to "spare not to lay out your coyne for
Powder, Bullets, Match, Armes of all sorts, and all kinde of Instruments for
War . . . for the Lord Christ intends to atchieve greater matters by this little
handfull then the world is aware of." But enough was enough. In 1639 the
General Court of Massachusetts Bay banned arms sales in which the profit
margin exceeded 100 percent.48
By 1675 the Puritans regarded profiteering as a Provoking Evil. Shopkeepers
and merchants who set "excessive prizes on their goods" tempted God's wrath.
This arrived in terrible severity in the form of King Philip's War, which
Puritans blamed in part on their growing greediness. Although they declared
their cause to "appear to be both just and necessary, and . . . only a Defensive
War," they resolved to punish profiteers severely. In 1676 Richard Scammon
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was convicted of a "breach of the law of oppression in taking 500 feet of boards
for mending a pistol lock . . . by his own statement not worth more than 6s.
6d." Scammon was sentenced to return half the boards to his customer and to
forfeit the remainder to the county treasurer as a fine.49
A revealing incident that illustrates the relationship between the military
and the merchants took place in Boston during Queen Anne's War. In 1711 a
fleet of ships carrying 12,600 men arrived in the city in preparation for an in-
vasion of French Canada. Overnight, the population of Boston more than
doubled, severely straining the inventory of provisions. British officers offered
to purchase provisions at prices that were customary in England, but the
Bostonians refused to sell. The British suspected that the Americans were
temporarily withholding goods in hopes of obtaining an extortionate price
later. The British demanded that the General Court of Massachusetts impose a
schedule of fixed prices. When the court complied, some merchants became
"enraged." Massachusetts authorities ordered that no one should conceal pro-
visions, but as one British officer noted, "there was no penalty for any person
endeavouring to make a monopoly," and hoarding continued. It was only after
the British commanding officer was invited to assist at the June commence-
ment at Harvard that provisions arrived "in sufficient quantitys."50
The heart of the controversy was not the schedule of fixed prices but rather
the exchange rate between Massachusetts currency and the British pound.
Boston merchants demanded that a Massachusetts pound be valued at 83 per-
cent of a British pound, but the British commanders balked. After several days
of negotiations, the merchants grudgingly agreed that a Massachusetts pound
would be valued at 71 percent of the British counterpart. The merchants of
Boston accepted the lower figure, according to the British general, only "after
they found that no body would conive at or share with them in their exorbi-
tant gain on the publick's necessity." The agreement stipulated that there be no
fixed price on wine because soldiers consumed it in quantity, it varied consid-
erably in quality, and it could easily be adulterated with water. Instead, it was
agreed "that sworn teasters might be employed to come as near as they could
to the present value of the quantity."51
Despite the compromise, bad feelings persisted. The British government
took its commanders in America to task for paying excessive prices. Admiral
Hovenden Walker, the senior naval officer present, protested that while the
prices "were very exorbitant and excessive,... we were obliged to comply with
them, they being resolved to make an advantage of our Necessities." The
governor of Massachusetts defended the Americans, claiming that the
Massachusetts legislature "set a rate on all victualls below the ordinary price
that Her Majestie's forces might reasonablely by supplyde."52
Who was correct? Doubtless the dispute could never have been resolved in
a way that was completely satisfactory to all concerned, but the British system
of supply practically ensured disagreement. By relying on military officers as
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the procurement agents, the British used men who were neither interested in
the problem nor qualified to resolve it. Nearly three years later, as the matter
continued to simmer, Admiral Walker offered views that applied to other mili-
tary men in his position in other times and other places: "I must confess, I
always thought it more the business of a military Officer to furnish himself as
well as he could, with such Stores and Materials as might enable him to put in
Execution and Enterprize he was commanded upon, with the best Appearance
and View of Success, than the nice Calculation of the Charge, which seems to
me rather what belongs to another Province."52 In other words, a military offi-
cer is a soldier, not an accountant. A soldier wants only the best equipment
available, and hang the cost!
By the French and Indian War, procedures for the control of defense costs
had improved, but the disagreement between British commanders and Ameri-
can merchants did not lessen. Americans were charged with speculating in
currency, trading with the enemy, cheating on coinage, and most frequently,
committing extortion. One British officer complained that Americans objected
when British soldiers cut trees with which to repair a log fort and even wanted
to charge him for "Ground to encamp on." Douglas Leach has reported an oc-
casion when American colonists actually refused to replenish British warships
until the navy paid for the fresh water from their wells. A British army com-
mander, the ill-fated General Edward Braddock, employed American purchas-
ing agents, but complained that "none . . . will serve without exorbitant pay
and [I] am forc'd to make more Contracts than I otherwise should to guard
against the failure of some of them, in which Contracts the people take what
Advantage they can of our Necessity."54
Connecticut's legislature became so concerned about "exorbitant prices"
charged to equip its troops that it imposed a comprehensive price control
schedule. Sutlers were limited to a 50 percent markup on all liquids, cheese,
tobacco, sugar, tea, raisins, coffee, candles, and soap, and a 25 percent markup
on clothing and all other articles sold to soldiers. Even so, there were so many
soldiers who refused to pay the charges they incurred that the army became
burdened by the "sundry law-suits" initiated by the sutlers. Connecticut au-
thorities demanded "that the sutlers and traders . . . shew reasons, if any they
have, why their said accounts should not be examined in some proper manner
and a just and reasonable price be fixed for each kind of article." In May 1761, a
committee of seven was appointed to "set a just and reasonable price for each
kind of article according to the circumstances of the time and place when and
where same was delivered." This was the first known instance of the renegotia-
tion of a defense contract in American history.55
Another issue that became serious was the ongoing disagreement between
Britain and the American colonies in respect to sharing war costs. It certainly
was of long duration. As early as the 1690s the conflicting positions were clear:
Americans thought that Britain owed them defense and were consequently
28 I W A R H O G S
reluctant to pay for it themselves; Britain thought that the colonies owed loy-
alty to the Crown, and the colonies ought gladly to sacrifice for the common
defense. In 1698 Governor Francis Nicholson complained bitterly about his
Maryland neighbors: "Those who are obliged by law... to have arms and am-
munition of their own cannot amongst them all equip a twentieth part. . . .
Some were very willing that the King should deliver them from popery and
slavery and protect them in time of war, but now that by the King's valour and
conduct all these troubles and fears are ceased, they are not satisfied with his
government because it curbs in their former atheistical, loose and vicious way
of living and debars them of their darling illegal trade." A royal customs official
notified London that "when [the Marylanders] found that all their threats
could not frighten me from my duty and therefore their beloved profitable
darling, illegal trade, must be ruined, they resorted, having no other game to
play, to open disobedience and contempt [The Americans] are a perverse,
obstinate and turbulent people who will submit to no laws but their own, and
have a notion that no Acts of Parliament are of force among them except such
as particularly mention them."56
The war profits dissension was a raw old wound. In 1742, during the War of
Jenkins' Ear, both New York and Massachusetts petitioned the Privy Council to
appropriate funds for defense. The British considered New York's request "a
matter of Surprize." Noting that the New Yorkers had failed to tax themselves
to provide powder, the British denied the request, commenting that "from
the Scituation, Soil, and Extent of this Province [we] cannot conceive them
unable to Furnish themselves with Powder The Inhabitants of this Province
may... very well postpone the restoring of their Publick Buildings and lend an
helping hand at least for their own Security without throwing the whole
Burthen upon Your Majesty." Massachusetts got the same answer: the Privy
Council refused to send any ammunition "till it appears that this Province
shall have paid for the Small Arms sent thither in 1704."57 Britain was still angry
about a bill that was nearly forty years old!
In 1711 Colonel Richard King, the quartermaster general who had sought to
purchase provisions for the British attack upon Canada, echoed this theme.
King complained of "the interestedness, ill nature and sowerness of these
people, whose government, doctrine, and manners, whose hypocrisy and cant-
ing are insupportable.... With what great truth one may affirm, that till all
their charters are resum'd by the Crown, or taken away by act of parliament,
till they are all settled under one government. . . , they will grow every day
more stiff and disobedient, more burthensome than advantageous to Great
Britain."58
Thus by the close of the colonial period, the war profits problem had
fully emerged. The American military system had been organized as an ama-
teur, paramilitary structure whose basic concept was collective self-defense.
Originally financed by individual soldier-settlers and by English investors, it
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relied for its support upon weapons, ammunition, and supplies from home,
supplemented by plunder and by local contributions. The system gradually
converted from collective self-defense to one based on individual self-interest.
This self-seeking basis led to abuses such as cheating on supplies, scalp boun-
ties, trading with the enemy, and price extortion. In the early eighteenth cen-
tury, a more modern, semiprofessional army appeared, but by the eve of the
Revolution this change was incomplete.59 The distinction between individual
interest and collective military obligation remained unresolved during the
colonial period. Its unsettled, ill-defined nature led to a quarrel over war prof-
its between Americans and British. This fundamental disagreement over
the price of Anglo-American defense helped to point the way toward the
American Revolution.

Virtue Tested
There is such a thirst for gain, and such infamous advantage taken to forestall, and
engross the articles the Army cannot do without, thereby enhancing the cost of
them to the public fifty or a hundred pr. Ct, that it is enough to make one curse
their own Species, for possessing so little virtue and patriotism.
GEORGE WASHINGTON
British military policy was a key ingredient in the coming of the American
Revolution. Although perhaps secondary to the army's perceived threat to po-
litical liberty, the army's role as a major economic institution was profoundly
repugnant to Americans. Although there were constitutional proscriptions
against a standing army in peacetime, the American colonists had virtually
nothing to say about the army's composition, location, activities, or cost. The
army's economic role formed an important part of the American critique of
Britain, and it contributed mightily to the development of a complex and so-
phisticated Revolutionary ideology.1
The development of American military practices was an embodiment of
that ideology. The American attitude toward the relationship between war and
wealth coalesced during the War of Independence and was deeply affected by
past experience and by Revolutionary ideology. American revolutionaries
viewed the War of Independence as a struggle between a virtuous society and a
corrupt society. The mere existence of the British army as a peacetime institu-
tion, regardless of whether it was stationed at home or abroad, was clear evi-
dence to some that Britain was a society rotten with corruption. This belief was
shared not only by American revolutionaries but also (and not coincidentally)
by British writers of the "Country" persuasion. According to this thinking, the
best of all possible societies contained a tripartite balance between monarchy,
which provided power, aristocracy, which offered wisdom, and the people at
large, which imparted national spirit. It was vital that all three elements be rea-
sonably independent, else their contribution would be negated. The British
32 I W A R H O G S
army had the insidious effect (from the American point of view) of co-opting
the independence of Parliament and thus tipping the balance toward autoc-
racy. The way it did this was by monetary corruption. A substantial cluster of
members of Parliament were also army officers, thereby dependent upon the
king for promotion and pay. They were no longer independent freeholders,
able to weigh issues carefully and to arrive at the public good objectively. They
were now "placemen" or (to use the Americans' scornful term) "interested,"
meaning that the king had placed them in Parliament and that they served
their own personal interest as opposed to the larger public interest.2
Americans were aware that in twisting the Lion's tail they were dangerously
arousing the ire of the world's leading military power. In part, American hopes
of victory depended on certain physical advantages, such as distance and vast-
ness. In the heady days of 1775, the crucial advantage that Americans believed
they possessed was not natural but moral. Thus an American captain could
write that his men fought with the "confidence of the martial superiority
of free men to slaves."3 British soldiers were professionals, mercenaries; they
fought for pay rather than for patriotism. This was doubly true of Britain's
hired allies, the Hessians, who seemed to have no patriotic motivations what-
soever. Mercenary soldiers, so the argument went, lacked valor; when the ulti-
mate trial by fire came, they would not risk their lives for money. European
armies would lack the staying power of the American fighters, who served a
higher ideal.4
The word Americans most frequently used to describe their supposed
moral advantage was virtue. Stated forthrightly, Americans were virtu-
ous whereas their enemies were corrupt. Although superficially a simple word,
in the context of the American Revolution (and particularly in its early phase),
virtue was saturated with meaning. On one level, it meant that America's tradi-
tionally amateur warriors lacked the vices that were associated with their in-
creasingly professional cousins. The licentiousness of professional soldiers,
according to American theorists, included not only such obvious forms
of debauchery as gambling, profanity, drunkenness, and prostitution, but
also milder varieties such as fickleness, infidelity, and even levity. George
Washington vaguely feared that if given free rein, soldiers would "run mad
with pleasure" and would engage in "diversions of all kinds." American citizen-
soldiers, conversely, were expected to display a degree of asceticism that was re-
ligious and Utopian. Massachusetts clergymen were among the staunchest
critics of the debased morality of the British army, and it was partially to satisfy
them that Revolutionary theory placed such emphasis on an amateur mili-
tary.5
In a broader sense, the Revolutionary concept of American virtue carried
an economic meaning. Regardless of their military or civilian standing, all pa-
triotic Americans were expected to display their virtuousness by sacrificing
economic self-interest to the good of the cause. The paragon of virtue was
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George Washington, who rejected the salary of $500 per month offered by
Congress and who served for eight years without pay (although he was com-
pensated for his expenses).6Another celebrated example was that of the three
Americans who apprehended the famous British spy Major John Andre. Andre
offered his captors a thousand guineas for his freedom, but they delivered
the prisoner to American authorities. This exposed Benedict Arnold's treason
and perhaps saved the Revolution. In gratitude for their "virtuous and patri-
otic conduct," Congress voted each of the men an annual payment of $200 and
presented each with a silver medal.7
The leaders of the Revolution used the concept of "virtue" in exactly this
economic sense. George Washington, who yielded to no man his dislike of war
profiteering, delivered a jeremiad against the practice soon after he assumed
command of the Continental army in 1775. "It is a matter of great Concern,"
Washington wrote, "to find, that at a time when the united efforts of America
are exerting in defence of the common Right and Liberties of mankind, that
there should be in an Army constituted for so noble a purpose, such repeated
Instances of Officers, who lost to every sense of honour and virtue [emphasis
added], are seeking by dirty and base means, the promotion of their own dis-
honest Gain, to the eternal Disgrace of themselves, and Dishonour of their
country—practices of this sort will never be overlooked."8 In 1778 Washington
became so angry at defense contractors for charging extortionate prices that he
declared that it was "enough to make one curse their own Species, for possess-
ing so little virtue and patriotism."9
Congressmen employed similar usage. John Adams, in appointing James
Warren to the Navy Board in 1777, remarked, "The profit to you will be noth-
ing, But the Honour and the Virtue the greater. I almost envy you this Em-
ployment." Richard Henry Lee complained that "the inundation of money
appears to have overflowed virtue Look around you, do you anywhere see
wisdom and integrity and industry prevail?... The demon of avarice, extor-
tion, and fortune-making seizes all ranks." In 1779 William Whipple decried
"the failure of public virtue." "Speculating miscreants... have been sucking the
Blood of their country."10
The existence of virtue among the American people implied a willingness
to sacrifice that had both military and economic dimensions. Theoretically, all
members of a virtuous society ought willingly to set aside personal interests
and to take up arms in the common defense. The concept of the Minuteman,
drawn from the ancient idea of a nation-at-arms, symbolized the willing-
ness of the virtuous American to sacrifice at a moment's notice. George
Washington personified this ideal. The British, on the other hand, were sup-
posedly sated by luxurious living, and large numbers of them allegedly would
not risk their lives. Although the British were more numerous, a smaller pro-
portion would be available for combat, thereby partially overcoming the
American numerical disadvantage.11
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The willingness to make an economic sacrifice took several forms. Soldiers
were expected to serve for little or no pay. General Charles Lee exhorted
innkeepers to "give testimony to your virtue and patriotism" by refusing to
serve persons who were disloyal to the cause. But most important it meant a
refusal to profit from the war. No virtuous American should plunder civilians,
steal from the government, or raise prices to extortionate levels. Colonel John
Laurens, aide-de-camp to General Washington, perhaps expressed this concept
best in a letter to his father, Henry Laurens, who was president of the Con-
tinental Congress. "If we are as virtuous as we ought to be," wrote young
Laurens, "we should have those who are enriching themselves by commerce,
privateering, and farming, supplying the army with every necessary conve-
nience at a moderate rate." Although Laurens doubted that this was entirely
possible, he asked his father as the leader of Congress simply for "such prices as
bear some proportion to our pay."12
Although Revolutionary ideology provided the concept of a virtuous
people, its application to the matter of war profits originated in other experi-
ences. These included recollections of the Great War for the Empire, which
lived in the social memory as a time of rampant war profits (anticipating the
remembrance of the Civil War and World War I). In debate in Congress in
September 1775, three congressmen remembered how the troops had been
"imposed upon" by contractors in the "last War." They declared their determi-
nation not to allow it to happen in the Revolution. Washington himself may
have profited from his service in the earlier conflict. As colonel of the Virginia
militia, he received a salary, expenses, and a 2 percent commission on all sup-
plies purchased for his troops. After the war he was able to buy 500 acres for
£350 and was also able to pay £300 for slaves to cultivate the land.13
Contracting policies of the British army before and during the Revolution
were a second irritant. A commission in the British army was a valuable prize,
for which the applicant paid handsomely. A lieutenant-colonelcy cost £4,500,
but it conferred numerous prerogatives. A colonel handled the money desig-
nated for soldiers' wages, could sell luxuries to the rank and file, and received a
very large share of spoils won in battle. In 1780 Britain had fraud in payments
to troops estimated at £30,000. One American captain expressed his contempt
for the nepotism of the British officer corps: "It was no unusual thing in the
[British] army, for a Colonel to make drummers and fifers of his sons, thereby,
not only being enabled to form a very snug, economical mess, but to aid also
considerably the revenue of the family chest In short, it appeared that the
sordid spirit of gain was the vital principle of this greater part of the army." In
1779 a German immigrant serving as a captain in the Continental army, fol-
lowing European practice, attempted to extract a fee for licensing sutlers. A
court-martial excused him with a reprimand on the grounds that his "conduct
might possibly have arisen from a misconception of the nature of his office."
General Washington "acquiesced" in the sentence, which he found "lenient."14
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A third source of the antiprofiteering ethic were the views of many Ameri-
can clergymen. Men of the cloth were among the most outspoken critics of the
British army, which they considered a fountain of moral degradation, a ser-
pent in the American garden. They found the greatest source of sin to be
everyday business transactions, and when these took place in a military con-
text, the temptation was deepened. The favorite scriptural reference of Ameri-
can ministers who decried war profits was Deuteronomy 23:9, which advises,
"When the Host goeth forth against thine Enemies, then keep thee from every
wicked thing." As one American private recorded during the peak of Revolu-
tionary fervor in 1775: "Our minister preached 2 sermons. He preached from
Dutrinomy 23th and 9th verse in the forenoon and afternoon, and he preached
2 very good sermons to the soldiers how it was best for us to do and what not
to do."15
The republican ideal that pervaded the Revolutionary era included several
implications for the way an army should be organized. The basic theory was
that virtuous citizens would volunteer for service with no expectation of pecu-
niary reward. In short, duty and money would be completely divorced. There
would be no enlistment bonuses, no handsome wages, and no severance pay.
Every soldier would provide his own weapon and would train himself to fire it.
Because an army needed organization, soldiers would accept military disci-
pline graciously. Civilians would sacrifice to support the troops without com-
plaint. Enlistments would be short because to allow permanent service would
invite the corrupting influences of a professional army. The brash young
Americans planned to take on the British regulars with what was essentially a
national militia.16
These ideas were put into effect in the early days of the Revolution. On 30
November 1775, congressional leaders reached a decision not to pay enlistment
bonuses but rather to rely on patriotic exhortation to raise the army.17 A com-
panion policy adopted by the various states established enlistments on a short-
term basis. These steps guided the army's development during the first year of
the war.
The militia system failed. In 1775, during the initial excitement, sufficient
numbers of men volunteered to take up arms. As a long-term solution, more
tangible incentives proved necessary. The idea of short-term enlistments was
found wanting in the American invasion of Canada. The final and unsuccess-
ful assault on the city of Quebec had to be scheduled for 30 December 1775, be-
cause the soldiers' enlistments were due to expire on the following day. During
the summer of 1776, the concept of valorous citizen-soldiers was again tested
when British regular forces invaded New York. Washington's men were
soundly whipped and forced to flee into New Jersey.
American leaders faced a painful choice: reorganize or surrender. Their
answer was obvious, and in September 1776, Congress approved a plan to pay
enlistment bounties. This reversal was an admission that Americans were not
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so virtuous that they would risk their lives for ideals alone. But if the flame of
republicanism flickered, it did not die out entirely. "I do not mean to exclude
altogether the Idea of Patriotism," wrote Washington. "I know it exists, and I
know it has done much in the present Contest. But I will venture to assert, that
a great and lasting War can never be supported on this principle alone. It must
be aided by a prospect of Interest or some reward. For a time, it may of itself
push Men to Action; to bear much, to encounter difficulties; but it will not
endure unassisted by Interest."18
The new army fielded after the experiments of the first year took a new ap-
proach to the question of soldiers' pay. A disappointed George Washington ad-
mitted that few men "act upon Principles of disinterestness," so few, indeed,
that they were only "a drop in the Ocean." The solution was to be found in fi-
nancial incentives: handsome bounties and better pay. Enlistment bounties
were set at $20 and 100 to 200 acres of land in 1776. By 1780 recruits were re-
ceiving $150 in specie for five months' service. Wage rates were comparable
to the earnings of civilian laborers in 1776, except that because soldiers were
guaranteed continuous employment they were theoretically better compen-
sated. Inflation quickly destroyed this wage advantage, but bounties remained
attractive. As one disgruntled congressman remarked, "Bounties before un-
heard of have been given to but little better purpose than to hire the populace
to visit the army; this instead of checking the growing avarice of the country
(which ought to have been their object) has cherished it, till they pay their de-
votion to no other shrine than mammon's."19
The establishment of bounty payments for enlistment opened a new field
for military fraud. New recruits or veteran soldiers occasionally deserted their
regiments and reenlisted in others (usually under a different name) for the
purpose of obtaining multiple bounties. This was a perennial problem
throughout the war, and it was particularly shocking to George Washington.
When in 1776 he first learned of double enlistments, he reacted "with great as-
tonishment and surprise," and he warned grimly that "so glaring a fraud . . .
will be punished in the most exemplary manner." This was the first of a dozen
warnings issued by the commander, and he backed up his words with action.
The original punishment for bounty fraud was thirty-nine lashes, which was
more severe even than the penalty for desertion, which was thirty lashes. They
were later made crimes of equal severity, but the punishment was increased,
first to 100 lashes "well laid on" and later to death. The actual execution of a
soldier for bounty fraud was extremely rare (there is only one known case),
but sentences of 100 lashes, while infrequent, were common enough to be a
frightening deterrent.20
In practice, the wage policy of the Continental army was ambivalent. While
in theory wages were comparable to those of civilians, in practice they lagged
far behind. Rampant inflation eroded or destroyed soldiers' buying power, but
even worse was the irregularity of payment. One intrepid warrior who served
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from 1776 to 1783 recalled that he was paid regularly for only the first five
months of his service. In the following six years of service, he had only one real
payday. Continental soldiers did not fight for monetary reasons, and their offi-
cers were in even worse shape. Inflation struck them harder, as one surgeon
suffering at Valley Forge explained: "The present Circomstances of the Soldier
is better by far than the Officer—for the family of the Soldier is provided for
at the public expence if the articles they want are above the common price—
but the Officer's family are obliged not only to beg in the most humble manner
for the necessaries of Life,—but also to pay for the afterwards at the most ex-
orbitant rates—and even in this manner, many of them who depend entirely
on their Money, cannot procure half the material comforts that are wanted in
a family."21
The claim that officers were sometimes forced to beg to avoid starvation
was not far-fetched. In 1779 Connecticut's congressional delegation pleaded for
public assistance for the troops, which it described as being as poor as orphans
and widows. During the "hard winter" of 1779-80, conditions equaled the
squalor of Valley Forge, two years earlier. Soldiers ate birch bark and roasted
old shoes, and officers slaughtered their pet dog for food. Even a major general,
John Sullivan, was obliged to borrow money to support his family, and he
pleaded with Washington for relief (unsuccessfully). William Heath, another
general whose officers resorted to borrowing from local citizens for their ne-
cessities, informed Washington of their dismay. "I need not paint to your
Excellency their feelings when they are dunned by the peasants for small sums,
and [I am] at a loss what answer to give them." The officers' families had
become indebted to their neighbors and were unable to repay them.22
Washington hoped to alleviate his officers' plight by endorsing a plan to
give them half-pay for life—a form of deferred compensation. This scheme
went awry on ideological grounds: it was too British and too unrepublican.
The opposition in Congress argued that it created a public-supported aristoc-
racy that had profited from the war. Another British-oriented plan advocated
by Colonel Theodore Bland would grant officers knighthood, vendible com-
missions, half-pay during peacetime, and pensions for widows. Washington
adamantly opposed this idea as a violation of Revolutionary principle, and
Congress agreed. A compromise eventually settled the half-pay controversy.
Officers were granted half-pay for seven years. Throughout their travail, the
men of the Continental line displayed a kind of deep stoicism that was the ul-
timate measure of their commitment to the cause. As General William Heath
wrote at the coldest moment of the "hard winter," "Notwithstanding all their
tryals and sufferings they exhibit a patience, health, good temper and spirit not
to be paralleled."23
The remarkable resiliency of the Continental army in the face of extreme
adversity has been often noted but seldom explained. American morale
weakened under the weight of British attack, but ultimately did not break,
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according to John Shy, because the British war effort greatly deepened the
American dislike of everything British. Yet another reason that Americans sup-
ported their army longer than the British supported theirs was the differing at-
titude of the two armies toward graft. Most Americans, following George
Washington's determined and unflagging leadership, supported aggressive
measures to ferret out every form of fraud. The British, following the lead of
every commander except Charles Cornwallis, winked at graft. The Royal Army
dripped with corruption.24
The ingenuity displayed by Royal officers in milking military appro-
priations for their personal profit during the American Revolution was re-
markable. One device was simply an old custom: padding military payrolls
and keeping the overcharge or "off-reckoning." By 1780 the fraudulent off-
reckonings amounted to £30,000, and the paymaster had absorbed another
£100,000. A very lucrative new trick was to charge the government for one
measure of supplies but to substitute a smaller quantity while pocketing the
difference in price. This could be accomplished by charging for a "country
cord" of firewood, which was 19 percent larger than the standard cord actually
delivered, or for a "Winchester" bushel of provisions, which was 25 percent
larger than the bushel in actual use. There were also extra rations for officers'
nonexistent families, currency manipulation, overcharges for the construction
of defensive installations, fraudulent receipts for forage, and overcharges in
renting horses and wagons to the army. These practices varied from mildly
questionable to outright larceny, but the result was similar in that some officers
amassed extensive fortunes in the process. Three deputy quartermasters retired
shortly after the war and settled on their newly purchased country estates, one
of which totaled 20,000 acres. The chief engineer of the Royal Army purchased
two estates and a colonel's commission, and sent his sons to expensive military
schools. In 1778 Horace Walpole acidly remarked, "General Howe is returned,
richer in money than laurels."23
In contrast, the American army took vigorous steps from the beginning to
protect its reputation from charges of corruption. The first officer charged
with fraud, a quartermaster, was court-martialed on 5 July 1775. Others fol-
lowed soon thereafter. "As nothing can be more fatal to an Army, than Crimes
of this kind," General Washington wrote in August 1775 to John Hancock, "I
am determined by every Motive of Reward & Punishment to prevent them in
the future." In a fine expression of republican rhetoric addressed to Richard
Henry Lee, Washington wrote: "In short I spare none & yet fear it will not all
do, as these People seem to be too inattentive to every thing but their Interest."
Washington even despaired that his vigor in prosecuting fraud would ruin his
reputation: "My life has been nothing else since I came here but one continued
round of annoyance and fatigue; in short no pecuniary recompense could
induce me to undergo what I have, especially as I expect, by shewing so little
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countenance to irregularities and public abuses to render myself very obnox-
ious to a greater part of these people."26
Washington proved to be as good as his word. While British officers were
making their fortunes on defense fraud, American officers were being prose-
cuted and dismissed by the dozen. At least thirty-two officers of the Con-
tinental Line were punished during the war for a wide variety of fraudulent
practices (see appendix A). Most were dismissed from the service. (In Nov-
ember 1775, Congress established dismissal as the punishment for officers; en-
listed men were to receive from fifteen to thirty-nine lashes.) In addition,
officers were humiliated and ostracized. Congress specified that upon convic-
tion for fraud, an officer's name was to be published in newspapers, "after
which it shall be deemed scandalous in any officer to associate with him."27
Captain-Lieutenant Theophilus Parke, an artillery officer, was chosen as an
example to others. Convicted in March 1780 of fraud and forgery, he was sen-
tenced to be dismissed from the army "with infamy." This meant that his sword
was broken over his head before an assembly of his troops, he was excluded
from holding civil or military office, and the charge was published in the press.
Yet even this humiliation was far preferable to the fate of some enlisted men
convicted of fraud. In May 1780, a military surgeon witnessed a frightening
scene: "The criminals were placed side by side, on the scaffold, with halters
round their necks, their coffins before their eyes, their graves open to view, and
thousands of spectators bemoaning their awful doom. At this awful moment,
while their fervent prayers are ascending to Heaven, an officer comes forward
and reads a reprieve for seven of them, by the commander in chief. Only one
man was actually hanged, for the crime of forging discharges that allowed a
hundred men to leave the army.28
Nothing better illustrates the developing American attitude toward war
profits than does the hoary old military custom of plunder. To some extent,
both the British and the Continental armies were guilty of plundering.
Scholars agree, however, that the weight of the evidence shows that the British
and their Hessian allies plundered somewhat more freely than did the Ameri-
can troops.29
From the outset of hostilities, official American policy opposed plunder.
European troops brought with them a centuries-old plundering tradition that
was difficult to control and impossible to eradicate. American commanders
considered the limitation of plunder an important advantage in their cam-
paign to achieve broad support. With certain notable exceptions, and despite
many violations, the army attempted to observe the policy throughout the
conflict. The exceptions were, first, during the American invasion of Canada in
1775) when undisciplined American troops plundered their northern neigh-
bors; second, during the "hard winter" of 1779-80, when farmers were unwill-
ing to sell food to the troops; third, when American commanders consistently
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allowed and even encouraged the seizure and sale of property owned by
British soldiers stationed in America; and finally, when Americans seized the
property of "Tories," a category which, unfortunately, was defined with a con-
siderable degree of elasticity.30
George Washington's dislike of war profits was never displayed more
graphically than in his hatred of illegal plunder. Shortly after assuming com-
mand in the summer of 1775, Washington established procedures to encourage
his troops to seize property belonging to British soldiers. As befitted the egali-
tarian warriors of the infant Republic, Washington ordered that this legal
booty was "to be equally divided between the Officers and men, that took it."
(The last phrase led to jurisdictional squabbles over who had actually captured
the property.) Although Washington continued to encourage the plundering
of British forces (as an incentive to motivate his troops to fight) until at least
the end of 1776, he also issued orders against "unlawfull and irregular plunder-
ing." This meant the seizure of property not belonging to enemy troops. In
practice, distinguishing between the two categories proved quite difficult. After
the Battle of Monmouth Court House in 1778, Washington checked his sol-
diers' packs for possession of illegal plunder.31
The Continental Army had good reason to restrict plundering. The army,
and the Revolution it advanced, depended upon the goodwill of the civilian
population for support. Plundering would win few friends for the cause. No
one understood this fact better than Washington. He summoned his consider-
able powers of persuasion and all his eloquence to exhort his men to stop the
practice. In 1777, upon receiving reports of illegal plundering—a practice he
called "wicked, infamous, and cruel"—Washington wrote: "We complain of
the cruelty and barbarity of our enemies; but does it equal ours? They some-
times spare the property of their friends: but some amongst us, beyond expres-
sion barbarous, rob even them! Why did we assemble in arms? Was it not, in
one capital point, to protect the property of our countrymen? And shall we to
our eternal reproach, be the first to pillage and destroy? Will no motives of hu-
manity, of zeal, interest and of honor, restrain the violence of the soldiers?"32
Washington had decided that unless plundering ceased, "the people will
throw themselves, of Choice, into the Hands of the British Troops." This was a
threat to the Revolution itself, and it justified, in the commander's eyes,
Draconian measures. In July 1777, Washington directed that a court-martial
sentence of a soldier convicted of plundering be carried out. To set an example
for others, the man was to be executed, Washington ordered, "in the most
public manner your situation will admit."33
On other occasions Washington covered his iron fist with a velvet glove. He
tried to shame his troops into halting the plundering. "How disgraceful to the
army is it," he remarked, "that the peaceable inhabitants, our countrymen and
fellow citizens, dread our halting among them, even for a night and are happy
when they get rid of us?" But when words alone were not enough, Washington
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issued regulations intended to curtail plundering. Only officers of the rank of
colonel or above could issue passes to leave camp; no soldier could leave quar-
ters with his firearm; rolls were called between 8 and 10 P.M. to isolate plunder-
ers; and wagonmasters were directed to remain close to their horses to prevent
unauthorized use. In 1777 Washington granted to dragoon commanders au-
thority to impress horses to replenish lost animals, but when he found that the
cavalrymen "go about the country, plundering whomsoever they are pleased to
denominate Tories, and converting what they get to their own private profit
and emolument," he withdrew the authority. In fact, Washington withdrew all
authority to plunder Tories. A General Order of 21 January 1777 prohibited
"the infamous practice of plundering the Inhabitants, under the specious pre-
tence of their being Tories—Let the persons who are known to be enemies to
their Contry, be seized and confin'd, and their Property disposed of, as the law
of the State directs—It is our business to give protection and support, to the
poor, distressed Inhabitants; not multiply and increase their calamities."
Washington's harsh restriction of plundering and plunderers bestowed a tan-
gible moral advantage on the American cause.34
If British commanders had been equally determined, they might have
triumphed in the contest for American loyalty. But reports of plundering
by Redcoats and Hessians circulated continually. Fences and buildings were
burned for firewood; household furniture was stolen or destroyed; cattle were
slaughtered with much of the carcass wasted; mechanics' tools were taken.
There was even a report that cherry trees were cut down when Royal troops
were unable to reach the fruit in the high branches. A. R. Bowler has suggested
that the miserable quality of rations shipped to America from England im-
pelled the British and Hessian troops to plunder. This is probably true (and
may explain their commanders' permissiveness), but it is unlikely that such an
excuse would have persuaded many American farmers that British actions
were justified.35
If George Washington was angered by graft and plundering, he was equally
outraged by a third source of war profits: trading with the enemy. This practice
was a direct and obvious violation of Revolutionary principles. A virtuous re-
publican who possessed more goods than he could consume himself ought
properly to donate them (or sell them for a modest price) to the good of the
cause. Only a grossly corrupt countryman or an ardent royalist would sell
them to the British to obtain a greedy profit. In August 1775, at the same time
he was punishing graft and exhorting his troops against plundering,
Washington issued the first of many lamentations on trading with the enemy.
In a letter to the New York Provincial Congress, he wrote: "It must give great
Concern to any considerate Mind that when this whole Continent at a vast ex-
pence of Blood & Treasure is endeavouring to establish its Liberties . . . there
are Men among us so basely sordid as to Counteract all our Exertions for the
Sake of a little Gain."36
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Washington's moral outrage was just one reason to oppose trading with
the enemy. Goods shipped to the enemy not only strengthened them (and un-
dercut the American logistical advantage) but also weakened the American
effort in that there were fewer goods available to the patriots. Hard money
transferred to the British stimulated inflation and made it more difficult to
collect taxes. Trading with the enemy bred distrust among compatriots, and
after 1778, it threatened the alliance with France. The French justifiably felt
that, in return for aid rendered to the American cause, they could expect to
obtain a larger share of the American market. When Americans returned to
pre-Revolutionary trade channels, even as the war raged on, the French were
rightfully annoyed. Trading with the enemy had only one redeeming virtue:
it provided a source of intelligence to the American leadership. In George
Washington's opinion, this value was not worth the cost. "Those people who
undertake to procure intelligence under cover of carrying produce into New
York," Washington complained,"... attend more to their own emoluments
than to the business they have charged, and we have found their information
so vague and trifling, that there is no placing dependance upon it."37
As with any illicit activity, it is impossible to determine exactly how much
trading with the enemy occurred. Contemporary reports were so exten-
sive that it is obvious that the amount of proscribed trade was substantial.
During the war the value of British goods exported to Nova Scotia increased to
a figure that was ten times as large as that which the colony could possibly con-
sume. Consignments from Scottish ports to North American destinations
from which cargoes could be transhipped to American customers tripled over
prewar levels.38
Anticipating later attempts to exclude British goods (the War of 1812 em-
bargo, Prohibition), the embargo leaked badly, and the most capacious leak
was through Canada. It is also clear that trading with the enemy increased as
the war dragged on and the idealism of the first year waned. In March 1776,
the British evacuated Boston, substantially because of the difficulty of obtain-
ing supplies there. But when they occupied New York four months later, a
steady trickle of supplies commenced. These supplies were not sufficient to
meet the needs of the British forces, which depended primarily on supplies
transported from home, but the trade became considerable. Although the
much-maligned American militia enjoyed some success at interdicting this
trade, New York's commerce with outlying regions may have returned to
prewar levels by 1780. Connecticut became a center of illegal trade, and ship
captains hired to stop it began to engage in it themselves. When the British
occupied Philadelphia in 1777, dozens of new stores opened, some of which
were specialized firms catering specifically to the needs of British officers.
Washington found it necessary to dismantle some flour mills near Wil-
mington, Delaware, in order to keep them from supplying enemy troops in
Philadelphia.39
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Trading with the enemy during the American Revolution was among the
most ethically ambiguous matters in the entire history of the war profits issue.
The vexing question was how to tell just when normal commerce shaded into
trading that was morally offensive. Unless a person believed implicitly that
British control of America was wholly illegitimate, entering into a transac-
tion which might help to sustain that control was not reprehensible, except in
the eyes of dedicated rebels. The British did not consider their occupation of
Boston or New York to be an invasion. They believed they were simply reoccu-
pying soil that was rightfully theirs. A merchant who traded with the British
could persuade himself that he was acting ethically if he were in sympathy with
the British, neutral toward them, or even lukewarm on the war. There was also
a matter of timing. The fighting began more than a year before independence
was declared. When did an individual's moral obligation to suspend trading
commence? With the first battles, with the call for an embargo, or with inde-
pendence?
British traders complained that "villainous" American customers com-
monly made purchases and then reneged later on their obligations. From the
American point of view, "trading with the enemy" was not unethical as long as
nothing of value was given. Finally, there was the question of price. American
traders, in the tradition of their fathers and grandfathers, greeted the arrival of
the Royal Army by happily jacking up their prices.40 If items of little military
value were sold at sufficiently high prices, it might be reasonably argued that
the British cause was harmed rather than helped.
Another problem was the utter impracticality of completely severing trade
with Britain. Indeed, this was not even desirable. Besides gunpowder, the item
in shortest supply in America in the early years of the war was salt. Since salt
was used for preserving meat, it had a vital military value as well as a civilian
use. Salt shortages were so severe that riots broke out, ration cards were issued
(in New York), and salt was even used as a medium of exchange. To alleviate
the shortage, the Virginia legislature made an exception to the restrictions on
trade with Britain, allowing ships to clear for Bermuda, as long as they engaged
in that trade alone. Still, scarcity had driven up the price of salt, so that an un-
usual profit might be obtained in reselling it. A North Carolina county at-
tempted to limit the gain by restricting the markup on salt to 200 percent, but
dissatisfaction remained.41
Considering that Revolutionary leaders temporarily allowed trading with
the enemy for salt, was profiting from that trade unethical? An answer might
be found in the magnitude of the profits obtained. As one example, Nicholas
Brown, a merchant of Providence, Rhode Island, was able to triple his invest-
ment in the salt trade in 1777. If this had become public knowledge, he cer-
tainly would have been denounced as undevoted. In 1776 the Pennsylvania
Council of Safety learned that certain importers had marked up a shipment of
salt by 87.5 percent. The Council resolved to express its disapproval of "the
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Conduct of those mercenary men, who, regardless of the public Good and the
Interest of their Country, in this Unreasonable and avaritious manner, mo-
nopolize those articles so necessary to the Community and lay on such enor-
mous Profits as puts it out of the power of the Industrious Poor to procure a
necessary supply for their Families." The Council confiscated the salt and sold
it at cost. In 1781 Congress voted to prohibit the salt trade with Bermuda for
the duration of the Revolution.42
In another transaction, the ethical dimension was affected by the ultimate
use of the British product. In 1778 Henry Laurens purchased some hard-to-
find buff cloth that was manufactured in Britain. Normally, such a purchase by
the president of Congress would be highly questionable. But Laurens sent the
cloth to his son John, a lieutenant colonel in the Continental Army, for the
purpose of making a new uniform.43 Henry Laurens might well have preferred
to purchase French cloth, but since the final use of the product was military,
there was little to criticize.
A final ambiguity involved the complicity of customers in the illegal trade.
When the war broke out, there was a rough consensus in America that English
goods should be shunned. American merchants turned away from their cus-
tomary sources of supply in the British empire in favor of opening up new
ones elsewhere. Opportunism and patriotism were impelling forces: now that
the Navigation Acts were inoperative, good profit might await the merchant
who was the first to tap the new trade. In particular, the large and potentially
lucrative market for American tobacco in France beckoned to opportunistic
American traders. If French products were suited to the taste of American con-
sumers, Britain could be neatly excluded. Exchanging French finished goods
for American tobacco (with Britain kept out) might serve as a basis for a per-
manent trading relationship.
Although it attained some success, this plan was better in conception than
in execution. American consumers were used to purchasing British products,
and this preference did not disappear with the outbreak of hostilities. The ex-
perience of Nicholas Brown of Rhode Island is illustrative. Early in the war,
Brown patriotically refused to purchase British products. But he later reversed
his position, specifying that he would buy only British goods. He found that
French goods did not sell well in America, and New England goods did not sell
well in France. French traders were slow to fulfill contracts, and they did not
wish to extend credit. Brown's dilemma was whether to continue with his
French venture, while his customers turned either to less-principled vendors
or to those with Tory inclinations, or else to engage in trading with the enemy.
Brown and other merchants preferred the latter alternative, or, as Brown de-
scribed it, "the Clandestine Way." There was no question in George Wash-
ington's mind about the ethical level of this trade. In 1781 he wrote, "Men of all
descriptions are now indiscriminately engaging in it, Whig, Tory, Speculator.
By its being practiced by those of the latter class, in a manner with impunity,
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Men who, two or three years ago, would have shuddered at the idea of such
connexions now pursue it with avidity and reconcile it to themselves (in which
their profits plead powerfully) upon a principle of equality with the Tory."44
The heart of the issue was whether a businessman who was sympathetic to the
Revolution was thereby obliged to allow his customers to be absorbed by his
Loyalist competitors. Loss of livelihood was a greater sacrifice than most men
were willing to make.
Trading with the enemy involved primarily civilian goods. Nevertheless, its
existence expressed a lack of support for the American war effort. The system
of procuring vital military supplies also exhibited some lack of concern for the
army's needs. Domestic suppliers and manufacturers sometimes sought to
obtain unusual profits out of the irregular conditions created by the war. This
occasionally materialized in the fashion of degraded quality of military sup-
plies, one of the most persevering forms of profiteering.
Food and other provisions supplied to soldiers have been a notorious
source of complaint since soldiers first marched, but the Continental army had
genuine reason to feel aggrieved. Quartermasters often ordered beef but re-
ceived horsemeat, forcing the army to establish a board of butchers to examine
the meat supply. Salt pork was frequently ruined when teamsters drained the
brine from the barrels in order to lighten their loads. Imported blankets were
so small that two and sometimes even four were required to cover a man.
Shoes were legendary for their dilapidated quality. A pair often lasted for only
a few days. In 1779 General Washington complained of "great abuses" whereby
shoes were made "by putting in small scraps and parings of leather and giving
the Shoes the appearance of strength and substance, while the Soals were
worth nothing, would not last more than a day or two's march."45
The amount of profits received by American military suppliers during the
Revolution was controversial at the time, and their degree of excessiveness will
never be completely resolved. The recent work of E. Wayne Carp argues per-
suasively that charges of corruption in the supply offices were exaggerated.46
Nevertheless, it is an undeniable fact that there was a widespread public per-
ception that speculative buying, hoarding, price gouging, degraded quality,
and various other fraudulent procedures were very common. There were sev-
eral sources of this belief.
In the first place, the administrative procedures for supplying the military
forces were poorly developed or nonexistent. The fledgling nation fought its
first war according to the methods that had served the various colonies in the
skirmishes with the Indians and the French. When such a war broke out, it was
customary for the colonial legislature to appoint a war committee. This body
held the authority to award contracts for military supplies to local providers.
When the Revolution commenced, the Continental Congress assumed the
responsibility for procurement and appointed committees to carry it out. The
responsibilities of these committees overlapped, and members could not
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devote full attention to any single assignment. When the day-to-day work of
purchasing military supplies was carried out by harried congressmen, public
suspicions about the efficiency of their supervision was easily aroused.
A second controversial feature was the reliance upon a contracting system
that gave the defense contractor an incentive to raise prices. The Continental
army employed purchasing agents who were compensated by being allowed to
keep a percentage of the cost of each contract. This percentage was normally
2.5 percent, but sometimes higher. Therefore, the larger the contract, the larger
the supplier's commission. This system had its origins in peacetime business
practices. American merchants frequently employed purchasing agents at a
customary rate of 5 percent. This rate rose considerably during wartime. In
June 1777, Congress partially replaced the discredited commission system with
a system of fixed pay and rations for the Commissary Department. The quar-
termaster general continued to be remunerated by commission.47
A third circumstance leading to charges of profiteering was the method of
financing the war by inflation. A characteristic common to most inflationary
periods is the general belief that others are gaining economically faster than
oneself. Since others seem to be advancing, it follows that they must be doing
so as the result of active encouragement, that is, by aggressively raising their
prices. In other words, to the people of the Revolutionary era, a general price
increase was necessarily the result of a conspiracy to raise prices. Along with
poor congressional oversight and faulty contracting systems, inflationary psy-
chology contributed greatly to charges of price gouging.
Although these factors led to a somewhat exaggerated perception of the
amount of profits obtained during the war, there is ample evidence that some
Americans did profit handsomely from the conflict. The largest profits, how-
ever, did not go to those whom the public believed to be gaining. They went
instead to persons who were on the periphery of the supply system and who
capitalized on unusual opportunities that cropped up because of the war.
A prime example of this phenomenon was the case of Robert Morris, the
man whose name is most closely associated with Revolutionary War profiteer-
ing. As a congressman, until 1778 Morris chaired the Secret Committee, which
gave him broad authority over procurement. He then left government and re-
mained in private business until 1781, when he returned as superintendent of
finance, charged with the responsibility of overhauling the creaky supply
system. Morris successfully advocated that the government switch from using
its own procurement officers to advertised contracting with private vendors,
on the grounds that open contracting would be cheaper and much less arbi-
trary than impressment. When the war ended, Morris received much public
criticism for enlarging his own fortune while serving in public office. Morris
did earn considerable sums during the war, and he did mix public business
with private. During the eighteenth century the distinction between private in-
terest and public interest was much less clear than it was to become, and the
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greatest gain Morris made during the war came while he was out of public ser-
vice from 1778 to 1781. Undoubtedly the knowledge he acquired as head of the
Secret Committee served him well later, but this certainly did not violate any
contemporary ethical standard.48
Perhaps the single most lucrative enterprise brought about by the Revolu-
tionary War was raiding British sea lanes. At least 800 British ships were cap-
tured, 600 by privateers and 200 by the Continental navy. These ships had a
total value of more than £5 million and were sold by their captors as quickly as
possible. There was certainly nothing unethical about this established enter-
prise: Congress had approved it, all had a chance at it, and there was substan-
tial risk involved. Even George Washington himself invested in a privateering
enterprise, as did other Revolutionary leaders.49
Yet there was room for some question. The substantial value of the ships
and cargoes seized often led to considerable squabbling about the distribution
of the prize shares. American prize agents in Paris resold captured property, re-
alizing a usual markup of twenty-five times but perhaps as high as eightyfold.
Congressman John Langdon of New Hampshire resigned his seat in order to
serve as U.S. "Agent of Prizes" in that state. Langdon received a commission
(usually 5 percent) on the sale of every prize captured by a holder of a congres-
sional commission. He amassed a great fortune during the war, and within six
months of its conclusion he began work on a new home that was as opulent as
any mansion in New England. Langdon exemplified the opportunity priva-
teering afforded for aggressive, opportunistic men to rise in economic status
during the Revolution.50
Although most equipment for the Continental army came from abroad,
Congress and the state governments gave great encouragement to domestic
production. Cannon and gunpowder were the supplies needed most. The total
number of cannon forged in the United States is unknown, but it was certainly
in the thousands, and most states had foundries.51 The best documented enter-
prise was that of Nicholas Brown and his brother Moses. The Brown ven-
ture experienced difficulties that would become commonplace in the defense
industry two centuries later: unpredictable markets, changing military re-
quirements, inflationary increases in materials and labor, cost overruns, and
controversy over prices.
By January 1776, the Browns had begun to expand their foundry in order to
produce cannon. Their offer to sell included a requirement that payment be
made even if the war ended before production was complete. This transferred
the risk of peace (and loss of market) to the government. The Navy Board
changed the patterns for the cannon after signing a contract to commence
production. During the delay, inflation took a hefty bite out of the profits, but
the government was reluctant to cover this cost. It was also slow to pay its
bill. Instead, the Browns were labeled "extortioners" by Congressman John
Langdon, who himself emerged from the war as a wealthy man! As an antidote
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to inflationary increases in costs, the Browns refused to quote firm prices on
future orders until the cannon were completed. (This anticipated the flexible
pricing of World War II.) Despite all the problems, however, it is clear that the
Browns profited handsomely, although the amount cannot be gauged pre-
cisely. When the war ended, the Browns had paid for a modern foundry that
could be converted to civilian production.52
Not all American defense industries were so profitable. Powder mills and
lead mines failed to reward their owners, largely because of production im-
pediments. Lead mines were either unproductive (as in Massachusetts) or were
taken over by the government to prevent extortionate prices on a critical com-
modity (as in Virginia). When the mine operators of Virginia refused to accept
a fixed price of £33 per ton of lead, the Virginia convention took over the
mines, offering only to pay "a reasonable annual rent." In the case of gunpow-
der, there was a national shortage of its vital component, saltpeter (potassium
nitrate). No powder mill could operate without it, and Congress controlled the
supply. Early in 1776 Congress agreed to send fifty tons to Pennsylvania, ten
tons to Massachusetts, and ten tons to New York. In the eighteenth century, as
in the twentieth, large states received most of the defense contracts. Actual
losses were sustained by men who used their personal wealth to subsidize pro-
duction or purchases in the expectation that Congress would reimburse them.
The director of a state-owned gun factory in Virginia died deeply in debt for
that reason, and General Nathanael Greene received his compensation posthu-
mously.53
Impelled by deep ideological convictions, the Revolutionary generation
took sweeping and innovative steps to restrain war profits. Although by
modern standards their governing mechanisms were rudimentary, the meth-
ods they devised in hopes of controlling war profits anticipated nearly all of
the programs utilized by the federal government during the great wars of the
twentieth century.
In the first place, Revolutionary leaders exhorted the public to restrain
their appetites. As noted, George Washington was the most frequent and most
forceful opponent of war profits in whatever guise. He was by no means alone.
In 1780 Major General William Heath issued a public proclamation pleading
that "no person or persons will be so ungenerous to their friends and allies . . .
as to enhance the prices of the necessaries of life above the current prices." Just
in case anyone could not resist the urge to overcharge, Heath threatened to
post the names of the gougers conspicuously in public places. Of twentieth-
century American leaders, only Franklin D. Roosevelt approached the fre-
quency and eloquence of Washington's moral exhortations.54
A second approach was to make the tax structure more progressive. In the
maritime towns of New England, flush with profits from privateering, there
was a strong demand for luxury goods. In 1777, anticipating the Civil War
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income tax and modern excess profits taxes, Connecticut began to assess per-
sonal property, especially coaches, clocks, and silver plate, at substantially
higher rates. From 1779 to 1781 the Maryland legislature imposed a progressive
property tax on luxuries, such as silver plate. In 1780 New York approved legis-
lation designed to keep manufacturers' profits, merchants' prices, and the
wages of mechanics and laborers at the levels of 1774, the last prewar year. New
Jersey established a tax directly pointed at deputy quartermasters general
on the assumption that these officials were profiting unfairly from the war.
(The Continental Congress resolved that New Jersey ought to reverse its deci-
sion.)55
Rationing was a third device that presaged twentieth-century techniques.
To deal with a critical shortage of salt in several localities, in 1775-76 Revolu-
tionary leaders commandeered private supplies in order to maintain even dis-
tribution and prewar prices. In December 1775, the Virginia Convention seized
3,600 bushels, which it alloted to thirty County Committees of Safety to be
sold at five shillings per bushel to persons selected by the committees. To
counter charges of favoritism, the justices of the peace replaced the
Committees of Safety as the distribution agent. Each family received one peck
of salt for each family member. In 1776 Pennsylvania allowed the price of salt
to triple to 15 shillings per bushel. No family was to receive more than one-half
bushel, but only the honor system enforced that edict. Each family was re-
quired to make a public declaration "of what Quantity they are possessed of,
more than their Just proportion of this necessary Article, at a time of such
great Scarcity of it."56
Related to rationing as a means of spreading the burden of the war was
price control. Most of the states participated in price control efforts, and six
conventions were held to establish ceilings. North Carolina was typical. In 1780
its legislature resolved that prices had reached "extravagant height" because of
the "wicked arts of a set of men called speculators." The Carolinians attempted
futilely to license commerce and limit profits to 25 percent on each transaction.
But not all the states joined the effort, and those that did lacked the power to
enforce their programs. Prices increased to more than two hundred times
greater than prewar levels. In a feeble effort to fight the increase, some authori-
ties resorted to impressment. Since the use of force to bring about public com-
pliance was foreign to republican theory, the authority to impress military
supplies was circumscribed by a degree of due process. Before impressment
could take place, a justice of the peace had to issue a warrant. Two or three "in-
different" private citizens were to adjudicate disputes as to the reasonableness
of the prices offered.57
Rampant inflation exposed a conflict in the theory of republicanism,
which protected private property and which was averse both to excessive war
profits and to using force to control prices. In the case of hoarding to obtain a
50 I WARHOGS
windfall profit, was the government justified in using impressment to force
sales? George Washington was normally and wisely reluctant to undertake
impressment, because he considered impressment a violation of the rights of
property and because he believed that the practice undercut public support for
the cause. Evidently Washington felt that war profits were even more repre-
hensible than impressment, for in 1777 he used his authority to seize a supply
of hides that he believed was being withheld from the market in order to gain
a speculative profit.58
Congressional and army leaders also experimented with a number of
minor changes designed to reduce war profits. Most of these were directed at
the commissary and quartermaster department, which were constantly the
object of suspicion. Officers were required to supply monthly and later weekly
reports of supplies on hand. Proposals were offered to open the supply system
to competitive bidding that would result from public notices. The most popu-
lar suggestion was to change the system of compensating procurement officers
by a commission based on a percentage of purchases to one in which they re-
ceived a fixed salary. This reform was accomplished in 1777.59 (This anticipated
the World War I decision to switch from contracts based on reimbursement of
cost plus a percentage of cost to cost plus a fixed fee.)
The Revolution was peculiar in its deep distrust of military supply officers.
Although administrative changes were often suggested, there was a fundamen-
tal assumption of the rapaciousness of supply officers that led to numerous de-
mands for their replacement. No official, in fact, who was given a major
responsibility in the supply system emerged from the war with his reputation
entirely intact. Nathanael Greene, Joseph Trumbull, Robert Morris, Carpenter
Wharton, Thomas Mifflin, and Stephen Moylan were all men who suffered a
degree of ignominy. Ironically, near the close of the war Robert Morris re-
deemed his reputation during his term as superintendent of finance only by
significantly shrinking the size of the supply system. The verdict of history,
shared by the most careful students of the problem, is that the supply problems
of the Continental army were not due to the greediness of its supply officers.
Their chicanery was grossly exaggerated.60
Greene's case is revealing. Appointed Washington's quartermaster general
in 1778, Greene supervised a corps of 3,000 men with authority to spend mil-
lions of dollars. Having ample opportunity to dip deeply into the public cof-
fers, Greene was guilty of some minor indiscretions. He diverted some military
business to a family enterprise managed by his brother and cousin in which he
owned a share. In 1779 Greene also entered into a partnership with Jeremiah
Wadsworth, the commissary general, and Barnabas Deane, as operating part-
ner. This firm engaged in shipping and privateering, where it gained and lost a
fortune. Neither of these enterprises was significantly profitable to Greene, but
his commissions on war supplies were impressive. He earned about $170,000
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in specie from his appointment, which he converted to extensive holdings in
real estate and other ventures.61
Perhaps every war leaves behind a degree of bitterness, resentment, and re-
crimination. The deep sense of indignation felt by the veterans of the
American Revolution was approached in American history only by the dis-
satisfaction common to veterans of the war in Vietnam. By 1780 Congressman
John Paterson asked: "Where is the spirit of the year 1775? Where are those
flaming patriots who were ready to sacrifice their fortunes, their all, for the
public?"62
In the view of many officers and enlisted men, those who had espoused the
republican concepts of virtue and disinterestedness in 1775 were now devoted
to enlarging their own fortunes. "Those who had played a safe and calculating
game," one veteran wrote, "were rewarded for it; pelf, it appeared, was a better
goal than liberty; and at no period in my recollection, was the worship of
Mammon more widely spread, more sordid and disgusting. Those who had
fought the battles of the country, at least in the humbler grades, had as yet
earned nothing but poverty and contempt; while their wiser fellow-citizens
who had attended to their interests, were the men of mark and consideration."
One of his comrades wrote half-apologetically (for a virtuous republican
ought not to be bitter) to General Washington: "I candidly confess I feel a de-
gree of resentment against the conduct of many."63
That resentment manifested itself in a number of ways. In 1780 a dispute
arose in Connecticut over war taxes. As an incentive to enlistment, the state
proposed that all new recruits would be excused from paying tax obligations.
Soldiers already in the national service, however, would continue to be taxed,
and much of the tax money would go to pay bounties to the new recruits. The
experienced veterans, many of whom who had suffered through the darkest
days of the war, resented paying taxes to men whom they considered to be lag-
gards.64
The national controversy over postwar payments to servicemen was also
related to the fundamental question of the equity of the war burden. Officers
demanded payment of their back wages in full, plus half-pay for life. Congress
agreed to grant unpaid back wages plus five full years of wages, to be paid in
federal securities. This compromise brought protests from some taxpayers,
who believed that officers of the Continental army had profited improperly
during the war. These civilians objected to the permanent continuation of a
situation they viewed as inequitable.65
The question of amnesty for Tories was also in part a war profiteering
issue. Tories tended to be wealthy, at least in New England. During the war
they often abandoned their estates to take up residence in politically more con-
genial climates. While others were making sacrifices, the Tories had either sat
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out the war or had actively aided the enemy. When peace returned, there was a
real possibility that the property of Loyalists would be returned to them; that
was what the peace treaty implied. The thought of British sympathizers living
comfortably on commodious American farms so outraged some Americans
that mob action resulted.
To prevent another round of charges of extortionate pricing, many of the
leaders of the Revolution believed that the government should own its own ar-
maments factories. This was the recommendation of Alexander Hamilton in
his famous Report on Manufacturing of 1791.66 In this respect, Hamilton antic-
ipated the position of Woodrow Wilson in 1919, who endorsed a League of
Nations statement that private trade in arms was open to "grave objection."
(This was perhaps the only issue upon which Hamilton and Wilson agreed.) In
the balmy days of the Republic, the war profits issue seemed resolvable. At
a farewell banquet given at the conclusion of the Revolution, comrades-in-
arms drank to the belief that the characters who had denied the cause "will be
past us":
The Merchant who Ven'r
The Rich Brawling Lawyer
Plush Coated Quack
The Meagre Chopp'd Usurer.67
The toast, unfortunately, was premature. The nation was not entirely rid of the
unvirtuous.
Left-Handed Trade
The speculators of the land
A great proportion as we see
Without one single blush demand
Four dollars for a pound of Tea!
UNITED STATES GAZETTE (5 JANUARY 1814)
This Mexican war—a perfect outrage upon every principle of both civilization and
Christianity—was got up, and is kept up, mainly by these leaches, so that they may
glut themselves on the spoils. Oh, my countrymen, be intreated to tolerate neither
these evils nor this accursed war any longer!
AMERICAN PHRENOLOGICAL JOURNAL (NOVEMBER 1847)
When the Continental army disbanded, America's military establishment es-
sentially disappeared. In late 1783 the regular army numbered but eighty sol-
diers, none ranking higher than captain. During the Articles of Confederation
period, Congress increased the army to an infantry regiment and a small
artillery unit, but military appropriations were trifling. As long as the army
languished as a skeleton force, war profiteering remained a dormant issue.1 In
the 1790s the Federalists rebuilt the nation's military forces, but between the
Revolution and the Civil War only conflicts with Britain in 1812 and with
Mexico in 1846 resuscitated the war profits controversy.
In the 1780s contention about war profits dwindled to bickering about who
gained and who lost during the Revolution. In the Philadelphia Convention in
1787, Pierce Butler of South Carolina sought to have the new U.S. Constitution
discriminate between Revolutionary veterans who had been paid for their ser-
vice in government bonds and those who had speculated in the issues. Butler
"expressed his dissatisfaction lest [the Constitution] should compel payment
as well to the bloodsuckers who had speculated on the distresses of others as to
those who had fought and bled for their country."2
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When George Washington was inaugurated as president in 1789, the army
still counted only 694 soldiers in its ranks. The navy, scrapped after the Revo-
lution, was nonexistent. Washington disapproved of a defense policy that
relied heavily on a militia, and Federalist leaders gradually strengthened the
nation's regular military forces. When the Federalists left office in 1801, the
army's complement had reached 5,400 troops, and the resurrected navy had
thirteen frigates in service and six ships-of-the-line under construction.3
This military augmentation was not cheap. Between 1790 and 1794, military
costs were 40 percent of all federal expenditures, and during that time the de-
fense budget increased by three and a half times to $2.5 million annually.
Coastal fortifications costing about $1 million were erected during the Feder-
alist years. To arm the expanded forces, the army had first relied on European
suppliers. Washington had painful experiences with supply problems during
the Revolution and with the frontier army, and he was concerned lest the
French Revolution interrupt the European arms pipeline. He took an active
role in establishing permanent federal armories first at Springfield, Mas-
sachusetts, and later at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Besides spending on forts and
armories, when war with France threatened in 1798-99 the Federalists bud-
geted support for twelve army regiments and an enlarged navy. In 1798 private
foundries began casting cannon, and the War Department let contracts to pri-
vate firms for the manufacture of small arms. The early rifle and pistol con-
tracts were generally unprofitable, however.4
In 1800, with defense spending threatening to soak up half the federal
budget, the Republican Party sensed a winning campaign issue. The $7 million
earmarked for the defense budget could be obtained only by borrowing, and
Republican leaders charged that interest rates would be exorbitant. After cap-
turing the presidency and control of Congress, the Republicans blocked the
bankers' potential gains by cutting the army by 39 percent and decommission-
ing most of the frigates. Albert Gallatin, Thomas Jefferson's tightfisted treasury
secretary, was convinced that the military establishment wasted resources,
led to debt, and was largely unneeded. During Jefferson's first years in the
presidency, Gallatin held appropriations for the "Peace Establishment" consis-
tently under $1 million annually. In 1802, to save money and wipe out fraud,
Congress eliminated the quartermaster and commissary departments (a deci-
sion it would regret a decade later). There was little room for complaint about
war profits, even though in 1808 a deepening feud with Britain impelled the
Republican leadership to return the army's strength to Federalist levels.5
Mr. Madison's War
The War of 1812 was arguably America's most unpopular war. The Federalist
Party was almost unanimously opposed to the cause, and there were substan-
tial elements of dissent within other constituencies as well.6 In an atmosphere
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of unpopularity, the cost of the war and the price of war goods might well have
instigated discord, but in this instance they were of secondary importance. The
Federalists, who owned a well-deserved reputation for friendliness toward de-
fense spending, were on slippery ground when criticizing President James
Madison's military expenditures. The army's muskets and cannon were being
made in armories their party had built, and Federalists were the chief propo-
nents of manufacturing at home.
The Federalists preferred a more secure footing on which to base their case
against Madison's war policy. They disputed the worthiness of the cause, ques-
tioned Madison's war plan, and argued that the war played into the hands of
the hateful tyrant Napoleon. Almost as an afterthought, they noted that the
war damaged a profitable commerce, required burdensome expenditures, and
imposed oppressive taxes and inflationary costs. The Federalists denounced in-
justices allegedly imposed by Republican war finance, but their reproach cen-
tered on regional inequities rather than on unfair individual treatment.7
Although questions about the economic conduct of the war arrived late,
they were in earnest. In 1813 British seapower interdicted supplies of numerous
commodities. Along with heavy military purchasing, blockade-induced short-
ages drove up prices abruptly. In Philadelphia and other cities along the east-
ern seaboard there was extensive speculation in such staples as coal, sugar,
flour, salt, coffee, and tea. "The gambling is high," observed a Marylander.
"Immense sums will be won or lost. It appears to extend from one end of the
union to the other. The price of these goods is amazingly enhanced. Many
bankruptcies may be expected from this wild business."8 A Republican journal,
doubtless assuming that many commodity speculators were Federalists, de-
nounced price extortion as "criminal." In 1814 a Federalist who identified
himself as "ANTI SPECULATOR" reported that the price of sheepskins had be-
come so augmented that someone had butchered four animals for their skins,
not even bothering to save the carcasses. Outraged, he demanded that hounds
be set forth against the "Scalping Speculators."9
The sectoral shifts brought about by wartime conditions inflicted hardship
on most Americans but offered opportunity to others. The shipping industry
was heavily affected; an American embargo and the British blockade kept mer-
chant and fishing vessels in port. Conversely, land transportation commanded
a premium price. In 1814 salt could be purchased for fifty to seventy cents
per bushel at Amelia Island, Spanish Florida, or Kanawha Springs, Virginia.
Transportation to Baltimore, Maryland, or Charleston, South Carolina, added
$2.50 to the cost, but since the price of salt in those cities was $5.00 per bushel,
the business was surely lucrative. The blockade tripled the price of coal
in Philadelphia in 1813, and the cost of transporting a barrel of flour from
New York to Boston increased sevenfold by 1814. Early in 1814 a disgusted
Federalist grumbled, "There is one description of persons who may cordially
greet each other with 'A happy New Year!' We mean . . . the long list of army
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contractors . . . who hold profitable or sinecure places as a reward for slan-
dering George Washington and other fine deeds."10
Those who were situated to take advantage of these conditions tended to
be in the South and West. This deepened the animosity for the war in the
North and East. In 1815 advancing prices for cotton, sugar, and tobacco
brought anger to seaboard cities: "They have given money a south and south-
western direction," the coast complained. On the other hand, a group of North
Carolina merchants became so attached to the lucrative business acquired
when soldiers were stationed nearby that they were enraged when army com-
manders marched the regiments.11
Although the war closed off some markets to northeastern merchants, it
opened others, at least to those unconcerned about compromising their re-
publican virtue. During the War of 1812, trading with the enemy thrived as in
no other American conflict. This was due in part to the unpopularity of the
cause and in part to the ready market in British Canada. In the first three
months of the war, Britain cut off trade with American customers, except for
those granted a special license. The eagerness of Americans to trade with the
enemy was made clear when these licenses sold openly for up to $5,000 in
American cities. They were also often counterfeited.12
Traditional smuggling routes along the New England border reopened
soon after the conflict broke out. Each summer of the war, herds of cattle from
downstate New York and from Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont tram-
pled paths through the forest as they ambled northward to nourish the Royal
Army in Canada. Not even severe weather could interrupt an American pas-
time that was as satisfying as it was shameful. In January 1813, smuggling was
reportedly "as brisk as ever." In a single winter day federal agents in Vermont
captured twenty-seven sleighs "laden with English goods," and charges of
smuggling clogged the docket of the U.S. District Court at Rutland, Vermont.
In 1814 every day twenty to fifty wagonloads of illicit goods crossed through
Castine, Maine, allowing a royal governor to boast that two-thirds of the
British army stationed in Canada lived on American beef. "The depravity of
these creatures," reproved a Republican editor disgusted with his unvirtuous
countrymen, "is beyond anything we ever expected to find in the United
States."13
Much of the illicit trade was in goods that while militarily valuable would
not be directly useful in battle—foodstuffs, cloth, and wire, for example.
Nevertheless, trade with the British sometimes clearly crossed the indistinct
boundary between subsistence and weaponry. Americans supplied spars for
the construction of the British warship Confiance built at Isle-aux-Noix on
Lake Champlain. Planks intended for the vessel were confiscated and found to
be worth more than $5,000. Rhode Islanders living on Block Island main-
tained their well-earned reputation for disregarding trade restrictions by
carrying intelligence and supplies to British blockaders on a daily basis. "Self,
L E F T - H A N D E D T R A D E I 57
the great ruling principle," pronounced a British officer, "[is] more powerful
with Yankees than any people I ever saw."14
Trade with the enemy was sufficiently extensive to damage the war effort.
Numerous troops were sent north in a fruitless attempt to close the border.
Armed skirmishes were occasionally fought between smugglers and American
border guards—who were known in smugglers' parlance as "highway robbers."
In 1814 near Burlington, Vermont, thirteen mounted infantrymen were dis-
patched to capture smugglers. They were attacked by a gang of thirty traffick-
ers, who killed one soldier and took five prisoner. A mob of eighty armed
smugglers including a merchant, a physician, and a grand juror sortied from
Georgia, Vermont, and fell upon outgunned border guards, several of whom
were badly beaten. "How superabundant is our country of scoundrels," sighed
the Niles' Weekly Register.15
Smuggling was not only violent but expensive. A nationwide shortage of
specie developed as money flowed abroad to pay for illegal imports. According
to Donald Hickey, early in 1814 $2 million in gold went offshore, followed by
another $1.8 million the following summer. Part of this money departed via
Canada, but Boston and New York also served as outlet points. In 1814 illicit
shipments worth $30,000 each were confiscated at New Haven and Ston-
ington, Connecticut. "This nefarious business has greatly contributed to the
scarcity of specie," complained a Marylander. "This left-handed trade is doing
us serious injury, totally changing the relations of trade."16
Trading with the enemy was a lucrative but illegal way to profit on the war.
Another convenient means of profiting was even more remunerative and also
legal: privateering. This activity was comparatively expensive and quite dan-
gerous, but these considerations discouraged few participants. In 1812 there
were many shipowners still sailing who had hunted the seas for British booty
during the Revolution. Others were sons of former privateers or otherwise re-
lated to them. Although ownership of a privateering vessel was a rich man's
game, there was plenty of opportunity for a common seaman to earn prize
money. Owners of privateers customarily split the prize money with their
crews, and within each ship the money was normally split evenly between offi-
cers and tars. In addition to the value of the ship that could be confiscated, the
U.S. government paid a bounty for each British sailor captured. This fee began
at $20 in 1812, rose to $25 in 1813, and reached $100 in 1814.17
Prize money was equally available to sailors in the U.S. Navy, and whether
obtained aboard a privateer or a frigate, the gain could be substantial. Early in
1813 a naval squadron under the command of Commodore John Rodgers cap-
tured the British packet Swallow, which had a cargo worth $158,000 aboard.
When Rodgers returned triumphantly to port, he needed six wagons to carry
his booty. Parading with colors flying, drums beating, and accompanied by a
marine guard, Rodgers deposited his wagonloads of loot "amidst huzzas of
spectators." Few Americans can have arrived at a bank in more spectacular
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fashion than did Rodgers, and when the news of his coup spread to other sea-
ports the effect was electric. Rodgers' personal share was nearly $12,000, which
was comparable to the bonus paid to Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry after
his victory in the battle of Lake Erie.18
Privateering was a popular enterprise from the Republican South to
Federalist New England. In Salem, Massachusetts, the Essex Register kept a
running account of the profits obtained. In November 1813, as the second year
of the war came to a close, Salem lost seventeen privateers worth $164,100. By
contrast, Salem's adventuresome seamen had seized and brought to port
enemy ships valued at $675,695.93, a return of better than four to one. The
great disadvantage to the privateering business was the substantial risk of cap-
ture, but American shipwrights offered a solution. A sleek new ship design
possessed an uncanny ability to point high into the wind, greatly improving
the chances of eluding a pursuing English vessel. When war profits were high,
technology responded.19
In December 1813, Congress belatedly imposed an embargo intended to
block illicit trade with the enemy. Although comprehensive, the embargo of
1813 was not total, as it allowed privateers to clear American ports. This led to
abuses, as "privateers" (particularly those from New England) sometimes
packed their holds, declared they were seeking prizes, then sold their cargos to
the enemy. When privateers or merchantmen were captured, their owners
often paid ransom to recover the vessel and crew. When British ships off Cape
Ann captured American coastal vessels, they customarily sent the captain
ashore to obtain $200 in ransom to recover his ship. Occasionally they de-
tained the captain himself pending payment of a $50 ransom. Some American
captains therefore allowed themselves and their ships to be captured in return
for a share of the ransom money. In February 1814, Congress attempted to pre-
vent "collusive captures" by forbidding the ransoming of prizes.20
Besides ransoming, two other hoary old forms of war profiting that were
waning were plunder and scalp bounties. When news of the declaration of war
in 1812 reached the northern border, Americans living in Eastport, Maine,
crossed into New Brunswick and plundered the village of St. Andrews, seizing
all the goods they could find. But when the tides of war turned, the Canadians
crossed back into Eastport and ravaged the American plunderers, revealing the
disadvantage of the practice. Early in the war an American privateer, aptly
named the Midas, plundered Harbour Island in the Bahamas, stealing 740
doubloons from one unfortunate British subject. President Madison revoked
Midas's letter of marque. The proscription against plundering had limits,
however. In 1814 Captain William Patterson plundered a pirate settlement on
Grand Terre Island in Barataria Bay in Louisiana. Patterson seized seven
schooners, plus specie and dry goods, worth about $500,000. No objection was
raised; plundering an English settlement might be ungentlemanly or impru-
dent, but plundering a pirate camp was sensible policy.21
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The War of 1812 set the frontier aflame, and with it the issue of scalping
arose once more. Disregarding their own customary practice of two centuries
of forest warfare, Americans disingenuously professed outrage that the
demonic English were reportedly offering a bounty of six dollars per Ameri-
can scalp. (As late as 1794, committees of private citizens in Cincinnati and
Columbus, Ohio, were still offering bounties for Indian scalps. They paid ac-
cording to a sliding scale of $136 for each of the first ten scalps, $117 each for the
second ten, and $95 each for the third ten.) Nevertheless, the scalp bounty
charge became a staple of American propaganda. Early in 1813 the semiofficial
Niles Weekly Register reported that the British ship Euretta bound for London
was carrying in its hold five hundred American scalps. Since the price the
British were allegedly offering in 1812 was well below the previous market
price, and since Americans regularly paid ransom to retrieve prisoners cap-
tured by Indians, this murderous form of war profit had probably ended or at
the very least was mercifully close to its conclusion.22
Although the practice of paying scalp bounties had faded, Congress relied
heavily upon other cash prizes to encourage military service. The sons of the
minutemen still voiced support for the Revolutionary concept of republican
self-sacrifice—the main formal qualification for an army commission was
"virtuous conduct"—but in practice they depended on very attractive mone-
tary rewards for enlistment. The cash bounty for enlistment was alone worth
about a year's wages for a young man, and the total bounty was more than
most people earned in two years. The Jeffersonian purist John Taylor of Caro-
line lamented, accordingly, that the virtuous soul of Revolutionary America
was dimming. The need for enlistment bounties as well as the widespread
practice of trading with the enemy offered clear evidence that the fervid indi-
vidualism of the Jacksonian years was making its appearance.23
The problem facing the Madison administration was how to make use
of monetary incentives without succumbing to avarice. To this end, various
means for controlling war profits were employed, several of which originated
during the Federalist years. There was good reason to steal the Federalist
thunder, because as the months passed, criticism of the war became increas-
ingly shrill. In December 1812, the "Friends of Peace" of Salem, New Jersey,
denounced war costs: "ONE HUNDRED MILLIONS per annum will be required,"
the Friends exaggerated. "Who, fellow citizens, are [these expenditures] to ben-
efit? None but office holders, army contractors and the favourites of a party
administration." "Loans on loans, taxes on taxes, double and increasing prices,"
cried a Federalist. "What benefit is this war to any but those who live on the
spoils of the people?"24
In 1812 Congress reestablished the army's supply agencies, casualties of
Jefferson's cost-cutting campaign a decade earlier. Madison appointed a college
friend and veteran of the Revolution, Morgan Lewis, to be quartermaster gen-
eral. Callender Irvine became commissary general of purchases, and Colonel
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Decius Wadsworth assumed the position of commissary general of ordnance.
Although there was considerable waste and some serious shortages of supplies,
these men were generally capable, and the supply system, while still inefficient,
was improved from the woeful performance of the Revolution.25
The ordnance department had the most innovative management. The
government armories at Springfield and Harpers Ferry, which the Jefferson-
ians much disliked, served them well during "Mr. Madison's War." Colonel
Wadsworth implemented a system of controlling procurement costs by divid-
ing production of both small arms and cannon among federal armories and
private arsenals. When muskets were produced in various places with inter-
changeable parts, an accurate estimate of the cost of production was possible.
The cost of producing weapons in a government armory served as a "yard-
stick" by which to measure the cost of production by private contractors. This
was the origin of the distinctive feature of American arms production by
which weapons development and production is carried forth by a mixture
of federally owned armories and private firms. By contrast, militia units in
such states as Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky were very poorly
equipped.26
Supplies of provisions and clothing were less efficiently managed. The
system of providing army food had suffered severely during the Jeffersonian
frugality. It had become customary before the war for contractors to omit
parts of a consignment, such as candles or soap, and if necessary to bribe com-
manders to take delivery of the shipment. To stop this practice, the commis-
sary department attempted to force contractors to sign a binding agreement
and post a performance bond, but this method proved ineffective. Numerous
instances of the degraded quality form of profiteering were reported. Ship-
ments labeled "prime beef" turned out to be horsemeat, army bread was too
hard, and leaky barrels that spilled brine resulted in inedible pork. In perhaps
the most repulsive example in the history of degraded supplies, a frontier
doctor found excrement in a shipment of army bread.27
Improvements in the Quartermaster Corps were not sufficient to eliminate
fraud. In 1814 Colonel James Thomas, quartermaster general of the northern
army, and his assistant Michael T. Simpson overstated the cost of provisions
they procured. Because quartermasters customarily received a fee in the
amount of 2.5 percent of the sums expended, magnified prices resulted in sub-
stantial profits for the two men. Significantly, the discrepancy was discovered
when their accounts were audited, suggesting an improvement in managerial
techniques. On the day after Congress was notified of the discrepancy, a Re-
publican member called for an investigation of supply contracts. Representa-
tive Lewis Condict, a physician from New Jersey, demanded to know if any
funds had been "misapplied," if any supplies had been deficient or "unfit to
use," what was lost, and what was being done to recover it. In requesting such
an investigation, Condict anticipated numerous other legislative inquiries into
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arms procurement, including the Committee on the Conduct of the War of
1862-65, the Nye committee of 1934-36, and the Truman committee of World
War II. Condict's demand was rejected, and his quest for legislative account-
ability, like those of many of his successors, did not bear fruit.28
Congress attempted to even out the burden of the war through its system
of war taxes. The first war taxes were imposed by the Republican-dominated
Congress in 1812, and they sharply increased duties on imported goods. This
had a heavy impact on the Federalist cities of the North and East, who
protested loudly. The Republicans had traditionally been opposed to direct
taxation, but the war emergency, like so many others in American history,
forced them to revise their doctrine. At least two of the taxes were regional leg-
islation: a twenty cent per gallon tax on distilled spirits (heavier than the
"Whiskey Tax" that prompted rebellion in 1794) and a twenty cent per bushel
tax on imported salt. Both of these fell most heavily on southerners and west-
erners. The liquor tax was discriminatory because whiskey was the drink of
choice in their region, and the salt tax was discriminatory because interior
farmers had great need for salt but little access to it. The Republicans also
made a clear if rudimentary attempt at progressive taxation. Several luxury
taxes were imposed. These taxes would apply only to those who owned gold,
silver, and plated ware, gold and silver watches, fancy carriages, and expensive
furniture. In 1815 Treasury Secretary Alexander J. Dallas proposed adoption of
an income tax that would heavily impact the North and East, but he met with
no success.29
The tax structure made a halfhearted attempt to distribute the burden of
the war evenly, but the system of war finance offered some considerable gains
to its financiers. In March 1813, the Treasury Department sold notes in the
amount of $16 million. Unfortunately, these could not be sold at face value, as
they brought only $88 for every $100 bond. The 12 percent discount resulted in
a postwar gain of nearly $2 million to the purchasers. The primary beneficia-
ries were wealthy merchants who subscribed to two-thirds of the loan: David
Parish, Stephen Girard, and John Jacob Astor.30
A year later, Congress authorized loans in the amount of $25 million. In
May 1814, the Treasury sold $7.9 million in 6 percent bonds having a face
value of $100 but discounted to $88. The bankers extracted a promise that if
bonds were sold at a more favorable price later, the lower price must be made
retroactive. In August, the Treasury sold $2.5 million in 6 percent bonds dis-
counted to $80. According to the agreement, the Treasury was compelled to
give a rebate to the first purchasers. Therefore, the bankers loaned $10.4 mil-
lion for government obligations carrying a 20 percent discount. When the
notes were repaid after the war, the bankers realized a capital gain of $2.6 mil-
lion.31
The War of 1812 marked the climb to banking prominence of Stephen
Girard of Philadelphia, who used the occasion to achieve a place in the
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thriving ranks of great financiers. In early 1812 Girard formed a private, un-
chartered bank that met severe difficulty in gaining recognition in the nation's
banking community. Shrewdly perceiving an opportunity presented by the
Treasury Department's need to place war loans, Girard agreed to act as the
government's broker. This agency brought recognition and good profit to
Girard's bank, which continued to record comfortable profit margins for many
years after hostilities ceased.32 Girard thus pioneered a path that would be fol-
lowed eagerly and gainfully by later opportunists—W. W. Corcoran on the
next occasion and Jay Cooke during the Civil War.
Mr.Polk'sWar
America's war with Mexico was hotly debated, but its financial burden formed
only a minor part of the quarrel. In the euphoric days of Manifest Destiny,
war supporters believed that America was upholding revolutionary republi-
canism against the menace of benighted monarchism. Albert Gallatin, the
eighty-five-year-old former secretary of the treasury, was a lonely voice when
he decried the Mexican incursion on the ground of its economic cost.
Struggling against an impassioned tide of expansionism, Gallatin's pleas for
frugality fell on deaf ears.33 The war was cheap in relation to its predecessors,
and when the nation's gains were measured against the economic costs the war
imposed, it was among the most highly rewarding of America's many success-
ful military ventures. The 1840s were an inopportune time for the war profits
argument to thrive.
There were several reasons why the war profits question lay dormant
during the Mexican War. Although the war aroused vigorous disapproval, the
opposition was divided into two camps. Both groups condemned the aims of
the war, but they differed on its intrinsic evilness. The opponents generally
concurred that the United States was engaged in what the Rhode Island legis-
lature called a "war of conquest." The more moderate Whig critics simply as-
serted that the war was unwarranted aggression, unlawfully precipitated by the
Democratic president, James K. Polk. Speaking at Faneuil Hall in Boston in
November 1846, the Whig spokesman Daniel Webster contended (inaccu-
rately) that "the Mexican war is universally odious throughout the United
States." By censuring it as a "presidential war," Webster disclosed the basic
Whig strategy of emphasizing Polk's culpability as a bringer of war, as opposed
to accentuating the cost of the war.34
The more extreme critics asserted that Polk was carrying out a secret but
nonetheless recognizable plot to seize territory in order to facilitate the spread
of slavery. The "unhallowed object" of the war, declared a Presbyterian divine
from Ohio, was deeply sinister—the acquisition of land for the expansion of
slavery.35 Thus while both groups alleged that the war's ultimate objective was
economic gain—the conquest of territory and/or the preservation of slavery—
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neither alleged that the war's immediate purpose was direct personal profit.
The more moderate, politically astute Whig critics recognized the broad sup-
port the war attracted. They elected to focus their criticism on Polk's actions at
the inception of the war and generally to avoid attacks on the conduct of the
war itself. This shrewd choice was undoubtedly influenced by the presence at
the front of two commanders who were being considered for the Whig presi-
dential nomination: Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott.36 The cost of
the Mexican War thus became of secondary concern to the war's critics; the
political opponents preferred not to challenge the execution of Polk's war plan,
and the abolitionists had bigger fish to fry. Slavery was far worse than war profi-
teering, and the abolitionists would not fail to exploit any opportunity to vilify
the greatest evil of their day.
Although a matter of secondary concern during the Mexican War, war
profits nevertheless attracted some attention, largely but not exclusively from
the more radical war opponents. "War, wasting a nation's wealth, depresses the
great mass of the people," observed the transcendentalist reformer Theodore
Parker. "But [war] serves to elevate a few to opulence and power.... There is
one class of men who find their pecuniary advantage in it. I mean army con-
tractors, when they chance to be the favourites of the party in power." Other
abolitionists used the existence of war profits as an opening to undercut the
moderation of the Whig position. One line of argument held that so many
Americans were making money out of the war that the profits undercut any
inclination to consider and spurn the war's sordid purposes. Another line of
attack was that war profits showed that Polk alone could not be responsible for
the war's existence and continuation. "Did nobody vote for the supplies, and
are not supplies the sinews of war?" demanded another New England clergy-
man. A final abolitionist charge was that the conquest of additional slave soil
was motivated by an avaricious desire to drive up the price of slaves.37
If they had been so inclined, war critics would have had little difficulty
finding ample grist for controversy in the mobilization effort. The Mexican
War was America's first foreign campaign, and maneuvers at great distance
presented unusually disruptive supply problems. Until Congress approved a
declaration of war in May 1846, no special funds had been appropriated. The
War Department was then expected to supply no fewer than three armies of
invasion simultaneously. Each army was stationed about a thousand miles
from Washington, and each expected to stretch its supply line much farther.
Transportation therefore became a major part of the war's cost. The War
Department purchased massive quantities of ships, draft animals, and wagons,
and these caused sectoral shifts in the American economy that were potentially
controversial.38
Estimating the price of campaigning at great distances was extremely diffi-
cult. In the first eighteen months of the war, the Quartermaster Corps bought
11,529 horses, 22,907 mules, 16,288 oxen, 6,886 wagons, and 72 sailing and steam
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vessels. It also hired 300 wagons, 5,000 mules, and several hundred other wa-
tercraft. Purchases of this magnitude inevitably drove up prices. Surf boats
needed for General Winfield Scott's attack on Vera Cruz were budgeted to cost
$200 but eventually cost $950. Trading in used wagons became very active. In
Baltimore, used wagons that had cost $90 new could be sold to the army for
$150. There were reports of persons who speculated in used wagons making as
much as $600—a year's wages—in a single day.39
Along the Gulf Coast, military needs affected economic conditions dra-
matically. The quartermaster corps purchased or leased almost every vessel
available in New Orleans and Mobile, and some were "seaworthy" only by a
loose wartime definition. Although government agents tried to obtain the
lowest possible prices, the seller's market produced rates that were favorable
to the shipowners. By February 1847, more than 100 merchant vessels were
plying the Gulf under lease to the government, and while this development
was very advantageous to the shipowners it was unwelcome news for shippers.
New Orleans traders engaged in civilian commerce were throttled by the
shortage of shipping capacity, which caused shipping rates to double.40
Food prices fluctuated dramatically. In addition to the heavy military
demand, there were crop failures in Europe. Foreign sales of American agricul-
tural commodities, particularly in Britain and Germany, were exceptionally
strong. In Corpus Christi, a supply depot for the invasion of Mexico, corn
reached the unheard of price of $1.50 per bushel. Prices of most other provi-
sions also shot upward, but beef did not. With ample herds of beef cattle avail-
able in Texas, beef prices held stable at one cent to one and one-half cents per
pound. Salt pork, a staple of the military diet, was considerably more expen-
sive. A barrel of pork weighing 320 pounds sold for only $10 in St. Louis, but
shipping it to Santa Fe added $40 to the price, resulting in a final price of 15.63C
per pound. When army supply officers entered these unstable markets, they
became easy targets for critics. A Whig commentator maintained that "utter ig-
norance, waste and extravagance have marked all the arrangements." Most war
foes, nevertheless, were preoccupied with attacking Polk and the expansion of
slavery and did not pick up the scent of scandal.41
The Polk administration deftly skirted criticism of the procurement
process. Because he distrusted the bargaining abilities of naval officers, Polk
appointed Gideon Welles (who would later become famous as secretary of the
navy during the Civil War) to head the Naval Bureau of Provisions and
Clothing. Welles served efficiently as the navy's chief purchasing agent, and the
army was well served by capable officers in the quartermaster, commissary, and
ordnance departments.42 Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup demon-
strated his resourcefulness by relying heavily on army arsenals for the produc-
tion of war materiel. The federal arsenal at Watervliet, New York, hired 400
boys to manufacture musket cartridges, of which a million were under order.
An even more dramatic expansion of production occurred at the Philadelphia
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supply depot. The number of workers employed at Philadelphia increased
from 400 to 4,000 (many of them seamstresses), making it very likely the
largest manufacturing complex in the nation. Producing 500 different articles,
at peak production the depot sent the troops 12,000 pairs of shoes, 700 tents,
and 35,000 garments per month.43
With production under the control of the army itself, there was little room
for criticism in respect to extortionate pricing or quality degradation. The
army admitted that it paid its temporary workers a premium wage—which the
quartermaster general estimated at about one-third "too high"—but this
stirred no uproar. Still, the system was by no means foolproof. A shoe manu-
facturer holding a contract to supply the army with shoes at $1.05 per pair had
a shipment rejected for poor workmanship by a government agent at Phila-
delphia. The supplier then sold the unsatisfactory shoes to an intermediary,
who cleverly ferreted out another government buyer who agreed to accept the
entire lot at a price of $1.50 per pair.44
The peculiarities of a war with Mexico affected the war profits problem
in other ways. Since the Mexican ocean fleet was of negligible size, there was
little chance for profit in privateering. U.S. naval officers were able to relieve
the boredom of blockade duty and to find financial opportunity by enforcing
the ban on slave trading. In 1846 the USS Yorktown captured the slaver Pons,
resulting in a lucrative distribution. Half the prize money went directly to the
officers of the Yorktown, and the other half was set aside for their pension
fund.45
President Polk elevated and semilegitimized the ancient art of plunder by
announcing that "it is the right of conquerors to levy contributions." He then
directed the army to commandeer Mexican property to offset war costs. An
early report by Secretary of War William L. Marcy estimated that "captured
property" confiscated from the Mexicans carried a value of $3,840,000. (The
money went into the army's general purpose fund.)46 The flow of goods was
not entirely one way, however. Since most of the supplies for General Scott's
invasion force were purchased in Mexico, the Mexican economy received a
welcome influx of specie. When the American army withdrew from Vera Cruz
in 1848, it disposed of many of its animals and much of its supplies at public
auction. A number of criticisms were expressed about the prices obtained for
the American equipment—one ship, the Saint Louis, was sold for scrap for
$500—but the Mexican markets were too far off to stir much contention in the
United States.47 The war had been far too successful to permit much quibbling
about a few disadvantageous sales to the conquered.
Although little was made of it at the time, the Mexican War was lavishly
valuable to its financiers. When the war commenced, the U.S. Treasury was
running a hefty surplus resulting from income from a protective tariff. The
Democratic Party was committed to reducing the tariff, which it accomplished
in 1847. (The Walker tariff, the only major wartime tax cut in American
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history, probably helped neutralize complaints about wartime gains.) Having
cut taxes, in order to finance the war the Polk administration was forced to
borrow. In 1847-48 the Treasury sold bonds totaling $34 million in two issues.
The major player in the bond purchase was the Washington banking firm of
Corcoran and Riggs, which had close ties to Secretary of the Treasury Robert J.
Walker and other influential Democrats. Smaller shares went to the banking
house of E. W. Clark and Co. of Philadelphia and to other firms.48
After the bankers contracted to purchase the Treasury bonds, their role was
to resell them on the open market. As they anticipated, they were able to resell
most of the bonds at a higher price, turning a tidy profit. In 1847, W. W.
Corcoran, the senior partner in Corcoran and Riggs, received $281,000 as his
share of the firm's profits on the war loans. In 1849 his earnings were another
$130,000. Jay Cooke, then a junior partner in the Clark firm, did less well, but
he would go on to augment his fortune and gain notoriety as the financier of
the Civil War. By contrast, an army private received $8 per month, or $96 per
year (plus subsistence). Even a colonel's pay was only $75 per month, or $900
per year.49 Corcoran, the war's financier, thus achieved an income in 1847
nearly three thousand times as large as that of a combat soldier. That he could
do so without attracting critical comment exemplified the dedication of the
Jacksonians to the concept of unfettered economic individualism.
4-
The "Shoddyocracy"
Shoddy coats, shoddy shoes, shoddy blankets, shoddy horses, shoddy arms, shoddy
ammunition, shoddy boats, shoddy beef and bread, shoddy bravery.... We can vie
with any people who ever practised the great art of knavery.. . . Men .. . should
carry a scarlet'S' upon the forehead, much more prominent than the 'A' on the
breast of poor Hester Prynne.
HENRY MORFORD, THE DAYS OF SHODDY: A NOVEL OF THE GREAT
REBELLION OF 1861 (1863)
Within weeks after Confederate siege guns forced the capitulation of Fort
Sumter, rumors of scandal in the War Department began to circulate. By the
first Christmas of the war, these accusations reached a crescendo. "The record
is a sad and gloomy one," pronounced the New York Herald, the nation's largest
newspaper. Of the first $200 million spent on the war, the Herald maintained,
$50 million had been "dishonestly pocketed."1
For a century thereafter, the history of Northern mobilization has been
presented as a kind of morality play. Saving the Union and ending slavery were
noble accomplishments, the story went, but providing the tools of victory gave
rise to rampant corruption. Greed on the home front became an inglorious
but oft-repeated counterpoise to the sacrifice of the troops at the front.
Partisan charges taken from a deeply divided Romantic era substituted for a
measured historical account, with Progressive historians being notably meticu-
lous in repeating the wartime allegations.2 In his muckraking 1907 account,
History of the Great American Fortunes, Gustavus Myers told of "indiscriminate
plundering," "stupendous corruption," and "shameless frauds." "The Federal
armies," Myers charged, "were . . . the helpless targets of the profit mongers of
their own section who insidiously slew great numbers of them—not, it is true,
out of deliberate lust for murder, but because the craze for profits crushed
every instinct of honor and humanity, and rendered them callous to the ap-
palling consequences."3 In the aftermath of the Great War, Myers's charges
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were echoed and expanded by Fred A. Shannon, A. Howard Meneely, and
others. The sparse rank of dissenters included R. Gordon Wasson, Russell F.
Weigley, and J. Matthew Gallman.4
Steeped in controversy, like the conflict itself, the issue of war profits
during the Civil War remains unresolved. A careful investigation of the Union
mobilization effort (the Confederate side is not a part of the present discus-
sion) discloses a degree of complexity that has not been sufficiently examined.
Most writers who have described the scale of corruption have based their as-
sessment on the improvised, haphazard procedures of the early days of the war
rather than on an examination of the full record of the conflict. Although chi-
canery was never absent, profits accruing to military contractors and others
derived largely from the massive, unprecedented disruption of the civilian
economy at the commencement of hostilities; from the unplanned, hell-for-
leather mobilization; from the rudimentary nature of a state-based arms pro-
curement system; and from the war's unexpected and unpredicted duration.
"Few .. . know or can appreciate the actual condition of things . . . in those
days," remembered Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles of the desperate situ-
ation in 1861. "Nearly sixty years of peace had unfitted us for any war, but the
most terrible of all wars, a civil one, was upon us, and it had to be met."5
The War for the Union was a transitional experience in respect to technol-
ogy and tactics, but it also modified war mobilization. The groping methods of
the early months gradually gave way to more systematic procedures as a corps
of able managers rose to power. This expansion of administrative capacity—
what Frank E. Vandiver called the ascendancy of "democratic militarism"—
was part of an organizational augmentation that was under way throughout
the Union government.6 The resourceful administrators included civilians and
soldiers holding key executive posts in various departments (such as Secretary
of War Edwin M. Stanton, Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs, and
de facto Chief of Ordnance Captain George T. Balch) 7 Aided by increased con-
gressional scrutiny, they boldly streamlined the procurement process, most by
shifting contracting from the states to the federal government. These measures
reduced, but could not eliminate, the incidence of profiteering.
The Civil War was also a transitional episode in respect to opportunities
for financial gain. While the principal forms of profit seeking that stirred con-
troversy continued to be extortionate pricing and degraded quality, the war
also produced contention over several older types of profiteering that would
decline or disappear in the twentieth century: plunder, privateering, trading
with the enemy, and bounty jumping.
The transitional nature of the war is revealingly illustrated by inconsistent
policies governing plundering. Naval officers were allowed to receive a mone-
tary prize for capturing enemy ships or property, as was traditional, but army
officers were banned from these gains. In another striking example, in 1863
Lincoln's cabinet debated whether to recommence the hoary practice of priva-
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teering. Secretaries William H. Seward and Salmon P. Chase of the State and
Treasury Departments wanted to issue letters of marque to permit private ves-
sels to interdict Confederate ocean commerce, but Gideon Welles and Attorney
General Edward Bates objected, arguing that privateering would antagonize
Britain and would not significantly dent Confederate trade. They eventually
compromised by deciding to commission private vessels into the navy.8
As the war lengthened, these traditional varieties of profiteering were modi-
fied and complicated by the implementation of advanced technology. The in-
dustrial revolution introduced to the military environment such technological
advances as railroads, steamships, and machine tools. Along with several new
and more complex weapons, these machines opened fresh opportunities for
profit making that would remain at the center of the profiteering controversy
in the twentieth century. These modern modes of war profiteering included
patent royalties, stock market speculation, and gains in executive income. To
reduce the new and numerous manifestations of war wealth, the War Depart-
ment and the Civil War Congress devised control mechanisms that were ex-
perimental then but that would flourish in later wars: a federal income tax,
renegotiated pricing, and prosecution for fraud in war contracts.
Besides its military-political qualities, the War for the Union was also a
transforming cultural event, and it denoted the emergence of profiteering as a
minor but enduring theme in American fiction. Henry Morford, an author
whose goal was to "stamp the human vipers with infamy," became the first
American novelist to employ profiteering as a major theme. In an otherwise
unmemorable 1863 yarn, The Days of Shoddy, Morford invented Charles Holt,
a conniving New York merchant, as the prototypical fictional profiteer. While
daydreaming during a church service immediately following the assault upon
Fort Sumter, Holt plots to sell shoddy cloth to the army. His scheme succeeds
spectacularly, and he becomes vulgarly opulent. Olympia, his alcoholic and
adulterous wife, personifies by her debauched morality and coarse manners
the commercial class the war allegedly spawned. This group of loathsome
profiteers would become known as the "shoddy aristocracy" or, more simply,
the "shoddyocracy." It was a metaphor for Civil War business itself.9
During the first three months of the Civil War, effective planning of the Union
war effort was crippled by a fundamental misunderstanding about the enor-
mity of the conflict.10 When the chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, only a month
after the beginning of what would turn out to be a major war, disposed of
5,000 carbines at a bargain price, he made a costly blunder. For this mistake
and others General James W. Ripley was dubbed "Ripley Van Winkle." In
Ripley's defense, he was acting under a widely shared assumption that the
rebellion would be short-lived and that the army would not grow beyond
250,000 men.11 In April 1861, optimists estimated that the rebellion would be
crushed within ninety days, whereas pessimists thought that victory might
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take six months or a year. The New York Herald placed the expected cost of the
war at $i5O-$2oo million.12
Of course, all these estimates were grossly inaccurate—low by a factor of
eight. In the early weeks of the war, this misapprehension seriously hampered
defense procurement, as there is a great difference between preparing to fight
a three-month rebellion and organizing for a major war that might last for
several years. The U.S. Army eventually grew to 1,700,000 men, not a quarter-
million, and the Civil War ended up as the most rushed mobilization in
American history.13
Because the rebellion was expected to be short-lived, the War Department
delayed sponsoring new arms factories, and the Navy Department elected to
lease ships rather than to build them. Forecasting the length of wars is a no-
toriously inexact art, and mistakes continued throughout the Civil War. In
December 1861, when the war had already far outlasted early predictions,
Salmon P. Chase estimated its cost at $475 million based on an expected fur-
ther duration of one more year. In September 1863, a year and a half early, the
New York Herald confidently announced that "the rebellion is now drawing to
a close."14
A second problem originated in the peculiar location of the rebellion. The
city of Washington was nestled in an area harboring numerous disloyal citi-
zens, and for good reason the Lincoln administration presumed that some civil
servants were disloyal and might give military secrets to the rebels. (In June
1861, when an oath of loyalty was administered to one hundred clerks in the
War Department, twenty refused to take it.)15 To prevent the transmission
of military information to the enemy, the Union government preferred to
locate defense procurement in the more loyal states until the capital could be
cleansed of treason.
During the colonial period, and particularly during the Revolution, mili-
tary procurement had been largely a state function. State militias remained in
existence, and each had a quartermaster whose responsibility was purchasing
war materiel. Most were located closer to the centers of defense production
than was the War Department in Washington. Communication lines from
Washington to the loyal regions necessarily passed through rebel territory,
where they were subject to disruption or interception. For all these reasons, the
Union war effort initially concentrated on state-level purchasing. There was a
distinct resemblance to the mobilization for the Revolution, in which states
played the major role.
Shoddy Uniforms
State-level purchasing led to the first major procurement scandal of the Civil
War, an episode that caused the conflict to gain a reputation for having an un-
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usually high level of profiteering. This was a case of the degraded quality type
of profiteering, and it involved the purchase by the State of New York of uni-
forms for its volunteer troops. Some of these uniforms were hastily sewn of
poor-quality cloth that deteriorated quickly, causing much embarrassment to
New Yorkers but no significant damage to the war effort.
The story begins on Friday, 26 April 1861, just two weeks after the fall of
Fort Sumter and President Lincoln's subsequent call for troops to suppress the
rebellion. The New York Military Board, which included such prominent
Republican politicians as Governor Edward D. Morgan and Treasurer Philip
Dorsheimer, met in Albany and awarded a contract for the manufacture of
12,000 army uniforms to the clothing firm of Brooks Brothers of New York
City. On the next day, Brooks Brothers hired 125 cutters and 5,000 hands. By
the following Friday, 5,000 uniforms were completed, and the rest were fin-
ished soon afterward.16
There were numerous problems with the Brooks Brothers contract.
Although the contract was opened to competitive bidding, potential suppliers
were given only twenty-four hours to prepare and submit their bids. Robert
Freeman, the agent for Brooks Brothers, improperly obtained prior knowledge
that gave his firm an unfair advantage, and the wife of the state treasurer who
signed the contract received a new dress as a gift from the contractor. Although
the contract was for a large number of uniforms, Brooks Brothers did not
divide it among other clothing firms, which would have hastened completion
and avoided jealousy. Brooks Brothers submitted its winning bid at $20.00 per
garment, but Governor Morgan forced a reduction only to $19.50, even though
subsequent contracts would be made at $i8.oo.v
The most telling charges concerned the quality of material and workman-
ship. When Brooks Brothers discovered that the supply of regulation army
woolen cloth in New York City was insufficient to complete the order, the firm
requested and obtained permission from the Military Board to substitute
other available materials—petersham satinet, felt, mixed cassimere, and mixed
coating. Some of this cloth was of inferior quality, even partially decayed, and
it deteriorated rapidly. The lower-grade material was known in the garment
industry as "shoddy," but only a trained eye could tell it from superior grades.
The construction of the uniforms also bore the mark of great haste. Some gar-
ments were badly cut and ill-fitting; others were missing buttons, and some
lacked button holes. Many wore poorly: some ripped open when first put on,
and others lasted only a few days or a few weeks. This forced combat-eager re-
cruits to spend a great deal of time mending their clothing. The New York
Volunteers presented a ragged, unsoldierly appearance, and they were mocked
by men from other states. This was a great embarrassment both to the recruits
and to their patrons, many of whom imagined that the Civil War would
amount to little more than a dress parade, a show of force, and a great victory
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celebration. Because each soldier was required to pay for his own uniform
from a clothing allowance, the gallant volunteers of '61 would also be forced to
bear the shameful cost themselves.18
The actual extent of the scandal was a matter of dispute. Brooks Brothers
claimed that of 36,000 uniforms the firm manufactured in 1861, only 500 were
damaged goods. The lieutenant governor of New York claimed that the
"greater part" were substandard. After an extensive investigation by the New
York state legislature, Brooks Brothers agreed to replace 2,350 uniforms, worth
about $45,000. This action partially compensated the state for the firm's two
discreditable actions. Brooks Brothers should never have shipped thousands of
damaged garments, and when it substituted a cheaper grade of cloth, it should
have granted a reduction in price. Asked by a state legislator how much money
he had made by the substitution, Elisha Brooks replied evasively and reveal-
ingly: "I think I cannot ascertain the difference without spending more time
than I can now devote to that purpose."19
Although Brooks Brothers had behaved improperly in its discharge of the
uniform contract, the matter hardly deserved the notoriety it received, as some
contemporaries understood.20 The terms shoddy aristocracy and often simply
shoddy became generic terms representing all who made profits on war con-
tracts. The first use, and certainly the most extensive use, of the word shoddy as
meaning defense contractors rather than a kind of cloth was by the large and
influential New York Herald,™ which had a partisan reason for doing so. Its
editor, James Gordon Bennett, had a strong dislike for the merchant classes of
New York City, for the Republican Party, and for the early war policy of the
Lincoln administration. The Herald implied that shoddy was synonymous with
the Lincoln wing of the GOP and that Lincoln was a "shoddy candidate." The
newspaper also disliked the use of shoddy in cloth, because it allegedly drove
up the price of newsprint, which was then made of rags. The price of paper
rose 100 percent in the first year of the war, and Bennett, who was probably the
largest purchaser of newsprint in the country, said that papermakers were
among the worst of the war profiteers.22
The Brooks contract offered an ideal opportunity to lambaste the alleged
rascals. The contract was let improperly by the highest officers of the state,
Republicans all. Besides Governor Morgan and Treasurer Dorsheimer,
Thurlow Weed, a high Republican leader and rival editor whom Bennett re-
garded as personifying the antichrist, played an important but hidden role in
securing the contract for Brooks Brothers. The inspectors who approved the
uniforms were also influential Republican merchants. The chief of these was
George Opdyke, who was to run successfully (against Bennett's strong opposi-
tion) for the office of mayor of New York in 1862. Before the war the Herald
had routinely denounced New Yorkers who had been born to wealth (the
"Knickerbocker Aristocracy") and who had made their money in fishing (the
"Codfish Aristocracy") or in fiber (the "Cotton Aristocracy"). Now it poured
vitriol on the "Shoddy Aristocracy."23
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There were few limits to the Herald's scorn. It reported that because of
shoddy uniforms, New York troops were "half-naked" and that "it is by such
contracts as these that the life-blood is being sucked out of the nation by the
vampires." It claimed that "politicians . . . have been delving in the shoddy
pool, bathing in its filthy waters,... but instead of cleansing them of their lep-
rous spots it has covered them with slime that will hang to them during their
natural lives." The Herald charged that Fifth Avenue brownstones that had
become vacant were now filling with families fattened by war profits. Their
homes contained shoddy carpets ("brilliant colors and little wool"), shoddy
pianos ("all case and no music"), shoddy portraits ("all paint and no like-
ness"), and even shoddy toys ("dead, pink-eyed rabbits"). The shoddy aristoc-
racy allegedly employed shoddy cooks ("more French than skillful"), served
shoddy wines ("with all their excellence on the label"), and drove shoddy
horses ("prance more than they go"). When the shoddy aristocracy attended
the opera, they supposedly applauded at the wrong time, wore excessive
makeup, and even looked through the wrong end of their opera glasses. In jus-
tice, the Herald demanded, the shoddy aristocracy "ought to be repenting in
State prisons instead of living in brownstone fronts."24
Despite the extremism of the charges, the label stuck. "Far and wide," re-
ported a New York investigating committee," [the Brooks Brothers contract]
has become the subject of grave discussion, and the clothing which was fur-
nished under it is now only known to the people by the term of'shoddy.'" A
private wrote home from the front that "shoddycracy is pretty large in New
York, they say, the hideous offspring of the monster war." And Harper's Weekly
reported a visit to a Fifth Avenue brownstone inhabited by "Mr. Shoddy" and
"Mrs. Shoddy," who supposedly had made $195,000 in two weeks. The former
was "a huge Titan in dancing attire—a flabby villainous countenance—
diamonds flashing from the center of a wall of ruffled linen—an atmosphere
heavy with pomade." Mrs. Shoddy wore "intensely blue silk, and a huge coro-
net of pink and purple artificial flowers." She used ain't, and she substituted
Jigger for finger, parler for parlor, and reg'lar for regular. Their home was deco-
rated by "abominable, showily framed paintings" by a cheap "Western artist"
whose name the Shoddies could not remember. Although the "Shoddies" were
fictional, the image of Civil War defense contractors as vulgar nouveaux riches
was real and lasting. The Brooks Brothers contract incident was paralleled by a
similar episode in Philadelphia that led to charges and investigations of crony-
ism, inferior quality, and fraud.25
Railroads
A second early war scandal that received great notoriety concerned the trans-
portation of troops by rail. Again, the unfortunate location of the nation's
capital played a role. In early 1861 it was vital that the government rush rein-
forcements into Washington to prevent the Confederates from capturing the
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capital. There were only two rail connections to the North: the Baltimore and
Ohio ran east of the city to Baltimore and then north, and the Northern
Central ran more directly north to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where it con-
nected to trunk lines. There was an emergency need for passenger transpor-
tation on these lines, and Secretary of War Simon Cameron, whose family
owned the Northern Central, had the responsibility of deciding how much of
it would flow over his family's track and at what price. Under the emergency
conditions pertaining, a conflict of interest was unavoidable.
The transportation of soldiers during the Civil War proved to be a lucrative
and controversial business. Three years before the outbreak of the war, officers
of western roads had met secretly and agreed not to transport troops for any-
thing less than first-class fares and not to allow the troops to carry with them
any more than eighty pounds of baggage. In June 1861, there was further evi-
dence of overcharging on troop transportation. Governor Andrew G. Curtin of
Pennsylvania discovered wide variation in the price of transporting his state's
volunteers: some roads were charging three cents per passenger per mile (the
"local" rate), and others were charging only two and one-fourth or two and
one-half cents (the "through" rate).26 On June 4, Governor Curtin assembled
delegates from twenty-one lines in Harrisburg in an attempt to settle on a
standard rate. Against the opposition of Cameron's Northern Central, the con-
vention set the rate at two cents per passenger-mile. The roads also agreed that
military freight would be charged "local" rates, which were also more expen-
sive than "through" rates. This was to the railroads' advantage because freight
transportation was generally more profitable than passenger transportation.27
Governor Curtin's convention, which reached a voluntary, government-
encouraged agreement establishing standards for an entire industry, set a
precedent for federal policy. It anticipated the practices of the War Industries
Board during World War I and the associationalism advocated by Herbert
Hoover during the 1920s. In another harbinger of the controversies of the
World War I era, the Lincoln administration initiated the employment of busi-
nessmen on a temporary, unpaid basis for the period of the war emergency—
a kind of prototype of the "dollar-a-year" man.
Secretary Cameron appointed as his assistant for railroad matters a vice
president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Thomas A. Scott, who only took a leave
of absence rather than resign his position because the rebellion was not ex-
pected to last long. Scott thus incurred a direct conflict of interest: while still a
railroad executive, he was also serving as an agent of the government.
Although the term conflict of interest had not yet gained currency, Scott
became a target of criticism for bearing competing responsibilities. The New
York Times protested that "a public official should be . . . unsuspected and
above suspicion." Noting that Scott received a salary of $9,000 as a railroad ex-
ecutive but only $3,000 as a government official, the Times loftily declared that
"the virtue of the public officer should never be subjected to unnecessary
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temptation."28 Although this rhetoric was reminiscent of the American
Revolution, such an arrangement would not have been protested then. During
World War I such arrangements were common, but by World War II they
would not be acceptable.
Disregarding his critics, Scott assumed responsibility to work out a stan-
dard rate schedule for military rail transportation. The first consideration was
the price of shipping into the capital. The Baltimore and Ohio, whose officers
were widely suspected of having Confederate sympathies, held a monopoly
of traffic from Baltimore to Washington. The B&O charged the government
three and three-fourths cents per mile for transporting troops into the city,
which was well above the two-cent rate charged by the Pennsylvania roads. For
the entire New York to Washington trip, the B&O price was six dollars per sol-
dier. Cameron and Scott forced the B&O to cut this to four dollars, but only
by rerouting traffic along the Pennsylvania Railroad to Harrisburg, where
it picked up the Cameron-owned Northern Central. Of course, this opened
both Cameron and Scott to charges of nest-feathering at their competitors' ex-
pense. The B&O did not suffer; before the war commenced, it ordinarily ran
eight cars per day into Washington. Within a year, traffic increased to 400 cars
per day.29
On July 7,1861, Assistant Secretary Scott issued a directive that would es-
tablish the standard nationwide rate schedule for rail transportation for the
entire war. Scott's letter set the price that the government would pay at two
cents per passenger per mile (the same as the state of Pennsylvania rate). In the
manner of countless other bureaucrats, Scott attempted to soften his edict, tes-
tifying that he intended the two-cent figure to be "a guide and maximum
amount." His letter belied his claim, as it simply ordered War Department
agents to "please observe the following as a general basis" when it settled upon
two cents.30
At this price, troop transportation was very attractive to northern rail-
roads. The cost to the roads of troop transportation was not commonly re-
vealed, but one executive of Cameron's Northern Central testified that the
figure generally used in estimating the cost of passenger traffic for long dis-
tances was one and one-third cents per mile. However, if freight cars were
used, as was often the case with troops, the cost was customarily estimated at
nine mills per mile.31 Therefore, the markup for army traffic was generous—
from 50 to 122 percent.
The railroads maintained that there were certain disadvantages to military
business that justified these prices. Because troop trains left on short notice,
extra conductors and telegraphers had to be employed. The young warriors
were allegedly hard on equipment: their bayonets tore headliners, their knives
cut cushions and upholstery, and if they were carried in freight cars, they
gouged holes in the wall for ventilation. Soldiers often pilfered from other
freight cars, especially if they carried tobacco or cheese. Troop trains had
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priority, which delayed freight trains, and troop transfers were usually one-way
journeys, which required deadheading on the return trip. Although these ar-
guments undoubtedly had some merit, their validity was doubtful.32
Proof that these nuisances were not overly burdensome materialized when
railroads moved aggressively to obtain as much military business as possible.
Because the War Department paid a flat rate per soldier per mile, the most
profitable contracts were those that carried large numbers of soldiers long
distances. In practice, this meant the transportation of western regiments to
Washington. The competition for western military business was very active.
To carry a 1,000-man regiment in the Union army required approximately
eighteen passenger cars and seven luggage cars, or about two trains. A railroad
would charge the government about $14,200 for the 714-mile trip from
Chicago to Harrisburg, and about $4,700 of this would be profit. In order to
obtain this payment, railroad executives were willing to pay generous bribes to
regimental officers—approximately $i,ooo-$i,5oo per regiment. The Sixth
Wisconsin, which would distinguish itself in combat at Antietam, Fred-
ericksburg, and Gettysburg, had a rather inglorious arrival. Its commander,
Colonel Lysander Cutler, admitted that he accepted a $400 payment from the
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago to route his regiment along that line.
Other colonels accepted substantially more. The Michigan Southern paid be-
tween $5,000 and $8,000 to obtain military business.33
Swollen railroad profits in the early months of the war prompted the gov-
ernment to take action in February 1862. It called a convention of the major
lines to work out a freight rate schedule. The contest again centered on "local"
vs. "through" rates. Scott's schedule of July 1861 required only a slight reduction
in rates for the longer distances—about 25 percent. A number of critics
charged that the difference should have been much greater. Scott disagreed,
but at least one railroad general superintendent testified that "through" prices
were about 50 percent too high.34
The result was a compromise: passenger rates would continue at two cents
per person per mile, and government freight would be carried at prices that
were 10 percent below published schedules. In return, the government agreed
not to encourage "harsh competition." In this matter, the Lincoln administra-
tion anticipated the decision of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to set aside
antitrust prosecutions for the duration of World War II. In 1862 Congress ap-
proved the Railroad Act, which empowered the government to take over rail-
road lines if the public safety required. This gave the government a powerful
weapon that anticipated the takeover of railroads during World War I and the
control of business by the Office of Price Administration during World War II.35
Owing to these congenial agreements, nearly all Northern railroads were
quite profitable during the early period. The war-stimulated economy pro-
duced huge volumes of business for the east-west lines, which benefited most
firms. There were few north-south lines in 1861, and while they were more
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likely to be ravaged than east-west lines, they were still able to remain healthy.
In the first six months of the war, profits of most businesses fell, but railroad
profits improved, in some cases dramatically. The total earnings of the eigh-
teen northern railroads that issued monthly reports improved from $26.8 mil-
lion in i860 to $29.5 million in the early months of the war. This was an overall
increase of 10 percent, although four roads lost money. Profits of Secretary
Cameron's Northern Central increased 44.5 percent in the first year of the war,
a fact which did not escape public notice and which certainly contributed to
his replacement. In Cameron's defense, however, he was placed in an impos-
sible position—the safety of the nation and his personal financial interests
were inextricably connected. Although his performance was less than sterling,
he did not quite deserve the opprobrium he received.36
Throughout the war, railroad profits were similarly impressive. The Penn-
sylvania Railroad increased its earnings from $5 million to $17 million (unad-
justed for inflation) over the period 1860-1865, and the New York Central
doubled its profits. Indiana lines that had been near bankruptcy recovered so
well that they could make repairs and also pay generous, even handsome, divi-
dends. In 1864 the Indianapolis to Terre Haute paid a stock dividend of 25 per-
cent, a regular cash dividend of 5 percent, and a special dividend of 5 percent.
Even the Baltimore and Ohio, whose location placed it in great jeopardy of de-
struction, recorded a total increase in investment from $31.6 million to $43.1
million. The B&O dividend, which its directors set at 6 percent from 1861 to
1863, improved to 7 percent in 1864 and 8 percent in 1865. Perhaps no company
was more fortunate, however, than the strategically located Philadelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore, whose profits increased from $236,000 in the
last full year of peace to $1,645,000 in the first full year of war—an increase of
452 percent. Railroad express companies, which had the important morale-
building role of carrying packages from home to the soldiers and the grisly
role of returning corpses from the front, were strategically situated to profit
from the conflict. American Express paid a 35 percent cash dividend and a 50
percent stock dividend in 1864.37
Shipping
The early war period produced confusion and controversy in the supply of an-
other kind of transportation services: shipping. The Union strategy was first to
impose a blockade of the Confederacy and later to invade it from the sea and
along the Mississippi River. This required a large and rapid enlargement of the
government's shipping capacity. This expansion was at first carried out in the
fashion that had been used during the Revolution, but this means proved too
costly and too controversial for the nineteenth century.
In the summer of 1861, the United States was a great maritime nation, own-
ing some four million tons of shipping. Nevertheless, the Navy Department
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lacked the ships needed to enforce the blockade and to transport troops. Navy
Secretary Gideon Welles moved quickly to expand the fleet, and like Secretary
Cameron in the War Department, Welles relied upon New Yorkers to carry out
the expansion. Welles's chief agent was George D. Morgan, an exceptionally
well connected individual who had ties both to Governor Edward D. Morgan
and to the secretary himself. George D. Morgan was the governor's cousin and
Welles's brother-in-law.38
The system that Welles employed for the purchase and lease of naval vessels
was borrowed from methods used in the ship brokerage business. It was also
quite similar to practices used in the American Revolution. The government
designated a person to be its purchasing agent, and he in turn received a com-
mission on each purchase or charter, in most cases 2.5 percent. Commissions
were irregular in the peacetime ship brokerage business, and 2.5 percent was
the customary rate. In 1861 the Navy Department's purchases were huge by
prior standards, and a commission of 2.5 percent was a very attractive plum. In
four and a half months George D. Morgan purchased eighty-nine ships for the
navy, receiving as his commission a total of $95,008—roughly as much as
President Lincoln earned in all four years in office. The government did realize
a substantial benefit from Morgan's service, since the total cost of the ships he
purchased was about $900,000 less than the owners' asking prices. While
Gideon Welles exercised good judgment when he employed an astute ship
broker as the navy's agent, it seems probable that knowledgeable advice could
have been obtained at lower cost. Following heavy congressional criticism,
Morgan left for an extended vacation in Europe.39
Several unfair charges were hurled at shipping agents. A congressional
committee investigating the Burnside expedition of 1862 charged Captain R. E
Loper with extracting exorbitant fees of 5 percent for chartering ships. In fact,
Loper charged no commission; he only charged 5 percent interest on his own
money, which he advanced to the lessors. Critics also often overlooked the
extremity of the emergency conditions. In 1862 John Tucker, the transporta-
tion agent of the War Department, chartered shipping for General George
McClellan's peninsular campaign. Tucker was later criticized for failing to ad-
vertise contracts. In rejoinder, Tucker described how he had been called into
Lincoln's office and told that each day's delay cost the government $1 million.
The president told Tucker directly that every hour of delay was more disas-
trous to the nation than was the loss of the money. Tucker pointed out that he
had notified shipowners verbally rather than publicly because verbal notice
protected military secrecy and was nearly as effective at spreading the news
as a written announcement. If the size of the fleet needed to transport
McClellan's invasion force—301 ships and 88 barges—had been made public,
the enemy would have been alerted to the plan. When McClellan's attack
failed, Tucker was directed to bring the army back from the peninsula so that
it could be placed between Lee and Washington. "Go," ordered Secretary
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Stanton, "and make the whole power of the War Department bend to bring-
ing that army away in the shortest possible time." In six days, 80,000 men,
27,500 animals, and 2,600 wagons and batteries were moved back to Wash-
ington. To accomplish this feat, Tucker chartered every ship available, all at
fixed prices.40 If Tucker had paused to negotiate prices, he would have been
highly irresponsible.
Another aspect of the shipping conundrum involved the price of charter-
ing merchant ships for military use. In 1861 a customary rate prevailed in New
York and Boston for chartering ships for commercial use. This was three to
four dollars per ton per month for a four- to five-month charter, with the
owner accepting the ordinary risk of loss at sea. A ship displacing 1,000 tons
would thus normally rent for $3,000 to $4,000 per month. In the summer of
1861, there was no shortage of ships in northern ports because business condi-
tions were depressed and because owners were unwilling to risk loss of the
ships to Confederate raiders. Nevertheless, agents for the Union government
paid five to six dollars per ton per month for three-month charters, with the
government accepting the risk of loss due to military action. This was about
40 percent above the market rate.41
Some of this excess cost resulted from bribes paid to government officials.
Lessors of ships sometimes surrendered part of their customary 2.5 percent
commissions to naval agents. Washington Libbey, a Boston ship contractor,
testified to a congressional investigating committee that he chartered his ship
Eliza and Ella to the navy for $3,600 per month. At 800 tons, the Eliza and Ella
normally brought $2,700. Libbey admitted that the extra $900 went to bribe
the naval agent. When he was asked, "Doesn't it look very much like cheating
the government?" Libbey replied, "Yes, sir."42
Another fraudulent stratagem involved the surreptitious sale to the navy of
ships personally owned by naval agents themselves. W. H. Starbuck, a ship
broker of New Bedford, Massachusetts, was employed by the navy to purchase
two whaling ships for a total of no more than $15,000. Starbuck located the
William Badger selling at $2,500 and the Roman selling at $4,000. He had an
accomplice purchase the two for the total of $6,500. Acting as the government's
agent, Starbuck then bought the two ships from his friend for $14,550, with the
two partners sharing the $8,050 gain. In addition, Starbuck pocketed a com-
mission of 7.5 percent on the purchase. The navy forced him to refund $6,i66.43
The extravagance in shipping costs in the early months of the war was ac-
tually more waste and inefficiency than it was theft. When officials proceeded
under the assumption that the rebellion would be short-lived, it made sense
for the government to lease ships rather than to purchase them. Frequently
ships were rented at expensive daily rates, and frequently there were delays
in sailing orders, as military strategy lacked firm direction. As a result, ships
sometimes accumulated embarrassing rental charges even before they left
port. In April 1861, the navy chartered the steamer Cataline for a fee of $10,000
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per month. Since the owners had only recently purchased the vessel for
$18,000 plus $5,000 for refitting, the fee was generously remunerative. In addi-
tion, the Cataline's owners extracted a promise from the government to pay
them $50,000 if the ship were lost. When the ship burned, rumors of arson cir-
culated. Whatever the cause of the fire, the owners turned a tidy $20,000 profit
in less than three months. The following year, the government charted the
steamship Marion for $1,000 per day. Since the ship had a value of $100,000,
this was reasonable for a short cruise. But the navy did not return the vessel for
168 days, thereby running up a rental bill that far exceeded the value of the
property.44
Much of this might have been corrected if the nature of the conflict had
been clear at the beginning. Once it became evident that the war would be
long and large, the government was in a better position to limit abuses. The
disastrous battle of Bull Run revealed the full extent of the struggle, and there-
after officials planned for a more extended period of strife. By November 1861,
the navy was driving a harder bargain. When it purchased the Mercedita,
the Navy Board forced a reduction in price from $135,000 to $100,000 and suc-
cessfully insisted upon a $15,000 refitting. Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Gustavus Vasa Fox gloated privately over the new circumstances: "They came
at us with the belief that we were prepared and willing to buy every steam-
boat at anybody's price, and they have found their error, and gnash their
teeth in bitterness and disappointment."45 If the navy could have proceeded
more deliberately early in the war, this reversal might have been accom-
plished sooner.
More serious than the charges of exorbitant prices for shipping was the
charge that ships sold or leased to the government were not seaworthy. This
was a most dangerous example of degraded quality in military supplies as it
could lead to defeat at sea and mass death. In 1862 the navy chartered fifty-one
ships to transport an expeditionary force commanded by General Nathaniel P.
Banks to New Orleans. One of these, the Niagara, nearly foundered, forc-
ing the crew to make an emergency port call. A full-scale investigation by
the Senate followed. Since Cornelius Vanderbilt, the largest shipowner in the
country, had chartered the ships, the controversy attracted much attention.
Nautical opinion on the seaworthiness of the Niagara differed dramatically,
with some witnesses pronouncing it safe and others finding it unsound. The
investigation did establish certain incontrovertible facts. The ship was twenty
years old and had been designed for passenger service on inland lakes. Gov-
ernment inspectors discovered serious rotting of its main beams. Although
there were 500 passengers aboard, the Niagara carried only 100 life preservers,
a clear violation of safety rules. Despite these defects, by the standards of the
1860s the ship was probably safe for lake voyages, except for the shortage of life
preservers. The vessel was not fit, however, to round Cape Hatteras in winter,
particularly when overloaded with soldiers and their gear.46
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The Niagara affair illustrates the difficulty of assigning blame for degraded
quality. The ship was certainly no bargain: its purchase price in 1862 was only
$10,000, although its owner claimed he spent another $8,000 to $10,000 to fit
her out. This included a coat of paint, leading to an allegation that he simply
painted over rotten beams. He leased her to the government for $400 per day,
a price that exceeded operating costs by about $300 per day. At this rate, the
owner would recover his investment in two months, assuming the vessel con-
tinued to float. Nevertheless, the greatest abuse arose from the danger to life
deriving from the ship's usage. The navy surely knew that it was dangerous to
send an aged and overloaded lake steamer to sea. But war entails risks, and in
this case, luckily, no lives were lost. Of fifty-one ships chartered for the penin-
sular expedition, none sank, and only one was investigated, despite numerous
charges of sinister behavior. Commodore Vanderbilt was exonerated of blame,
although some historians have doubted his innocence.47 Vanderbilt went on to
serve the Union faithfully, even presenting an expensive steamship (christened,
predictably, the USS Vanderbilt) to the navy.48
There are no verifiable cases of the loss of life due to unsafe ships in the
Civil War. There are, however, other verifiable cases of the misuse by the navy
of otherwise safe vessels.49 Insurance carriers were understandably averse to
underwriting voyages through narrow, crooked rivers guided by inexperienced
pilots. Rates were sometimes nearly astronomical: 33 percent of the ship's value
for the peninsular campaign of 1862, and as much as 10 percent per month for
other expeditions.5"
Fortifications
Many of the charges of fraudulent spending in the early war period were di-
rected toward the Department of Missouri, commanded by General John C.
Fremont. Missouri was vital to the Union cause: a slave state which controlled
important waterways, its loss to the Confederacy would have had a devastat-
ing, perhaps decisive, effect. Fremont was the most famed of the "political gen-
erals." The Republican nominee for president in 1856, he had a vast following
in the abolitionist wing of the party. In late July 1861, following the Union
defeat at Bull Run, Fremont believed that he was in great danger of losing the
state. "The rebels are advancing in force from the south," he wrote Secretary of
State William H. Seward. "We have plenty of men but absolutely no arms, and
the condition of the state critical."
Fremont's state of mind goes far to explain why charges were levied against
him. He believed that in order to save the state he had to hold St. Louis. To pro-
tect the city he ordered that fortifications be built at any cost. A contractor,
E. L. Beard, estimated that the city could be fortified for $315,000. Fremont ac-
cepted this offer on 4 September 1861, and Beard received an advance payment
of $171,000. He hired 4,000 men immediately by doubling prevailing wages.
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After spending $3,000 on lights, work went on night and day, and the fortifica-
tions were completed in thirty days. In a controversial decision, Fremont re-
leased an additional $151,000 to Beard only two days after construction
commenced, rather than waiting to pay upon completion. Beard later claimed
that his prices were "very fair," but he admitted that the contract "gave a good
profit" and cost two to three times as much to complete than if the work had
not been done in haste.51
There were other examples of needless waste in Fremont's command.
Colonel John Reeside, Fremont's inspector of horses, was paid a commission
of 2.5 percent of their price for inspecting them, or about three dollars a head.
In New York City, by contrast, the inspector of army horses received only fifty
cents. Since Reeside inspected about five thousand horses in the last five
months of 1861, he received about $15,000 instead of the $2,500 which the New
Yorker would have charged (a generous sum in itself). There were also many
charges of fraud, some of which were probably true, although this is difficult
to determine. For example, Fremont's chief quartermaster, Major (later
Brigadier General) Justus B. McKinstry, was court-martialed and convicted of
twenty-six violations of military regulations in connection with army con-
tracts in Missouri. Allegedly, McKinstry let contracts without advertising,
paid excessive prices, and dealt with middlemen. Most historians have ac-
cepted his guilt,52 but there is reason to doubt it. McKinstry incurred the ani-
mosity of the powerful Blair clan, which early sought his removal for failing
to purchase from their cronies. He came under heavy pressure to purchase
from Republicans alone, receiving a letter to this effect from Abraham Lincoln
himself, another from Secretary of War Simon Cameron, and six from Con-
gressman Frank P. Blair's son. When General Fremont ordered McKinstry to
purchase $750,000 worth of supplies without advertising, the quartermaster
refused. McKinstry was given little opportunity to prepare his defense for his
trial, and he had little support from Chief Quartermaster Montgomery Meigs,
a Blair ally.53
In any case, the expenditures were not sufficiently wasteful or corrupt to
merit the tone of criticism from Fremont's political opponents, who were far
from the scene and could hardly understand the depth of the emergency.
Unlike the situation elsewhere, the Missouri state government was unwilling to
assist the federal troops. On one occasion, Quartermaster McKinstry was or-
dered to buy 500 sets of cavalry equipage "tomorrow." On another, he was di-
rected to purchase clothing and equipment for twenty-seven regiments in two
weeks. Unadvertised purchases were also perfectly legal under some circum-
stances. An act of 1809 allowed unadvertised purchases "when immediate de-
livery is required by the public exigency."54 If ever there was such an exigency in
American history, it was certainly in Missouri in 1861. In June 1862, congress-
men approved legislation requiring written contracts, but one month later
they suspended their decision for the remainder of the year.55
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Nevertheless, one congressman declared that "a horde of pirates" was ruin-
ing the credit of the government. The New York Herald called Fremont the
"Great Mogul" and denounced him for "personal extravagances, rivaling that
of princes." (Fremont's headquarters were in an opulent mansion renting for
$6,000 per year.) The Herald claimed he wanted to establish the "kingdom of
Fremont the First." A more measured response came from the congressional
Committee on the Conduct of the War. "The exigencies of the department," it
reported, "were such that much should be pardoned in one compelled to act so
promptly, and with so little at his command." Fremont certainly spent extrava-
gantly, but had he spent excessively? His total expenditure was $12 million. Was
this too much to hold Missouri for the Union in 1861? Although some contem-
poraries and some Progressive historians deplored the waste, President Lincoln
was not greatly concerned. Secretary of War Cameron visited Fremont and cut
his spending, but when Lincoln replaced his commander in Missouri, it was
for military reasons. In a message to Congress, Lincoln declared, "I am not
aware that a dollar of the public funds . . . was either lost or wasted." In 1865,
when the emergency had passed and the political controversy had cooled, a
Senate committee quietly recommended payment for wagons ordered three
years earlier by Fremont without competitive bidding.56
Firearms
When the Civil War began, there were not enough modern weapons available,
either in the United States or anywhere else in the world, to fight a war of its
magnitude. The mobilization of Northern manpower was so rapid that
American and European manufacturers could not possibly meet the demand
for arms. Within four months, the U.S. Army grew from 17,000 men to
500,000—an increase of twenty-nine times.57 In these months, the acquisition
of rifles became a limiting factor on the extent of the slaughter. There was little
point in inducting more men until world armaments factories could tool up to
equip them. In 1861 and 1862, the Civil War occupied the entire capacity of the
American armament industry and much of the world's as well.
A year before hostilities opened, the War Department had shipped 105,000
rifles from Northern arsenals to Southern depots. When the fighting began,
Northern inventories of modern weapons were insufficient—there were only
about 60,000 up-to-date weapons among the 500,000 on hand.58 Before the
war, the government-owned Springfield armory produced about 10,000 rifles
per year. By doubling employment and operating almost round-the-clock,
ordnance chief James Ripley correctly estimated that production could be in-
creased to 3,000 weapons per month.59 Yet even at this rate, it would take the
Springfield armory an impossible twenty-eight years to arm a million-man
army. Ripley had no choice except to enlarge the army's procurement system,
which had traditionally relied on a mixture of public and private enterprise.
84 I WARHOGS
Civilian sources, both at home and abroad, would now become the corner-
stone of arms production.
Thousands of rifles were imported from Europe, with both state and fed-
eral governments pursuing the overseas arms supply. In August 1861, the State
of New York contracted with the firm of Schuyler, Hartley, and Graham for the
purchase of 10,000 English-made Enfield rifles "at the lowest practicable price,
and in the shortest time, and of the best quality."60 The difficulty was that sev-
eral American agents (and sometimes the enemy) might be bidding upon the
same lot of weapons simultaneously. This led to charges of price extortion.
Because arms agents customarily received a commission based on a percentage
of the funds they disbursed, it was also alleged that they sustained the bidding
war for selfish reasons.61
In November 1861, after the immediate emergency had diminished,
Secretary Cameron attempted to take control of the situation by asking war
governors to stop sending purchasing agents to compete with federal officials.
The governors agreed, but coordination remained imperfect. Nearly a year
later, an auction of firearms included as bidders agents of the War Department
and the states of Missouri, Indiana, Massachusetts, and New York. Yet even at
the peak of the tight market, the ability of foreign arms dealers to play off a
state government against federal authorities was never unlimited. An importer
of Enfield rifles attempted to extract a better price from the federal govern-
ment by asserting that Pennsylvania had bid 25 percent more. Governor Curtin
disavowed this offer, and the federal agent held firm.62
The U.S. government gradually became shrewd in dealing with foreign
suppliers. Even during the tumultuous conditions of 1861, the War Depart-
ment did not lose all ability to negotiate prices; Assistant Secretary Tom Scott
drove down the price of 10,000 French muskets by $6 per weapon by refusing
to meet a dealer's asking price.63 In 1862 Secretary of War Stanton sent to
Europe Marcellus Hartley, a thirty-five-year-old New York dealer in sporting
arms who knew the overseas markets intimately. Upon arriving in England,
Hartley found that a cartel of gunmakers formed as the Small Arms Company
had nudged the price of rifles to monopoly levels. Under normal market con-
ditions Enfields would sell at prices of 42 to 45 shillings ($12.13 to $i3.oo),64 but
the Small Arms agreement had nearly doubled the price to 80 shillings. By
shrewd maneuvering and by declaring that he would pay no more than 50
shillings, Hartley broke the ring and eventually cut down the price to an aver-
age of 45 shillings. By December 1862, Hartley had purchased 204,848 rifles
worth about $2.7 million. "In London and Liege I cleaned the market out,"
he reported to Stanton. "It has required care and caution to push the manufac-
turers to this unusual quantity, without materially advancing the price."65
According to accepted custom, Hartley could have expected a 2.5 percent com-
mission on his purchases, which would have amounted to about $66,ooo.66
Hartley asked compensation only for his expenses, however.
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A factor that affected the price of foreign arms to the great advantage of
European arms dealers was the desire of the Union leaders to purchase
weapons at whatever price was necessary to keep them out of the hands of
Confederate agents. Since the Confederates had limited ability to manufacture
weapons themselves, their only hope of obtaining them was by foreign pur-
chase. The North had much more ready cash than the South, and it could use
this effectively to buy up the world supply of military arms and thus deny
weapons to the enemy. The War Department attempted to keep this purpose
secret in order not to enhance the world price of guns, but its ability to conceal
its intentions was undoubtedly meager.67
To obtain arms from private establishments, the army devised an innova-
tive form of contracting: incentive pricing. Under this system, and in accord
with established military practice, a contractor's ability to deliver quickly took
precedence over price. Ripley's first step was to make a baseline estimation of
the cost of manufacturing standard military weapons—Springfield rifles or
cavalry sabres, for example. Since the army manufactured rifles itself, this was
not difficult, and Ripley calculated the expense of producing a rifle at $13.93
and of forging a sabre at $4.53 (exclusive of charges for the cost of land, build-
ings, and machinery). After establishing baseline prices, Ripley recommended
that "a liberal profit on the cost should be allowed."68
Translated, this meant that the government would pay twenty dollars per
rifle or seven dollars per sabre. This price was intended to be sufficiently at-
tractive to encourage new firms to enter the market and old firms to tool up
for production. The Bureau of Ordnance let dozens of contracts to produce
rifles at the twenty dollar figure. These contracts typically were for 50,000
weapons to be delivered by 1 January 1862. In September 1861, Ripley also
awarded a contract to produce 1,000 cavalry sabres per week at seven dollars
each. If the contractor could produce 20,000 in twelve weeks, he would receive
a fifty cent bonus on each blade.69 Ripley certainly knew that not all its con-
tractors could possibly deliver on their promises, but he evidently hoped that
some of them could do so.
In practice, none of the rifle contractors succeeded in fulfilling their con-
tracts. The reason was that these contracts created a massive run on machine
tools used to manufacture firearms. One contractor alone, the Trenton Arms
Company, ordered forty-four milling machines, eleven boring machines, four
screw machines, ten lathes, and miscellaneous other equipment. On short
notice American machine tool producers could not possibly fill all the orders
they received. The slaughter on the battlefield had to be postponed until new
machines could be built that could manufacture mechanical killing devices.
The army therefore extended the contractual deadlines for rifle delivery to
Mayi862.70
The 1861 allowable price of twenty dollars per rifle was clearly favorable to
established firms. The Remington Arms Company, a very efficient producer,
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notified the war department that it could turn a suitable profit at sixteen dol-
lars, and over the course of the war it received $3 million in military busi-
ness.71 For smaller, newer producers, rifle manufacture was not a bonanza.
These companies had to tool up after the war began, when machine tools
commanded a premium price. Almost continual usage wreaked havoc on the
machines, and depreciation was rapid. In two wartime years, the value of
gun making machinery typically depreciated about 50 percent. The cost of
one small, new factory (owned by the mayor of New York, George Opdyke)
was $97,000 for machinery, tools, and fixtures. Other new gun factories cost up
to $5oo,ooo.72
In 1863 Mayor Opdyke's firm produced about 15,000 rifles per year at a cost
of $16.48 each for materials, labor, and an allowance for wastage of 12.5 per-
cent. When the cost of machinery depreciation is added ($1.62 per gun), the
total cost becomes $18.10. A $20 price would yield a profit of only slightly more
than 10 percent above the cost of production, which would probably not cover
the cost of rent and insurance (Opdyke's factory was burned in the New York
riots of July 1863). The price actually charged to the army, $24.70, was thus at-
tractive to the manufacturer but not exorbitant. In 1861 a producer of interme-
diate efficiency could sell rifles profitably at $18.n
In the spring of 1862 Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, who replaced
Simon Cameron, determined that there were outstanding contracts for
1,164,000 Springfields, whereas army needs were estimated at only 500,000. An
outburst of public opposition demanded that these contracts be cut back, on
the grounds that the rebellion would collapse before they could be delivered. A
defense contractor, Robert H. Gallagher of the Union Arms Company, pleaded
against cancellation on the grounds that the rebellion might not subside. He
pointed out that Britain might intervene or that France might invade Mexico.
He even suggested a possible British invasion of New England. Although
Gallagher was plainly arguing in his own self-interest, he was certainly much
more farsighted than soothsayers who were predicting an early end to the war.
Nevertheless, the Senate directed Stanton to appoint a commission to reduce
the number of contracts. The Commission on Ordnance Contracts, which
consisted of former Secretary of War Joseph Holt and Robert Dale Owen, the
son of the famous reformer, condensed the orders to 600,000. There were
thirty-six rifle contracts outstanding, and the Commission cut thirty-two of
them. The four that were not reduced were the very first ones let, all of which
included a provision that no member of Congress was an interested party.74
In 1862 the Commission on Ordnance Contracts reviewed 107 outstanding
defense contracts to determine whether prices were excessive. These contracts
covered rifles, pistols, carbines, cannon, ammunition, saddles, sabres, machine
tools, and such raw materials as lead and salt peter. Seven contracts were ex-
plicitly modified because of "unreasonably high" prices; these were principally
for technically advanced weapons produced in relatively small quantities. The
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commission objected to the purchase of 10,000 breechloading rifles from the
Spencer Repeating Rifle Company at $40.00 each and to 2,500 breechloaders
from the Burnside Rifle Company at $38.50. It also rejected all but one contract
for revolvers at $25.00. Twelve contracts were modified without comment; in
most cases, this was so that the government could benefit from economies of
scale. Instead of paying twenty dollars each for an entire order of 50,000 rifles,
the commission cut the price for the second 25,000 to sixteen dollars. The
commission also routinely reduced the price paid for cavalry sabres. In eight
other cases, however, the commission explicitly declared that "prices do not
seem unreasonable," or words to that effect. Thus after reviewing 107 contracts
suspected of being exorbitant, the commission cut prices in nineteen cases and
left prices unchanged in eighty-nine. In seven cases it directly stated that prices
were unreasonable, and in eight it directly stated that they were fair. The new
technique of controlling the cost of military supplies would be used more ex-
tensively during and after World Wars I and II, when it would be termed "re-
negotiation."75
The War Department continued to purchase huge quantities of muzzle-
loading rifles throughout the war. In 1864 the rate was about 2,000 guns per
day or nearly three-quarters of a million per year.76 For experienced companies
with comparatively low production costs, the incentive prices paid to attract
new producers were a dream come true. The Ames Manufacturing Company
of Chicopee, Massachusetts, exemplified the kind of profits that could accrue.
In the last three years of peace, the Ames firm employed about 200 workers
and paid profits of 8, 8, and 10 percent on its outstanding stock. As the war
widened, employment reached 1,000 and dividends increased dramatically:
first to 12 percent in 1861, and then to 32, 44, 25, and 25 percent for the years
1862 through 1865. When peace returned, dividends fell back to the i860 level of
10 percent.77 Although established, efficient producers like Remington or Ames
did very well, the overall record does not support a charge of widespread price
extortion. The problem of large, efficient firms earning handsome profits due
to a pricing schedule sufficiently generous to keep small, inefficient firms in
production would return during World War I.
Advanced Weapons
Most Civil War rifles were uncomplicated, single shot pieces that could be pro-
duced by several different manufacturers according to patterns developed at
the Springfield armory. Repeating firearms were recent developments whose
design was much more complicated. These technically advanced weapons—
mainly the Colt revolver and a variety of repeating shoulder weapons—
commanded a premium in the marketplace. The justice of these higher prices
became a matter of considerable disagreement. Did these weapons cost more
simply because they were more expensive to manufacture or because their
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makers were improperly extracting a monopoly profit based on their patent
claims?
The Colt's Patent Fire Arms Company was the first firm to receive close
public scrutiny. Despite his residence in Hartford, Connecticut, Colonel
Samuel Colt was widely suspected of having Confederate sympathies. The
basis for this suspicion was that shortly after secession he had contacted
Southern officials in hopes of selling sidearms to the Rebel army. After hostili-
ties erupted, however, Colt moved quickly to solidify his ties to the Union. In
May 1861, Colt offered the use of his factory to the War Department, and he
presented $50,000 worth of breechloading rifles to Connecticut for use by its
volunteer forces.78 Nevertheless, his company was soon accused of overcharg-
ing on the sale of pistols to the government.
For several years before the war, Colt had sold revolvers to U.S. military
units at a price of twenty-five dollars. Estimates of the cost of production vary;
Colt revolvers may have cost as much as nine dollars to make, or they may have
cost only $4.00 or $5.00. In either case, when sold for twenty-five dollars, they
returned a handsome profit. This was particularly annoying when it was dis-
covered that Colt had sold revolvers simultaneously to the British government
(a potential enemy) for $12.50 and to American civilians for $14.50. In i860
Colt cut the American military price to twenty dollars, but this hardly satisfied
his critics, who pointed out that a disparity between military and civilian rifles
was more justifiable than between military and civilian handguns. Civilian
customers willingly accepted the military style pistols, which were only slightly
different from military versions, but civilians had little desire to use military
rifles, which were generally too heavy for hunting. Revolvers of comparable
quality to the Colt models were available from his chief competitor (the
Remington Arms Company) for fifteen dollars in small quantities and thirteen
dollars in large numbers.79
In 1861, to meet wartime demand, Colt added three new buildings to his
factory. He agreed to produce Springfield rifles at the army incentive price of
twenty dollars. His firm eventually employed 1,100 men and met a payroll of
$50,000 per month. Upon his death in 1862, Colt was able to bequeath $2 mil-
lion to his nephew. Although his wife successfully overturned the will, Colt's
considerable fortune clearly accumulated substantially from military sales. The
machinery at the Colt works was worth more than $500,000 in 1862, and when
the plant was consumed by a great fire in 1864 the direct loss was between $1.5
and $2 million.80 Samuel Colt was probably the first American to become a
millionaire by making weapons. Although his fortune was built upon indis-
putable technical excellence, it exemplified the doubtful ethical rectitude of
riches gained from war.81
High prices demanded by inventors were evidently an important reason
that the army was slow to adopt breechloading rifles. In August 1861, the
Ordnance Bureau advised against the purchase of 10,000 breechloading car-
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bines offered at $35. "The price," General James Ripley said, "I consider too
high." Even at $28 to $30 Ripley resisted the purchase of breechloaders. Yet de-
spite Ripley's indifference, contractors were able to sell enough breechloaders
to earn very healthy profits. During the third quarter of 1862, the Sharps com-
pany declared dividends that equaled 24 percent of the market value of its
stock.82 William F. Brooks, who had patented a carbine design, received a roy-
alty of $6.50 per weapon. In 1864 he collected the ample if not lavish sum of
$i6,o68.83 Although major blame for the delay in adopting breechloaders must
rest with General Ripley, excessive demands by their manufacturers also played
a part. This was probably the greatest damage that defense contractors did to
the Union war effort.
A third technically sophisticated weapon that stirred dispute was the more
powerful cannon. The controversy centered on the actions of Captain Thomas
J. Rodman, a young army officer who discovered an improved process for cast-
ing large guns. Troubled by the explosion of the great gun "Peacemaker"
aboard the USS Princeton in 1845 (which killed Secretary of State Abel P.
Upshur and several other officials), Rodman began to rethink cannon casting.
He invented a process in which cannon were hollow-cast, allowing the barrel
to be cooled from the inside out by pumping water down the hot muzzle.
Rodman guns were much stronger than solid-cast cannons, which cooled first
along the outside perimeter and slowly to the center before being bored out.
Rodman guns would fire three to ten times as many shots as conventional
types before they failed.84
Despite the promise of Rodman's theories, his senior officers refused to test
his methods, doubting their value and claiming a lack of funds. Because testing
was very expensive, Rodman assigned a half-interest in his patent to the firm of
Knap and Totten, a large gun foundry. In return, this company agreed to cast a
number of guns and test them. The tests, which cost $60,000, proved the supe-
riority of the Rodman process, and the patent became extremely valuable.
Rodman and Knap asked a royalty of 20 percent of the production cost, which
would raise the price of cannon from 6.5$ per pound to 7.8$ per pound. In
i860 this was of no great importance, since only twenty-six guns were cast and
the royalty amounted to $3,037.68. During the Civil War, however, 7,892
cannon were furnished to the Union army. Rodman and Knap agreed to li-
cense their process to other makers for one cent per pound. If all the guns were
manufactured according to the Rodman process, the patentees would become
very wealthy. To prevent this from happening, the War Department's Com-
mission on Ordnance Contracts ruled that Rodman's assignment of his patent
to a civilian was a violation of military regulations and nullified the action.
The commission noted, however, that nothing in the regulations prevented the
assignment if Rodman first resigned.85
In its ruling, the War Department conveniently ignored its own malfea-
sance. Before patenting his invention, Rodman had consulted his superior
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officer and inquired whether there would be any impropriety in doing so. The
commander's reply was unequivocal: "Certainly not." If Captain Rodman had
not sold a share of his patent to raise money for testing, the process would
never have been developed, and the defense of the United States would have
been seriously impaired. Although Rodman was severely criticized, his actions
were thoroughly honorable, and he deserved every royalty he received. These
were considerable but not outrageous. In 1864 the total weight of Rodman
guns purchased by the army was six million pounds. At a penny a pound, this
amounted to $60,000, half going to Knap and half going to Rodman. Cannon
forged by Knap sold for 10 percent less than those of his competitor, the
Dahlgren gun. Nevertheless, the War Department reduced his orders on
grounds of excessive prices.86
The incomes of other cannon makers were not so defensible. One of the
largest foundries in the country was the West Point Foundry at Cold Spring,
New York. This firm produced at its peak twenty-five cannon and 7,000 pro-
jectiles per week, fulfilling about a fifth of the needs of the Union army for
cannon. In 1864 its superintendent, Colonel Robert Parrott, reported a tax-
able income of $278,861.07, and his partner, Governeur Paulding, received
$95,983.55. They paid federal income taxes in the amounts of $13,943.35 a nd
$4,609.18, respectively.87 Parrott's income, eleven times that of President
Lincoln's salary, was nothing if not excessive, and the tax system was ineffective
at relieving the abuse. In his defense, Parrott pointed out that despite infla-
tionary pressures, he did not increase the price of cannon shells throughout
the entire war. Still, his claim that he accepted only "a fair manufacturing
profit" rings hollow.88
Provisions
Every war causes economic disruptions as the economy shifts from civilian to
military production. The Civil War was very large, like World War II, and like
the American Revolution, it was fought on American soil. In economic impact,
the Civil War exceeded both, and in its circumstances of utmost emergency
there were inevitably economic gainers and losers. Railroads that ran north
and south lost business, while east-west lines benefited. Few, if any, Northern
businesses were not affected. As early as April 1861 the randomness of the war's
effect was apparent. When rebel forces cut off supply lines to Washington, the
War Department entered into a verbal contract to purchase 2,000 head of
cattle at eight cents a pound. This was well above the customary rate and re-
flected the unusual risk the contractor accepted in bringing the animals to the
city. By a stroke of good luck, rail connections to the capital were restored just
in time to transport the cattle safely, and the contractor collected a very gener-
ous sum.89
Other contractors enjoyed windfall profits. Among them, surprisingly,
were cotton textile manufacturers. Although the Southern embargo on cotton
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might have been expected to cause chaos, in fact it produced bulging bank bal-
ances. The value of inventories of raw cotton shot upward. At the outbreak of
the war, textile firms held about a three-month supply of cotton, which rapidly
appreciated by at least 50 percent. Of twenty-four textile firms reporting in
1861, eighteen increased dividends, four paid the same dividend as the previous
year, and only two reduced them. Total dividends rose from $618,000 to
$i,oi3,ooo.9° As the embargo tightened, some firms turned to arms making,
but others continued to find the textile business quite profitable. In 1865 alone
a Rhode Island textile firm recovered profits of $97,000 on an investment of
$200,000.91
For suppliers that were placed in a fortunate position by the changed cir-
cumstances, benefits could be handsome. Kentuckians were lucky in that the
government hoped to induce their loyalty by spending generously in their
state. Newspapers prospered as they contentedly tapped a market eager for war
news. The New York Herald saw its circulation improve from a daily average of
65,694 in i860 to 92,158 in 1861, and the New York Times enjoyed a similar
circulation gain. Some of the profits were absorbed by price increases for
newsprint, and the Times uncharitably denounced "combinations of specula-
tors" who had allegedly driven up the price of paper. The newsmen congratu-
lated themselves for breaking the ring by importing paper from Europe, but
their motives may be presumed to have been other than entirely patriotic.92
Ship chandlers found a ready market for almost every marine accessory.
Rosin sold at $35 per barrel and turpentine at $200. Almost every kind of naval
or military hardware required an abundance of screws, and this industry, cen-
tered in Rhode Island, prospered even more than textiles or iron manufacture.
The large Boston firm of Smith Brothers and Co., a supplier of naval hardware,
had annual sales of $150,000 in i860 and an average of $567,000 in the follow-
ing three years. This was a sufficiently large increase to attract a Senate investi-
gation, and Franklin W. Smith, a partner in the firm, admitted under oath that
he charged the government more than the "lowest market cash prices." This
surcharge was justified, he protested in a complaint that echoed gripes nour-
ished by countless legions of government suppliers, because payment was
always delayed one to six months after delivery. Smith also carped that he was
obliged to take discounted certificates that were worth only ninety-six to
ninety-eight cents on the dollar and that banks would not take navy vouchers
as collateral.93
Speculation
Uncertain wartime conditions prompted wild speculation in commodities
and stocks. Gold prices rose dramatically after the government suspended
specie payment on 1 January 1862. This had a great effect on international
trade. Americans who held bills of exchange saw values appreciate by as much
as 25 percent in a month. This was accomplished by shipping flour, grain,
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provisions, or petroleum to a European port, obtaining a foreign credit, and
then waiting for its value to increase. The opportunity to speculate in foreign
credits sometimes became a more important reason for engaging in foreign
trade than the commercial reasons alone.94
Gold speculation became almost a national sport. Gold coins disappeared
from circulation, making it difficult or impossible to make change. In 1864
R. H. Gallagher opened "Gallagher's Evening Exchange" so that speculators
could indulge their fancies after regular exchanges had closed. Women were
particularly affected by gold fever, and some pawned their jewelry in order to
speculate. One disgruntled male complained that "some of our women are al-
ready infected with the prevailing passion of money-making as they have been
long with that of spending it. 'What's the price of gold to-day, my dear?' es-
capes from the pretty mouth of your wife before she has impressed the habit-
ual kiss of connubial welcome upon your expectant lips." Clergymen, whose
fixed salaries were ravaged by wartime inflation, attempted to protect their
purchasing power by investing their wages in the gold market. To some, this
seemed most improper.
During the peak of the speculative mania, brokerage firms collected huge
commissions, as much as $5,000 a day, and telegraph firms basked in the
lucrative warmth of heavy wire traffic. Not to be left out, a significant number
of telegraphic orders to trade gold originated in the South, as many as 800 per
day. Since the price of gold fluctuated with the fortunes of the Union army,
opportunities for cheating were frequent. One ring of speculators conspired
to gain control of telegraph wires in order to delay reports of the outcome of
the battle of Chancellorsville until they had invested heavily. Failing, they
lost $100,000. In March 1865, rumors of peace sent gold and stock markets
tumbling.95
Trading with the Enemy
A form of enterprise that was extremely profitable because of wartime disrup-
tions and that was also extremely speculative involved trading with the enemy.
As in the American Revolution and the War of 1812, trading with the enemy
continuously plagued the Union cause. It is impossible to measure this illegal
activity accurately, but there is little doubt that Abraham Lincoln's problems
with illicit trading were several times more severe than George Washington's or
James Madison's. As early as February i860, fully a year before the fighting,
Southern agents were in Springfield, Massachusetts, to contact manufacturers
with thinly veiled proposals for buying arms in the event of war.96 Despite the
bitterness and the bloodiness of the Civil War, commercial relations between
the North and South were never entirely suspended.
The most commonly traded commodity was cotton. The reason for the in-
tense activity in cotton was the great difference in price on the two sides of the
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battle lines. Prices fluctuated, but cotton sold for three to ten times as much in
the North as in the South. For example, in 1862 cotton bought at Helena,
Arkansas, at fourteen cents per pound could be resold at St. Louis for 45-46
cents per pound. This may even understate the situation: other estimates state
that cotton purchased in Arkansas at $25 to $50 per bale sold in St. Louis at
$250. By 1863 the price of cotton reached $1.00 per pound in New Orleans and
$1.50 in Boston, inviting the payment of bribes to Union officers who would
allow it to be shipped through Union lines.97
There were many reasons for the extensiveness of the illicit cotton trade.
Smuggling is an ancient theme in American history, and there are very few if
any occasions in which a market as lucrative as the Civil War cotton trade has
not been served. The cotton growing area was vast, and there were innumer-
able routes to the North, where as many as 400,000 bales of illegal cotton may
have been sold, leading Allan Nevins and others to suggest that the Northern
market may have been even more important to the Confederates than was the
European market.98 The smugglers were ingenious and often very difficult to
identify—who could tell exactly which shipments originated with a Union
sympathizer and which with an enemy? Certainly some of the cotton imported
from England had been grown in the Confederacy and smuggled through the
Yankee blockade. The policy of the Lincoln administration was inconsistent
about trading with the enemy. Early in the war Lincoln was most reluctant to
suspend trade with the border states, whose loyalty he was anxious to retain,
even though contraband might enter the Confederacy. Kentuckians who lob-
bied for government business found a receptive audience in the president and
his cabinet. Treasury Secretary Chase formulated a policy by which the gov-
ernment permitted trade with Kentucky, Delaware, Maryland, and Missouri,
unless the "ultimate destination" of the articles was the rebel states. But how
could the final destination be ensured? Chase was also quick to reopen trade
once an area had been subdued, establishing a policy in 1861 "to let commerce
follow the flag."99
Since military occupation was by no means the same as establishing loy-
alty, and since occupied areas were often recaptured, Chase's policy was a loose
one. It may even have been the result of misguided humanitarianism. Treasury
agents were ordered to allow the shipment of "family supplies" to the South,
but under this guise much contraband was moved. No such reason could
excuse Secretary of War Stanton's actions in covering up evidence that impli-
cated Chase's son-in-law, Senator William Sprague, in a scheme to trade
Northern guns for Texas cotton. This was carried out in order to prevent per-
sonal and political embarrassment.100
President Lincoln was himself halfhearted about suppressing trade with
the enemy. On 13 July 1861, Congress authorized Lincoln to suppress all trade
with the Confederacy or, at his option, to allow it to continue under license.
Not until August 16, when the war was fully four months old, did Lincoln take
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action. Others had acted more swiftly. On 23 April 1861, police in New York
City seized 2,000 uniforms packed for shipment to rebel troops in Alabama.
On the following day, the U.S. district attorney in New York convened a grand
jury to stop the furnishing of supplies, food, and clothing to the Confederate
army. On the same day, Daniel Fish, a gun manufacturer, was arrested and
charged with treason for selling guns to the rebels.101
Elsewhere, Committees of Safety reminiscent of the early days of the Ameri-
can Revolution were established to ferret out traders. These appeared in April
and May 1861 in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. In Pennsylvania, extra-
legal committees confiscated contraband disguised as buggy whips, flour, and
other nonmilitary items. In Cincinnati, a committee seized bacon destined for
the Confederacy. In Indianapolis, a Committee of Vigilance organized about 1
May 1861; Governor Oliver P. Morton hired two detectives to investigate rumors
of illegal trading, and this led to the interception of shipments at Vincennes,
Evansville, and New Albany. In May 1861, the Indiana legislature, acting more
rapidly than Congress, outlawed trading with the rebel states.102 Lincoln was
very liberal in granting licenses to trade for Confederate cotton. He seems to
have treated these special exemptions to the "no trade with the enemy" policy as
a form of patronage. By 1864 Lincoln had granted at least forty exemptions that
allowed trading in cotton. Amazingly, these exemptions could be sold to an-
other trader who would carry out the actual transfer. The known availability of
these special licenses caused rumors of bribery and corruption to circulate
throughout the capital. Lincoln also ordered the release of an illegal trader who
had been apprehended and sentenced to prison for the duration of the war.103
Lincoln reasoned that it was better for the Union to buy cotton directly
from the South rather than to buy it indirectly from England after it had been
shipped there and its price enhanced six times. In 1863 General Nathaniel P.
Banks authorized the purchase of cotton as long as it was paid for in U.S. cur-
rency alone. In effect, this was supposed to establish an exchange in which the
North sent pieces of paper to the South and received cotton in return. Of
course, cotton traders with Confederate sympathies were very reluctant to
accept payment in greenbacks, but when they found out that the alternative to
trade was confiscation, they were usually persuaded. Some planters, however,
successfully demanded payment in gold or salt. In 1862 Treasury agents deter-
mined that in a single three-month period, $355,000 in gold passed through
Cairo, Illinois, on its way south. Trading for salt was more acceptable, since it
was neither lethal nor easily traded in world markets. As General William T.
Sherman observed, however, it was necessary to the curing of bacon and salt
beef and therefore was of military value. As in the American Revolution salt
was scarce in the South, and at the Union army's insistence, trade in salt was
prohibited in December 1862. Nevertheless, trade remained brisk throughout
the war. In 1862 the exchange rate was established at one bale of cotton for ten
sacks of salt. Jefferson Davis agreed to the trade, although he objected to the
exchange rate as unfair to cotton.104
THE "SHODDYOCRACY" I 95
While the cotton-for-greenbacks trade may have been somewhat advanta-
geous to the North, there is evidence that the Confederates then used the U.S.
currency to purchase much-needed military equipment in Northern markets.
In 1864 the administration attempted to take control of the huge trade by or-
ganizing a government-operated cartel that alone could trade with the bel-
ligerent states. Treasury agents who accompanied the Union forces paid 75
percent of the New York price for cotton less taxes, insurance, and freight. This
reduced profits of the illegal traders considerably, but the system remained
open to abuse. In January 1864, Chase appointed Ralph S. Hart to be special
agent at Natchez, Mississippi. Before Hart was suspended five months later,
records of the Adams Express Company showed that he sent his wife $19,000.
His timely death saved him from prosecution.105
Union army officers who were not trading with the enemy were commonly
exasperated at the illicit practice. Although less eloquent than George Wash-
ington, General Sherman was equally blunt. "War and commerce are inconsis-
tent," Sherman declared. "We cannot have commerce until there is peace and
security." But while salt sold for $1.25 per sack in Union-occupied New
Orleans, a few miles across Lake Ponchartrain in Confederate territory it
brought $100. When a price differential of that magnitude existed, it became
nearly inevitable that Sherman's hopes of interdiction would not be realized.
Nevertheless, he did his best to stop illegal trading, and in August 1862 he had
several soldiers shot for the offense. A somewhat milder policy advocated by
General U. S. Grant was to have illicit traders drafted.106
Lincoln's attempts to regulate the cotton trade were constantly thwarted by
poor administrators, and by 1865 the trade was huge and almost unrestricted.
Memphis was its center, but Brownsville, Texas, lagged not far behind. Most
Northern traders hailed from the border states, but in imitation of colonial
chases between their ancestors and the Royal Navy, Rhode Islanders were
prominent in the ranks of smugglers.107
Plunder
In partial continuation of earlier practices, military regulations during
the Civil War legalized the confiscation of cotton by the navy but not by the
army. The customary naval practice (which continued in effect) was that the
quest of naval prizes was a legitimate encouragement for vigorous efforts.
Prize money remained a very effective incentive for Civil War sailors. In
May 1862, Captain David D. Porter ruefully observed of his sometimes lan-
guorous senior officers, "It is astonishing how much better and stronger these
old fellows get when there is prize money in view; it resuscitates them com-
pletely."108
An interpretation of maritime law allowed contraband seized by the navy
on inland waters as well as the ocean to be classed as a legitimate prize. Because
Civil War naval operations frequently took place on broad western rivers
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flowing through prime cotton land, this policy unlocked abundant opportu-
nity for economic gain. The rule stated that half of the cotton confiscated was
to go to the government and half was to be divided among the fleet. In the Red
River campaign, Porter's sailors fanned out along the banks in search of cotton
for resale, unfortunately spending more time looking for cotton than search-
ing for Confederates. In order to get around the question of whether the
cotton they captured was actually owned by rebels rather than Unionists, the
sailors kept a stencil marked "C.S.A." When they found cotton, they simply
marked it as enemy property and declared it contraband. To stop the sailors'
abuses and to quiet disgruntled army officers, Congress in July 1864 made it il-
legal for the navy to seize cotton as a lawful prize. That the practice was lucra-
tive while it lasted was made clear by Porter, who had yielded to the temptation
he had earlier deplored. "When this is over I will come North," exulted Porter,
by then an admiral. "Then I will sit down and rest under my own vine and fig
tree and as my share of the prize money ought to be large I can live quietly and
after the fashion I have desired all my life."109
According to army regulations, confiscation of cotton by the troops consti-
tuted an act of plunder, which if it were allowed to continue would contradict
the theory that the army was fighting the war for lofty purposes. The federal
government accordingly appointed civilians to handle confiscated cotton,
paying them 25 percent of what they could capture (often with the assistance
of the army). These civilian agents, unfortunately, sometimes confiscated
cotton from Unionists, pilfered cotton and sold it themselves, or cheated the
government by delivering low-grade cotton and keeping the best for them-
selves. The switch to civilian agents was but a qualified success.110
Sometimes plundering was carried out under the guise of foraging. As one
young Yankee explained, "We are in Secessia and the meanest part of it, too,
and anything the boys can forage they consider it theirs. A field of potatoes,
five acres, was emptied of its contents in short order.... You ought to see them
clean out the fences." In the bitter fighting along the Kansas-Missouri border,
both sides plundered pitilessly. In their famous raid on Lawrence, Kansas,
William Quantrill and his men openly declared their purpose as being "plun-
der." The Kansas militia, the Jayhawkers, swept into Missouri and plundered
without restraint—horses, livestock, and slaves. In an echo of practices past, in
1862 Union Major General Ormsby M. Mitchel, a world famous astronomer,
permitted his men to plunder cotton, watches, and whatever else they could
find. He was charged, like his military ancestors, with illegally transporting the
booty in government wagons.111
A more innovative scheme involved General Neal Dow. This officer, who
served in Louisiana, confiscated many objects of fine furniture, as well as
pianos, china, books, and knickknacks, which he shipped back to his home in
Maine. After the war General Dow was sued for his seizure of cotton, but in
1880 a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld his right to plunder. Not so
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fortunate were four enlisted men of the Thirteenth Connecticut. Apprehended
in 1862 with $400 plundered from the home of a New Orleans woman, all four
were hanged.112
Fraud
The great value of Confederate cotton in the North led to the corruption of at
least some quartermasters. This office was continually scrutinized for fraud
during the American Revolution, and while professionalism had greatly re-
duced the number of cheating quartermasters, a few continued to observe the
hoary traditions of their trade. The chief quartermaster of the Department of
the Gulf, Colonel Samuel B. Holabird, sold $205,000 worth of seized cotton
and kept $102,000 for himself. His assistant, Captain Jacob Mahler, had a defi-
ciency of $266,000 in his accounts. There also were a few scattered examples of
corruption in the purchase of other commodities: a Detroit horse trader of-
fered a $10,000 bribe to Major A. A. Selover of General Fremont's staff in order
to get a horse contract; the Indiana quartermaster received a kickback of 50<t
on every saddle sold to the state, as well as 5-10 percent on other contracts (he
was forced to resign); and R. B. Hatch, the quartermaster at Cairo, Illinois, re-
ceived a $300 bribe from Chicago dealers for awarding a contract for the pur-
chase of lumber for the construction of Camp Douglas. There were a few other
frauds disclosed, but the striking characteristic is the overall honesty of the
Quartermaster Corps.113
Manpower
The American Civil War was the last and greatest occasion in history in which
military manpower procurement offered a large opportunity for profit.
Numerous scholars, from Fred A. Shannon to Eugene C. Murdock, have illu-
minated unethical aspects of the procurement business. The most common
offense was bounty jumping, which was even more lucrative and extensive
than in the American Revolution. Although it is impossible to determine how
extensive the practice was, there were 268,000 desertions from the Union army,
and a substantial number were in order to reenlist and collect another bonus.
The known record for successful bounty jumping is thirty-two times. Groups
of men enlisted and jumped together; Fred A. Shannon reported a group of
3,000 to 5,000 such gangsters who lived on Manhattan Island. In one raid, 590
were captured. Men who successfully enlisted twenty times received as much as
$8,000 each. But as in the American Revolution, the penalty for bounty jump-
ing could be extreme. In December 1864, three Indiana men were shot for the
offense, although President Lincoln reprieved a fourth who was just nineteen
years old. A group of 150 bounty jumpers were paraded through the streets of
Indianapolis with placards hung from their necks to identify their crime.114
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A second enterprise that produced great controversy was substitute bro-
kering. In 1862 Congress invoked a draft law that included a provision to allow
drafted men to gain exemption by furnishing a substitute. Firms appeared
whose business was to locate substitutes for reluctant warriors who were
unable or unwilling to find substitutes for themselves and who were willing
and able to pay for the service. Although there was nothing inherently unethi-
cal in offering this service in return for compensation, the draft was so un-
popular and so often abused that substitute brokers became lightning rods for
criticism. Historians have argued that the draft was terribly unfair to the poor
(a fact that has been sharply disputed), and substitute brokers—men who
profited upon the sacrifices of patriots—became a kind of showcase exhibit of
its essential unfairness.115
Substitute brokers were charged with encouraging bounty jumping, over-
charging for the service, and furnishing defective recruits, among other faults.
They had a clear incentive to promote bounty jumping, since they needed po-
tential recruits badly, and it is entirely likely that they did so. They also charged
heavily for their service. Fortunes of $10,000 to $15,000 and even as much as
$100,000 were made in New York. Hawley D. Clapp, known as the "King of
Bounty Brokers," was arrested in 1864 and imprisoned in Fort Lafayette. He
was alleged to have swindled more than $400,000 from recruits by persuading
them to enlist and then keeping their bounties for himself.116
Several spin-offs of the substitute brokering business were reminiscent of
notorious practices of the past. As had their predecessors, Civil War substitute
brokers sometimes passed off injured men and claimed them as healthy. This
was so common that the New York Herald claimed there was a parallel to
Shakespeare's Henry IV, in which Falstaff protests, "I have pressed me none but
good householders sent to the Tower by a summary order of Lord Chief
Justice."117 Harper's Weekly claimed that substitute brokers furnished, besides
criminals, cripples, underage boys, herniated men, the mentally retarded, and
even men who were partially blind. There were also some escaped Confeder-
ate prisoners of war furnished as substitutes. They could enlist in the Union
army, collect their bounties, and then desert to their comrades with pockets
full of cash and heads full of military intelligence. In a belated attempt to gain
control of the situation, in March 1865, Congress made it illegal for brokers
to enlist the insane, convicts, persons under indictment for felony, deserters,
minors, or men "in condition of intoxication." In addition, it became a crime
to deprive a recruit of his bounty. The penalty was set at two years in prison or
a $1,000 fine.118
In a new twist, a kind of subbroker cheated on charges for housing recruits
before the army could provide quarters for them. The army paid brokers for
temporarily supplying room and board for enlistees, but it was slow to send
the money. Not wanting to wait for payment, the brokers sold at a discount
their claims against the government to a group of "special contractors." These
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"special contractors" then falsified the records before presenting them to the
government. The case of Solomon Kohnstamm illustrates the scheme. In 1864
a broker named Louis Pfeffer of Albany, New York, subsisted 116 recruits for
the 58th New York Regiment. His bill was for $100, which he sold to Solomon
Kohnstamm of New York City. Kohnstamm altered the document so that the
figure became $1,366, which he then submitted to the government for pay-
ment. He was apprehended and tried on forty-seven counts of fraud. After de-
liberating only fifteen minutes, the jury found him guilty. Before these brokers
were discovered, they defrauded the government of an estimated $7oo,ooo.119
The recruitment of so-called mercenary troops aroused great controversy.
Facing a domestic shortage of raw material for their business, the enterprising
brokers decided to import from Europe. Since a large number of Union sol-
diers were German immigrants, Confederates and their sympathizers charged
that Abraham Lincoln was following a cruel practice of the infamous King
George III, who hired Hessian mercenaries. Although this was an exaggeration,
a new disgrace to the already inglorious record of mercenary warfare occurred
in 1864 when a shipload of 700 German immigrants were brought to the
United States by bounty brokers. The brokers agreed to pay the Germans' pas-
sage if the Germans would enlist in the Union army. In return, the brokers
were allowed to collect and keep the Germans' enlistment bonuses, thereby
turning a gross profit of $700,000. A military investigation determined that the
Germans were not deceived, despite many allegations to that effect. Although
Confederate charges that the U.S. Army recruited mercenary soldiers abroad
have been accepted by several historians, there is no evidence that this hap-
pened with great frequency.120
Censure and Control
The Civil War era was unusual in American history in many ways, not the least
for its atmosphere of mistrust. Americans of the 1860s expressed doubt about
the motives of their countrymen. Loose charges of malfeasance fell upon a re-
ceptive audience. The first Civil War Congress, as Allan G. Bogue has shown,
was most notable for its willingness to launch investigations, and these investi-
gations were rooted in suspicion. Contemporaries recognized this phenome-
non. "The last Congress," wrote the New York Herald in 1863, "will be memor-
able for its inquiring disposition."121 This milieu of suspicion gave credence to
charges of profiteering, and it also prompted demands for change. In com-
parison to the great issues of the war—saving the Union and ending slavery—
reducing profiteering was decidedly of less importance.122 Nevertheless, the
Civil War generation began to grapple with it.
Reports of fraud in contracting that began to circulate during the chaotic
weeks after the opening of hostilities produced the first outraged calls for
punishment. In August 1861, Senator Orville Browning of Illinois, reacting to
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reports of bribery in the award of verbal contracts, called for the imposition of
the death penalty. "I would not stop to carry that penalty to the extremity of
death against any officer of the Government who, in such a time as this, would
be so lost to the principles by which we all ought to be governed, as to seek...
his own pecuniary advancement at the sacrifice of the interests of the public,"
Browning told the Senate. "If we were to shoot one or two of the rogues, it
would have a more salutary effect in putting an end to the pilferings that are
alleged than all the others we could adopt." Browning was by no means alone.
There were repeated calls for the death penalty in the press. "Every dishonest
contractor and conniving inspector," demanded the Scientific American,
should receive a "trial by a drum-head court-martial and instant military exe-
cution."123
Although the death penalty was not imposed (except for bounty jumping),
the government experimented with other devices for controlling the profits of
its suppliers. The government had no choice except to buy in a seller's market,
but it was not wholly without the ability to negotiate. A case in point was its
dealing with Jay Cooke, the general subscription agent appointed by Secretary
Chase to sell government bonds to the public. In July 1861, Cooke informed
Chase that "we could not be expected to leave our comfortable homes and
positions here [in New York] without some great inducement and we state
frankly that we would, if we succeeded expect a fair commission from the
Treasury in some shape for our labor and talent." The "great inducement" or
"fair commission," according to Cooke, ought to be a commission of three-
eighths percent (.375 percent) of the price of the bonds. This would be divided
three ways: one-eighth percent for subagents, one-eighth percent for expenses,
and one-eighth percent for Cooke himself. Chase objected and successfully cut
the commission to .25 percent, which was one-third less than Cooke had asked.
As bond sales increased to enormous quantities, Chase lowered the commis-
sion further. For selling $362 million in "five-twenty" bonds, Cooke received
$220,054.49—less than one-sixteenth percent. By 1865, a near panic on the
stock market caused Chase's successor, William P. Fessenden, to meet Cooke's
demand, even though Cooke would have settled for less. For five war years,
Cooke's total income (including both government and private business) was
about $844,ooo.124
The government could also use its great buying power to affect prices.
Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs learned that he could restrict
prices by placing contracts carefully. When inventories in government arsenals
declined, Meigs ordered that replacement should take place gradually, in order
to prevent "a field day for the profiteers." Secretary of War Stanton was willing
to threaten suppliers with confiscation if they sought what he considered to be
an unfair price. In 1862 the War Department needed to buy boats for use on
the Mississippi River. When he learned that the owners were asking "high fig-
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ures," Stanton exploded: "The [War] Department will submit to no speculative
prices. . . . I will authorize the quartermaster to seize such boats as may be
needed as other property is taken for military purposes, leaving the parties to
seek remuneration from Congress."125 Of course, a claim against the govern-
ment might take years to recover, and the amount would be problematical.
In 1863 the speculative crisis deepened sufficiently to prompt the War
Department to resort to commandeering if necessary to obtain supplies. As the
Confederate army advanced into Pennsylvania, Quartermaster General Meigs
ordered the purchase of clothing for emergency troops. "Do not allow specu-
lative prices," Meigs telegraphed the quartermaster in Harrisburg. "With
the approval of the commanding general fix prices and compel supplies."
Subsequently, on several occasions there were discussions in Congress and the
press about the possibility of applying martial law to defense contractors. This
would expedite the prosecution of fraud and probably increase the severity of
the punishment, perhaps even allowing the death penalty. Only the doubtful
constitutionality of the idea prevented its adoption.126
Instead of declaring martial law, Congress approved landmark legislation
that made fraud in defense contracts a federal crime. Sponsored by the House
Committee on Government Contracts, the Frauds Act of 1863 included an in-
novative concept that would spark much controversy in the twentieth century.
Any person who informed on a fraudulent contractor (in modern parlance, a
"whistle-blower") could claim half the monetary judgment obtained; in the
twentieth century this could and did amount to tens of millions of dollars.
John K. Stetler of Philadelphia became the first contractor convicted under the
law. He received a five-year sentence for supplying the army with adulterated
coffee.127 Since the law was effective against quality degradation, but did not
address the basic question of price gouging, it was of modest effectiveness
during the Civil War. The nation preferred to rely on indirect or informal
means of controlling extortionate pricing.128
One alternative that the government employed was to produce military
supplies itself. Although the Union did not utilize government-owned defense
facilities as much as did the Confederacy, nevertheless the war saw the expan-
sion and creation of new plants. By 1863 rifle production at the Springfield
armory reached 25,000 weapons per month, while all private armories com-
bined produced 60,000 small arms. The government also constructed three
new arsenals. In 1862 Navy Secretary Gideon Welles proposed the construction
of government-owned shipyards on the grounds that private yards were too
small and too slow. The idea died when opponents argued (perhaps with some
prescience) that government yards would be filled with lackadaisical political
appointees. The government did build the largest bakery in the world. Near
Alexandria, Virginia, it was built next to a railroad track so that flour could be
delivered directly. Consuming 400-500 barrels of flour each day, it employed
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200 men in a building that covered an entire acre. Normal production was
90,000 loaves per day. There was a public demand for price controls on bread,
but the government at least had little to fear from greedy bakers.129
In 1862 the Holt commission had forced the renegotiation of more than a
hundred rifle contracts, establishing renegotiation as a principle of defense
contracting. In a later case, the ordnance bureau learned that an arms dealer,
acting as a middleman, had turned a windfall profit of $280,000 for work
of "a few days at most." Confronted with the evidence, the dealer proposed
to surrender 40 percent of his proceeds. Unfazed by this offer, the War
Department unilaterally rescinded 90 percent of his gain. In 1862 a govern-
mental commission examined claims for monetary compensation filed at
Cairo, Illinois, by 1,696 hopeful petitioners. It cut the claims by 25 percent
(from $599,000 to $451,000). Agents of the Navy Department also used rene-
gotiation as a way of reducing prices they deemed exorbitant. At least one at-
tempt to appeal these reductions to the U.S. Supreme Court met with failure.130
As the crisis deepened, Northerners began to see the war as a struggle
against twin evils, the rebels at the front and the laggards at home. The latter,
who would be known as "slackers" during the Great War, were often identified
as greedy defense contractors. "When a nation goes to war from a high
motive," declared the North American Review, "the motives which influence in-
dividuals are tested and disclosed.... Thus war develops the immoral, no less
than the moral, elements in a society, and the worth of that society depends on
the relative power which each of these elements secures to itself.... The soldier
who gives, not only his life, but his heart to his country; the contractor who
cheats the government and abuses the soldiers with his shoddy... such are two
among the contrasts which the test of war displays."131 Northerners were deter-
mined not to fail that test.
Although the government possessed a few methods of limiting the profits
of contractors, the Northern people preferred to trust voluntary action com-
bined with moral suasion to thwart profiteering. Most Northerners had little
doubt that the war was being fought for worthwhile principles, and they de-
nounced vehemently anyone who would dishonor the cause by using the occa-
sion to seek personal fortune. "Vultures that prey upon the hearts of the dead
on the battlefield," thundered the New York Tribune in 1861, "are human com-
pared with monsters who furnish rotten blankets and rotten meat to the living
in camp." "The self-styled loyalist, who puts money in his purse at the expense
of soldiers who go to fight rebels," added the New York Times, "is worthy only
of unqualified detestation, and no fate can be too severe for him. Our prison
doors gape for such knaves. Hustle them in."132
The outrage expressed toward defense contractors intensified as the war
brought new social strains. Some actually welcomed the hardship they ex-
pected the war to bring. "For the past twenty years we have been getting rich,
lazy, and luxurious," insisted the New York Herald in 1861. "Our dresses and our
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diamonds were as rich and costly as any aristocrat's." But when the hardship of
war set in, the Herald optimistically promised, the nation would experience a
"regeneration." "We will be more American and less foreign. We shall have
cheap houses.. . . Our ladies will wear gingham dresses, instead of silks and
satins, and for ornaments they will have red roses . . . and no pasty, glassy dia-
monds." But after 1861 the war brought only more prosperity for much of the
civilian population, not the anticipated cathartic suffering. Many worried that
the war was becoming deeply caustic to the virtue of a republican people. The
Herald's prediction that "wealth will no longer be the criterion of what a man
is wor th . . . . Merit will rise to its proper position in the social scale" seemed
sadly premature.133
A favorite means of moral suasion was the antiluxury campaign. After the
first year of depressed production, the war-stimulated economy brought a
marked increase in the demand for luxury goods. Many items were targeted,
but the most commonly denounced were silk dresses, laces, diamonds, fancy
carriages, expensive theater tickets, and yachts. Wartime prosperity extended
from Leavenworth, Kansas, where the population tripled and opulent homes
were built on the bluffs overlooking the Missouri River, to New York City, the
center of the nation's financial markets. "Never was New York so brilliant, so
captivating," remarked one resident.134
The antiluxury campaign was led by women and the press. In the capital,
women led by wives of cabinet officers entered into a "Ladies National
Covenant" in which they pledged not to purchase luxury goods. Members
identified themselves by wearing a badge showing a black bee upon a tri-
colored ribbon. In New York, a large meeting of women voted against the pur-
chase of "unnecessary foreign luxuries." Some women, led by Susan B.
Anthony, objected to the action on the ground that the pledge was not strong
enough. In Boston, the antiluxury movement was led by the most socially
prominent local women. Elsewhere, women pledged to cut expenses by raising
hemlines by three inches and by replacing silk with mousseline de laine.135
The press, led by the New York Herald, heaped scorn on extravagant expen-
diture. In an editorial on "The Striking Contrasts of the War," written only a
week before the battle of Gettysburg, the Herald described with a pen dipped
in vitriol the conspicuous display of luxury in Central Park. "If the weather be
pleasant this afternoon, the Park will be crowded with rich equipages," the
Herald wrote. "Our shoddy aristocrats will be found enjoying themselves in
state and style. To them the war has brought only riches and luxury. Their
prancing horses, their elegant carriages, their silks and laces and diamonds, are
the results of the war. The breeze, elsewhere laden with the shrieks of the
wounded and the groans of the dying, brings to these wealthy contractors and
their families the sweet scents of the flowers, the voluptuous strains of the
music, and the delicious coolness of the hills and the woods."136 Similar edito-
rials on such topics as "Luxury against Patriotism," "Immorality and Political
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Corruption," "Democracy on Trial," and "The Age of Extortion" could be
found in such diverse publications as the New York Times, North American
Review, Christian Examiner, and Scientific American.™
The public outcry against war profits became institutionalized in the
demand for a personal income tax. The Civil War income tax was imposed by
Congress in response to western objections to a federal property tax imposed
in 1861. Under a plan advocated by Secretary Chase at the beginning of the war,
a direct tax on real estate apportioned by state would be adopted. Western
states protested their people were not as wealthy as Easterners, and they thus
would bear an unfair share of the burden. Western congressmen demanded re-
dress in the form of an income tax that would bear heavily on Eastern manu-
facturers and highly salaried public officials.138
The income tax worked approximately as designed. In 1863 New York alone
contributed fully one-third of the total revenues, and other important manu-
facturing states such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Massachusetts also
paid disproportionately large sums—from 10 to 15 percent each. The income
tax was not the principal producer of revenue, however. It furnished only
about one-fifth of the revenues collected, rising to 29 percent in 1865. Over-
all, the revenue system was not as regionally discriminatory as these figures
imply.139
The income tax was clearly designed to be progressive and particularly to
strike prosperous manufacturers. Theories of public finance were not well ad-
vanced in the 1860s, but the idea of progressivity was certainly grasped. The
New York Times declared that the "correct principle" was to tax luxuries but not
necessities, and the New York Herald advocated taxing "the richest and most
able to pay." Manufacturers argued that imposing both corporate and personal
income taxes constituted double taxation, but merchants replied that manu-
facturers were given monopolies through tariff protection and that the income
tax was a fair quid pro quo.140
The income tax rate structure was progressive by the standards of the
times, if not of the twentieth century. The lowest bracket was 3 percent on in-
comes from $600 to $10,000 per year, but since only one American in seventy-
two earned $600 or more per year the tax clearly struck the affluent. Incomes
over $10,000 paid 5 percent. In 1864 the rates were raised to 5 percent on in-
comes from $600 to $5,000, 7.5 percent on incomes from $5,000 to $10,000,
and 10 percent on incomes over $10,000. Only 31,000 Americans (out of 36
million) acknowledged that they had incomes in excess of $5,000—the richest
.09 percent. The income tax was a modest antidote to a system of war finance
that was burdensome to low-income wage earners because it relied heavily on
inflation as a means of transferring resources to the government.'41
The war tax system had several other progressive features. Congress dis-
cussed but rejected a plan to impose a dollar per year direct tax on gold
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watches and pianos. Instead, the government adopted an annual charge of 50<t
per ounce for gold plate and 3<J an ounce for silver. (In an unprecedented dis-
play of federal power, tax collectors entered private residences and weighed the
precious metal to establish the fee.) Yachts were assessed an annual fee ranging
from five dollars upward, and carriages paid from one to ten dollars each year.
Billiard tables were charged at ten dollars, and beer and liquor at 2-5<t per
gallon. Predictably, indignant brewers, billiard table manufacturers, and
carriage makers descended on Washington to protest the taxes, but their efforts
were in vain. To get at railroads and their passengers, a 3 percent federal
tax was imposed on dividends on railroad bonds and on sales of passenger
tickets.142
There were many contemporary charges that income and other taxes were
flagrantly evaded, and some of these have been accepted by historians. As with
many illegal activities, tax evasion is difficult or impossible to measure. New
York gas utilities were frequently cited as evaders, and the city fathers threat-
ened to take over the firms. In order to force tax payment, some newspapers
published the names of taxpayers and the amounts of taxes paid. The tax law
also contained an innovative provision that allowed a person informing the
government of tax evasion to claim half of the fine imposed. Although there
was inevitably some cheating, George Boutwell, Lincoln's able commissioner of
revenue, reported that income from the taxes far exceeded expectations. Noah
Brooks, an astute journalist, remarked that "it is indicative of the spirit and
temper of our people [that] people everywhere are more ready to comply with
the far-reaching requirements of the law than the most sanguine had supposed
to be the case. Our people talk a great deal, but they usually do about right."143
Contributions
In 1985 a respected scholar described the effort on the Northern home front as
an "endless tale of fraud, corruption, profiteering, and near-treason" that
belied the conspicuous valor of Yankee troops at the front.144 Yet despite all the
evidence assembled thus far, the record of the Northern people during the
Civil War was by no means a litany of unmitigated greed. There was a great
outpouring of support from businessmen and other civilians who were willing
to give much more than lip service to the cause. The history of the war is filled
with instances of businessmen who charged less than the market would bear,
contributed their services or their possessions without charge, raised money to
help the troops, or bought war bonds at charitable prices.
Although some railroads charged handsome fees, others carried troops
for less than cost or even for nothing. From April through June 1861, the
Michigan Southern and some other lines carried troops without charge.
Erastus Corning, president of the New York Central, proposed in 1862 to
106 I WA EHOGS
transport troops to Washington at a discount of 40 percent off the regular fare.
Volunteers who were rejected by the army for medical reasons would receive a
free ride home.145 The record of defense contracting would be incomplete if
these sacrifices were excluded.
Shipowners also sometimes generously loaned their vessels to the navy
without charge. In 1862 James Gordon Bennett, the editor of the New York
Herald, loaned his yacht, the Henrietta, to the navy for a year at no cost. When
the Confederate navy threatened to break the Union blockade of Hampton
Roads with its ironclad warship CSS Virginia, President Lincoln called Corn-
elius Vanderbilt to the White House and requested the assistance of
Vanderbilt's fleet, asking him to name his price. Vanderbilt refused compensa-
tion, but committed to the navy as a gift a new steamship built at a cost of
$800,000 and christened the USS Vanderbilt. Vanderbilt even put his life on the
line. He sailed his namesake vessel to Hampton Roads with the intention of
ramming the Virginia, but when the Confederate ship did not accept battle
(probably fortunately for the amateur admiral), Vanderbilt turned over com-
mand to the navy. The USS Vanderbilt served throughout the war, and after the
Confederate surrender a grateful Congress passed a resolution of gratitude and
ordered that a gold medal be struck to signify the nation's appreciation. The
commodore reportedly was miffed because the navy did not return the ship,
but he accepted the medal graciously. "Should our government be again im-
perilled," Vanderbilt declared, "no pecuniary sacrifice is too large to make in its
behalf, and no inducement sufficiently great to attempt to profit by its neces-
sities."146
Some businessmen patriotically sold their products to the government
below the market price. Just one example was John Baldwin of Chicago, who
in 1861 rejected price enhancement on lumber he sold to the army for the con-
struction of barracks. In explanation, Baldwin showed a deep sense of wartime
ethics. "We were bound to put the lumber as low as we could sell it to the gov-
ernment," he said simply. There were many other examples.147
Merchants with thorough knowledge of overseas markets also rendered
important service to the Union cause at little or no cost. The international
arms dealer George L. Schuyler of Schuyler, Hartley, and Graham was given
authority to purchase $1 million in European arms. Working for only $10 per
day plus expenses, Schuyler rejected as insults all offers of bribes intended to
induce him to accept inferior weapons. Henry Shelton Sanford, the Union spy-
master on the Continent, spent $15,000 of his own money on bribes in 1863,
winning a great but secret victory in preventing the Confederates from obtain-
ing warships in France. In 1863 William H. Aspinwall and John M. Forbes
served as secret agents seeking to buy ironclads and commerce raiders. They
accepted compensation for their expenses but not for their services.148
The war effort received millions of dollars in voluntary contributions from
businessmen. On 20 April 1861, amid the excitement and outrage of the post-
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Sumter period, in twenty minutes members of the New York Chamber
of Commerce contributed $22,450 to the Union cause, with the pro-secession
editor James Gordon Bennett making the largest donation ($3,000). By 26
April contributions reached $87,790, aided by $10,000 from the famous mer-
chant A. T. Stewart. On the following day, William B. Astor topped Stewart and
Bennett with a $15,000 donation, and the fund grew to $118,890. Solomon
Sturgis, a merchant from Chicago, contributed over $120,000, even equipping
at his own expense an entire company of soldiers with Sharps repeating rifles.
Francis Loomis of New London, Connecticut, a wealthy clothing manufac-
turer, offered to replace the entire garrison guarding New London at his own
expense. President Lincoln declined, although the plan would have cost
Loomis nearly a million dollars.149
Businessmen institutionalized their contributions in such organizations as
the Union League Club and the U.S. Sanitary Commissions. Both were pro-
Lincoln, quasi-political institutions that selflessly raised large sums of money
and tirelessly distributed assistance for the Northern war effort. Nevertheless,
the Union League was erroneously denounced as merely a group of nouveaux
riches who lacked sufficient status to gain admission to the more exclusive gen-
tlemen's clubs. Allegedly, they were "debarred by their lack of education, cul-
ture and refinement from associating with the really intellectual portion of the
community."150
In fact, the Union League included old wealth (the shipping merchant R. B.
Minturn, the tea merchant George Griswold, the department store king A. T.
Stewart), distinguished scholars (the scientists Francis Lieber and Wolcott
Gibbs), accomplished surgeons, and prominent men of affairs (Franklin H.
Delano, grandfather of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Hamilton Fish, the
future secretary of state). The rival Loyal Leagues were made up of men who
were not admissible to the Union League because of membership in the
Democratic Party, failure to support President Lincoln, or insufficient promi-
nence. In any case, the Union League and the U.S. Sanitary Commission ren-
dered invaluable aid to the war effort, and the troops knew it. "Where'er we
went—in the pine lands of Georgia or the swamps of Mississippi," wrote
General William T. Sherman, "letters came to us from your members telling us
not to heed the cost or expense; 'You shall have whatever is necessary; there
shall be plenty of money and plenty of men; go and do your duty like soldiers,
and you shall be backed.' And we knew we would be, and we were."151
Although there was confusion and fraud in the Civil War, the full story, in
Allan Nevins's deft words, was of an organized war replacing an improvised
war. By 1865 the term shoddy had fallen into disuse as the troops recognized the
growing efficiency and basic selflessness behind the war effort.152 Although the
"shoddy" legend would be sustained into the late twentieth century,153 the real
Civil War was a mixed record of waste and efficiency, of profit and loss, of
fraud and sacrifice.

Toward the Great War
Those who scent from afar the cadaverous odor of lucre have for the most part fur-
nished war's dominant motive.
DAVID STARR JORDAN (1914)
For half a century after the Civil War, the United States was at peace, inter-
rupted periodically by frontier skirmishes, colonial incursions, and a short war
with Spain. Arms production declined abruptly after 1865, and American sup-
pliers faced a major shakeout. For a few years, lively foreign sales staved off
bankruptcy. By 1872 nearly 1.4 million weapons had been cast off to other na-
tions' armies. Obsolescent guns were shipped all over the world—to Russia,
Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Egypt, Cuba, Greece, China, Japan, and even the
Vatican City. Turkey bought 350,000 of the best and cheapest rifles, while a
desperate France, threatened by Prussian attack, paid a dear price for 706,000
lower-grade arms, along with 54 million rounds of ammunition. Nevertheless,
the inevitable reduction in the weapons business took its toll. Of the forty-
eight major arms contractors at the close of the Civil War, only eleven re-
mained in business after 1870.1
Foreign arms sales kept the profiteering controversy smoldering. Some
Americans harbored grave doubts as to whether the United States should be
the arms merchant to the world, particularly the arms merchant to France. The
French had spent lavishly on Confederate bonds during the Civil War, and, al-
though the Union army was distracted, French troops had invaded Mexico, in
defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. Conversely, German-Americans had loyally
supported the North, and their Prussian cousins were sympathetic to the
cause. After the outbreak between France and Prussia in 1870, France placed a
large order for rifles with the Army Ordnance Department. When Secretary of
War W. W. Belknap learned of the impending sale, he withdrew authorization
immediately in order to maintain American neutrality. Belknap agreed, how-
ever, to sell guns and ammunition to the American agent of France, the firm of
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E. Remington and Sons of Ilion, New York. This decision brought a protest
from the German government and opposition from Secretary of State Ham-
ilton Fish.2
Because of the bitterness toward France and the dubious legality of the
sale, a controversy developed that anticipated the larger and more bitter dis-
putes of the early twentieth century. Secretary Belknap's leading critics were
Senators Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and Carl Schurz of Missouri, two
former abolitionists who were now leaders of the Liberal Republican faction
that had broken with President Ulysses S. Grant. Schurz was also the recog-
nized leader of the German-American community, an exiled combat veteran
of the Revolution of 1848.3 The coming dispute with arms merchants would be
heavily indebted to abolitionists and their descendants, and it would often
draw upon the ideas of German liberalism. The Massachusetts-Missouri al-
liance also suggested the future cooperation between New England progres-
sives and western agrarians.
Early in 1872 Senators Sumner and Schurz demanded a probe of arms sales
to France. A discrepancy had been discovered in the French accounts: although
the French government had paid $10 million for the American arms, the
U.S. Treasury Department reported that it had received only $8,286,000. The
senators suspected that the missing funds had been used to bribe American of-
ficials to approve the sale. The Remington firm had ample motive for chi-
canery, thought Sumner, as it was to receive a handsome commission of 5 per-
cent on the order.4
The Grant administration was reluctant to support a legislative investiga-
tion, but after extended debate the Senate approved a resolution to establish a
committee of inquiry. Owing to Sumner's illness, Schurz spoke in favor of or-
ganizing the committee, and he was assisted by women who packed the gal-
leries and filled the Senate chamber to overflowing. The ladies applauded
wildly to express their support.5 (This demonstration foreshadowed feminist
backing for the investigation of the munitions industry conducted by Senators
Gerald Nye and Arthur Vandenberg in 1935.)
The Senate committee could find no evidence of corruption on the part of
any American official, although it did uncover a letter from Samuel Remington
in which he claimed that he had the "strongest influences working for us."
Upon investigation, this turned out to be an exaggeration of the political influ-
ence of Remington's friends. The theft of funds was most likely committed by
French agents.6 Nevertheless, neither Schurz nor Sumner was persuaded that
the truth had been found. Following their lead, the historian Allan Nevins de-
clared (without substantiation) that "it was more than suspected that some
[War] Departmental officers made a pretty penny from [the transaction] ."7 A
minor incident in itself, the arms "scandal" featured abolitionism, feminism,
German liberalism, pacifism, politically inspired charges, and unsuccessful in-
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vestigation. All these elements were conspicuous in the larger controversy half
a century later.
In the 1870s the United States relinquished leadership in weapons produc-
tion to Britain and Germany, where American designers of machine guns and
armor plate were forced to seek business.8 Few Americans noticed or mourned
the decline in military arms production, and concern about war profits was
nonexistent. Meanwhile, the industrial revolution was steadily but inexorably
transforming military technology. Like other technologies of the period, wea-
ponry became greatly more sophisticated. In no area was this more evident
than in sea power, where the world's leading navies were shifting to steam
power, metal hulls, screw propellers, armor plate, and breech-loading cannon.
The American fleet, smugly oblivious to these changes, rotted and rusted away.
Profits and the New Navy
By 1880 the U.S. Navy was so decrepit that even Chile's tiny fleet seemed men-
acing to some, and a consensus formed that the ironclads and wooden-hulled
frigates of Civil War vintage must be replaced with more modern vessels.
During the 1880s and 1890s, the American fleet shifted from what James L.
Abrahamson has termed a "peace navy," suited only to coastal and harbor pro-
tection and limited commerce raiding, to a "war navy," which featured a power-
ful battle fleet capable of challenging any great power for supremacy at sea.9
Modern warships required a thick and expensive belt of armor, and it was in
the furnishing of this steel plate that the war profits question returned. It ap-
peared in the two most time-honored forms of profiteering: first, that prices
charged by manufacturers of armor plate were exorbitant and, second, that
armor plate was supplied in criminally degraded quality.
Following the battle of the ironclads USS Monitor and CSS Virginia in 1862,
European naval architects had raced to implement the revolutionary technol-
ogy. By 1885 armor plates had thickened dramatically, but even so they could
still be penetrated by rapidly improving naval cannon. To catch up with these
developments, naval officers pleaded with American steelmakers for help.
Although the interest of the steel industry was initially lethargic, the mid-i88os
weakness in the primary market for steel rails finally prompted some interest
in diversification. Steelmakers told Congress, however, that prices of at least
$500 per ton would be required to induce them to enter the armor plate busi-
ness. When in 1887 the Navy Department finally accepted a bid from the Beth-
lehem Iron Company for 6,703 tons of armor, the average price was $538.67
(expected to rise to $632.61 after testing losses). This was within 20 percent of
established European prices.10
Bethlehem's entry into the military market, though it would make the firm
a central figure in the coming arms controversies, was a shrewd business
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decision. Located in eastern Pennsylvania, Bethlehem Iron (later Bethlehem
Steel) was at a disadvantage to its western competitors in serving the rail
market. Bethlehem also depended on Cuban mines for iron ore, which bur-
dened its products with heavier transportation costs. In serving the eastern
naval shipbuilding industry, these disadvantages disappeared. Bethlehem's
location became an advantage, and Cuban ore was better suited for making
the higher-grade steel required in military contracts than it was for rails.
Bethlehem was nevertheless unable to complete its mill and deliver steel
quickly enough to satisfy the naval appetite. In 1890 Secretary of the Navy
Benjamin F. Tracy, with the assistance of President Benjamin Harrison, per-
suaded a reluctant Andrew Carnegie—the leading business pacifist—to enter
the military market. Tracy promised Carnegie, Phipps and Company the same
prices as were given to Bethlehem three years earlier. Both Bethlehem and
Carnegie received assurances of obtaining steady business, and the armor plate
industry settled down as a two-firm oligopoly, with the U.S. Navy as the only
customer.11
This was a prescription for discord. Steel rails made by the open hearth
process could be produced profitably at the turn of the century for $30 a ton.12
When it was reported that open hearth armor plate brought more than $500 a
ton, a throng of critics in and out of Congress gathered. There were many crit-
ics who doubted the need for a modern "war navy" in the first place, and
numerous others explicitly disliked paying unbid anu allegedly exorbitant
prices for its armor. Bethlehem and Carnegie (and later Midvale Steel, a third
invited entry into the armor plate business) became known collectively in the
Populist-Progressive argot as the "Armor Trust" or the "Armor Ring."13
In 1893-94 opposition to the naval rearmament program spread into a
controversy that became known as the "armor plate scandal." Four discon-
tented employees of Carnegie Steel—they would be known today as "whistle-
blowers"—presented evidence to Grover Cleveland's secretary of the navy,
Hilary A. Herbert, that Carnegie Steel had fraudulently sold defective armor
plate to the navy. Herbert investigated, agreed with the informants, and recom-
mended that Carnegie be fined. President Cleveland set the fine at $i40,489.14
Carnegie complained, and a lengthy congressional investigation ensued.
This investigation examined several charges: that Carnegie Steel had failed to
follow specified procedures in making armor plate; that it falsified results of
tests of armor plate; that it had concealed or disguised defects in plate (al-
legedly the steel had been weakened by blowholes that were secretly and im-
properly patched); and that it had secretly re-treated samples of armor plate
scheduled for ballistic tests. The committee disregarded the explanations of the
steel firm and reported that frauds of a near criminal nature had transpired.15
The most careful student of the episode, Robert Hessen, has determined
that the facts of the matter belie the committee's report. No defective armor
was sold to the navy, no sailor's life was endangered, and the retreated plates
TOWARD THE GREAT WAR I 113
submitted for testing were rejected by the navy. Even so, the behavior of
Charles M. Schwab, Carnegie's supervisor of armor plate production, was seri-
ously improper and deceitful.16 Because of Schwab's misconduct, the brief and
simplistic report of the investigating committee became accepted as the stan-
dard account of the incident. It became a centerpiece in the broad but ingenu-
ous indictment of defense contractors presented by at least six major books.17
The overstated charge of Carnegie's perfidy joined the erroneous claim that
J. P. Morgan's fortune had been founded on ill-gotten gains from the Civil War.
Together these charges formed the "historical basis" for the progressive indict-
ment of munitions makers.18
Not only was the particular lot of steel that was held in question during the
armor plate scandal not defective (except cosmetically), but American plate
had become the world's strongest. In 1889 Hayward Augustus Harvey, an
American inventor, had devised a process for case-hardening steel that gave
American plate a technological superiority. In 1892 firing trials in the United
States and at the Vickers steel works in Sheffield, England, showed that
Harveyized steel was significantly better than English types. Vickers hastened
to catch up, in the process infringing on Harvey's patents. Meanwhile, the
Krupp firm in Germany developed a similar, patented process that could be
combined with the Harvey method. In 1894 the various patent holders and
steel firms formed a pool to divide the business—and fix the prices—among
the ten principal armor plate manufacturers of Britain, Germany, France, and
the United States. This was a true armor trust, but the agreement applied only
to sales of armor plate to third-party countries; the agreement did not apply to
steel sold to the British, German, French, and American navies. Nevertheless, it
gave substance to congressional and other critics who alleged collusion in bid-
ding on armor plate.19
The armor plate scandal and the existence of the patent pool raised serious
questions in respect to the appropriateness of profits on armor plate. In 1895
Secretary Herbert initiated a review of armor prices with the intention of elimi-
nating excessive profits. He demanded that the prevailing price for armor steel
($600 a ton) be cut, on the ground that the initial investment in plant and
equipment had been retired. The steelmakers offered a 10 percent reduction,
which Herbert rejected as inadequate. He undertook an investigation of world
armor prices, even making a secret trip to England and using naval attaches to
help uncover the truth. But the Carnegie firm learned of Secretary Herbert's
plan, and it successfully undermined his investigation. Herbert's inquiry dis-
covered wide variation in foreign armor prices, with some similar to and some
lower than the American price.20
Because of the secretiveness of the steelmakers and the absence of records,
it is impossible to determine today the level of profit they were obtaining.
Influential congressmen, however, wanted a price reduction. In 1897 the
populistic Democratic senator from South Carolina, Benjamin R. Tillman,
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demanded that the maximum price for armor be fixed at $300 a ton or, if this
was not accepted, that a government-owned armor plate plant be constructed.
Tillman, in what his biographer would describe as a "heroic last stand," de-
clared that any senator who would pay more than $300 was willing to grovel
"in the mire of corruption and rottenness." The $300 figure originated from a
revelation in 1896 that Bethlehem Iron had agreed to sell armor to the Russian
Navy for $250 a ton—less than half the price it charged the U.S. Navy! The
lower figure for foreign sales exemplified a practice common in the armor
plate and elsewhere in the international arms industry—selling steel at a price
below cost of production in order to maintain an ability to service the domes-
tic market. In an election year, the commonality of this practice (known today
as "dumping") was disregarded by senatorial critics, and they also ignored the
fact that the Russian price was later raised to $524. Secretary Herbert, who was
anxious not to impede rearmament, was willing to pay $400, and the House of
Representatives approved $425. When the Navy Department asked for bids at
$300, Carnegie Steel demurred, and it also rejected bids at $400. Instead, both
Carnegie and Bethlehem offered to sell their armor plants to the government
and to abandon the armor plate business entirely.21
For Carnegie Steel, the armor plate business was a minor specialty—its
plant represented just 2 percent of its total investment, and profit margins were
declining. In 1893-94, according to company records, the armor plant earned a
rate of profit of 30 percent on the investment. At that time, the price of armor
was $671.15 a ton. By 1898, after congressional critics had conducted their price
reduction campaign, the profit margin fell to 15 percent, which was lower than
that obtained on other steel investments. In 1898, after prolonged negotiations
with the new Republican administration, the price was fixed at $460. This was
undoubtedly profitable, but it was probably less so than the margin that per-
tained in Germany, where the House of Krupp was obtaining a profit on armor
plate of 100 percent of the cost of production. (Krupp prices were generally
higher than those obtained in the United States.) Nevertheless, the profits ob-
tained by Carnegie and Bethlehem were far too high to satisfy those largely
agrarian skeptics who doubted the need for the rearmament program in gen-
eral and its growing cost in particular.22
The Spanish War
As the 1890s drew to a close, the rearmament program had obtained some suc-
cess, although certainly not without generating considerable controversy. By
1896 the U.S. Navy had become the world's sixth largest. Although still far from
formidable, it was respectable. The peacetime army, whose duties were for-
merly restricted to Indian control, riot duty, coastal defense, militia training,
and river and harbor improvement, was becoming a "war army," whose basic
mission was to fight a small war with a foreign power.23 Yet the war with Spain
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revealed that America's organizational capacity had lagged behind its military
aspirations.
In 1898, when the United States declared war, the regular army had not
been enlarged in many years, and its complement remained fixed at 25,000
men.24 The tenfold increase in strength would have to be made up, in
the American tradition, of volunteer troops who were assembled, trained,
equipped, and transported at nearly a moment's notice. This haste would nec-
essarily entail a considerable financial burden, and this would offer another
opportunity for charges of mismanagement and war profiteering.
The Spanish War was too brief, too cheap, and too popular to produce
severe dispute, but it did foreshadow what was in store. There were numerous
charges of malfeasance, some well grounded, but most accusations of profi-
teering were really matters of haste and inefficiency rather than avarice. The
best-known of these incidents was the "Embalmed Beef" controversy, which
materialized because provisions supplied to the troops for once fully justified
the soldier's eternal gripe about army food.
The basic ration issued to the troops in 1898 was canned roast beef. The
army had little experience in fighting in the tropics, and its supply officers
failed to anticipate that canned beef would spoil quickly in the heat. There
were also some cans of beef that contained gristle, pieces of rope, and even
some dead maggots. These problems formed a good example of the degraded
quality form of profiteering. Charges of malfeasance reached the press, which
in classic muckraking fashion exaggerated the evidence, attributed sinister mo-
tives, and assumed corruption in government. The army's commissary general,
Charles P. Eagan, was forced to resign, terminating a long career and staining a
distinguished record. In 1899 a court of inquiry found that Eagan had made a
mistake in judgment, but had done so honestly. Nevertheless, the myth of
meatpackers corruptly providing the troops with adulterated beef became
deeply engraved on the social memory of the Spanish War.25
There were a few other allegations of profiteering related to uniforms,
arms, and training camps. As in the Civil War, there was not enough blue cloth
of military grade available to supply uniforms for the multitudes of adven-
turesome volunteers. Inferior grades were again employed, this time know-
ingly. These uniforms faded or wore out quickly, allowing press critics to
recycle old charges of corruption and to bring back the timeworn accusation
of "shoddy" quality. Due to congressional stinginess, supplies of modern, bolt-
action Krag-Jorgensen rifles were insufficient. These weapons went to the regu-
lar army, while volunteers were armed with obsolescent single-shot Spring-
fields of Civil War vintage. The new Krags used smokeless powder, but the
older models used black powder that left a cloud of smoke to give away the
troops' position. Powder manufacturers (principally the DuPont Company)
hastened to produce greater quantities of smokeless powder, but they were
charged with improperly hiking their prices as well. (The original price, a
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dollar per pound, was reduced to 8o<t, which one congressman termed "extor-
tion.") James A. Frear, a veteran of 1898 who served for many years in Con-
gress, maintained that contractors had overcharged the army for the
construction of training camps. Lumber that allegedly should have cost thirty
dollars per thousand board feet was sold to the government at sixty dollars,
and laborers who supposedly should have received $4 a day were paid $y.26
Brief though it was, the War of 1898 was not too short to produce its share
of disgruntled veterans. Sanitary conditions in the thoughtlessly constructed
camps were poor, and 20 percent of the recruits contracted typhoid fever. One
in seventy died of disease, and doubts about this sacrifice appeared. The war
offered an excellent opportunity for the era's leading dissenters, the Populists,
to oppose its cost, but most Populists were slow to seize it.27 The war was gen-
erally popular in the South and West, but Tom Watson, the Populist presiden-
tial candidate from Georgia, contended that foreign involvement only
benefited the "privileged" classes. Watson lamented that imperialism diverted
attention from "the unjust system they have put upon us." Congressman Frear,
who would cast his vote against American entry into the war with Germany in
1917, said that his predecessors in Congress had been "swept off their feet" by
war hysteria in 1898. His colleague in the Senate, James K. Vardaman of
Mississippi, a combat trooper in Cuba, believed that the worthy goals of the
war had been corrupted into an imperialistic venture by greedy businessmen,
particularly bankers. Though the war lasted but three months, one volunteer
uttered sentiments as old as war itself: "We have been ignored, neglected, dis-
honored, belittled, and more or less forgotten!... The enlisted man received a
pittance of $15.60 while in the field."28 The charges of expensive munitions,
adulterated food, costly cantonments, and underpaid soldiers were all revived
in the bitter disputes of the Great War.
The Progressives and Defense Profits
From 1898 through 1913, the United States embarked on a program of accelera-
ted military expansion. In 1899 bitter fighting resumed as American forces
sought to consolidate control of the Philippines. Congress voted to triple the
prewar army and to double the naval construction program. Between 1898 and
1907 nineteen battleships and ten armored cruisers were authorized, and the
naval buildup produced results. The new warships were twice as large and
twice as heavily armed as their predecessors. Between 1879 and 1921, the
number of sailors increased by ten times, and naval appropriations rose by
forty times. The U.S. Navy rose from sixth largest in the world to second place,
behind only Great Britain, and even that was not enough to satisfy some naval-
ists. The army increased in manpower by nine times and in its budget by thirty
times. As this unceasing growth continued, progressive critics of expansionist
diplomacy asked a series of simple, reasonable, and searching questions: Why
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did the United States need these forces? Would they be used to good purpose?
When would the expenditures stop rising? And perhaps most important,
would great military strength have harmful effects on the nation?29
These troublesome questions foreshadowed the larger and increas-
ingly more divisive debates of the following decades. Progressive critics of mili-
tary force and expansionist diplomacy—who might be called "isolationist
progressives"—added two more considerations to the list: what part in Ameri-
can defense policy was being played by private profit, and was this private
profit serving the national interest? Their answer to these new questions—that
profit played an inordinate and improper role—would shape their answers to
nearly all other military questions.
The most fundamental defense issue of the Progressive era was whether the
United States faced any serious danger at all. In 1837 Abraham Lincoln himself
had eloquently articulated a traditional belief in American invulnerability
to attack. "All the armies of Europe, Asia, and Africa combined," Lincoln de-
clared, "... could not by force take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on
the Blue Ridge, in the trial of a thousand years." In 1880 the illustrious Civil
War general William T. Sherman said that the chance of invasion was "simply
preposterous."30 For many Americans, this safety from foreign attack was as
complete in the twentieth century as it had been in the nineteenth. "Three
thousand miles of salt water separate the hell over there from God's country,"
wrote one Oklahoman. "Surely, surely there [is] no reason why the USA should
get mixed up in the bloody mess on the other side of that blessedly deep and
wide ocean."31
Military critics specifically rejected the assertion that the principal poten-
tial enemies identified by champions of defense spending—Germany, Japan,
and Britain—represented true threats. David Starr Jordan, the pacifist presi-
dent of Stanford University, dismissed the notion that Japan had any design on
the Philippine Islands or upon gaining territory in the Western Hemisphere.
"We cannot conceive of a war between Japan and the United States," Jordan
confidently announced in 1914.31 Lucia Ames Mead, a pacifist who was one of
three women on the board of directors of the Anti-Imperialist League, believed
that American control of the Philippines was a matter of reversed priorities.
She believed that navalists desired the Philippines in order to justify a larger
navy, rather than that the United States needed a strong navy in order to pro-
tect the islands. Progressive critics further believed that to continue to increase
defense appropriations would divert funds from social programs, would vio-
late traditional American opposition to standing armies (thus undercutting
American exceptionalism), and would even invite battlefield carnage by
making available the weapons it required. Opposing the Spanish War, David
Starr Jordan expressed views that were common among American pacifists
throughout the progressive era. He told the Stanford Class of 1898 that it was
"not what we shall do with Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines [sic]. It is
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what these prizes will do to us." Jordan believed that the only practical uses for
the United States Navy were to conduct ceremonies and to render assistance to
American citizens in trouble abroad."33
Forcefully rejecting the logic in support of defense spending, Progressive
critics began to speculate upon what other motivation might explain the advo-
cacy of defense increases. Their suspicions centered on the corrupting influ-
ence of money. Their conclusion became the American version of what
became known internationally as the "Merchants of Death" theory, namely,
that defense contractors aided and abetted the outbreak of war in search of
profit. Its origins came partly from within the United States and partly from
Europe. But American conditions—particularly the heritage of the Civil
War—ensured that the Merchants of Death idea would gain a large American
following.
In 1909, Oswald Garrison Villard, a leading Progressive journalist and a
grandson of the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, declared in a speech
in New York City that support for increased naval spending came from "a
combination of very wicked persons who stand to profit from a big navy."
(Villard referred to Colonel Robert M. Thompson, a Naval Academy graduate
who had become chairman of the board of directors of International Nickel.
Nickel was an important component of armor plate, and Villard believed that
avarice explained Thompson's support for navalism.)34 Villard was not only
among the first to link the rearmament program directly to greedy profit seek-
ing, but he also remained the most outspoken advocate of that position.
Villard displayed some of the suspiciousness and contentiousness for which
his grandfather was famous, and the antipreparedness movement (and later
the antiwar movement) exhibited some of the zealousness and crusading self-
righteousness of the abolitionist movement.
Others soon picked up Villard's cry. In 1910 Nicholas Murray Butler, presi-
dent of Columbia University, offered an early and candidly simplistic state-
ment of this idea. Butler declared, "I am one of those who look for the simplest
motives in explanation of action or of conduct. My impression is that some-
body makes something by reason of the huge expenditures in preparation for
war." In 1913 a leading Progressive journalist, Hamilton Holt, charged "the
agents of ordnance manufacturers and shipbuilders" with working against
friendship between the United States and Japan. By 1914 Congressman Clyde
H. Tavenner was writing in the Progressive journal La Follette's Weekly Maga-
zine that millionaire munitions executives were "agitating" for a larger defense
in search of profit. Tavenner went on to allege the existence of a "World Wide
War Trust" that endangered the peace. In early 1914 David Starr Jordan added
confidently, "About war scares and war equipment, matters inherent in the War
System, centre the grossest exhibitions of human greed. Those who scent
from afar the cadaverous odor of lucre have for the most part furnished
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war's dominant motive." Thus the allegation that munitions makers in search
of fat profit promoted war preceded the debate over the Great War by sev-
eral years.35
The Great War was profoundly disturbing to Progressives who blithely en-
tertained a romantic, nineteenth-century belief that humanity had marched so
far down the road of progress that war had become an anachronism, even an
impossibility. "Except as a result of accidental clash in uncontrollable war ma-
chinery," proclaimed David Starr Jordan early in 1914, "war is already impos-
sible." Since war was inconceivable, progressives reasoned, preparing for it was
senseless. "There is, in fact, something primitive, outworn and unprogressive
in the spectacle of a civilized nation composed of millions of clever people
trusting for its defense in forts and ships," Jordan proclaimed. "Europe recoils
and will recoil [from war]," he predicted with supreme overconfidence.36 When
the events of August 1914 smashed forever this dreamy innocence, the reaction
among Progressives was despair and anger. "It is impossible now," Jane
Addams recalled later, "to reproduce the basic sense of desolation, of suicide,
of anachronism, which that first news of war brought to thousands of men
and women who had come to consider war as a throwback in the scientific
sense." But David Starr Jordan knew immediately where to place the blame:
"The mailed fist has crashed through the delicate far flung fabric of our civi-
lization, sweeping away as cobwebs all that we have cherished. . . . THE WAR
SYSTEM MUST GO." 3 7
Jordan's intellectual journey to a belief that war was caused by profit seek-
ing was illustrative. As a youth, Jordan was a militant republican, hating every
respect of royalism, and he maintained that faith throughout his life. Jordan
spent the summer of 1912 studying the American Civil War, and he later dedi-
cated one of his early pacifist tracts to the memory of his brother, who was
killed in it. He concluded from his study that while civilization was progres-
sing, war, as an anachronistic remnant of monarchism, was the worst enemy
of progress. Jordan also reached the conclusion that threats to peace in Europe
were being conjured up by greedy weapons merchants in England and
Germany, whose baneful alliance with militarists was a wretched carryover
from feudal days. "It is the gigantic and remorseless naval military lobby, not
the menace of Germany, which keeps up the British naval budget," Jordan
wrote to Charles W. Eliot, the president of Harvard University, in September
1912. "In the United States," Jordan added, "with no possible fear of attack of
any kind from any quarter we are spending nearly a million dollars a day, (1) to
follow the fashion of Europe, (2) to create an ideal perfection of defense where
no defense is needed, (3) to gratify our own armor plate lobby, and (4) to keep
national defenses so high as to discourage tariff reduction." Eliot demurred. "I
cannot believe that all these war preparations are caused by the machinations
of a few manufacturers interested in the making of war materials," he wrote,
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arguing that defense contractors were too few to cause a great war. This
exchange between the leaders of Stanford and Harvard portended a debate
that would absorb the nation two decades later.38
Antipreparedness
The year 1915 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Civil War.
In one way or another, its bittersweet memory affected the views of most par-
ticipants in the preparedness controversy. The Civil War reminded many
Americans not only of gore and glory but also of swollen fortunes, an un-
wanted outcome that had never been reconciled. Those who lamented the fail-
ure of the Northern cause to achieve its idealistic goals—and thus to justify its
sacrifice—found that the charge of war profiteering resonated. For a few the
memory was vivid and direct. At eighty, Isaac R. Sherwood of Ohio, who had
served as a brigadier general in the Union army, was one of the most venerated
members of Congress. In January 1916, Sherwood echoed his Civil War heri-
tage by denouncing "that powerful group of war exploiters in Gotham who
value blood-coined dollars as more vital than orderly self-government." Sen-
ator John D. Works of California, who had served in the Union cavalry, was a
leading opponent of preparedness. Works displayed his long (but not infal-
lible) memory by declaring that the call for preparedness came from "the in-
fluence of plutocracy, wealth, big business.... Plutocracy and militarism are
concordant and congenial evils."39
Others formed their views of Civil War profiteering by hearsay. In 1922
Warren G. Harding, by then president of the United States, recollected how a
chance meeting a decade earlier had left a deep impression: "I remember,"
wrote Harding, "in 1913, I attended the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of
Gettysburg. Quite by accident I ran on to a small camp-fire group of Union
and Confederate veterans The chief theme of discussion, in this reunion of
former foes, was that the Civil War was fought at the command of the capital-
ists of the North and South.... Among these grim old veterans, rollicking in
the enjoyment of their reunion, there was that inevitable resentment of those
who had made fortunes out of the war or those whose fortunes had something
to do with bringing on the war."40
Many of those who were outspoken against preparedness and profits were
profoundly affected by the social memory of the war as related by historians of
the time. Gustavus Myers's depiction of The History of the Great American
Fortunes was one of the most widely read and influential tracts of the Progres-
sive era. It made the oft-repeated charge that the foundation of J. Pierpont
Morgan's fortune was gun-trading during the Civil War.41 Since Morgan's firm,
under the leadership of his son, was the leading supporter and supplier of
Britain before the American war declaration, Myers's charges focused the in-
tervention question sharply: Should the United States participate in another
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gory conflict if the probable result was to intensify the inequality of the distri-
bution of wealth?42 Other writers cited James Ford Rhodes on Civil War profi-
teering, conveniently overlooking Rhodes's opinion that the charges of cor-
ruption were "much exaggerated."43
Some remembered the economic cost of the Civil War from Confederate
perspectives. The Southern historian Frank L. Owsley blamed the Confeder-
acy's defeat on the failure of Britain to intervene, and he believed that Britain
made this decision for reasons of profit. Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels, a North Carolinian, was the son of a Confederate soldier who was
killed in the war. His mother taught her sons to hate war, and Josephus re-
mained suspicious of military ways. Daniels became arguably the most aggres-
sive opponent of war profits in the Wilson administration.44
Perhaps the most important legacy of the Civil War was creating the con-
viction among antipreparedness Progressives that if the United States entered
the Great War it would mean the end of the Progressive movement. Recalling
the vitality of the antebellum reform spirit, as exemplified by abolitionists,
pacifists, feminists, and 48'ers, they sadly also recalled how the Civil War had
drained away the zest for reform. From this perspective, the Civil War became
a profoundly reactionary event.45 Since progressives regarded businessmen as
the sworn enemies of reform, they suspected that businessmen would seek to
enter the war not only in order to gain a blood profit but also to kill off the
vigor of the reform movement. Jane Addams pessimistically summarized this
view: "Everything that we have gained in the way of social legislation will be
destroyed."46 Thus, progressives argued, war profits had a dual role in bringing
on American participation in the Great War.47
In a curious way, the battle over preparedness and war profits pitted de-
scendants of both sides of the Civil War profiteering quarrel against each other.
Those in favor of preparedness included J. P. Morgan, whose father was at the
center of the Civil War dispute, Marcellus Hartley Dodge, and Charles Schwab.
The descendant of Marcellus Hartley of the Civil War era, Dodge owned all the
shares of the Remington Arms-Union Metallic Cartridge Company.48 Un-
questionably, American entry would greatly benefit Dodge's ammunition busi-
ness. Charles Schwab of Bethlehem Steel, the leader of the "Armor Trust," was
the grandson of a mill owner who had held a contract to make blankets and
overcoats for the Union army. The du Pont family was another case in point.
The family firm had supplied powder for the nation's arms for a century, and
the latest generation of du Ponts was expected to gain from American partici-
pation.49
Thus while defense contractors were often heirs of family businesses that
had long been engaged in supplying military needs, the chief critics of defense
spending were often descendants of abolitionists, like Oswald and Fanny
Villard. Congressman Daniel R. Anthony Jr. of Kansas was another prepared-
ness foe of staunch abolitionist lineage. Anthony's father, a fiery Quaker editor,
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was an abolitionist of considerable local standing who later worked for
temperance and woman suffrage. The younger Anthony's better-known rela-
tive was his illustrious aunt, Susan B. Anthony, the renowned abolitionist and
feminist.50
In charging that profit was a major purpose of preparedness, the an-
tipreparedness camp was taking up a cry that had resounded in England and
Germany. In the decade before the war, British defense contractors had built
nineteen plants in Russia, making everything from cannon shells to battle-
ships. These investments were highly profitable, and critics at home claimed
that British foreign policy was designed to protect the investment. A serious
controversy developed in 1906 concerning the Coventry Ordnance Company,
a major contractor for the Royal Navy. Allegedly, H. H. Mulliner, Coventry's
managing director, supplied Parliament with counterfeit documents purport-
ing to show a substantial increase in German naval spending in hopes of in-
creasing British naval appropriations. This episode included a frightened out-
cry from the English public for the construction of more dreadnoughts: "We
Want Eight and We Won't Wait!"51 This allegedly contrived danger led to the
desired increase in spending and contributed to the Anglo-German naval arms
race, which was one of the causes of the Great War. In 1906 the famous English
dramatist, George Bernard Shaw, presented Major Barbara, which featured as
a principal character Sir Andrew Undershaft, an amoral defense contractor
who cheerfully sold arms to both sides in any war. (Undershaft was loosely
modeled on the Krupp family, the cannon kings of Germany.)52 First produced
in the United States in 1915, Major Barbara attracted considerable attention be-
cause of its author's literary prominence.
There was a substantial production of British nonfiction which was also
very critical of defense spending. An illustrious galaxy of writers including
John A. Hobson, Norman Angell, Henry Noel Brailsford, George H. Perris,
and H. G. Wells attacked the military from different perspectives.53 Besides the
publication of English books and journals in America, these ideas crossed the
Atlantic in several other ways. Norman Angell, the best-known British pacifist,
made a speaking tour of the United States, and several American pacifists vis-
ited their British comrades.54
In Germany, the principal prewar critic of military spending was Karl
Liebknecht, the leader of the socialists in the Reichstag. In 1913 Liebknecht
gained international prominence by charging that members of the Krupp steel
enterprise were warmongers and by presenting evidence to the Reichstag that
confirmed his claim. A Krupp agent was eventually imprisoned and several
naval officers were cashiered for bribery and theft of documents. Krupp agents
used this secret intelligence to plant a war scare in a French newspaper. From
the Krupp point of view this had the happy and profitable effect of winning
the Reichstag's approval of an expanded military budget. But it also brought
wide attention to Liebknecht's book, Militarism, the American edition of
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which appeared in 1917. In Militarism Liebknecht denounced "profiteers" and
"the bloody international of the merchants of death." (Both the terms "the
bloody international" and "merchants of death" would later become titles
of book-length exposes of war profiteering.) Liebknecht also charged that
German navalists demanded a fleet that would be "highly profitable to them-
selves."55
The German Left had many admirers in the United States, and to them
Liebknecht's claims were highly plausible. Americans who sympathized with
German military critics included pacifists Oswald Garrison Villard and David
Starr Jordan, the socialist Scott Nearing, Senator Robert M. La Follette
of Wisconsin, and Congressmen Richard Bartholdt of Missouri and Henry
Vollmer of Iowa, who were widely identified as spokesmen of the large
German-American voting minority in Congress. Together, they were the intel-
lectual descendants of Carl Schurz.56
Although a fledgling antipreparedness, antiprofiteering movement had ap-
peared by the highwater mark of the Progressive era, the outbreak of war in
Europe in August 1914 forced Americans to think more deeply about defense
questions. Isolationist Progressives of both parties united against American
participation. Devoted to the Jeffersonian heritage, they deeply distrusted pro-
fessional soldiers, whom they regarded as unproductive and parasitical. The
war itself was European, therefore wicked; its principal value was merely to
demonstrate anew the decadence of monarchy and imperialism. War was a
logical outcome of the uneven and unfair distribution of wealth, which
monarchy made justifiable and which agrarian progressives found deeply rep-
rehensible. War meant killing, and by connecting maldistribution of wealth to
war, an economic problem was transformed into a profound moral question.57
By 1914 a broadly based, pacifist, antipreparedness phalanx existed. The an-
tipreparedness persuasion produced several organizational expressions, the
most prominent of which was the American Union against Militarism. Other
such groups included the League for Peace and the Anti-Preparedness Com-
mittee. The militantly pacifist American Union against Militarism counted
among its leaders such illustrious journalists as Oswald Garrison Villard
and Frederic C. Howe; Crystal Eastman, a well-known socialist who orga-
nized the Woman's Peace Party of New York; and Amos Pinchot, a wealthy
New York lawyer whose brother Gifford was the Progressive era's leading con-
servationist. At the suggestion of a number of congressmen, in 1916 the Union
against Militarism organized a public speaking tour to protest military
buildup.58
The members of the Union against Militarism, like the Anti-Imperialist
Committee, were mostly New Englanders. The Union against Militarism op-
posed secret diplomacy, atrocious weapons, and war toys. It demanded a na-
tional referendum on a war declaration and the outlawing of the private
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manufacture of war materiel. The position of the Union against Militarism
was that businessmen were looking forward to making profits out of war.
"Neither the United States nor any other country can carry on a war which will
make the world safe for democracy and for plutocracy at the same time," pro-
claimed Pinchot. "If the war is to save God, it cannot save Mammon." It fol-
lowed logically that by taking the profits out of war businessmen would work
against war. If people had a financial incentive to maintain peace, war would
be ended as a human institution.59
The antipreparedness movement had strong ties to the feminist movement
as well as to progressivism in general. As early as 1872 the abolitionist Julia
Ward Howe, famous as the composer of the "Battle Hymn of the Republic,"
went to England to work for peace, although her mission failed when she
was denied permission to speak at a convention of the English Peace Society.
Returning to the United States, Howe held peace meetings in eighteen Ameri-
can cities, denouncing the American role as arms purveyor.60 Jane Addams, the
famous settlement house worker, became actively involved in pacifist work in
1907. Her prominence and indefatigable zeal gained her the leadership of the
women's peace movement. Other prominent feminists who became active in
the peace movement included Lucia Ames Mead, of the Anti-Imperialist
League, Crystal Eastman, settlement worker Lillian Wald, and the writer
Charlotte Perkins Gilman. (Gilman did not attribute warfare to greed, but be-
lieved that war had masculine causation: men had a naturally combative in-
stinct, and they loved glorious ostentation and noise.) In August 1914, Fanny
Garrison Villard, the daughter of William Lloyd Garrison and mother of
Oswald Garrison Villard, gave the peace movement further prestige. She iden-
tified herself as a vigorous promoter of a permanent women's peace organiza-
tion by chairing a Woman's Peace Parade in New York City. She believed that
men were too willing to compromise with militarism. What the peace move-
ment needed, in the family tradition, was militancy.
In April 1915, at the call of Jane Addams, a group of militant pacifists meet-
ing at The Hague organized the Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom. The delegates denounced war profits as a cause of the Great War:
"The private profits accruing from the great arms factories [are] a powerful
hindrance to the abolition of war." They approved and vigorously supported a
resolution to make the manufacture and sale of arms a state monopoly. Three
of eleven points in the resulting platform of the Women's Peace Party
concerned the economic causes of war. In November 1916, the Women's Peace
Party proposed an investigation of the munitions industry, a goal that
stretched back to the Franco-Prussian War and was realized two decades later.61
Although the opposition to war profits had its roots in the Civil War
legacy, in religious pacifism,62 in progressivism, in feminism, in British anti-
imperialism, and in German liberalism, its geographical strength was in the
West and South. During the prewar decade, "little navy" men in Congress usu-
TOWARD THE GREAT WAR I 125
ally represented the rural South and Midwest.63 Very early, the antiprepared-
ness, antiprofiteering campaign displayed some aspects of midwestern
parochialism. Far from the seacoast, little navy men felt no significant danger
of invasion. Shipbuilding was entirely an Atlantic seaboard industry, which
in the midwestern view produced little benefit but brought great cost. Often
believing that prices of agricultural commodities were manipulated to their
benefit by Wall Street brokers, westerners suspected that unnecessary naval
spending was another instance of devious easterners fleecing the pockets of
helpless farmers. Small-town newspaper editors were frequent proponents of
this analysis.64
Opposition to defense spending was most intense in places like Nebraska
and North Dakota. Besides the occupational affinity of grain farming for paci-
fist, antimilitary ideas, many midwesterners maintained ethnic affections for
Germany or Scandinavia (the latter being neutralist, socialist, or both), as well
as other non-English regions of Europe. Economic links to the military were
likewise weaker in the Midwest and South. North Dakota ranked last among
the states in defense expenditures, receiving only 1/2500TI1 that of New York.
Thus in October 1914, only a few weeks after the guns of August had first thun-
dered, Congressman Henry Helgesen of North Dakota was already charging
that Woodrow Wilson's love of big businessmen would involve the United
States in the European war. In the presidential election of 1916, the Prohibition
Party, which had much of its support in the Midwest, included in its platform
a plank calling for the removal of private profit from the manufacture of
war materiel. "The feeling of New York is not the feeling of America," wrote the
Californian David Starr Jordan. "The big business of New York and [New
York's] big voting population look on the world with very different eyes."65
The war profiteering issue, in the sense that large wartime gains were im-
proper amid sacrifice, was secondary in the quarrel over preparedness. The
core of the dispute was the appropriateness of American sales of war materiel
to belligerent powers, which might lead the nation into military as well as eco-
nomic engagement. The principal questions consisted of the legality of arms
sales, the amount of credit that should be extended to support them, and the
degree to which the United States should prepare to defend this commerce.
Inevitably, though, the debate confronted the question of who benefited from,
and who paid for, American mobilization.

Warhogs and Warsows
War brings prosperity to the stock gamblers on Wall Street. The stock brokers
would not, of course, go to war, because the very object they have in bringing on
war is profit They will be concealing in their palatial offices on Wall Street, sit-
ting behind mahogany desks, covered with clipped coupons—coupons dyed in the
lifeblood of their fellow man.
SENATOR GEORGE W. NORRIS (1917)
The demise of peace in 1914 startled and frightened Americans, and two and
a half years would pass before the United States reluctantly entered the Great
War. During the interval between Congressman Clyde H. Tavenner's sweeping
arraignment of the munitions industry and the American war declaration,
profits on military products climbed to unknown levels, the market for
military-related stocks reached record highs, and the isolationist progressive
bloc dueled steadily with a growing coalition of supporters of preparedness.
The harshest words were exchanged over the war declaration itself, but the
acrimony of the dispute flared much earlier. In 1916 the opponents of pre-
paredness persuaded Congress to enact a special tax on profits gained from
making munitions. The munitions tax was yet another example of progres-
sivism's evangelical campaign to master monopoly capitalism, but it became
the harbinger of modern attempts to control war profiteering. The campaign
against monopolism was much older than the debate over the Great War, and
the longing to obliterate such particularly odious and allegedly dangerous ex-
amples of monopolistic profiteering as the "Armor Trust," the "Powder Trust,"
and the "Aircraft Trust" would continue for decades. Yet as dividends and
prices of military stocks swelled in 1915 and 1916, the campaign against arms
makers took on increasing urgency, and the war profits issue surfaced in vari-
ous forms.
By 10 August 1914, the Wilson administration was already considering the
American economic role in the conflict. Secretary of State William Jennings
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Bryan informed President Wilson that the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company
had asked on August 9 whether the government objected to loans to bel-
ligerent powers. Bryan recommended that Wilson disapprove the Morgan
Company's request on the grounds that loaning money would be an unneutral
act (although not illegal). Perhaps somewhat inconsistently, Bryan did not
oppose sales of munitions to the Allies by private firms, but that had been the
established American policy since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Wilson
first agreed with Bryan's view (that sales should be allowed but not loans), but
he changed his mind and overruled his aide, deciding to permit both sales and
loans on March 311915. Wilson did follow Bryan's advice in part, however. As
Bryan had recommended, Wilson took the first action designed to limit war
profits; by purchasing fifty-four German and Austrian merchant ships trapped
in U.S. ports, the government attempted to counteract what it considered to be
extortionate rates charged by private shipping firms. These rates had risen by
700 percent during the first six months of the war.1
In part to protest Wilson's decision to approve the Morgan loans, Bryan re-
signed his post and commenced a speaking tour. This decision by such a highly
visible figure focused national attention on war profits. On 20 June 1915, Bryan
addressed a crowd of 70,000 at Madison Square Garden in New York City.
The Great Commoner denounced preparedness and loans to belligerents and
called for government ownership of munitions plants in order to take the
profits out of war. Disregarding his earlier position, by 1916 Bryan also con-
tested sales to belligerents as well as loans.2
Champions of a strong defense roared back at Bryan. Between December
1914 and June 1915, advocates of preparedness formed two organizations, the
National Security League and the Navy League, to advance their cause. Since
both organizations were well financed, progressives suspected that the funds
were coming from profit-seeking defense contractors who stood to gain hand-
somely from a defense buildup.3 In 1915 Hudson Maxim, the brother of one of
the principal inventors of the machine gun, published an intemperate argu-
ment for preparedness titled Defenseless America* This was followed by the
first of many motion pictures that would figure in the war profits debate. A
Battle Cry for Peace, the film version of Defenseless America, luridly depicted
the awful consequences of an America conquered by Germans. The an-
tipreparedness circle regarded the film as reckless demagoguery (it received the
assistance of the large and powerful Hearst newspaper chain), and in 1916 they
alleged that it was deliberately shown in theaters located in districts repre-
sented by antipreparedness congressmen seeking reelection. The wealthy au-
tomaker Henry Ford, a business pacifist, took out full-page advertisements in
250 newspapers in the hope of countering the effect of the film. Ford charged
that Maxim was a war profiteer.5
The antiwar progressives noted that Maxim's brother was earning substan-
tial profits from supplying rapid-fire weapons to the Allies. They inferred from
this relationship that the preparedness campaign was backed by wealthy busi-
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nessmen who hoped to profit from the war and who would stop at nothing to
gain their ends, including the use of the new motion picture medium as a per-
nicious means of rousing people's fears. In suspecting that the preparedness
campaign was profit motivated, the progressives were substantially wrong.
Advocacy of the cause of American preparedness fell mainly to businessmen
with little or no previous involvement in military contracting, and the largest
defense contractors generally shied away from the preparedness debate.
Executives of the Du Pont Company, for example, assumed that the war
would be brief: a conflict perhaps on the scale of the Franco-Prussian War. Like
other American business leaders, the du Ponts were wary of losses they could
suffer if they tooled up for a war that might terminate abruptly. Du Pont execu-
tives had distinct and bitter memories of the Spanish-American War when
their firm had swiftly expanded its facilities to produce brown prismatic
cannon powder. After Spain's surrender, the firm was left with expanded facili-
ties, a large powder inventory, canceled contracts, and political charges of ex-
tortionate pricing. The U.S. Navy afterward attempted to soothe its disgrunt-
led supplier, but Du Pont president Eugene du Pont declared a preference for
accepting the loss rather than remaining in the military powder business.6
In 1915 the Du Pont company's new president, Pierre S. du Pont, specifically
requested that no officer or employee of the firm become active in the pre-
paredness movement, although he broke his own rule by personally subsidiz-
ing distribution of Defenseless America.7 The position of the J. P. Morgan
Company early in the war was that it would be foolish to think that America
would not be harmed by a general European conflict. Since Morgan's brother-
in-law, Herbert L. Satterlee, was a founder of the National Security League, the
League's views were contaminated in the eyes of isolationist progressives, who
saw it as a mouthpiece of the Morgan interests. Morgan did become a con-
tributor to the NSL by 1918, as did T. Coleman du Pont (Pierre's brother), but
investigations of the National Security League and the Navy League were
unable to show that major funding came from large defense contractors.
Most of the money for the preparedness organizations actually came from
businessmen whose wealth derived from enterprises that served the civilian
economy, and 94 percent of the money behind the National Security League
came from New York City.8 In 1918, after the United States entered the conflict,
the National Security League assembled a $400,000 war chest to defeat con-
gressmen who had voted against preparedness or against the war. The League
was thus a latter-day equivalent of the Union League of the Civil War era, even
to the extent of holding some of its meetings in Union League clubrooms. The
ample resources of the National Security League, as well as its willingness to
question the loyalty of its opponents, quite naturally inspired rancorous reac-
tions, as had the Union League.9
The sinking by Germany of the British liner Lusitania in May 1915
staggered the neutralist position, and two days later President Wilson asked
Congress for increased appropriations for the army. A clamor for preparedness
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developed, and although it came principally from outside progressive ranks,
the preparedness impulse drove a wedge into the progressive cohort. By 1916
Wilson, backed by growing consensus of American opinion, advocated further
enlargement of the American fleet. This phase of naval expansion appealed to
some who had been previously uncertain or opposed—southern and western
farmers who had become resentful of the British blockade. As the president
put it succinctly to his key adviser, Colonel House, "Let us build a navy bigger
than hers and do what we please."10
Former president Theodore Roosevelt, who needed no new excuse for
championing preparedness, reacted to unfolding war news by extending his
reasoning in respect to arms sales. Although the United States had always de-
fended its legal right to sell arms to belligerents (just as a local gun dealer could
sell arms to private citizens), Roosevelt argued that German atrocities in Bel-
gium meant that the United States now had a moral duty to sell arms to those
who were attempting to resist the war criminals." [The] issues at stake are ele-
mental," wrote the Rough Rider. "The free peoples of the world have banded
together against tyrannous militarism and government by caste. It is not too
much to say that the outcome will largely determine, for daring and liberty-
loving souls, whether or not life is worth living." Roosevelt's rather romantic
view of the war issues was not atypical. Just as pacifists entertained the roman-
tic notion that civilization had progressed so far that war had become impos-
sible, supporters of preparedness and intervention gave romantic, even poetic,11
reasons for participating in the conflict. It was not uncommon to describe
the great issue of the time as simply whether to allow the continuation
of "Prussianism" or "Kruppism." These terms lumped together Germany's
allegedly evil qualities: atrocities, militarism, attacks on peaceful shipping,
and the "sordid enormous trade in the instruments of death." Herbert Hoover,
writing in 1917 on "German Practices in Belgium," said: "I have neither the
desire nor the adequate pen to picture the scenes which have heated my
blood I myself believe that if we do not fight and fight now, all these things
are possible to us—but even should the broad Atlantic prove our present de-
fender, there is still Belgium. Is it worth while for us to live in a world where
this free and unoffending people is to be trampled into the earth and to
raise no sword in protest?"12 The Great War was presented to the American
public in glowing, romantic terms by its advocates, and when the clamor for
the crusade stilled, an angry reaction struck those who profited during the
hostilities.
In 1914-15 there was ample reason to be concerned about national defense.
Despite twenty years of rearmament, the nation remained hopelessly unpre-
pared for a major war. Unlike European nations, the United States maintained
no agency to coordinate defense mobilization. President Wilson, obedient to
the isolationist progressive wing of the Democratic Party and distrustful of
business influence in government, opposed serious efforts to make plans for
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converting the American economy to a wartime basis, although he moved
closer to clear support for a defense buildup.13
Wilson's preparedness program appealed to a new branch of progres-
sivism—what John M. Cooper Jr. has termed the "Liberal Internationalist"
wing.14 Most progressive luminaries feared American entry into the war sub-
stantially because they believed that war would herald the end of the reform
spirit as it had in the Civil War era. The nascent internationalist wing took a
different view. This dissenting group, which included such progressives as
Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and Ida Tarbell, welcomed preparedness as
an opportunity to advance the liberal agenda. They believed that preparedness
would bring a flow of power to the national capital. They were joined, within
the Wilson administration, by Secretary of War Lindley Garrison, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, and chief foreign policy adviser
Colonel Edward M. House. With Woodrow Wilson in office, progressives con-
trolled the White House, so the liberal internationalists believed that the
expected flow of power could be channeled into support for progressive pro-
grams. In particular, they believed (correctly as it turned out) that the funds
required for preparedness could be obtained only from the expansion of the
federal income tax. This would afford an opportunity to increase tax rates on
persons in the upper income brackets significantly. War would thus be used to
accomplish their leading goal of wealth redistribution through taxation, a
dream which had not been realized in peacetime. (The Spanish-American War
experience offered a promising lesson. It was financed by a progressive inheri-
tance tax, although this lapsed in 1902.) Indeed, by 1916 the distribution of
wealth in the United States was more unequal than in any other year in recent
history.15
The most active advocate of the redistributionist position was Amos
Pinchot, who, while remaining prominent in the American Union against
Militarism, now formed and bankrolled the New York-based American Com-
mittee on War Finance. Other groups involved included the Association for an
Equitable Federal Income Tax and the Public Ownership League of America.
As Pinchot put it, "If we ever get a big income tax on in war time, some of it—
a lot of it—is going to stick."16
Even more supremely optimistic about the possible benefits of prepared-
ness were certain members of the clergy, who anticipated that preparedness
would create a renewed sense of community in the nation. One even went so
far as to predict that by revitalizing community spirit preparedness would lead
to a reawakening of Christianity in America, and this might even bring the
Second Coming!17
The thunder of 1914 presented new and inviting opportunities for Ameri-
can businessmen with a keen eye for the main chance. Most businessmen who
aspired to take advantage of the new circumstances did so first by seeking to
capture markets in neutral or Allied countries abandoned by their British,
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French, and German competitors. In prewar years Germany had nearly mo-
nopolized the European market for dyestuffs, potash, toys, and film. Britain's
naval blockade made it possible for American firms to compete for this trade
for the first time. American toys now sold briskly in the British Empire, and
American motion pictures displaced British productions as the dominant at-
tractions in both the British and the world markets. Machine tool sales blos-
somed overseas, and American firms replaced the German concerns as the
largest exporters of civilian merchandise to Russia. German torpedoes sank
hundreds of ships, and American shipbuilders busily laid down new keels to
replenish the world's supply. Meatpackers did well, and even American seal-
skins found eager new customers. All these were examples of a classical form of
profiteering: gaining windfall profits as a consequence of sectoral shifts in
demand brought about by the disruptive propensity of war.19
Serving these flourishing new markets was a practical approach to profit.
As long as the United States followed the neutralist policy declared by Presi-
dent Wilson, disruptions in the world economic structure would offer
Americans trade advantages that would fatten dividend statements. The stale-
mate on the western front was immensely profitable to American manufactur-
ers, who commenced production of rifles, cartridges, cannon, uniforms,
buttons, canteens, shells, fuses, and every other accoutrement a British or
French soldier required. "Workmen and engineers who never before had seen
blueprints of these death dealing instruments of war quickly familiarized
themselves with their manufacture," remembered a steel executive. There was
stiff competition for Allied war contracts, and a sharp broker who could secure
a lucrative military contract for a manufacturer acquired (for obscure reason)
the sobriquet "liceman."19
These markets were a far more certain and appealing path to prosperity
than was promoting American military engagement, which would likely lead to
governmental controls and elevated tax rates. Nevertheless, the antiprepared-
ness camp continually attempted to find evidence to show that military con-
tractors had sinister and greedy intentions of stirring up a war declaration. In
1935 Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota sought to show that the president of
the Colt's Patent Fire Arms Company, Samuel M. Stone, had endeavored
to bring about American entry into the European war. To the contrary, the evi-
dence disclosed that the real interest of the Colt company in the prewar period
was in selling automatic pistols in Latin America, a market from which
European competition had become excluded.20 There was no need to incite a
war with Germany, as there were ample business opportunities in serving the
former customers of European producers and in producing war materiel for
the Allies. In 1916 a business journalist estimated that while no more than 3,000
workmen had been employed in only six firms in the munitions business in
1914, by the end of two years of war that number had risen to 500,000 workers
in more than a thousand shops. The greatest gains, moreover, had come in
manufacturing machinery rather than in manufacturing munitions.21
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The fight over the income tax of 1916 became the first direct engagement
in the long quarrel over corporate profits obtained during the First World
War. On 24 November 1915, Secretary of the Treasury William C. McAdoo an-
nounced the Wilson administration's version of an income tax bill. The
Treasury had included a provision to impose a special tax of two cents per
pound on the production of dynamite, gunpowder, and nitroglycerine, but
President Wilson ordered its deletion.22
The attempt to impose a special munitions tax was a direct strike at the
E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company, which would henceforth figure promi-
nently in the profiteering controversy. The Du Pont Company was controver-
sial even before the war. It was one of several combinations that had been
successfully prosecuted during the progressive era trust-busting campaign. In
1911 the "Powder Trust" (as Du Pont was known colloquially) was divided into
three separate firms, and the U.S. court enjoined it from carrying on further
anticompetitive commercial practices. In the interest of protecting national se-
curity, however, Du Pont was allowed to maintain its monopoly on the mili-
tary powder business.23
By 1915 Du Pont was again a focus of controversy. This was partly because
the wealthy du Pont family, which had relatives in France, was very active in
the French relief program, thereby revealing its sympathy for the Allied cause.
But mostly the controversy developed because the company was heavily en-
gaged in selling munitions to Great Britain.24 The British, like their American
cousins, were inadequately prepared for war. British ammunition supplies
were too small, and when Winston Churchill became First Lord of the
Admiralty he was shocked to find that these vital but vulnerable supplies were
not even guarded against saboteurs. As the war intensified, Britain became de-
pendent upon foreign (which meant American) suppliers of powder (which
meant Du Pont). The reason for this developing dependency was the German
submarine.
In order to produce one ton of military-grade high explosives, eight to
twelve tons of raw materials were required. In order to produce one ton of
smokeless powder, as used in rifle and cannon ammunition, fifteen to twenty
tons of raw materials were needed. Because of this unfavorable ratio of raw
materials to finished product, which reached twenty to one, it was impossible
to produce the required munitions in Britain. There were simply too few ves-
sels in the British fleet to transport the huge quantity of raw materials, and
even if the ships had been available, the German submarine menace was a de-
cisive complication. Most of the nitrates came from mines in Chile, so the
ships would be in jeopardy to the U-boats during a long voyage. Britain had no
choice but to ask Du Pont for help.25
Pierre S. du Pont drove a hard bargain. Contrary to his company's repu-
tation, before the war military sales were only a small part of the firm's
business—only 5-10 percent. Commercial sales of explosives were far more im-
portant to the profit stream. Du Pont was very reluctant to convert or expand
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his commercial production facilities to serve the British and French military
market. If the war terminated abruptly, the firm's investment would be lost,
since a smokeless powder plant, because of the corrosiveness of the reagents
employed, would deteriorate very rapidly if taken out of production. Pierre du
Pont therefore insisted that the price of powder be sufficiently high to pay off
the cost of plant expansion in a single contract. In practice, this meant that the
Du Pont firm demanded that the British pay a dollar per pound for powder.
Since powder could be produced profitably at fifty cents per pound, this meant
that the company was allocating fifty cents per pound to pay for the enlarged
factory. Du Pont even insisted that the British deposit the funds for expansion
in advance, so that if the war ended quickly, Du Pont would lose nothing. If the
conflict raged for years, profits would be immense. The British government,
whose only alternative—surrender—was no alternative at all, was compelled
to accept the terms. Du Pont later defended his demands as a cold business cal-
culation.26
As the war disaster lengthened, Du Pont's profits became, in the words of
Pierre's biographers, "truly staggering." Du Pont ultimately supplied about 40
percent of the propellant powder used by the Allies. The firm's net profits aver-
aged 11.57 percent of invested capital for the last three years before the Great
War commenced, or about $5,263,000 per year. By 1915, profits zoomed tenfold
to $57,399,000. The following year they reached $82,iO7,ooo.27 These earnings
formed an inviting target for the opponents of preparedness.
Although Wilson had canceled McAdoo's scheme for a two cent per pound
tax on munitions, this provision was restored by the Ways and Means
Committee of the House of Representatives. The powerful chairman of that
committee was Representative Claude Kitchin, the longtime little navy progres-
sive who doubled as majority leader. He remained a staunch (but not an entirely
consistent)28 foe of preparedness, and his determination was bolstered in an
election year by heavy pressure from his North Carolina constituents and by the
hometown press that opposed American involvement. Despite his prominent
position in Congress, Kitchin faced a challenge for the Democratic nomination
for his seat, and he became the architect of the special munitions tax.29
The Kitchin committee proposed a graduated tax on gross sales of muni-
tions. This would vary somewhat by industry. Manufacturers of gunpow-
der would pay a tax of 8 percent of sales, while makers of cartridges and
firearms paid 5 percent and suppliers of copper only 3 percent. The reason
for this discrimination is obscure, but the effect was to single out the Du Pont
Company. A conciliatory provision specified that if profits fell below 10 per-
cent of invested capital, the special tax would be forgiven.30 Since the Du Pont
Company did better than that even in peacetime, this provision offered small
consolation.
Pierre S. du Pont was outraged. He pointed out, somewhat reasonably, that
the special surcharges on makers of gunpowder, guns, and copper left other
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vendors of war materiel untouched. Items like tanks, trucks, passenger auto-
mobiles, aircraft, and woolen goods had military value, and those selling them
to the Allies were also enjoying elevated profits. Why should he be singled out?
The Senate Finance Committee listened receptively to this complaint, but the
Joint House-Senate conference committee retained the special munitions tax.
(The rates, however, were changed from 8 percent of gross sales of powder to
12.5 percent of net income of powder manufacturers.) Du Pont's umbrage was
certainly partly due to affronts by backers of the tax. "All this . . . is to be done,"
wrote the Progressive Senator Robert M. La Follette, "because wealth is not
loyal enough to assume the burden it ought to bear."31
The special munitions tax of 1916 thus became the first excess profits tax in
American history. The Du Pont Company paid 90 percent of the money the
government collected from this source. With some justice, particularly since
the tax was imposed retroactively, the du Pont family and others resented this
tax as sectional and class legislation. It was intended largely to please farmers,
laborers, the lower middle classes, and isolationist Progressives in an election
year. In the case of North Carolina congressman Claude Kitchin, the tax
was partially a form of revenge against supporters of preparedness. However,
the American decision to impose an excess profits tax on the beneficiaries of
the Great War directly followed that of Britain, which had recently imposed
steeply graduated war levies.32
The Revenue Act of 1916 was on the whole a victory for the prepared-
ness forces, as the government now had the funds to commence the military
buildup. Kitchin and the isolationist Progressives had won only a consolation
prize, the special tax on munitions makers. Nevertheless, the preparedness fac-
tion faced daunting problems, as in 1916 the nation was still far from ready to
consider seriously the implications of converting the American economy to a
wartime basis.33
Rising commodity prices were a major source of concern. The price of
basic materials in military products rose well above peacetime levels long
before the U.S. declaration of war. By 1916 the price of copper, one-third of
which went into artillery ammunition, had more than doubled to twenty-eight
cents per pound (from thirteen cents in 1915). Between January 1915 and July
1917, steel billets rose in price fivefold. Steel plates that sold for $33.60 in 1913
brought $200.00 in 1917. Zinc prices tripled, and mercury went from $40 per
flask to $225. Before the war Germans controlled the world tungsten supply.
Tungsten prices advanced so rapidly that everyone who had a tungsten supply
thought he would eventually become a millionaire. Sales of canned meat broke
all records, driving up the price of pork and beef, and demand for cotton,
wool, and wheat was also brisk. The war encouraged new production of ben-
zol, toluol, ammonia, and napthaline, much of which went into explosives.
This level of demand produced tumultuous days on Wall Street and on re-
gional commodity exchanges as fortunes were made and occasionally lost.
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Successful stock and commodity speculators became known, if male, as
"warhogs" and, if female, as "warsows."34
A few examples serve to illustrate. The price of Bethlehem Steel stock stood
at 33 3/4 on 30 July 1914; it rose to a price of 600 during the war, a seventeenfold
increase. In 1917 the firm paid its shareholders a 200 percent dividend. During
1915 U.S. Steel stock rose from 48 to 120 5/8, and General Motors went from 78
to 750. At Atlantic Steel, the return on stockholders' equity, which had averaged
4.9 percent for the three years before the war, rose to 45.6 percent in 1916. These
returns were not approached again for twenty years. An index of nine ord-
nance stocks rose 311 percent in eighteen months. This was in sharp contrast to
stocks that served the civilian market—between 1914 and 1918 the stock market
as a whole dropped by 60 percent in real value. In these circumstances of in-
flated prices in some industries, depression in others, and rampant specula-
tion, there was ample room for resentment, for suspicion of overcharging, and
for charges of profiteering. Progressives were particularly bitter, as they felt
that the war was rejuvenating the wealth of corporate monopolists, whose
power they had been vainly hoping to destroy. Financial gains obtained by ap-
preciation in stock and commodity prices—a more incidental form of profi-
teering than windfall profits obtained directly from market shifts—were no
less contemptible to Progressives. Fighting Bob La Follette wrote bitterly to his
son, "The war-hogs never get enough."35
Besides the enmity toward the Du Pont firm and toward the commodity
speculators, a wellspring of the profiteering controversy as well as a major ob-
stacle to preparedness was the broad reservoir of bitterness toward the banking
firm of J. P. Morgan and Company. As in the case of Du Pont, animosity
toward the Morgan firm was well developed long before the war. In 1912 a con-
gressional investigation had charged that the Morgan firm monopolized fi-
nancial markets, and it became known in the progressive idiom as the "Money
Trust." Interchangeable terms like "The Morgans" or the "Money Trust" served
Populist and Progressive orators well when they wanted to provoke anger in
the grain belt or the cotton belt. As part of their general indictment of
Morgan's allegedly ill-gotten gains, Progressive critics constantly repeated the
myth that the foundation of the Morgan fortune was illicit trading during the
Civil War. Once the European war began, it seemed logical that the Morgans
would attempt to repeat their previous success by capitalizing on the opportu-
nities the new war presented.
Perhaps more so even than Du Pont, the Morgan firm attracted the wrath
of the opponents of preparedness and war profits.36 In January 1915, barely four
months after hostilities opened, the Morgan banking firm was selected by the
British government as its official purchasing agent in the United States.
The Morgan Company thus landed one of the most lucrative contracts in
American history: exclusive control over all British military purchases in the
United States during the First World War. The terms of the purchasing agree-
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ment were quite attractive: for the first $10 million worth of contracts that
Morgan placed, the company would receive a 2 percent commission; for every-
thing above that figure, the fee would revert to 1 percent. The plan was also
very attractive to Britain, as the British not only gained Morgan's expertise but
also cut their rates considerably. They had been paying as much as 10 percent
to American commission agents. Because British purchases reached astonish-
ing amounts, Morgan's profits were enormous. At its peak in 1916 Britain was
spending $83 million per week in the United States. Morgan later testified
under oath that British purchases for the entire war amounted to about $3 bil-
lion.37 This gave his firm gross earnings of at least $30 million from that source
alone.
That quantity of money alone would have attracted scrutiny, but several
other aspects magnified the squabble. It was Morgan money, banking money,
money gained from providing financial services rather than from producing
tangible assets. The Morgan firm had an exclusive contract, thus raising anew
the issue of how much control a single person or firm should wield over the
American economy. The Morgan firm gave most of the British contracts to
firms located in the industrial heartland, the North and East, but this of course
won it few friends in the South and West. Successful bidders were often firms
with strong previous links to the Morgans, raising charges of cronyism.
Critics hotly charged that this trade was the cause of growing American in-
volvement in the war. In January 1915, immediately after Morgan's appoint-
ment as Britain's agent, a group of congressmen from Iowa, Indiana, and
Nebraska sought by law to prohibit the export of munitions. This bid was un-
successful, as public opinion narrowly supported war profits. In January 1915 as
well, the Literary Digest polled representatives of 1,000 American newspapers
on whether they favored stopping the exportation of war materiel to belliger-
ents. Of those who replied, supporters of continuing the sales were in the ma-
jority by 244 to 167. This support was by no means uniformly distributed,
however. Residents of small towns in the South and West preferred an em-
bargo, whereas the big cities of the North, East, and South wanted business.
The Omaha World-Herald denounced the trade as "blood-money," and
the Nebraska legislature approved a resolution calling for an embargo. The
German-language press also overwhelmingly opposed sales to Britain. Some
Americans were, however, evidently swayed by economic interest. A writer
from the copper country of Michigan, where business was booming due to
war sales, declared, "We are torn with grief at the desperate state of affairs in
Europe, [but] we can not refuse to supply them with whatever goods they
need." The Nashville Banner added bluntly, "Let 'em shoot! It makes good busi-
ness for us."38
The dispute over sales to Britain was complicated by the issue of making
loans to Britain, which Wilson had approved at Morgan's request. In 1914 most
businessmen sided with Bryan and the agrarian progressives in opposition to
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lending the Europeans money because the financiers considered the Euro-
peans to be poor risks. By 1915, however, military sales were so lucrative that
most businessmen wanted the trade to continue, even if loans were necessary
to facilitate it. Sales were brisk not only to the British and French. Greece was
buying uniforms, rifles, gunpowder, and tents, as well as 500,000 canteens,
300,000 sheepskin overcoats, and five million cans of corned beef. Other large
orders came from Belgium, Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, and Russia. Fast selling
items included horses, "caterpillar" tractors, railroad ties, absorbent cotton,
and even Cossack boots.39
The opponents of sales and loans to the Allies complained that economic
commitment would inevitably lead to military commitment, but their ad-
vice was not persuasive. Besides the growing value of American military sales
abroad, the Germans used submarine warfare in a bloody attempt to interdict
the flow of trade. Although the advisability of this trade was acrimoniously
disputed, however, the legality of these loans was not seriously contended.
Under the Hague Convention of 1907, neutral powers could legally sell arms to
belligerents. Germany could hardly protest, as it had sold arms to Britain
during the Boer War and to both sides during the Russo-Japanese War.
(German-Americans were not so constrained, however.) Austria-Hungary did
file protests against American military sales, but Secretary of State Robert
Lansing flatly rejected them. Lansing garnered hearty applause from the in-
dustrial Northeast.40
The Morgan loans became a source of controversy in one other way. By
1917, when the United States declared war, Britain and France had run out their
line of credit. Private investors could no longer safely loan money to these in-
solvent governments, so the Wilson administration faced an unwelcome deci-
sion. The United States had either to guarantee the repayment of the Allied
loans, or shipments of war materiel must cease. Since the latter was totally
unacceptable—it would mean defeat—there really was no choice in the matter.
Wilson's inevitable pledge of repayment thus guaranteed that Morgan and
other bankers would be reimbursed in case the Allies defaulted. This was ex-
actly what happened, and Midwestern Progressives were livid. "Shall we with-
out organized resistance," beseeched Congressman John Nelson of Wisconsin,
"permit plutocracy to put the Forty Billion war debt with interest on our backs
and they to enjoy in comfort and luxury the partly untaxed interest on liberty
bonds bought at a discount out of swollen incomes from excess war profits?"41
When the German government announced the resumption of unrestricted
submarine attacks against neutral vessels, the probability of an American dec-
laration of war became evident to everyone. This touched off a new and even
angrier phase of the dispute over the interrelated issues of intervention and
war profits. The United States went to war in 1917 in defense of neutral rights.
This was a time-honored American principle, and it was truly and deliberately
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violated by the German submarine campaign of 1917.42 But the dissenters
raised legitimate questions. Were these rights vital to the security of all Ameri-
cans or only to the interests of a few well-heeled shipowners and ocean travel-
ers? Was securing these rights worth the price of fighting a major war with fifty
thousand deaths? To those who answered either of these questions negatively,
another explanation seemed necessary. Some reasoned that the war was fought
for profit. When German submarines actually sank some American ships,
President Wilson asked Congress for a war declaration, and the moment of
truth on the great question of war or peace had arrived.
Fifty-six congressmen, representing a substantial minority of the American
people, voted against American participation in the war. Most were Progres-
sives, most were Republicans, and most were from the Midwest. They had long
abhorred the "Money Trust," the "Powder Trust," and "Wall Street." Memories
of the Civil War lingered and mixed with these new enmities. Together, they
raised the temperature of the debate to a new level of acrimony.
The question of war profits always figured prominently in the thinking of
the war critics. One Progressive congressman, John M. Nelson of Wisconsin,
simply reasoned about war that the "effects are evil so [the] causes must be
evil." Since the source of all evil was money, Nelson deduced that the war must
be the fault of "Big Business, The Interests, the System, The Corporations, The
Monopolies, The Trusts, Special Privileges, Industrial Autocracy, Plutocracy,
the Money Power, Wall Street, or the Rockefellers and the Morgans."43 Arthur
C. Townley of the Nonpartisan League, which was rooted in the upper Mid-
west, charged angrily that "hundreds of thousands of parasites, the gamblers
in the necessities of life, use the war only for the purpose of exacting exorbi-
tant profits. We are working, not to beat the enemy, but to make more multi-
millionaires."44 Townley added, "It is apparent that munitions, armor, and steel
plants would be the gainers by a conflict. It is generally believed that the muni-
tions plants are responsible for a propaganda to involve this nation in the
European conflict."45
A leading war opponent was Senator Robert M. La Follette Sr. of Wis-
consin. He made it clear that his opposition rested substantially on the war
profits aspect. "Fellow citizens," warned La Follette in 1917, "it behooves a
nation to consider well before it enters upon a war . . . how much it has got at
stake. If all it has got at stake is the loans of the house of Morgan made to for-
eign governments and the profits that the munitions makers will earn in ship-
ping their products to foreign countries, then I think it ought to be weighed
not in a common hay scale but in an apothecaries' scale."46 La Follette even
suggested rather preposterously that big business had intentionally placed in-
nocent American passengers on the munitions ships in a vain attempt to pro-
tect their highly profitable cargoes from German torpedoes. These words
seemed sufficiently treasonable to some of La Follette's colleagues to warrant
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his expulsion from the Senate. La Follette replied that the campaign to expel
him was just another attempt by wealth to keep its war profits, and he pre-
vailed.47
No war opponent was more embittered than Nebraska's Progressive sena-
tor George W. Norris. "War brings prosperity to the stock gamblers on Wall
Street," accused Norris. "The stock brokers would not, of course, go to war, be-
cause the very object they have in bringing on war is profit.... They will be
concealing in their palatial offices on Wall Street, sitting behind mahogany
desks, covered with clipped coupons—coupons soiled with the sweat of moth-
ers' tears, coupons dyed in the lifeblood of their fellow man."48
By April 1917, when the United States finally drew its sword against
Imperial Germany, the allegation of appalling, even criminal, war profiteering
was well entrenched. Rooted in the rearmament debate of the first years of the
century, the charges of profiteering thrived in the dispute over participation in
the European conflict. Until a new war subdued the contention two decades
later, the profiteering dispute would linger as a fundamental memory of the
Great War. In 1935 the popular magazine American Mercury portrayed the
Great War as "No. 4" in its series entitled "Thieveries of the Republic."49
7Supplying the Doughboys
Who then is willing to consecrate his service this day unto the Lord?
1 CHRONICLES 24:5
Despite fierce opposition in some quarters, most Americans supported the de-
claration of war with Germany with determined enthusiasm. The Spirit of '17
was perhaps not so deep-seated as was the Spirit of '76 or the Spirit of '61, but
it was earnest and resolute. Nevertheless, a definite sense of apprehension was
present even among interventionists, who sensed very early the peculiar but
marked ability of the Great War to modify or destroy old verities. "If war is de-
clared," commented an editorialist in the Commercial and Financial Journal, "it
is needless to say we shall support the government. But may we not ask, one to
another, before that fateful final word is spoken, are we not by this act trans-
forming the glorious Republic that was, into the powerful Republic that is, and
is to be? . . . Must not we admit that we are bringing into existence a new
republic that is unlike the old?" Some were convinced that the venerable
"Glorious Republic," with its familiar Victorian fashions like refined manners,
modest government, and isolation from Europe's problems, was to be pre-
ferred above the emerging "Powerful Republic," with its enormously expensive
military, its intrusive government, and its troublesome foreign engagements.
Nagging doubts about the purpose and long-term effects of the Great War
formed the basis for continuing attacks on war profits, but there were several
other reasons which caused the criticism of war profits during this conflict to
be particularly heated. The Progressive mentality sustained a fundamental
trust in rationality, a deep passion for efficiency, and a simplistic belief in con-
spiracy. The war seemed manifestly irrational, grossly inefficient, and plausibly
conspiratorial. These qualities were a jarring introduction to the twentieth
century, and "Munitions Makers" became the rod that attracted mighty bolts
of Progressive anger.
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Even had the Great War not arrived as a most unwelcome intrusion that
threatened the heady but incomplete success of Progressivism, mobilization
issues would have provoked vehement disagreement. When the United States
declared war on Germany, it formalized a military relationship with Britain
and France that had begun in 1914. Thus the period of de facto economic al-
liance preceded the period of direct military participation by nearly three
years. This led eventually to a blurring of the distinction between war profits
and prewar profits. War profits were limited by ethics, tradition, and law,
whereas prewar profits (which were much greater in this instance) were not so
clearly constrained.
Before formal entry, the heavy burdens imposed on American firms by
British and French purchasing had brought them nearly to full production.
Accordingly, there was little slack in the American economy, and when orders
for the United States military effort were added to those of the Allies, heavy
demand drove prices upward. Of all American mobilizations, that for the First
World War produced more windfall profits in the form of increases in the
value of inventory (the classical definition of profiteering) than did any other.
Surprisingly, the single most profitable commodity to own before the war dis-
rupted normal trade patterns was machinery suitable for war production—
despite years of use the price of such equipment as lathes and screw machinery
appreciated.1
It was unfortunate that these unanticipated increases in inventory values
occurred when they did, because the United States by 1916 was at a peak in
its history of income inequality.2 Thus the profits gained during the pre-
war and wartime periods tended to exacerbate a national problem of income
inequality—regional and sectoral as well as individual—which had been a
major matter of controversy throughout the Progressive era.
The Great War was also America's first European conflict, which meant
that American forces were deployed at much greater distance than ever before.
This placed a premium on the price of transportation (both land and sea),
which was unexpected and could be reduced only with considerable difficulty.
Never in recent memory had the United States been in a position like that of
1917, when it found itself, ill-prepared, in a life-and-death struggle against an
enemy as dangerous, as fully mobilized, and as distant as Germany. If victory
was to be achieved, mobilization would require a brisker pace and a conversion
more complete than even in the Civil War.
Another denning quality of the Great War was its frightening new
weapons: submarines, tanks, poison gas, and, in particular, aviation. Avia-
tion was a very new field of military endeavor, and it possessed an unmatched
ability to excite the imagination. Despite America's pioneering role in civilian
aviation, the development of military capabilities lagged well behind Europe's
leaders.3 Since aviation technology was so new and unfamiliar, it was unusually
difficult to measure the degree of quality degradation (a secondary form of
profiteering) that took place.
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Finally, mobilization for the Great War was initially managed by Wilsonian
Democrats, who were the leadership of the minority party, and by military
commanders. The war managers were not generally drawn from the highest
rank of American business management. Wilson doubted the need for emer-
gency measures to force conversion to war production, relying instead on the
goodwill and virtue of the American citizenry.4 In this respect, Wilson hear-
kened back to the strategies of Washington and Lincoln. Both of them had
found difficulty with the voluntary approach, and so too would Wilson. When
mobilization was managed by Democrats and generals, criticism by Repub-
licans and businessmen was inescapable.
As the United States pondered its formal entry into the hostilities in the
fateful spring of 1917, the elements that deepened the profiteering controversy
and made it permanent were concealed or disregarded: apprehension about
the purposes and probable effects of the war on the nation, the problems of
conducting a grand military effort amid a reform milieu, the likely inflationary
effects of massive military spending on an overheated economy, the difficulty
of managing the effects of large sectoral shifts on an economy that was beset by
wealth inequality, the disruptive effects of a distant war fought with frighten-
ing weapons, and the obstacles to harmony associated with management of
the war effort by a minority party. Successful management of these elements
would require a very sophisticated administrative capability, and the American
system of military procurement was long neglected.
Procurement
The American system of procurement was little changed since the Civil War.
The fundamental assumption underlying the old custom was that in war as in
peace the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps, Ordnance Corps, Signal Corps,
Corps of Engineers, and Medical Corps would independently purchase the
supplies each agency needed. Each bureau had its own purchasing agents,
warehouses, financial system, and transportation management. Military re-
formers during the Roosevelt and Taft administrations made some halfhearted
efforts to modernize the system, but their initiatives were brushed aside by en-
trenched interests in the various bureaus. If there were competing claims
among the bureaus for the same resources (a possibility seldom if ever consid-
ered), the general staff would presumably balance them. The civilian economy
was believed to be so large as to be able to meet any conceivable military need
without breaking stride. If war came, it was expected to expand to meet the
new demand automatically.5
In peacetime this system was satisfactory, but in 1917 four different army
corps were competing to buy clothing, trucks, and automobiles, and the gen-
eral staff was too small and too inexperienced to manage the competition
among branches. The Corps of Engineers was building wharves, but so too was
the navy. The Quartermaster Corps and the navy were bidding against each
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other for the same food supplies. The navy's supply system was much better
prepared for war than the army's system, so army officers discovered that their
naval counterparts had already cornered key markets before the army had even
determined its priorities. There was no agency to coordinate or control army-
navy rivalry. None could prevent a profit-minded and unpatriotic supplier
from playing off one service against the other.6
At peacetime levels the amount of military purchasing would not strain the
American industrial colossus—appropriations for the ordnance department
were only about $10 million per year before 1914. Furthermore, the military
bureaucracy was sufficiently large and had the competence to let the contracts
and to supervise delivery. But military purchasing officers, accustomed to
spending at comparatively low peacetime levels, lacked the comprehensive
knowledge of the American economy needed to manage massive wartime
spending proficiently.7
There was ample evidence of the elementary character of prewar American
military planning. The normal complement of the Ordnance Corps was 85
men. The plan was that in case of war this agency would increase to 142 men in
five one-year increments. In December 1916, five months before American
entry, the chief of ordnance, Brigadier General William Crozier, asked that the
entire wartime complement be appointed. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker,
who was deeply suspicious of growing state power, rejected Crozier's request
on the grounds that no wartime emergency existed. When war was declared,
the plan automatically increased the ordnance staff to a mere 96 men. When
the real needs of the army were discovered, however, the complement of the
Ordnance Corps reached 5,000 men. Amid the confusion that was inevitable
during such a swift expansion, there was little time or inclination to consider
how to limit war profits.8
This haphazard approach was not only inefficient, which the progressives
abhorred, but also demonstrably obsolete. In April-May 1915, British war pro-
duction had fallen dangerously short of demand. This forced Britain to create
a Ministry of Munitions, an agency which was intended to rationalize and plan
procurement and to prevent wasteful and unfair advantage gained from the
war effort. In practice, this step proved to be more than just an emergency de-
fense measure. It was a major leap toward a modern economy: it amounted to
the replacement of a primarily free enterprise system of war production by a
primarily statist system.9
Not everyone understood that if the United States entered the war a simi-
lar transformation would have to take place. In the months before the declara-
tion of war, some members of the Wilson administration, particularly Sec-
retary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and the Bryan faction, resisted compre-
hensive planning for conversion, although European governments maintained
agencies for this purpose. Part of the military bureaucracy also feared the
creation of a ministry of munitions that might interfere with its prerogatives.
S U P P L Y I N G T H E D O U G H B O Y S I 145
The chief of ordnance, General Crozier, described such a reorganization
as "dangerous radicalism." The quartermaster general, General George W.
Goethals, did advocate a ministry of munitions, but President Wilson disap-
proved.10
Perhaps the chief intellectual force advocating the need for prewar plan-
ning for the control of profiteering was Howard E. Coffin. Coffin, a vice presi-
dent of the Hudson Motor Car Company, was the highly respected president
of the Society of Automotive Engineers. A leading member of the National
Security League, Coffin spent $20,000 of his own money to promote the cause
of preparedness. Appointed by Wilson to the Advisory Commission of the
Council of National Defense, Coffin urged the commission to inaugurate dis-
cussion of a standard form for war contracts and also of the appropriate
means for regulating profit on these contracts. The question of how to limit
profiteering was thus being discussed by civilian executives months before the
American declaration of war. Nevertheless, the inability of the government to
make the changes necessary to manage war profit satisfactorily was evidenced
by the experiences with constructing training camps, building airplanes, and
managing the copper and steel supplies.11
The difficulty was in managing the shift of resources from civilian to mili-
tary markets efficiently. A major enigma was trying to predict the duration of
the war as well as the amounts of men and materials required in order for
Allied arms to prevail. All of these quantities are indispensable requirements
for rational planning. The accurate prediction of the length and price of a war
is, however, among the most intractable of all social problems.
In retrospect, the estimations of the Army War College were reasonably ac-
curate, if somewhat belated. After initially refusing to provide an approxima-
tion of future needs, in February 1917 the War College, in collaboration with
the navy, submitted an estimate that a force of four million men would be
needed. This proved to be about the number of troops that were eventually
mobilized. The prewar appraisal was that a year would be required to train,
equip, and transport a major portion of this force to the western front. The
weight of the American effort would thus begin to be felt during the cam-
paigns of 1918, and this estimate proved approximately correct. Late in 1917,
however, army planners were forced to revise their estimate because of defeats
in Russia, Italy, and Flanders. Early German victories in the spring offensive of
1918 added to the consternation. An additional million men would be required,
and victory would not come until 1919.12
Despite the general accuracy of the army's estimate, there was little real un-
derstanding in 1917 of what this would mean for the civilian economy. Wilson's
Council of National Defense, for example, sought to measure the effect of mo-
bilization by using an elaborate chart of the supplies that would be needed for
an army of one million men, rather than the four million men actually re-
quired. As army officers in the various branches prepared their individual
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shopping lists, none were based on an accurate estimation of the productive
capacities of American industry. Prewar industrial surveys were of little use.13
In the early months, mobilization was hasty and disordered, if not chaotic.
The American economy was quickly strained by the massive demands of mili-
tary spending. Because of heavy Allied purchasing prior to American entry,
there was little slack in many sectors of the economy. Of prime importance
was an acute shortage of machine tools that remained evident despite soaring
prewar prices. As in the early months of the Civil War (and later during World
War II), the first step was to construct the machines that were needed to
manufacture the weapons that would fight the war. The shortage of machine
tools was particularly troublesome in the aircraft industry, which was still in its
infancy. As one beleaguered machine tool executive (who understood the fun-
damental problem very well) lamented, "We have no automatic way . . . of
going to war. We declare war and depend upon the patriotism and genius of
our people to supply, to any degree that may be necessary, what we as a people
are unwilling to maintain... a fully equipped military organization." Other in-
dustries in which the strain was initially severe were motor trucks (the war had
demonstrated their military value), gunpowder, steel, and electrical and me-
chanical equipment. On the other hand, residential construction, advertising,
and printing suffered immediate cutbacks.14
The task of mobilizing an army of four million soldiers meant that there
was little time for careful consideration of possible excess profits. The sheer
size of the buildup dwarfed all past experience. "None foresaw the gigantic size
of those orders," recalled one contractor. "Accustomed to millions [of dollars],
we were confronted with hundreds of millions, with the billion mark actually
in sight." Even the total number of war contracts remains uncertain. There
were at least 100,000 contracts let by the War Department during World War I,
with at least 25,000 of them in amounts exceeding $100,000. Charles
Eisenman, a member of the Committee of Supplies of the Council of National
Defense, was given the responsibility of approving contracts in the first days of
the war. He later testified that he reviewed about 200 contracts per day, making
a total of about 45,000 contracts in the first 200 business days of the war.15
Expenditures by the Ordnance Corps went from $10 million per year be-
fore the war to $4 billion in the nineteen months of the war—an increase in
the rate of purchasing of 250 times. Some of the contracts were so large that
they were difficult to comprehend, let alone oversee: for example, the army or-
dered 41 million pairs of shoes and took receipt of 32 million pairs. Who could
administer contracts of this magnitude capably? The construction of an am-
monia plant at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, employed, at its peak, 24,000 workers.
There were allegations of widespread and fraudulent waste of time and mate-
rials at Muscle Shoals, causing the Department of Justice to investigate. As one
humbled agent reported, "I am frank to say that I started out with the theory
that this crowd at Muscle Shoals was a gang of crooks, and I was primed for
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that, and blinded by that same opinion until I met them and had occasion to
investigate I saw no evidence of waste that was not incidental to an enter-
prise of that character."16
Careful supervision of contracts of this number and of this size was very
nearly impossible in a crisis situation. Even obtaining the required office space
was a difficult task. Congress was slow to approve funds for the expansion of
the Washington bureaucracy. Some clerks employed by the Ordnance Corps
placed their typewriters on window sills, some worked at home, and one group
of army officers rented a loft above a garage with their own funds and then di-
vided it into makeshift offices. Even if space had been available, trained man-
power was not. The Ordnance Corps hired Lester W. Blyth, an accountant
from Cleveland, to head its finance division, which audited war contracts.
When this division finally became fully staffed, which was not until 1918, it em-
ployed 1,200 accountants, plus numerous military officers, enlisted personnel,
and clerical workers. There were simply not enough trained accountants in the
United States (perhaps even in the world) to review all the war contracts thor-
oughly. Even if there had been more accountants available, it is doubtful that
the state of the accountant's art was sufficiently developed to meet the national
need.17
Heavy military purchasing soon altered the relationship between the
government and its vendors. General Crozier's Ordnance Corps was among
the largest purchasers. He recalled that "the state of affairs very soon got to be
such that they knew they would get the business, and they knew I could not
withhold the business from them on account of dissatisfaction with the price,
because they knew I could not escape the most destructive criticism if I left the
army without munitions because of price." Crozier was not entirely at the
mercy of the contractors; he had authority to commandeer any factory and to
force it to cease civilian production, under penalty of a fine of $5o,ooo.18 These
were awkward tools, nevertheless, and a wise administrator would be most
hesitant to use them. This reluctance did not escape the notice of the vendors.
The army had a long-standing institutional lack of interest in the careful
review of war profits. This was evident in American history at least as early as
1711, during Queen Anne's War, and on numerous occasions thereafter.
Bernard Baruch, who chaired the War Industries Board during the Great War,
described the twentieth-century version of the military concept of expediency
bluntly if inelegantly: "You must not forget this about the army: They want to
get this stuff as quickly as possible." When victory or defeat hung in the bal-
ance (or was thought to hang in the balance), soldiers cared nothing about
price or profits. As General H. M. Lord, the director of finance of the War
Department, candidly explained: "If a cable was received from General Per-
shing that they needed shoes, and to get them right away, the only thing to do
was to get them as quickly as possible—inside the law if possible, outside the
law if necessary."19
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Even if the army officers had been deeply concerned about war profits
(which they were not), the problem of defining and identifying profiteering in
a modern economy had become increasingly vexing. By 1917 the ascent in
prices had become widespread, although not universal. It was extremely diffi-
cult to distinguish between increases that were cost-driven and increases that
were greed-driven. There was also a thorny question of distinguishing between
products that were munitions of war—and that might therefore deserve price
control—and products that were essentially civilian in nature. As the Progres-
sive Nation observed (with some exaggeration), in order to be rigorously fair
in controlling profiteering, it would be necessary to distinguish between each
bushel of grain sold by each farmer (as well as all beef cattle, all sheep, all fruit,
and all vegetables) to determine which went for war purposes (such as feeding
soldiers or war workers) and which did not. "We must think this thing
through," the Nation warned. "Where shall we draw the line in the process of
making munitions of war? How far back shall we go in the demand that no in-
dividual citizen be allowed to coin money out of the miseries of war?"20
Cantonments
Plagued by the troublesome obstacles of haste, inexperience, and intricacy, the
effort to mobilize American resources without excessive gain plunged forth.
The first requirement was to induct men into the army and to train them as
rapidly as possible. In 1917 the British and French armies were faltering on the
western front; indeed, the German submarine campaign that provoked the
American belligerency was a gamble that the Allies would collapse before
American might could be brought to bear.
In a very real sense, training and equipping the troops was a race against
time: delay would mean defeat. Training the inductees required barracks and
training grounds, and these must be built as quickly as possible. In later years,
when the victory had been won (and its value doubted), and when the fear of
defeat had disappeared (and its memory forgotten), the cost of these camps or
cantonments became an object of partisan controversy.
The army was woefully unprepared to build training camps both speedily
and efficiently. In peacetime the construction division of the Quartermaster
Corps normally supervised the building of barracks. In April 1917, this agency
numbered just one colonel and four assistants. The war required, however, the
expenditure of $150 million on construction in the first six months; in com-
parison, the Panama Canal, the largest previous construction project, had a
budget of only $46 million in its largest year. Wilson timed registration for the
draft for June; if the camps were not ready to shelter the 1.2 million inductees
before the September frosts, the boys would freeze, the war effort would falter,
and Wilson would sustain a major political liability which he did not relish.21
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The army's original plan was to shelter the fixture doughboys in tents, but
the impossibility of this scheme quickly became evident. The army's estimated
requirement was for 87 million square yards of tent-grade cotton duck cloth.
The largest total production in the United States before the war was only 12-13
million yards, or about one-seventh of the demand. The army considered seiz-
ing tents used by American circuses, but this proved impractical. The camps
would have to be built of wood.22
The size of the cantonment project was truly remarkable. There were to be
sixteen camps, and they would require in total four billion board feet of lum-
ber, which was approximately equal to the total output of American mills in a
normal year. The barracks would need 177,000 doors, 46,000 water closets,
38,000 shower heads, 38 million feet of wall board, 200,000 kegs of nails, and
5,000 refrigerators. Delivery of these materials would require about 5,000 rail-
road cars for each camp. It would be necessary to unload an average of 50 cars
per day, and at the peak, 150 cars per day. These materials had to be manufac-
tured, delivered, and installed in only two months.23
In May 1917, the civilian-dominated General Munitions Board of the Coun-
cil of National Defense decided that this job was far too immense for the
Quartermaster Corps. Since the Corps of Engineers was occupied by construc-
tion problems in France, and since its expertise in handling such a task was
doubtful in any case, it became clear that the only available alternative was
civilian management. "We commenced to see the great need for the finest men
we could get," recalled a veteran of the Munitions Board. "We got hold of big
firms all over the country and we asked them to send big men Twenty-five
men who were earning $15,000 to $25,000 a year." These civilian construction
managers seized control of military construction projects, displacing army of-
ficers in all but name. "It was like a camel that got its head into the tent, and
then pushed all the way in," remembered one construction executive. "We built
a great big organization . . . and got its [the army's] tacit consent."24
The civilian managers moved swiftly. The locations for the camps were
chosen by a panel of army officers in order to limit political interference. At
Camp Grant, built near Rockford, Illinois, the construction contract was let on
21 June 1917, the same day that the site was selected. Work commenced on June
24, and the camp was sufficiently complete to receive its first 27,800 trainees by
September 17.25
The construction contracts became highly controversial. The terms of the
sixteen contracts, each of which was awarded to a large, established firm, speci-
fied that each general contractor would be compensated at the rate of the cost
of construction of the camp plus a fixed fee of $250,000. These contracts, then,
went to large firms, were in undefined but certainly large amounts, and had
quite unusual conditions. The contracts were let without competitive bidding,
and the "cost-plus" feature was peculiar and open-ended. This was enough
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to raise the suspicions of bypassed bureaucrats, unlucky competitors, business
critics, and Wilson's political opponents. The saga of the wasteful and im-
proper cost-plus contracts was beginning.
Although much criticized, the cost-plus contract of the First World War
was not entirely novel. This type of agreement was occasionally employed in
private industry and in military construction contracts before the war. Its use
was preferred in instances when costs could not be determined before a project
was begun—for example, when a building was to be repaired and the extent of
damage could not be known until the foundation was exposed, as happened
occasionally to post offices and courthouses. Cost-plus contracts were also the
mode for factory construction in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Ohio,
and some large firms, notably the tire manufacturers U.S. Rubber and Good-
year Tire and Rubber, even preferred them. At least one experienced construc-
tion firm worked exclusively on a cost-plus basis, and the U.S. Shipping Board
utilized them for a time in ship construction. The cost-plus contracts used for
wartime army contracts were based on models first employed by the navy for
repair work, though the navy preferred not to use the cost-plus device except
in unusual circumstances. The navy's experience was that significant amounts
of unnecessary material would be ordered and that workmen tended to shirk
on the job. Nevertheless, the navy did utilize the cost-plus feature for its new
training camps and naval air stations during the war.26
There were several reasons for the use of cost-plus contracts in the con-
struction of the cantonments, all of which became matters of dispute. The first
consideration was that the process of advertising sixteen contracts, preparing
bids, and selecting the winners was time-consuming. A second obstacle was
the unknown cost of materials. The heavy demands for lumber (a whole year's
supply would be needed) and other materials would presumably drive up
prices. Labor costs were also uncertain. How much wages and prices might in-
crease, as always, was anybody's guess. Finally, there was the unknown cost of
site preparation. When the contracts were first written, the actual location of
the camps was undecided. Accordingly, a contractor could not reasonably esti-
mate the cost of clearing trees, leveling roads, and grading soil for drainage.27
Critics contended later that none of these reasons should have been com-
pelling. The process of bidding the contracts would have taken about six
weeks, which, they maintained, would have been justified by the savings. In
almost any business proposition, furthermore, the costs of labor and materials
are somewhat variable, and to remove this variation as a factor in pricing re-
moves much of the risk, which is the justification for the profit. The type of
building under construction as a barracks was architecturally very simple and
very standard. Having been built many times before, it was simple to approxi-
mate its cost, since the army had prepared both a standard set of blueprints
and a standard list of materials. Finally, there was really no need to know the
exact position of the camps, because in practice the cost of site preparation is
seldom highly variable.28
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An assessment of these charges necessitates some speculation. Indis-
putably, advertising the cantonment contracts would have delayed the deci-
sions, perhaps by as much as six weeks. Although under wartime conditions
the paperwork would have been expedited, another period of time would have
been required to survey the sites properly.29 Due to these delays, American
troops would have arrived in France either somewhat later and/or somewhat
less well trained. The carnage on the western front would therefore have been
prolonged, and American casualties might have risen. Thus the economic cost
of having unadvertised contracts at the outset of the war must be weighed
against the economic and human cost of continuing the war for a period of
unknown length.
Besides unadvertised contracts, cost-plus contracts were allegedly a source
of excessive waste. After the Armistice, a special congressional committee
was charged with investigating the war's cost. It was chaired by Representative
Sylvester Graham, a Republican from Illinois, and hence became known as the
Graham committee. One of its subcommittees studied the construction of the
cantonments and reported that the total cost of the sixteen camps was $206.6
million, or about $12.9 million each. The majority of the committee asserted
that the "proper cost" was only $128.1 million, so that the "loss to the taxpayers"
due to waste and excess profit was $78.5 million.30 The majority report, how-
ever, was signed strictly by Republicans, who had an incentive to criticize a
Democratic administration; the Democratic minority unanimously rejected
this verdict. The straight party-line vote raises suspicions about accuracy of the
conclusions.
Although no one could foretell the exact cost of the camps, the govern-
ment's estimate was that each camp would cost between $3.5 million and $5
million, or about one-third of the final expenditure. In keeping with this ap-
proximation, the Munitions Board specified that each general contractor's fee
would be fixed at $250,000. This fee was calculated to be 6 percent of the as-
sumed cost. These contracts, then, were of the type known as "cost plus fixed
fee." The fee of 6 percent of the estimated cost was slightly lower than, but in
general accord with, the customary fee structure of the prewar construction
industry, in which a successful project typically yielded the contractor a return
of about 7 percent of the cost. As costs escalated, of course, the fees fell as a per-
centage of the total expenditure. They averaged just 2.84 percent of the cost,
which seemed eminently reasonable to the contractors, who pointed out that
Canada had paid 10-15 percent. Since risk was almost totally eliminated, how-
ever, the quarter-million dollar fee for four months' work seemed excessive to
some.31
The real problem with the cost-plus contract was not excessive profit but
rather excessive waste. Each contractor found it necessary to assemble a large
labor force, and each used wage incentives to attract workers to relocate. This
was unquestionably necessary, as local labor was completely inadequate.
The construction of Camp Sherman near Chillicothe, Ohio, required 11,000
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workers, but the entire population of the city numbered only i5,ooo.32 Yet even
if all the skilled carpenters in the country had been diverted to the camps, the
number would still have been insufficient. Therefore, contractors had to hire
and train unskilled workers to become carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and
other tradesmen. This circumstance became the source of much of the contro-
versy.
At Camp Grant near Rockford, Illinois, at least half of the 4,000 carpenters
employed on the project had no previous training. This workforce was made
up of a hodgepodge of grocery clerks, farmers, tailors, machinists, cooks, and
bartenders. They came, an army general pronounced, "from the flotsam and
jetsam of the laboring world." Despite their inexperience, these green workers
received what was then an attractive wage: 62.5$ per hour, or $6.25 for a ten-
hour day. Neophyte electricians made 70-75$, plumbers, 75-80$, and bricklay-
ers, 75-85$. To no one's surprise, the few bona fide craftsmen did not applaud
this invasion of their vocations by the well-paid and the untrained.33 Although
the new artisans could not meet the customary definition of "journeyman," or
be recognized as such by the craft guilds, the buildings did get built and were
fitted out, so that the titles "carpenter," "plumber," and "electrician," although
somewhat embellished, were not wholly inappropriate terms.
Much of the subsequent bitterness felt by returning doughboys toward
civilian workers was rooted in the contrast between the comparatively hand-
some wages paid to these instant craftsmen and the pittance paid to army
draftees. Even those who were not able to proclaim themselves to be skilled
tradesmen still received 35$ per hour as common labor, or $3.50 a day.34 A new
private, by contrast, received just $30 per month plus room and board. As one
disgruntled doughboy complained, "The man at the front must not be made
to feel that while he risks his life and his legs for a dollar a day, his exempted
neighbor in the comparative safety of his own home town is earning more
money in a day than he used to earn in a week."35 The historic relationship in
which soldiers' wages ranked between the wages of unskilled and skilled work-
ers had been dangerously violated.
The labor shortage combined with the frenzied supply situation to create
further disorder. Under heavy wartime pressure to reach completion, it was
impossible to synchronize the arrival of men and materials at the worksite.
This meant that gangs of workers all too frequently were assembled before suf-
ficient materials had arrived. With little else to do, these employees were often
observed simply lazing around the project, or worse. As one disgruntled
worker hired at Camp Sherman colorfully recalled, "When they first started
construction there, the wheat was still in those fields; why, you could go out in
those wheat fields any time and see a poker game and a crap game—I don't
mean one but several of them Every day more or less the same thing from
the time they got there in the morning until the time they quit; they wouldn't
even stop to eat dinner; didn't have time; the game was too big. . . . There is
some of the best crap shooters in the country right here in Camp Sherman
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now." "How about the saloons?" he was asked. "Oh, they were filled," was the
reply. "There wasn't standing room in those two up by the camp."36
Since disclosure of this situation could obviously prove embarrassing,
some foremen simply ordered idle workers to stay out of sight or to hide from
probing reporters. Inevitably, some of these idlers were discovered, with mul-
titudinous expressions of outrage and demands for dismissal resulting. This
produced a startling revelation: at most of the cantonments, general superin-
tendents had ordered that no worker be dismissed. Labor was so scarce that
managers ordered miscreant workers to be demoted or reassigned before dis-
missal was permissible. Critics suspected foul play; contractors must be seek-
ing to drive up costs so as to fatten profits in a cost-plus situation.37
Contractors defended themselves by pointing out that, since their fees were
fixed at $250,000, they had no incentive to inflate costs by padding the payroll.
On the contrary, if there was gross waste and inefficiency at a job site, their
professional reputations would suffer and their hopes of obtaining new con-
tracts would be jeopardized. The real source of payroll padding was labor.
Well-paid construction workers had a strong incentive to make the job last as
long as possible. As a result, there were numerous reports that workmen had
slowed down or "slackened up" as soon as they heard that the open-ended,
cost-plus contract was in vogue. Reports of shirking in order to stretch out the
job were most common among plumbers.38
The cost of the cantonments spiraled upward for related reasons. Supplies
of lumber arrived erratically, and this caused foremen to order extra sawing to
modify the lumber that was on hand rather than waiting for proper sizes and
lengths. Much of the lumber was low-grade, with many bad sections that had
to be cut out. Bad roads in the camps destroyed some lumber in transit as well.
As a result, there was substantially greater waste of materials—about 10 per-
cent more scrap—than would have occurred in peacetime work.39 The scrap
wood was destroyed by fire, and this reinforced the view that the camps were
constructed carelessly and wastefully. The version that circulated was that con-
tractors deliberately burned good lumber in order to inflate costs and profits.
Reports of reckless waste, idling, and fraud at the projects prompted
the War Department to take action. Government auditors swarmed to the
sites, accompanied in some cases by undercover agents of the Bureau of
Investigations of the Department of Justice, the forerunner of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Keeping tabs on the contractors proved to be difficult,
as the federal auditors often had little knowledge of construction methods.
Friction between the contractors and auditors developed quickly, particularly
when government auditors attempted to influence the order in which build-
ings would be erected.40 Nevertheless, the auditors and undercover men fer-
reted out a few cases of fraud.
Several workers were apprehended at Camp Grant for signing on to two
construction crews at the same time. They were jailed for ninety days before
trial, but their juries found them not guilty. At Camp Sherman, a secret agent
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unearthed a conspiracy in which a contractor apparently leased about two
hundred superfluous trucks from a subcontractor and collected a $5-10 a day
kickback on each vehicle for doing so. Also at Camp Sherman, the general su-
perintendent, Frank J. McGrath, received a salary of $4,362 for supervising
construction. When auditors discovered that McGrath also owned 25 percent
of the stock in the contracting firm of D. W. McGrath and Sons, they ruled that
he was engaged in double-billing and denied him his $4,362. There were other
instances of minor fraud and graft, but what was really notable was the general
absence of dishonesty amid boundless opportunity for corruption. Although
at each camp under construction the Bureau of Investigations commonly re-
cruited as an informant the stenographer to the general accountant, only one
prosecution resulted. There were a few other convictions, but no general chi-
canery. The presence of undercover agents to inspect the performance of de-
fense contractors, nonetheless, signified a heightened level of sophistication in
the antiprofiteering effort.41
These instances of minor crime or misconduct are insufficient to prove,
one way or the other, the degree of general fraud or waste on the construction
of the camps. The Graham committee, which investigated the cantonment
question, made several attempts to evaluate the broader issue. Their method of
evaluating performance was to invite a well-qualified construction engineer to
review in detail an individual contract. A professor of civil engineering at the
University of Michigan, selected as a disinterested observer, reviewed the per-
formance of contractors who erected 1,528 buildings in ninety days, or one
every forty-two minutes. He concluded that cost and waste were not exces-
sive.42 An experienced estimator from Chicago reviewed the performance of
the general contractor at Camp Grant, Bates and Rogers. He testified that in
his professional opinion, Camp Grant should have been built for $8,820,000,
which was much less than the actual cost of $12,851,000. He further concluded
that the total profit collected by the general contractor and all subcontractors,
$532,000, was also excessive in the amount of $112,000. He calculated the "cor-
rect" profit at the rate of 5 percent of the "correct" cost. Yet when Bates and
Rogers reviewed the outside evaluator's work, they discovered that he had ne-
glected several important expenses, including the costs of building a 1,000-foot
bridge, sixty miles of underground pipe, and a rifle range. His expertise was
successfully impeached, if not destroyed.43
An even more general standard was applied to the cost of building Camp
Sherman. This camp was the third most expensive in terms of the price per
bed, and it was much vilified as the source of excessive waste. In defense, the
general contractor, A. Bentley and Sons, measured the total volume of all the
buildings they erected and determined that the price of the camp was 14.754:
per cubic foot of building. Since the labor cost at Camp Sherman was 6.25<t per
cubic foot, the ratio of labor cost to total cost was 42.4 percent. In peacetime,
the industry expected that a well-managed construction project would have a
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ratio of labor cost to total cost of 40 percent.44 The price of Camp Sherman
was therefore slightly high, but not excessively so when the speed of construc-
tion is considered.
Summarizing the price of the construction of the cantonments, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the Republican progressive critics of these projects se-
riously underestimated the cost of delaying completion by putting out the
contracts to sealed bid. The charges of excessive, unwarranted profits gained by
the contractors from the terms of these contracts were similarly overstated.
The actual cost far exceeded the estimated cost, but the extra money went to
hire labor and to pay for materials, not to fatten the pocketbooks of greedy
contractors. The Democratic defenders of the Wilson administration were
much closer to the mark when they argued that while the rushed construction
schedule carried a heavy price, the money was well spent because it shortened
the war. The cantonment issue, however, was just one facet of the progressive
indictment of American business during the war. The progressives were also
angry at the aviation industry.
Aircraft
Next to the controversy over the Morgan loans, which addressed the very pur-
pose of American participation in the Great War, the quarrel over the perfor-
mance of the American aircraft industry was the most furious. This topic
served as a kind of surrogate for the entire conduct of the war effort. The air-
craft industry was investigated by the Department of Justice (Hughes commis-
sion, 1918),45 by the Senate (Thomas committee, 1918),46 by the House of Re-
presentatives (Graham committee, 1920),47 and again by the Senate (Nye com-
mittee, 1935-36).48
The fundamental problem of the American aircraft effort, as with other as-
pects of defense mobilization, was a late start. Although the United States was
the first nation to fly an airplane, its early technological leadership had lan-
guished as far as military applications of the invention were concerned. By 1916
the United States certainly lagged behind Britain, Canada, France, Germany,
and Italy, and perhaps behind others as well. This dawdling proved to be costly,
both in terms of wounded pride and wounded sons.
The first appropriations by the United States to explore military applica-
tions of the airplane were made in 1908. For the first eight years of lethargic
experimentation, the total appropriations were only $1.5 million, and total
number of airplanes shipped to the U.S. Army Signal Corps was just fifty-nine.
In 1916, eighty-three more planes belatedly arrived. As the military value of the
airplane on the western front became increasingly apparent, Congress finally
raised the appropriation to $13 million per year. During the war, expenditures
on warplanes reached $1.21 billion, a hundredfold increase, but even this sum
was too little and too late.49
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The United States, once the proud originator of the flying ship, only fifteen
years later was incapable of producing a state-of-the-art combat aircraft. The
few planes it did build—213 observation planes—were of negligible value.
Meanwhile, American soldiers huddled in the French trenches with inadequate
protection from enemy air attack. The American Expeditionary Force was
forced to purchase its warplanes from Britain and France, and in 1918 the AEF
had only 20-25 percent as many planes protecting the doughboys as did com-
parable units of the French army. American pilots, moreover, were killed in
battle about three times more frequently than British or Belgian fliers. The
American people demanded to know who was to blame and where the money
went. Had the United States received a fair value for its many dollars? Or was
degraded quality—a perennial form of profiteering—rampant in the aircraft
industry?50
When the United States declared war, Raynal C. Boiling was the U.S. Army's
leading technical expert on aircraft production. In December 1917, Boiling led
a group of high-level officials to London to confer with Allied leaders in order
to determine the appropriate role for the United States in the air war. The
Boiling commission, which included Wilson's key foreign policy adviser,
Colonel Edward M. House, met with British and French leaders, including
Winston S. Churchill, who was then the minister of munitions. The three
Allied powers penned an agreement which stipulated that the United States
would not attempt to manufacture its own pursuit (fighter) plane but would
instead purchase these types from the British and French. This was a recogni-
tion, Boiling admitted two years later, that the United States lacked the techni-
cal expertise needed to design and produce an advanced warplane. This view
was confirmed by Major General Mason M. Patrick, the chief of the Air Ser-
vice, American Expeditionary Force. Patrick said that it was wise not to at-
tempt to build a pursuit plane because the design was "changing rapidly,"
which meant too rapidly for American designers.51
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker later defended this decision as rational
and deliberate. The assumption, according to Baker, was that the United States
possessed the vital raw materials for aircraft production, while Britain and
France had sufficient productive capacity to meet the needs of all three powers.
This version of the story was true as far as it went: the United States did have
the materials and the Europeans did have factories. Their productive capacity,
nonetheless, did not fully meet American needs. The United States' late start,
furthermore, was partially the result of careless planning. An American
aviation designer, Dr. W. W. Christmas, had met with Baker well before the
American war declaration. Dr. Christmas told Baker that the United States
would soon be in war and implored him immediately to commence a pursuit
plane program, while there was still time. Christmas even offered to surrender
all royalties on his patents if Baker would agree. Baker, nevertheless, rejected
both Christmas's premise and his conclusion.52
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Meanwhile, the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense
was beginning to consider a possible role for the United States in producing
warplanes. The farsighted Howard Coffin, vice president of the Hudson Motor
Car Company, perceived accurately how far the United States was behind. In
March 1917, some two weeks before the United States declared war, Coffin re-
ported that no American warplanes could be produced and sent abroad until
1918. He thought that 2,000 machines might be built in 1918 with an increase to
4,000 in 1919. Coffin predicted, correctly, that there would be a serious short-
age of wood and cloth for the fuselages but that the "controlling factor is and
will continue to be the production of aeroplane engines." Since the estimated
need for an army of one million men, which was less than half of what was
ultimately required, was 4,500 to 5,000 planes, Coffin knew in 1917 that the
doughboys could not be adequately protected until 1919.53
Once a decision was reached not to attempt to build an American pursuit
plane, American leaders turned their attention to other possible contributions
to Allied air power that the nation might make. John D. Ryan, president of the
Anaconda Copper Company, became director of the Air Service, and his ap-
pointment immediately raised eyebrows in the Progressive camp. Anaconda, as
one of the largest copper producers, was the leader of a highly oligopolistic in-
dustry with frequent labor problems. The copper business featured several an-
ticompetitive practices, including interlocking directorates and a single firm
whose purpose was to sell the entire production of the leading copper produc-
ers. This agent was the United Metals Selling Company, and its presidency was
held by Anaconda's John D. Ryan. Progressives lumped these practices and
these firms together and denounced them as the "Copper Trust." They regarded
profits earned by the copper producers before the war as highly improper.54
Ryan selected Colonel Edward A. Deeds as head of aircraft production.
Deeds was also suspect on antitrust grounds. He was a former executive of the
National Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio. In 1913 he was convicted of
having violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and was sentenced to a year in
prison. His conviction was overturned on appeal, but this did little to restore
his reputation among Progressive business critics. Deeds owned 30,000 shares
of the United Motors Corporation, a holding company whose assets included
a valuable property known as the Delco ignition system. When Deeds was ap-
pointed head of aircraft production, he transferred his stock certificates to his
wife's name, later claiming that this constituted a bona fide divestment. During
the war, Deeds awarded a large contract for the purchase of airplane engines to
the Packard Motor Car Company, but the contract specified that the ignition
systems must be made by Delco. Several other valuable contracts also went to
Deeds's friends in Dayton. After the war the special investigating commission
headed by Charles Evans Hughes recommended prosecution for these infrac-
tions, but Ryan intervened. Ryan commended Deeds's contribution to the war
effort and maintained that this "outweighed any technical violations that may
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have occurred."55 Deeds, who before the war had been earning $85,000 per
year, had originally declined to serve owing to his concern that his various
interests might create an impression of a conflict of interest. He ultimately
reconsidered and agreed to come to Washington and serve for $1 per year only
after Coffin assured him that his investments would not be questioned.
Because Secretary of War Baker distrusted the Hughes inquiry, Deeds escaped
prosecution.56
Ryan and Deeds determined that the principal focus of the American air
effort must be on the gathering of raw materials for the factories of Britain and
France, which would make pursuit planes. A secondary role was to produce
a powerful new aircraft engine, the Liberty motor, which would power the next
generation of fighter planes. Of third importance was the fabrication of a
warplane of auxiliary value, the combination observation-bombing aircraft
known as the de Havilland DH-4. Each aspect of this endeavor became part of
the profiteering controversy in respect to the price, quality, and rewards ob-
tained from the materials supplied.
In the long and inglorious record of American unreadiness for war, there
are few instances of such woeful inadequacy as the absence of aircraft materi-
als in 1917. The state of the aeronautical art in 1917 required the use of exotic
substances that were extremely difficult and expensive to obtain on short
notice. The only suitable lubricating oil then available was castor oil, which the
airplane engines of the era consumed with a thirst that would embarrass a
drunkard—sometimes six quarts an hour. The United States not only did not
grow sufficient castor beans but it even lacked the seed to do so. A shipload
of seeds had to be imported from India, and American growers planted
110,000 acres to match the need. Propellers were made of mahogany grown
only in the tropics, and the harvesting of this wood depended on heavy rainfall
to float the logs to coastal ports. There were also serious shortages of linen to
cover the wings, as not enough flax was grown, and of acetone for the lacquer
that sealed them. Huge amounts of acetone had to be distilled from wood, of
which there was also a shortage.57 These glaring shortages led to unusual haste
and concordant waste, which inflamed the profiteering controversy. None of
these problems, however, approached the difficulty of obtaining enough
spruce trees to build the aircraft.
There was only one material that was strong enough and light enough
for the framework of World War I fighter planes. This was first-growth clear
spruce, the kind found only in stands of virgin timber in extremely remote
and mountainous regions of the Pacific Northwest. Virgin trees had very thin
growth rings, producing lumber that was denser and stronger than that which
came from second-growth trees. Even this wood was seldom satisfactory; only
10-15 percent of the spruce logs produced a grade of lumber suitable for fighter
planes. Lower-grade spruce as well as some fir was strong enough for trainers,
but only clear spruce could withstand the strains of combat aerobatics. To
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build the planes necessary to defeat Germany, about 100 million board feet of
clear spruce were required. To obtain this yield, American lumberjacks would
have to cut approximately one billion feet of first-growth spruce.58
Before the war, spruce had little commercial value, so no one had bothered
to build roads to the vital areas. To further complicate matters, spruce trees did
not grow in large clusters, but were intermixed with fir and scattered through-
out the Pacific slope. Surveys showed that the richest stand of virgin spruce
in the world was on 11,000 acres of the Olympic Peninsula in western
Washington, estimated at holding between 250 and 330 million board feet of
lumber.59 The declaration of war instantaneously changed this property
(known as the Blodgett tract) from one of uncertain value to one that was cru-
cial to the war effort. How could a fair price be set for timberland that was vital
to the nation's security?
The land was owned by William Blodgett, a Michigan lumberman who was
holding it for speculative purposes. Blodgett believed that oil might be found
on his property, and he further anticipated that in the next ten years the value
of the lumber would appreciate, perhaps to as much as $2 million. Despite
these hopes, in January 1918 he offered to sell the tract to the government for
$635,000. It was later alleged but not proved that before the war he had offered
the land to a private purchaser for $450,000, but the government decided to
accept his offer because of its perceived need to build a great fleet of bombers
for a massive air offensive expected to take place in 1919.60 But to gain access to
this resource, it would be necessary to construct a new railroad line. The cost,
necessity, and location of this line became significant aspects of the war profi-
teering dispute.
When the pressing need for spruce became evident, a consortium of patri-
otic Washington lumbermen had offered to harvest the vital lumber from
nearby trees. Twenty logging companies were involved, and each agreed to
accept only a nominal fee of one dollar for its services. After surveying the
easily accessible timber, the army concluded that even if the commercial log-
gers increased their production to the maximum extent possible, only one-
third of the required yield would be provided. It was therefore necessary to
draw upon the Blodgett stand, and the army awarded a construction contract
to an eastern firm, the Seims-Carey-Kerbaugh Company, to build a railroad
into the tract. This decision markedly annoyed the local loggers. Some felt that
this expansion was unnecessary, creating needless capacity that would depress
prices after the war. Others resented the presence of an allegedly inexperienced
eastern firm, which they regarded as a slight to the Pacific Northwest. The con-
tract was let on a cost-plus basis, which was automatically suspicious, and it
seemed even more dubious because the forty-mile route through mountain-
ous terrain appeared to be exceedingly long.61
When the cost of building the railroad was made public, the westerners
became convinced that their suspicions were well founded. To meet the war
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schedule, the railroad had to be built in the midst of a rainy Pacific Coast
winter. As a consequence, the road would cost $4 million, or about $100,000
per mile. This was roughly six times the customary prewar price, when roads
were built more deliberately and in good weather. The westerners complained
that the road's eastern terminus connected all-too-conveniently to the Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Rail Road. When the war ended, the Milwaukee
Road would be the only conceivable purchaser and therefore the likely benefi-
ciary of a give-away price. The track seemed to be of high-quality construc-
tion, as if it were meant to be a permanent line. The westerners noted that
John D. Ryan, the director of the Air Service, was simultaneously president of
Anaconda and a director of the Milwaukee Road, and they believed they had
detected a monumentally fraudulent scheme to enrich the railroad.62
Although this explanation was plausible, under careful examination the
charges proved groundless. A railroad construction engineer employed by the
Union Pacific Railroad was invited to examine the site, and he concluded that
the shortest feasible route had been selected. All parties agreed that the winter
construction costs were dear, but none could prove them exorbitant. John D.
Ryan, moreover, took no part in choosing the contractor, as that decision had
been made before he entered government service. He also studiously declined
to participate in the railroad site decision on the grounds of a possible conflict
of interest.63 Despite these facts and despite the inability of critics to prove their
case, many doubters remained unwavering, and that is the essence upon which
the war profiteering legends were based.
The effort to retrieve the riches of the great forests of the Pacific slope left
behind another festering wound. The demand for spruce was so enormous
that there were not enough lumberjacks in the entire Northwest to fell all the
trees. Also, the northwestern lumber industry was plagued by perennial labor
strife. The War Department feared that production might lag and that the
heavy demands might touch off a potentially disastrous strike. To avert these
difficulties, President Wilson took the unusual step of ordering the army into
the forests. A special "Spruce Division" was formed and sent to the Northwest
under the command of Colonel Brice Disque. These 30,000 soldiers worked
alongside civilian loggers to augment their output. The question of an appro-
priate wage for these soldier-lumberjacks promptly appeared: should these
men earn the same wage as their comrades in the trenches, or should they earn
the same wage as their coworkers in the forests?
Privates in combat in France earned a dollar a day, plus subsistence. This
was far beneath the earnings of northwestern lumberjacks, where the daily
wage was $5.00-6.00. To bridge this gap, the army gave the troops in the Spruce
Division a daily bonus of $2.5O-$7.oo. The reason offered to excuse this in-
equity was (as customary in military matters) expediency. The army claimed
that it simply could not draft men and get them to work in the forest next to
civilians who were paid much better. Therefore, an anomalous and basically
S U P P L Y I N G T H E D O U G H B O Y S I 161
unfair situation developed. Young men were conscripted either to face hard
work in the forest at home or death in the trenches abroad. Although neither
was an appealing prospect, the wages and safety of the Washington timber-
land were clearly preferable to the misery and danger of the Argonne forest.
That the compensation was better in the safer endeavor was an arrangement
that the trench fighters of France would not soon forget. To further com-
pound their indignation, there were numerous reports and a widely shared
belief that the army sent the better men to France, at a dollar a day, while the
lesser soldiers went to the spruce forests at six dollars. It was also noteworthy
that before the war Colonel Disque, who commanded the Spruce Division, was
only a captain with a salary of $3,000. He was eventually promoted to general,
and after the war he found employment with one of the civilian operators
(with whom he had negotiated contracts) at a salary of $3O,ooo.64
While doughboys and lumberjacks were hewing the spruce that would
form the fuselages, others were considering how to manufacture the motors
that would lift the planes. Here the nation was the beneficiary of good fore-
sight, although this did not come from the military. Correctly anticipating the
need for a powerful new aircraft engine, the Packard Motor Car Company
commenced designing an advanced power plant that became known as the
Liberty motor. As a Senate investigating committee reported, Packard saw the
need for a stronger engine "prior to the time that anybody else in the country,
including the Government, saw any need of it." The Packard engine was also
well ahead of the rest of the world. The normal power plants in World War I
pursuit planes of British and French design were in the range of 200-225 horse-
power; the Liberty motor, at 400 horsepower, nearly doubled the standard.
When the United States entered the war, Packard donated the design to the
government free of charge, although its contribution was not altogether self-
less sacrifice.65
When the Boiling commission met with British leaders to decide against
building an American pursuit plane, the group also resolved that the United
States should undertake a determined effort to manufacture the Liberty motor
as quickly as possible. Airplanes equipped with this engine would be able to
carry large bombloads that would allow the Allies to break through the
German lines in 1919. The Liberty motor was also thought to be adaptable
enough so that it could power the next generation of pursuit planes.66
The Packard Motor Car Company was rewarded for its foresight by ob-
taining an initial contract for the manufacture of 6,000 Liberty motors. This
contract was of a new and unusual type, a more sophisticated form of incen-
tive pricing than was used in the Civil War. The new arrangement was de-
signed to be used in an instance in which the actual cost of producing a
complicated new mechanism could not be accurately predicted beforehand. A
contract of this kind was supposed to be an improvement on the open-ended,
cost-plus form in which costs could soar upward unchecked. Engineers first
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estimated the cost of making a device. This approximation was expected to
be near the highest figure that might be anticipated, and thus it would serve as
an upper limit on the price. This uppermost or target price was known in
wartime parlance as the "bogie" price. When the production run was finished,
the actual cost of manufacture would be determined. If everything went well,
the actual cost would be less than the bogie price. The difference between them
would decide the final sum that the government would pay, and the supplier
would get the actual cost plus 25 percent of the difference. This latter feature
was to serve as an incentive to keep costs low. If unexpected difficulties caused
costs to escalate, the government would not be forced to pay a huge price as
could occur in a cost-plus contract. This innovation worked better on paper
than in practice, as the Packard contract revealed.
The predicted maximum or bogie price on Packard's Liberty motor con-
tract was $5,000 per engine. This included a fixed profit of $625, or 12.5 percent
of $5,000. The actual cost of manufacture was determined to be only $3,200.
Under the terms of target pricing, Packard was also entitled to 25 percent of the
difference, which amounted to a bonus of $450 per engine. When the fixed
profit and the bonus were combined, the total profit reached $1,075, a healthy
33.6 percent markup. This was considerably more advantageous to the con-
tractor than was likely with a cost-plus contract. To make the situation even
more questionable, the facilities for production of the Liberty motor were paid
for by the U.S. Army Signal Corps at a price of $4,470,000. After the Armistice,
Packard was able to purchase the facilities at a price of $849,556, or nineteen
cents on the dollar. After World War II, the famous Truman committee would
denounce this kind of sale as "legal profiteering."67
Despite Packard's technological leadership, and despite the great expense
involved, the Liberty motor contributed very little to Allied victory. Although
22,500 motors were ordered, by the time Germany surrendered only 264 had
been completed. With considerable understatement, the Senate described this
output as "gravely disappointing." The Liberty powerplant also proved to be
too heavy for most of the existing airframes. An attempt was made to fit the
Liberty motor to the English-designed Bristol fighter, which would increase
the plane's horsepower from 225 to 400. Vibrations caused by the great speed
of the ship and its general lack of airworthiness caused fabric to tear away and
wings to fall off. All the test planes crashed with the loss of their pilots. There
had been many earlier examples of quality degradation in the history of
American defense contracting, but none had had results so spectacular and so
deadly.68
As an interim solution, Allied commanders decided to add the Liberty
motor to a heavier plane, the English-designed de Havilland DH-4, an
observation plane that could be modified for use as a bomber. A total of 213
DH-4S were built in the United States and shipped to France before the
Armistice. Despite this fact, an oft-repeated postwar charge was that "not a
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single American-made fighting-plane of any description ever reached the
front." Still, considering the funds expended ($640 million), this production
level was at the very best an indifferent performance, even considering that
that sum also purchased 640 British and French-built planes. The DH-4 was
also not an advanced design, and both its fighting utility and its safety were
questionable. Production of this airplane became the most contentious in-
stance of allegedly degraded quality of the entire American war effort.
As a combination observation and bombing plane, the DH-4 was not
a sound design for either purpose. Even by World War I standards, the plane
was slow and clumsy, its range was short, and the pilot and his observer were
too far apart to communicate without effort. Nobody could reasonably claim,
therefore, that the DH-4 was a state-of-the-art design. Some declared it to
be obsolete, but a more judicious assessment would describe it as a contempo-
rary but not advanced design. It was a slow and ungainly flier, but not exces-
sively so.
The chief deficiency of the DH-4 was its dangerousness to flyers. The cock-
pit was located behind the engine, with the fuel tank behind the pilot. The hori-
zontal members of the fuselage were wooden longerons. In an emergency
landing these longerons tended to splinter, driving the fuel tank forward to
crush the pilot against the engine and/or to ignite a deadly and inescapable
fire. Since the exhaust pipe was located close to the fuel tank, and since the fuel
tank was not armored, the DH-4 was prone to cause an even greater horror—
fire in the air. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, America's best-known pilot of the
Great War, described this fate as his comrades' greatest dread.69
American pilots of the First World War were not outfitted with para-
chutes. (This was itself a sad commentary on the state of American prepared-
ness, since the "barbaric Hun" pilots were equipped with such gear.) If a fire
broke out at high altitude, there were only two alternatives. These were de-
scribed, with fatalistic understatement, by one veteran of the Lafayette
Escadrille as not "very pleasant to contemplate. Either stick with the ship and
suffer the agonies of a slow roasting death or to jump into quick and merciful
oblivion, a crushed and broken mass on the hard, unyielding earth." The great
American ace Raoul Lufbery died this way (he chose to jump).70 There were
enough instances in which the de Havilland DH-4 caught fire that the plane
acquired the grisly sobriquet "Flaming Coffin," a term which often appeared in
the glossary of postwar antiprofiteering writers.
The "Flaming Coffin" notion was too harsh. The placement of the fuel tank
to the rear of the pilot was a common design in the era. Some contemporary
warplanes did have fireproofed fuel tanks, although the DH-4 did not. There
were no statistics to demonstrate that the DH-4 was abnormally risky; all
wartime flying was dangerous, and the demolition record of the DH-4 was
not unusually poor.71 Nevertheless, its reputation contributed to the legend
of profiteering on aircraft: that vast sums of money were spent, that only a
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scattering of obsolete and useless planes were built, and that those few that ar-
rived belatedly were criminally hazardous to fly.
The confusing and disappointing record of American aviation during the
war was an illustration of an important characteristic of the war effort that
contributed greatly to the developing profiteering controversy. Unlike any
other major American war, the American role in the Great War ended sooner
than American leaders originally expected. In the past, Americans declared war
(or opened hostilities) and then commenced mobilization. Whatever minimal
planning took place usually underestimated the length of the hostilities by sev-
eral years and the cost by many millions of dollars. In the case of the First
World War, however, early estimates overstated the probable duration of Ger-
man resistance. This wisdom held that the war would last into 1919, at which
time massive shipments of American men and materiel would supposedly in-
undate the Central Powers. With the American economy in full production,
the war ended abruptly and rather unexpectedly in 1918. Great expenditures
had been made on warplanes and other weapons in anticipation of the next
year's campaign. These expenses appeared (suspiciously to some) to have pro-
duced scant benefit but large profit.
Copper, Steel, and Shipping
The increasing complexity of the American industrial giant was another chief
contributing factor to the war profiteering saga. There is no better manifesta-
tion of this intricacy than the performance of the copper industry. This busi-
ness was highly concentrated among a few interlinked producers. This cartel
was dominated by Anaconda, which was owned by the Guggenheim family
and administered by John D. Ryan. Before American entry, copper prices rose
dramatically due to brisk sales to the Triple Entente countries. In the ten years
before the war, copper sold on the average for about seventeen cents per
pound. Since the average cost of production was around eleven and one-half
cents in that period, the copper business was solidly but not spectacularly prof-
itable in peacetime. Heavy war demand, however, caused the price of copper
to move upward markedly. In 1916 copper rose to thirty-two cents a pound,
and on the eve of American entry, it reached thirty-seven cents. At these prices,
copper profits became robust; they were three or four times prewar levels.
In 1917 copper firms were annually returning in profits a range of 70 to 700
percent of invested capital.72 As the copper men fully realized, this was too
good to last.
The catalyst for bringing about a reduction to more acceptable wartime
levels was Bernard M. Baruch, then a member of the General Munitions Board
and later the chairman of the War Industries Board. As a prominent and very
successful speculator in metals, Baruch had entree to the Guggenheim family.
Baruch, along with Eugene Meyer Jr. met with Daniel Guggenheim and asked
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him to cut prices to a level that would convince the public that the war was not
being fought for profit. John D. Ryan also participated in bringing about
Guggenheim's consent to a reduction, and Guggenheim agreed to discount the
price to 16.6739 ,^ which was the ten-year prewar average. Since this reduction
affected an order of 45 million pounds, the savings were nearly $7 million. The
willingness of the copper industry to cooperate was partly patriotism, partly
acceptance of the inevitable, and partly a desire to avoid antitrust prosecution.
Nevertheless, this event signified the evolution of a new role for the govern-
ment, as the United States moved away from a weakly regulated economy with
significant concentration in key industries toward a more managed system.
The copper agreement exemplified the Wilson administration's management
of the war, which emphasized patriotism, voluntarism, and cooperation, rather
than coercion. The utilization of voluntary agreements and self-regulation
were early examples of what became known as associationalism.73
Unfortunately, establishing a wartime price on the basis of ten-year prewar
average was not a permanent resolution of the copper problem. The wages of
copper miners were tied by union contract to the price of copper, and to
reduce the price abruptly invited strikes in the copper mines. This circum-
stance alone would have been reason enough to allow the price to climb, but
there were other grounds as well. Other costs borne by the operators rose as a
result of wartime inflation, so that small inefficient mines could not operate
profitably at a market price of sixteen and two-third cents. Their cost of pro-
duction exceeded twenty cents per pound. If the government was to keep these
mines in production, prices would have to be higher, but how much higher? To
raise them significantly would produce a windfall for the Guggenheim inter-
ests, but to fail to raise them would mean an unacceptable loss of production.
Baruch met with leaders of the copper industry, who asked for a price of
twenty-five cents per pound. This was acceptable to the General Munitions
Board, but not to Baruch, who recommended twenty-two and a half cents.
Secretary of War Baker sided with Baruch, vetoing twenty-five cents, and a
compromise was finally reached at twenty-three and a half cents.74 At this rate
the Guggenheim mines earned handsome profits, and smaller mines stayed in
production. It was a classic compromise between the twin goals of restricting
profits and maintaining production.
Baruch hoped to repeat his feat by negotiating a price reduction in the steel
industry. Steel, however, proved tougher to bend than copper. Judge Elbert H.
Gary, the chairman of the United States Steel Corporation, had no love for the
Wilson administration, having been heavily criticized by Secretary of the Navy
Josephus Daniels. The steel industry had been a favorite target of business crit-
ics for twenty years, and the steelmen resented it. Baruch also lacked the close
ties with Gary that he had with Guggenheim.75
Nevertheless, as in copper, the steel industry could not hope to continue to
post the record profits of the prewar period. In 1914 U.S. Steel earned $46
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million, but this increased to $333 million in 1916 and $585 million in 1917.
Bethlehem Steel was even more fortunate. This company was poorly located
to serve the midwestern automobile market or to obtain raw materials effi-
ciently. Although poorly sited for the American domestic market, it was ideally
situated for the English military market, and it received an order for 8,ooo
field guns while also producing 12,000 cannon shells a day. From 1904 to 1915
Bethlehem paid no dividends, but in 1916, owing to hefty war contracts, it was
able to return 22.5 percent of its invested capital. Bethlehem profits were $9.4
million in 1914 and rose to $43.6 million in 1916. Before the war a share of
Bethlehem customarily sold for about $25, but in just nine months the price
soared to $275. By 1916 it had zoomed further to $700. This could not continue
indefinitely. As Price McKinney of the McKinney Steel Company of Cleveland
admitted, "We are all making more money out of this war than the average
human being ought to."76
Steel executives were notably unenthusiastic about giving up their lucrative
overseas profits and were not pleased when the Wilson administration, in an
expression of Allied solidarity, demanded that American steel firms sell to
Britain and France at the same price as at home. Secretary Daniels recorded
in his diary that upon hearing this the steelmen "gagged." Nevertheless, the
government forced price reductions. U.S. Steel asked for a price of four and
one-quarter cents per pound for steel plate, but government accountants de-
clared that two and a half cents was a fair price. The final compromise was
three and one-quarter cents for all producers. This process of price adjustment
ensured that high-cost producers stayed in business, but only at the cost of
maintaining near-record profits for U.S. Steel and other firms. Before taxes,
total earnings of all 131 American steel producers quintupled between 1915 and
1917. The average pretax rate of return on investment soared from 7.4 percent
in 1915 to 28.7 percent in 1917, falling back to 20.0 percent in 1918.77
The advantages enjoyed by large corporations during the war emergency
did not go unnoticed by business critics. U.S. Steel recognized the quandary its
efficiency forced upon the government. In March 1918, its chairman, Elbert H.
Gary, advocated a high excess profits tax to soak up the profits of low-cost
producers such as U.S. Steel while guaranteeing a fair profit to high-cost enter-
prises. Gary said this "would be fair and reasonable. . . .  That would be
satisfactory to all of us and certainly ought to be satisfactory to the Govern-
ment."78 This also seemed better than dividing the contracts among the various
producers and assigning each a different price. That might have violated the
Sherman Act, leading to an unwanted prosecution. A different approach
was followed in the cotton textile industry, where a composite price was calcu-
lated. This figure was based on an average of one high-cost, one low-cost, and
several middle-range manufacturers. It included a markup of 10 percent for
profit, which Charles Eisenman of the War Industries Board testified was a
"reasonable profit."79 (Thus yet another practical definition of the meaning of
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"reasonable" entered into war profiteering discourse.) All efforts to spread the
work had only limited effect, however, as the war effort consistently favored
large corporations. Nevertheless, war taxes did soak up some of the profit.
In 1915-16 steel firms paid less than 1 percent of their net investment in fed-
eral taxes, but this figure rose to 12 percent in 1917, receding to 8 percent in
1918.80
A related enterprise in which the bothersome question of "reasonable
profit" again appeared was the shipping business. The need to transport mil-
lions of troops to Europe, along with their gear and weapons, while simultane-
ously supplying the Allies, packed every ship to the fullest extent possible. Still,
the United States was seriously lacking ocean transportation, and prices rose
accordingly. Woodrow Wilson angrily singled out the shippers for a tongue-
lashing. He reproved the "almost insuperable obstacles they have been putting
in the way of the successful prosecution of this war. They are doing everything
that high freight charges can do to make this war a failure.... I do not say that
they realize this or intend i t . . . . I am not questioning motives. I am merely
stating a fact."81
The War Department tried to fill the discrepancy by acquiring cargo carri-
ers and passenger liners to convert to troopships. Both needed extensive re-
modeling: cargo vessels needed sanitary lines cut into their decks and pas-
senger liners needed their elegantly appointed cabins converted into hospitals,
offices, dining areas, and so forth. The government lacked the facilities to re-
furbish these vessels, so the conversions had to be carried out in private ship-
yards. The yards took advantage of this development, and prices rose sub-
stantially.82
The problem was not only high profits earned by shipbuilders during the
war—Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company, for example, netted $70 million
before taxes during the war, including a return of 57 percent of its invested cap-
ital in 1918—but also that the profits continued after the Armistice. Each ship
that had been converted to military use had to be reconverted and returned to
its owners after the war, again at great expense. Bethlehem Shipbuilding ac-
cordingly was able to earn another 57 percent on its invested capital in 1919.
The shipowners, moreover, expected that very extensive, and therefore very ex-
pensive, repairs would be made. But how extensive must be the repairs in order
to return a vessel in a seaworthy, prewar condition? There were many disagree-
ments. By 1919 the army had reconditioned seventy-six ships, at a total cost of
$4.6 million. This figure was far below the owners' request, which was $10.1
million.83
The government also had to compensate the shipowners for the lost prof-
its that would have been earned by the ships if they had remained in civilian
hire. This toll was known as a "demurrage" and was calculated on a daily
basis—in effect, a kind of imputed rent. But how much would these ships have
earned? Opinions differed considerably. Shipowners thought that they should
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be compensated at the comparatively high rates that pertained during the war,
but the government felt that peacetime tariffs were appropriate.
The history of the SS Manchuria, a vessel owned by the Atlantic Transpor-
tation Company, exemplified both problems. When the Manchuria was re-
turned to its owners after wartime service, they requested $1.06 million in
repairs. An independent marine surveyor declared this figure to be "grossly ex-
cessive," and the government cut it to $450,000. During its two years of mili-
tary service, the army paid the owners $2.35 million in demurrage, a figure that
the army later admitted was considerably less than it would have earned in
civilian traffic.84
In determining the "reasonable cost" of reconditioning a ship, or the "rea-
sonable demurrage," government administrators were necessarily exercising
their individual judgment, as they had when they decided that 10 percent was
a "reasonable profit" on a cost-plus shipyard contract. Unfortunately, there was
no national criterion of "reasonable profit," and this deepened the profiteering
disagreement. In May 1917, the General Munitions Board made an attempt to
establish a national standard. The Board appointed a committee intended to
represent "various geographic sections of the country" and charged it vaguely
with ascertaining the "proper percentages" of profit in each locality and the
"usual percentages in various kinds of industries." As a consequence of this
work, a governmentwide estimate of 10 percent as a measure of "reasonable
profit" emerged. This idea, unfortunately, was more easily conceived than it
was implemented.
There were several problems with the 10 percent paradigm. In a cost-plus-
fixed-fee contract, the fixed fee was based on 10 percent of the expected cost of
production. The true cost, as shown by the Liberty motor contracts, could turn
out to be significantly below the estimated cost, producing a much higher
yield. In a cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contract, the contracts were not always
written at the 10 percent level. The Dayton-Wright Aircraft Company, for ex-
ample, built Wilbur Wright Field near Dayton, Ohio. This company received a
fee of 15 percent of all costs, including leasing land for the base, for construct-
ing the buildings, and also for grading the soil. On the other hand, the Engle
Aircraft Company built airplanes in Cleveland, and its contract stipulated a
10 percent fee. There was no clear or cogent reason why there should be a dis-
parity between building an airfield and building an airplane, or between work-
ing in Dayton or working in Cleveland.85
A second question that had to be decided was the taxability of the 10 per-
cent markup. A group of shipbuilders argued that these cost-plus contracts
ought to be tax-free, since they had little choice but to accept the government
offer. Secretary Daniels would have none of this, and the profits remained tax-
able. There was also the sticky question of subcontractors. The Marlin-
Rockwell Company of New Haven, Connecticut, was an old-line arms
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manufacturer. It agreed to build a new plant to load bombs, organizing for this
purpose a subsidiary called the Marlin-Rockwell Loading Company. The latter
received a contract of the cost-plus 10 percent variety. The Loading Company
nevertheless relet the contract to the Fred T. Ley Company for cost plus 3.25
percent. The difference of 6.75 percent remained with Marlin-Rockwell simply
for supervising the subcontractor. Some doubted that this was reasonable, par-
ticularly when the officers of the Ley firm doubled their salaries for the dura-
tion of the contract.86
Besides deciding on what constituted a "reasonable profit," a further chal-
lenge in administering the cost-plus contracts was determining "reasonable
cost." Each contract required a number of supervisors whose job was to moni-
tor performance by including "reasonable costs" and excluding "excessive
costs." Exactly which costs were reasonable and which were excessive was often
a matter of considerable dispute. In every cost-plus contract, one or more
government auditors had the responsibility of reviewing expenditures.
Cost-plus contracts became a bureaucratic aggravation. Certain costs were
almost always allowable as "reasonable": these would include direct expendi-
tures for labor and materials. The perplexing questions were raised about the
contractor's overhead. Plant depreciation, repairs, taxes, insurance, power, fuel,
and royalties were generally not disputed. Salaries of management and various
"extra supplies" or "extraordinary costs" were not so easily acceptable.
Some corporations sought to gain advantage from the cost-plus contract
by inflating salaries. The New York Shipbuilding Company, for example,
increased its president's salary by 100 percent immediately upon receiving a
cost-plus contract. At the Standard Aircraft Corporation, H. B. Mingle, its
president, was paid $62,000 per year. He was a lawyer with no prewar experi-
ence in the aeronautical industry. The president of Bethlehem Steel, E. G.
Grace, raised his compensation dramatically by paying huge bonuses. Accor-
ding to standing company policy, Bethlehem's president received a salary that
was well below the norm for a comparable firm, but instead benefited from an
unusually generous bonus system. Grace's prewar salary of $12,000 was far
below the going wage for his level of management, which was about $75,000.
When an avalanche of war profits poured in, on the other hand, Grace was in a
very advantageous position; his bonus in 1917 was $1,501,532, and in 1918 it was
$1,386,193. Grace's situation was unusual but not entirely atypical. At Atlas
Powder the president went from $16,000 in 1914 to $56,179.94 in 1918, and at
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company the president went from $12,000 in 1914
to $75,000 in 1917. The army established an "interdepartmental cost confer-
ence"—a kind of salary police—to rule on the size of salaries in cost-plus con-
tracts. In the case of the Marlin-Rockwell bomb loading contract, which was
cost-plus, the government rejected as salary any payment above $15,000 for the
general manager. In so doing, the government anticipated the salary control
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plan adopted during World War II by executive order of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
It did not attempt to thwart the Bethlehem bonus program, however.87
Government watchdogs also attempted to control the padding of overhead
charges. The Grand Rapids Airplane Company, for example, was cited for
charging expensive dinners and high directors' fees against overhead and
for seeking deductions for depreciation of office furniture. Auditors discov-
ered that executives of the Duesenberg Motor Company sought to charge the
government for $11,000 in unnecessary travel expenses that even included $171
for cigars. At the Dayton-Wright Aircraft Company, Signal Corps auditors dis-
allowed charges for baseball uniforms for employees, for diplomas for expert
shotgun practice for plant guards, and for free tires and gasoline for commut-
ing workers. When the company objected, one beleaguered officer laconically
observed, "We get along beautifully with the Dayton-Wright people as long as
our officers approve all their purchase requests."88
Some of these expenditures were clearly lavish. The Standard Steel Car
Company had a contract to make railroad cars. It constructed a $350,000
hotel featuring ornate private dining rooms for executives and employees.
Accommodations were entirely rent-free, with operation of the entire building
charged to the government. An immense powder plant built at Nitro, West
Virginia, by the Thompson-Starrett Company was a complete city. Workers
got double-time for overtime, plus free housing, medical care, pharmaceuti-
cals, utilities, and laundry service. Tenants also received free cooking utensils,
with the government replacing any broken dishes. Employees could also
charge the government for free boots and coats, which could be replaced when
worn out.89
Controlling spending under cost-plus contracts was a difficult and un-
pleasant task. Contractors chafed at the constant supervision. William F. Carey,
a railroad builder, denounced cost-plus as "the most unsatisfactory kind of
contract that ever was let" because of the constant interference. These conflicts
sometimes reached foolish extremes. At its giant acetone complex at Muscle
Shoals, Alabama, the Air Nitrates Corporation found the works invaded by
twenty secret agents of the Bureau of Investigations. In retaliation for the raid,
the company accused the Justice Department men of drinking the whiskey
they confiscated on the premises and hired forty investigators to spy on the G-
men. This expenditure was then billed to the Ordnance Corps, which ap-
proved the charge because it believed the Justice Department detectives were
impeding production.90 This was a classic example of the perennial clash be-
tween the conflicting goals of limiting defense contractors' rewards, as desired
by civilians, and of rewarding production, as desired by the army. As usual, the
military won.
The difficulties with cost-plus contracts furnished strong reasons to develop
better arrangements. The government had several arrows in its quiver, but
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none was attractive. Instead of issuing a cost-plus contract, there was legal au-
thority to issue a compulsory production order. This required a contractor to
accept a contract at a price fixed by the controlling federal authority. The War
Department issued about 1,000 such orders, and the Navy Department was
even fonder of them, issuing 3,342 compulsory orders. Each of these directives
carried with it a written pledge to the recipient: "You are assured of a reasonable
profit under this order."91 Since government regulators doubted their ability to
compel performance, other approaches were the instruments of choice.
The government's favorite means of forcing business cooperation was the
use of priorities. Since a firm had to be certified by the War Industries Board as
engaged in vital war work in order to receive raw materials, power, or trans-
portation, the WIB could strangle it by revoking its priority status. Chairman
Bernard Baruch found no shortage of weapons to use against a recalcitrant
firm. "You can choke it to death, deprive it of transportation, fuel, and power,
divert its business, strengthen its rivals," he explained. Baruch later recalled
how this had worked in practice. One reluctant firm, which had dared to refuse
a military contract on the government's terms, was stripped of all access to
coal, steel, and rail transportation. "That was pretty persuasive," he remem-
bered smugly. "Then they acceded to our wishes."92
The weapon of last resort was commandeering. Under wartime rules the
government could simply send troops to confiscate materials or even entire
factories. In order to thwart hoarding, the navy seized the merchandise of
238 warehouses, 49 banks, 553 forwarding agents, and 223 exporters. The
army commandeered six different defense plants: those of the Liberty
Ordnance Company, Bigelow-Hartford Carpet Company, Hoboken Land and
Improvement Company, Smith and Wesson, Inc., Mosler Safe Company, and
the Federal Enamel and Stamping Company. Although the government used
this weapon reluctantly, it was readily available. When the War Industries
Board authorized the army to commandeer an acetone distillery in Terre
Haute, Indiana, it simply stated as its reason, "due to the attitude of manage-
ment."93
The War Industries Board was caught in a predicament. It was forced to
award contracts either on a cost-plus basis or on a fixed-price basis. In the
former instance, costs could quickly escalate; in the latter, costs would imme-
diately escalate, since the government had no choice but to purchase and thus
possessed no bargaining power. Compulsory contracts and commandeering
were heavy-handed devices that were certain to inspire resentment and thus
at least partially to defeat the purpose of obtaining efficient production. The
War Industries Board sought to avoid this quandary by assuming the power to
fix prices. Robert S. Brookings was appointed to chair the Price Fixing Board,
and he remembered how his group had snatched power. "We had no authority
from Congress to do other than commandeer for our war needs. . . . We
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arbitrarily exercised an authority which we did not have by law. We threatened
to commandeer concerns unless they abided by our decisions as to prices for
the civil population, as well as to prices for our war needs."94
The trouble with the formal price fixing program was that it established a
single price for each commodity. As Brookings explained, "We had to fix a
price that kept alive the least efficient plants, the least efficient producer, and,
of necessity, that price was a more profitable price for the more efficient pro-
ducer." The War Industries Board briefly considered a more complex, multi-
price system, but rejected the concept. The reason was that the government
would have to buy all the production of the low-cost producers, leaving the
civilian market to the high-cost producers. The result would be a dangerous
incitement to price inflation, a dismal choice for any leadership.95
As a consequence of these considerations, the Wilson administration en-
dorsed a new and broader excess profits tax. The special 12.5 percent tax on
income from munitions sales of September 1916 that fell heavily on the Du
Pont powder company was expanded in March 1917 to include all American
firms whose profits exceeded 8 percent of invested capital. This definition of
what was an acceptable war profit was also only temporary. Only seven
months later, Congress decided that the excess profits tax should be set at a rate
of 60 percent of any net income that exceeded 33 percent of invested capital.
Herbert Hoover, who then chaired the U.S. Food Administration, advocated
this approach, arguing that it would serve to prevent low-cost producers from
obtaining windfall profits. Others praised the excess profits approach for its
ability to keep both high-cost and low-cost producers healthy and in produc-
tion.96
Unfortunately, the high rates of the excess profits tax served as a stimulus
to evasion. Corporations utilized a series of maneuvers to avoid returning the
high profits to the Treasury. These included raising officers' salaries conspicu-
ously, purchasing superfluous advertising, and scrapping and replacing ma-
chinery before it was worn out. Mining firms took this occasion to invest
heavily in exploratory activity. Other expenditures of questionable necessity,
but which were nonetheless tax-deductible, included heavy new investments in
welfare capitalism. The excess profits tax, like the cost-plus contract, con-
tributed to high salaries and thus did little to arrest resentment.97
After compulsory orders, price fixing, commandeering, personal and cor-
porate income taxes, and the excess profits tax, the last line of defense against
profiteering was to limit the citizens' ability to make use of allegedly ill-gotten
gains. In 1917, in obedience to custom, Congress imposed a wartime luxury tax.
This tax was in part aimed at the pleasures of the upper class. It affected club
dues, railway tickets, and Pullman berths, on the assumption that the affluent
were more likely to join expensive private clubs and to travel in comfort.
Telephone and telegraph messages were similarly treated, since telephones
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were not then broadly available. Perhaps to restrict the frivolities of youth,
since these items could hardly have had much attraction to the war wealthy,
chewing gum and phonograph records were also deemed to be taxable luxury
goods.98
After all these attempts to deter the growth of wealth were made, the unre-
solved question was whether or not they were successful. The actual increase in
wealth holding by individuals in upper-income brackets during the First
World War produced contention that persisted long after the war ended. The
most fractious aspect of this lingering quarrel was the oft-raised charge that
the war had produced a crop of 23,000 new millionaires.
This allegation became a staple of progressive spokespersons who issued
ringing calls for redress and offered dire predictions of the collapse of social
order if the outrage went uncorrected. Congressman John M. Nelson, Repub-
lican of Wisconsin, without checking his arithmetic declared, "Government
statistics show that this war multiplied the millionaire class by five, where there
were 8,000 there are now 30,000 millionaires and seventy-one million of our
people do not even own their own houses. . . . What happens when injustice,
lawlessness, and oppression work their way to their final end? Behold Russia.
Do we want our fertile fields trampled down either by the hired hosts of the
Wall St. Tsars or land taken by the maddened multitude of half-starved men
and women under the leadership of the desperate despots of revengeful
Bolshevism?"99
The claim that the war produced 23,000 new millionaires can be traced to
a socialist organization, the research division of the People's Legislative Ser-
vice. It discovered, correctly, that the number of Americans who paid taxes on
an annual income of more than $50,000 increased from 7,500 in 1914 to 19,000
in 1917, an addition of 11,500 names. The People's Legislative Service assumed
that all of these persons were millionaires, since $50,000 represented a return
of 5 percent on an investment of $1 million. The Service then doubled the
11,500 figure to arrive at its final estimate of 23,000 new millionaires. Its justifi-
cation for this doubling was its presumption that there were as many million-
aires in the $30,000 to $50,000 bracket as in the higher level. It offered no
evidence to substantiate this adjustment, nor did it consider the possibility that
someone with an income of $50,000 might not be a millionaire. Nevertheless,
these figures were published in a number of labor journals, in particular The
Call, and the claim gained considerable currency.100
In 1924 the House Committee on Military Affairs investigated this accusa-
tion and, after discovering the weak assumptions on which it rested, deter-
mined that it had "no well-defined basis in fact." Although the 23,000 mil-
lionaire assertion was clearly an overstatement, an accurate estimate is more
difficult to determine. The total number of taxpayers in the highest income
bracket (above $50,000 per year) for the wartime period is as follows:101
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Year Number of Taxpayers
1914 7,500
1915 10,600
1916 17,000
1917 19,000
1918 14,000
1919 18,800
These figures are based on Internal Revenue Service records and do not in-
clude the effects of taxes or inflation. They may be interpreted in various ways.
The greatest increase in wealthy individuals came in the years 1915 and 1916, the
period before American entry. Since the United States was then a neutral
nation selling to belligerent nations, it confuses the meaning of "war profiteer-
ing" to label these persons as such. In 1917, the first year of American participa-
tion, the number of wealthy taxpayers increased modestly from 17,000 to
19,000, but in 1918 there was a decrease to 14,000. Thus in 1918, the only year in
which the United States was a belligerent for almost the entire twelve months,
there were actually 3,000 fewer wealthy taxpayers than in the last year of peace.
Of course, to make an accurate estimate of the number of war millionaires
would also require analysis of the composition of the wealthy cohort; some
persons might have fallen out of the select group to be replaced by others
whose wealth derived from the war. Such an analysis is not possible, but there
is little reason to believe that such a transposition took place. It can only be
concluded, therefore, that although a substantial number of persons—at most
11,500—became very wealthy during World War I, they largely gained their
wealth before the United States declared war.
The question of profiteering during the Great War should correctly be
posed in a different way: To what extent was there a shift in the distribution of
wealth that favored the wealthy? Analyzed in this fashion, it becomes highly
doubtful that any general new unfairness among the civilian population oc-
curred. The poorest stratum of wealth holders benefited greatly from the wage
increase associated with war jobs. Their total wealth increased from nothing or
less than nothing to a positive figure. It is an economic maxim that during a
period of high employment, wealth is more broadly distributed than during a
period of low employment, and this was clearly in effect in 1917-18. Although
wealth was not evenly distributed in the war period, there is no evidence that it
was more balanced then than before the war; in fact, as far as the civilian popu-
lation was concerned, wealth was slightly more evenly distributed during the
war than it was before or after it.102
The record of mobilization during World War I includes a number of ex-
amples of extreme accumulation by American businessmen. The $1.5 million
bonus obtained by E. G. Grace in 1917 may well be the largest direct increase in
wealth as a result of war in American history. Yet despite certain instances of
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unusual accretion, there were also examples of selfless sacrifice that were the
equal of any in previous conflicts. The most frequently remembered instance
of sacrifice is that of the famous "dollar-a-year" men, who allegedly entered
government service for only a nominal wage. Unfortunately, however, the
dollar-a-year men were not the best illustration of selflessness; some of them
received allowances of $2,000 to $3,000 annually to compensate them for the
cost of relocating to Washington, D.C.103
The real sacrifices came from firms that held the line on prices despite al-
luring opportunities to hike them. The cotton goods manufacturers, for exam-
ple, disciplined themselves to avoid price gouging. "We took it on ourselves in
the early days," recalled one executive, "to see to it that the industry did not
profiteer with the Government.. . . If unreasonable offerings were made, we
used personal pressure and various other kinds of pressure to have prices
made on a reasonable basis." Copper, zinc, aluminum, and steel producers cut
their prices upon American entry, as described, and certainly this was not a
result of compulsion. Some firms offered prices so senselessly low that Howard
Coffin of the Munitions Board feared that they could never be maintained in
the long run. Coffin described these prices as "unsound from an economic
point of view."104
Although Coffin's view would seem apologetic, there were instances of ex-
cessively generous contribution. John Baskerville, a Chicago property owner,
allowed the Ordnance Corps to use 12,000 square feet of office space without
charge for the duration of the war. This was a six-story building, and its free
use continued for nine months after the Armistice.105 Although Baskerville's
wealth was certainly not harmed by this donation, such sacrifice, if taken on a
grand scale, would have been ruinous.
Other forms of patriotic sacrifice included voluntary cuts in prices on war
contracts. The Allied Silk Trading Company obtained a contract to supply 6.9
million yards of silk cartridge cloth at cost plus a 7.5 percent commission.
Allied's president, M. C. Migel, observed that army procurement officers had
been cooperative and that payments had been prompt, so he cut his fee to 3
percent. By this decision, Migel surrendered $500,000 in profits. "The spirit we
are endeavoring to display we hope will be emulated by others," Migel ex-
plained. It was an offering that would have gladdened the heart of George
Washington.106
A similar decision was reached by the Yale and Towne Manufacturing
Company of Stamford, Connecticut. This firm was a lockmaker before the
war, but upon American entry it converted its production to artillery fuses.
Yale and Towne was the low bidder at $68.95 each on a contract to make 4,000
artillery fuses. This contract was not cost-plus, but was based upon informa-
tion obtained from the Frankford arsenal. After Yale and Towne commenced
production, it found that it could make the fuses much more cheaply than it
had estimated. It sent the Ordnance Corps an unsolicited offer to renegotiate
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the contract, and after discussing the matter with army procurement officers
Yale and Towne cut their price in half.107
The Ford Motor Company was another firm with a responsible record.
World War I was the first conflict in which steel helmets were employed, and
General Pershing requested their immediate manufacture. The lowest estimate
obtained by the army was 31$ each, but Ford agreed to make helmets at cost
plus 10 percent, while guaranteeing that the price would never exceed 31C. Ford
made 955,516 helmets at an average price of 10.33$ each, and after receiving
payment returned to the army a check for $197,000. Ford engineers had dis-
covered that a slight alteration in the specifications would actually strengthen
the helmet while cutting production costs dramatically. Ford also held a cost-
plus contract to produce artillery caissons that was expected to bring in about
$13 million. At the time of the Armistice, about 75 percent of the caissons were
finished and Ford could have collected handsomely—about $500,000—when
the contract was terminated, but the firm waived this fee. This was not un-
usual, either. On Armistice Day, the War Department had about 30,000 con-
tracts in effect, and most of them did not contain termination clauses. Most
contractors simply released the government from any obligation to complete
the contract. This may not have been a very significant concession, however,
since some lawyers believed that the contracts were not enforceable against the
government in any case.108
The wartime record of no other firm provoked more angry quarreling than
that of the Du Pont Company. In 1916, the year when Du Pont benefited most
from Britain's dependency, its net earnings shot up to more than ten times
prewar levels. The primary source of this bonanza was powder sold to the
Allies for one dollar per pound, or approximately twice the prewar rate. When
the United States became a belligerent, the price of powder dropped markedly.
Benefiting from the heavy investment in new production facilities, Du Pont
was able to cut its prices to 51.34 per pound in May 1917 and to 43-46(1 in 1918.
Du Pont prices were about the same as those charged by government arsenals
and well below those of its competitors. This was no small achievement, con-
sidering that the price of cotton rose by two-and-a-half times during this
period. As a consequence, the net taxable income of the Du Pont Company
dropped precipitously. Taxable income, which was swollen by prewar sales, had
been $127 million in 1916, but it fell to $78 million in 1917 and $13 million in
1918. Even so, this represented a handsome yield in relation to the untaxed
prewar rate of about $5.26 million per year. From the point of view of the Du
Pont family, by halving their prices they had demonstrated their patriotism
amply. Irenee du Pont would later claim, inaccurately, that "we did not make
any profit during the war and paid more in taxes than we made in profits."109
From the point of view of Du Pont's critics, nevertheless, these returns were ir-
responsibly lavish.
To further complicate the issue, the Du Pont firm became engaged in a
bitter dispute with Secretary of War Newton Baker over the cost of plant ex-
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pansion. In 1917 the total U.S. capacity for the manufacture of powder was 480
million pounds, which was far below the expected need for 1919 of more than
600 million pounds. Plainly, new factories were necessary, and Du Pont pro-
posed to build a huge new powder works with a capacity of one million
pounds per day. This facility would cost $90 million, and it would become
government property. Baker and Du Pont were unable to agree on an appro-
priate fee for building the factory, and their disagreement caused a three-
month delay. Ultimately, the government decided to build two powder plants,
one constructed by Du Pont and one by the Thompson-Starrett Company at
Nitro, West Virginia. The latter firm was inexperienced in powder production,
forcing it to rely on Du Pont designs for the new works. Du Pont graciously
provided assistance to its competitor, but even so the Du Pont factory was
completed before its rival. By the time the Nitro works were finished, Germany
had surrendered, and there was no need for the plant.110
The controversy that swirled around the Du Pont firm summarized the
defining themes of war profiteering during World War I. Du Pont was an east-
ern firm and therefore subject to western prejudices. It had earlier been con-
victed of violating federal antitrust laws, so its reputation was tarnished even
before the war began. Its leading product, explosives, seemed at casual inspec-
tion to be destructive material rather than useful merchandise. The peculiar
combination of Allied need and the German submarine blockade allowed Du
Pont to reap enormous profits, and these gains had little if anything to do with
the foresight of the company's managers, who nevertheless bathed in unseemly
affluence. To many people, this newfound wealth was neither earned nor de-
served.
Like other American manufacturers, Du Pont had charged foreign govern-
ments more for munitions than it charged American buyers, at least until
the United States became a co-belligerent. Most of the Du Pont profits,
therefore, were earned prior to American entry into the conflict. (For con-
structing five munitions factories for the U.S. government during the war, the
Du Pont Company's net profit was modest—only .34 percent of the cost.)111
Nevertheless, Du Pont had gained great wealth from the war, and it seemed
reasonable to persons who did not distinguish between prewar profit and
wartime profit that the firm must have yearned for war in order to fatten its
earnings. When the firm became embroiled in controversy over how to build
new production facilities, its reputation worsened. No longer merely the grasp-
ing "Powder Trust," Du Pont's name was now reviled as a bringer of war and a
bloated scavenger that had gorged while patriots suffered. In the bitter after-
glow of what was sarcastically termed the "war to end wars," Du Pont's
achievements and its generosities would seldom be remembered. Its ample
gains would seldom be forgotten.

8Grave Objections
I can vision the ideal Republic . . . where we may call to universal service every
plant, agency, or facility, all in the sublime sacrifice for country, and not one penny
of war profit shall inure to the benefit of private individual, corporation, or com-
bination.
WARREN G. HARDING, INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1921)
The great Armistice Day celebration of 1918 granted only a brief respite from
the war profiteering controversy. The mobilization of the American economy
for the Great War was a monumental task, and when Germany unexpectedly
surrendered, production was racing at full speed. The nation had paid too little
attention to preparedness until it was nearly too late, and it gave no attention
to the problems of reconversion until the war ended. Just as the United States
had never before simultaneously undertaken building projects as extensive as
the war demanded, it had also never attempted a smooth reconversion. The
process of returning to civilian production proved to be difficult and demand-
ing. Old antagonisms that had been largely set aside for the duration of the
war reemerged among the unsettled economic conditions that followed the
Armistice.
The perennial war profiteering dispute appeared in several new forms in
the postwar decade. Besides the immediate questions of who should gain and
who should lose as a result of the sectoral shifts associated with demobiliza-
tion, the legacy of the wartime profits dispute forced its way into the
Republican politics of the New Era, the decadelong quest for an effective arms
control policy, and even into the literary imagination of Jazz Age culture. The
postwar generation hoped to obliterate the scourge of war by legal action (the
Kellogg-Briand Pact), by parliamentary debate (the League of Nations), by
arms reduction (the Washington Naval Treaty), and not least of all by elimi-
nating war profit. As Herbert Hoover, who as much as anyone personified New
Era culture, said in 1924, "The more evident it is that the whole nation will be
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put in the storm and made to bear its share of sacrifice, the less likely we will be
to go to war."1 The crusade against profiteering became a prime example of the
persistence of the Progressive voice in the 1920s and the 1930s.
The first profiteering issue of the 1920s was far less lofty and far more tan-
gible than the larger question of eliminating war. It was the disposal of surplus
military supplies. In late 1918 the cancellation of war contracts produced a na-
tional inventory imbalance. The United States government had become the
possessor of vast supplies of military commodities. Disposal of these supplies
would test the nation's ability to maintain the wartime cooperation between
the government and business. The idea of building a cooperative state in the
1920s that would replace the friction which marked business-government rela-
tions during the Progressive era has become known as associationalism.2 Ex-
ponents of associationalism would find the problem of controlling war profits
as thorny as had the Progressives.
Many of the surplus military articles had considerable value on the civil-
ian market. Others were of lesser utility or nearly worthless, and there was
ample room for disagreement as to which were of use and which were not. The
government had little notion as to how to dispose of its vast holdings effi-
ciently. Should it simply flood the market with surplus commodities, or should
it withhold some of its inventory in hopes of obtaining a better price? Should
it sell its supplies on the wholesale market, or should it attempt to establish
retail outlets? Whichever choice it made, some would gain and others would
lose. As always, opinions differed on who deserved to benefit from the sale and
who did not. One resentful doughboy saw fraud afoot: "The men whose chief
object in the war remained, the traitor, the crook, the grafter, the profiteer, all
those who had a covetous eye upon the teeming warehouses that Uncle Sam
was to empty."3
As in the wartime period, copper was again a centerpiece of the debate.
On Armistice Day in 1918, the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps had on hand an in-
ventory of 100 million pounds of copper. This was the equivalent of one
month's supply for the entire domestic market at prewar production levels. If
the government sold this supply quickly, the price of copper would plummet.
Since wage rates in western mining towns were linked to the price of copper,
wage cuts would follow price cuts, and strikes would be highly probable. At the
request of the copper producers, the government agreed to parcel out its
copper holdings at a rate of five million pounds per month. The metal would
not be sold on the open market but would be sold back to the copper produc-
ers. This would allegedly protect the government's interest by ensuring a good
price, and at the same time it would protect the copper miners from wage re-
ductions and the copper producers from depressed profits.
The problem with this plan was that copper was a highly concentrated in-
dustry. The transaction was handled by the Guggenheim-dominated United
Metals Selling Company, and by using that firm the government was strength-
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ening an anticompetitive practice.4 The copper firms had benefited greatly by
the unusually heavy demands of the preparedness period, and it was unclear to
many why the government should help to preserve these monopolistic gains
by protecting the copper firms from the vagaries of the peacetime period.
Since the government also owned 50 percent of the total American supply of
platinum, which it sold promptly at the market price, and since it did not dally
in disposing of its inventories of lead, brass, antimony, tin, or steel,5 the policy
of delayed disposal appeared to Progressives to represent preferential treat-
ment for both copper miners and copper monopolists.
Delayed disposal was also the pattern followed in the leather industry, to
the great dismay of farmers who anticipated an opportunity to purchase har-
nesses cheaply. The quarrel over leather disposal originated during the early
part of the war. The Council of National Defense organized two committees to
coordinate the army's purchasing of leather goods. One of these had control
over shoes, and the other supervised other leather equipment. Both commit-
tees were made up of executives of the leather industry, who fixed prices and
assigned contracts. There was no competitive bidding, although huge amounts
of leather products were purchased. The army took delivery of 32 million pairs
of shoes, or nearly ten pairs for each soldier. The service also received 500,326
sets of double harness and 110,828 sets of single harness, although it owned
only 580,182 work horses and of these only 67,948 were sent overseas and an-
other 96,000 died. Procurement officers also purchased 945,000 saddles, 2.85
million halters, and 585,615 saddlebags, although the army owned only 86,418
cavalry horses. Army horses ate well, too; the army bought 2,033,204 nose bags
during the war, which was roughly four bags for each horse! Indeed, the only
limitation on the amount of leather products purchased was a shortage of
hides; there were enough outstanding orders at the close of the war to have
consumed 300,000 more hides than were available.6
When the war ended, this huge inventory of new harness owned by the
army threatened to ravage the leather industry if it came on the market.
Because leather executives were strategically placed to influence the process
of demobilization, they moved decisively to prevent a glutting of the market.
The key individuals were Colonel George B. Goetz and Major Joseph C. Byron.
Both Goetz and Byron had been prominent leather executives before the war
but had enlisted in the army in order to coordinate its leather purchasing. (In
addition to his salary as an army colonel, Goetz drew a retainer of $100 per
month from his former employer throughout his military service; he was a
"dollar-a-year man" in reverse.)7
Goetz and Byron took active steps to thwart the sale of military harness.
Their first step was to hinder its availability for sale by the Surplus Property
Division. This was accomplished by simply refusing to certify that most of the
harness was unneeded. To convince surplus property officers that the rest had
no market value, Goetz and Byron kept a mud-splattered set of harness in
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their office to demonstrate its worthlessness as surplus. A third approach was
an attempt to dump the government leather on the world market; all U.S. mili-
tary attaches were ordered to try to find buyers, but none could be found. The
real purpose behind these steps was revealed when a transcript of an address
by Colonel Goetz to a convention of tanners in Chicago was published. "I have
been very much disturbed," Goetz lamented,".. .that some speculator should
get hold of the material... and go and dump it in some one man's territory,
maybe ruin his business for five years, so that what we are aiming to do is to
pass this buck back to the consumer . . . and to spread it thin over the country,
not dump it all in one man's territory."8
In order to "spread it thin," Goetz and Byron resigned their army commis-
sions and organized a new firm, the U.S. Harness Company. This company was
capitalized at $170,000, based on contributions of $10,000 from seventeen
leather manufacturers. The U.S. Harness Company was to purchase the sur-
plus harness, recondition it for civilian use (charging the customers a commis-
sion of 40 percent of the price), and resell it gradually to civilians so that the
stability of the market was preserved.9 Not only would no individual manufac-
turer suffer from a glutted market, but also the informal division of the market
would be preserved against the threat of a rash of competition. Commercial
self-protection through delayed disposal could also prove to be a profitable
sideline.10
The actions of the leather executives in seeking to hold the harness off the
civilian market aroused the ire of the nation's farmers, who were its principal
purchasers. Farmers, not coincidentally, were among the chief critics of Ameri-
can mobilization for the war, and the farm economy had been heavily dam-
aged in the postwar period. Farm belt congressmen complained, and when
President Warren G. Harding learned of the matter, he canceled the contract
between the army and the United States Harness Company by executive order.
Harding's order was roundly applauded by the leaders of the American Legion,
the newly formed and highly vocal organ of the millions of veterans of the
American Expeditionary Force."
The farmers and veterans were not fully appeased, and the recriminations
continued. In 1923 the Justice Department indicted Goetz and seven others for
conspiracy to defraud the government. At their trial in 1924 the leather execu-
tives presented a letter from former secretary of war Newton Baker showing
that he had approved their plans. The presiding federal judge then directed a
verdict of not guilty. Although the defendants avoided conviction, the damage
to their business was permanent. During the immediate postwar years, the
leather business became the least profitable industry in the United States,
showing an average annual loss of 5.4 percent per firm. Delayed disposal, like
other associationalist policies, failed when it ran afoul of such powerful inter-
est groups as farmers and veterans.12
Samuel F. Colt (1814-1862), founder of the Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, was
the first American armsmaker to become a millionaire. Colt made his reputation during the
Mexican War as the manufacturer of the highly regarded "Walker Colt" revolver. Although raised
in New England, Colt hated abolitionists, and during the 1850s he sold guns indiscriminately to
both Northerners and Southerners. Three days after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter in
1861, Colt shipped his last order of five hundred guns to Richmond in boxes marked "hardware."
Shrewdly perceiving that projections of a short war were wildly mistaken, he tooled up for a five-
year conflict. Earnings of the Colt firm quadrupled from $237,000 a year to more than a million
(courtesy Connecticut Historical Society).
(Above) Samuel F. Colt built his mansion in Hartford, Connecticut, and named it Armsmear. Upon
his death, his holdings in the company that bore his name were worth about $2 million, and his
entire estate was appraised at $3.2 million, an enormous sum for 1862. After the Civil War, earnings
of the firm declined, but World War I brought new prosperity. By then a manufacturer of machine
guns as well as pistols, the net income of the Colt firm soared from $322,930 in 1911 to $5,797,794
in 1917, a nearly eighteen-fold increase (courtesy Connecticut Historical Society). (Below) Every
military conflict brings a shift in production, and for a nimble investor this reorientation offers
tempting opportunities. At the beginning of World War I frenzied buying drove defense stocks
skyward. The price of Colt's Fire Arms stock, for example, rose from a low of $160 a share in 1914
to a high of $940 in 1915. As this late 1915 scene reveals, some Wall Street clerks were so busy
filling orders that they had to sleep in their offices in order to meet the demand. Great gains were
indeed possible: five days before the U.S. war declaration in 1917, the Colt firm declared a dividend
of $75 per share, then split its stock eight for one (Current Opinion, December 1915).
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(Right) Marcellus Hartley Dodge (1881-1963) was a
grandson of Marcellus Hartley (1828-1902), the Union's
arms agent during the Civil War. Hartley, the founder of
the Union Metallic Cartridge Company, held interests in
fourteen other firms, and upon his death left to his
grandson, then twenty-six, an estate valued at $60 million.
In 1915 Marcellus Hartley Dodge controlled the Remington
Arms Company, the leading American manufacturer of
small arms, and this position enabled him to obtain a
contract to produce the Lee-Enfield rifle for the British
Army. With only this contract as an asset, Dodge organized
the Midvale Steel and Ordnance Company, whose stock
offering attracted investors in great numbers. Within a few
days Dodge sold out his Midvale position, realizing a capital
gain of $24 million (courtesy Remington Arms Company).
(Below) Eugene G. Grace (1877-1960), president of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the nation's leading
shipbuilder. Grace became a figure of controversy because of his gains during World War I. Although
underpaid for his position, his prewar base salary was only twelve thousand dollars. Nevertheless, he
received bonuses of $1,501,532 in 1917 and $1,386,193 in 1918—probably the largest single wartime
wage increase ever recorded in American history. Evidently undaunted by criticism of his
accumulations during the first war, when World War II stimulated steel sales Grace nearly doubled
his salary from $272,224 in 1939 to $537,724 in 1941. This was the fourth largest salary in the United
States. Grace's personal share represented 35 percent of the total increase in salaries paid to the sixteen
top officers of Bethlehem Steel in 1941 (courtesy Bethlehem Steel Corporation).
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Harold Gray, an angry former doughboy turned cartoonist, drew the immensely successful comic
strip "Little Orphan Annie." A principal character was a guilt-stricken war millionaire, Oliver
"Daddy" Warbucks, who converted a small machine shop into a very profitable munitions plant.
Annie and "Daddy" appeared in 345 newspapers having a daily circulation of sixteen million
copies.
TWO KINDS OF AMERICANS.
—Kirby in the New York World.
ARE YOU THIS KIND OF PATRIOT?
—Morris inthe Sacramento Bee.
Copyrighted by the New York Tribune Association.
OUT OF THE WEST.
—Darling in the New York Tribune.
OUR MODERN PAUL REVERE.
—Fitzpatrick in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
Profiteering has appeared almost unfailingly as a political issue during wartime. In "Are You This
Kind of Patriot?" and "Two Kinds of Americans" (both 1917), a sharp contrast is drawn between
the sacrifice of the wounded at the front and home-front gains based on fraud and greed. In "Out
of the West" (1917) and "Our Modern Paul Revere" (1929), political cartoonists employ a porcine
metaphor.
In the 1920s Edwin A. Link (1904-1981) (above) and his brother George T. Link (1897-1979)
(below) of Binghamton, New York, invented the Link trainer or "Blue Box," a full-scale, working
model cockpit used to train student pilots to fly by instruments. The Link trainer drew limited
interest from the Army Air Corps until World War II, when the company's employment rolls
expanded to fifty times its prewar figure. The Link brothers, whose salaries were but $ 12,000 and
$ 15,000 in 1939, multiplied their salaries sixfold in 1941 to $72,000 and $90,000. Royalties paid on
their jointly held patent rose from $87,000 in 1939 to $ 1,179,000 in 1941. In 1941 Edwin A. Link's
net income of $849,976 was the seventy-fourth largest in the United States. In 1942 the firm paid
salary bonuses to its employees in the amount of $352,000 (courtesy Edwin A. Link Archive,
Roberson Museum and Science Center, Binghamton, New York).
(Above) Speaking for millions of aggrieved doughboys, during the 1920s the American Legion
championed a scheme of "taking the profit out of war." The Legion claimed that if its plan had
been adopted beforehand, the Great War would have been shortened by six months and its costs
reduced by $10 billion. In this artistic rendition of the principle, Mars calls to service and demands
equal sacrifice from every able-bodied man: soldier, sailor, businessman, farmer, and laborer.
Significantly, the God of War fixes his gaze upon a desk-bound executive (American Legion Weekly,
September 29,1922).
(Right) Robert E. Gross (1897-1961),
president, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.
As defense spending rose in anticipation
of American entry into World War II,
Lockheed sales skyrocketed, largely
because of the success of its high-perfor-
mance fighter, the P-38 Lightning. Gross's
salary escalated from $27,400 in 1939 to
$125,000 in 1941, an increase of 456
percent. Lockheed thrived during the early
years of the cold war, and when Gross died
the firm he had purchased for $40,000 in
1932 had assets of $532 million (courtesy
Lockheed Martin Corporation).
(Right) Glenn L.Martin (1886-
1955), president, Glenn L.
Martin Corporation, Santa
Ana, California. Martin was a
pioneering designer and man-
ufacturer of light bombers,
including the B-26 Marauder
of World War II. His salary
rose from $33,970 in 1939 to
$60,260 in 1941, an increase of
11 percent. Martin's net in-
come in 1941, $779,476, was
the eighty-ninth largest in the
United States. Upon his death
his estate was appraised at
$14.3 million (courtesy Lock-
heed Martin Corporation).
(Right) Reuben H. Fleet (1887-1975), founder and
president, Consolidated Aircraft Corporation. On
the eve of World War II, his firm produced one of
only two American four-engine heavy bombers, the
B-24 Liberator. Consolidated also made the only
long-range flying boats then in production, the
twin-engine PBY Catalina and the four-engine
PB2Y Coronado. From 1939 to 1941 the Consoli-
dated payroll increased from 1,500 to more than
30,000 workers, and Fleet's salary more than tripled,
rising from $20,000 to $62,500. Army and Navy
leaders distrusted Fleet's autocratic managerial style,
and they encouraged him to sell his interest in the
firm. Anticipating rising tax rates and anxious to
spend time with his young new wife, he did so in
1942, receiving nearly $11 million for his share,
including a dividend of $880,000. Fleet's income for
1941 was the fourth largest in the United States.
With the blessing of the Roosevelt admin-istration,
Fleet's replacement was Tom Girdler, chief executive
officer of the Republic Steel Corporation, whose
superb managerial skills were rivaled only by his
bitter enmity toward the New Deal (courtesy San
Diego Historical Society, Photograph Collection).
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The government's policy of delayed disposal did not entirely work against
agricultural interests, however. The Quartermaster Corps possessed an inven-
tory of $10 million worth of canned vegetables, and the National Canners'
Association prevailed on the quartermaster general, R. E. Wood, to withhold
this stock from public sale in order to support vegetable prices. Since food
prices had risen significantly during the war, consumers understandably dis-
puted this decision. Similarly, representatives of the lumber industry were
afraid that the army would dump surplus lumber on the civilian market. They
warned that this would force the closure of lumber mills. Reminding the
nation of the radicalism of the lumberjacks, the mill owners warned that such
a shutdown would lead to mass unemployment "and probably bolshevism."
Although local lumberyards clamored for the early release of the surplus, in
the worried days of the Red Scare of 1919-20, the government did not wish to
risk labor trouble. In 1922, when the threat of Bolshevik violence seemed less
imminent, eleven lumber executives were charged with conspiring to defraud
the government by failing to use due diligence in disposal of surplus lumber.13
The army's disposal methods attracted scrutiny for several other reasons.
The Holt Manufacturing Company, the parent of the Caterpillar Tractor Corpo-
ration, had successfully inserted in its contract to furnish 2,000 military trac-
tors a clause that would have prevented the sale of these tractors as war sur-
plus. Despite the illegality of this clause, the Ordnance Corps officer in charge
accepted its inclusion. There were several other industries in which the army
sold its inventory back to the manufacturers. These included mosquito bars,
canvas duck, and cigarettes. In the latter case, the army discovered that it
owned 12 million packages of Camel brand cigarettes. It sold these back to the
R. J. Reynolds Company at 6.33^ per package, only to find that it had underes-
timated its requirements by 2.5 million packages. The army then had to repur-
chase these cigarettes from the firm at a profit of 2<t per package.14
The process of disposing of surplus airplanes unveiled new issues that pro-
duced misunderstanding. The army sold as surplus 4,608 aircraft engines and
2,716 training aircraft. The sale of these items brought a return of $2.72 mil-
lion, which was only 13 percent of the manufacturing cost of $20.8 million.
Most of the planes were sold back to the manufacturer, the Curtiss Aeroplane
and Motor Company, at vastly reduced prices. One type of plane, the Curtiss
J-i, had cost the government $4,250 each but brought only $200 as returned
merchandise. The other, the famous Curtiss JN-4 Jenny, had cost $4,000 but
again brought only $200 on the postwar market. Many prospective airplane
buyers hoped to obtain these craft directly from the air service at firesale
prices. They objected to the government returning the planes to the manufac-
turer, which would boost the price before the planes were made available to the
public. The army rightfully refused to sell directly to civilians because it was
afraid that the planes might be in a dangerous state of disrepair. By selling the
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planes wholesale, the army could ensure that the planes were reconditioned
before being placed on the civilian market. The disappointed civilian aviators
suspected a conspiracy to prop up prices.15
After the war, the United States government found itself the owner of
factories of potentially immense commercial value. The army held title to
a huge new smokeless powder plant at Old Hickory, Tennessee, which had
been built by the Du Pont Company at a cost of $83 million. Unfortunately,
there was little or no commercial market for this product, and the army had
to sell the plant for a fraction of its price. The director of sales of the War
Department, Ernest C. Morse, agreed to sell the Old Hickory facility to the
Nashville Industrial Corporation for $3.5 million. Although this bid was nomi-
nally the highest, the sales contract contained certain provisions that reduced
its value. Accordingly, Morse was indicted by a grand jury for fraud. Aug-
menting wealth by the acquisition of factories at bargain-basement prices was
a new and highly controversial form of profiteering.16
The demobilization period also brought forth a new round of charges of
profiteering by the provision of goods of substandard quality. The most conse-
quential of these charges concerned the sale of rotten fish to the army. The
summer of 1918 was unusually hot in Alaska, leading to the spoilage of about
five million cans of salmon or 22 percent of the pack. The War Department
subsequently forced the return of the tainted fish, recovering about $8,600,000
from the canners. Although a congressional committee investigated the inci-
dent, it was never able to determine conclusively whether the canning compa-
nies knew of the spoilage when the product was delivered. The Republican
majority, sensing an opportunity to damage a Democratic administration,
condemned the War Department for mishandling the purchase. Wilson's sup-
porters, on the other hand, praised the military for discovering the spoilage
and recovering the funds. The Democrats pointed out that the bad salmon
never reached the doughboys, and they reminded the public of the "embalmed
beef" scandal of the Spanish-American War, in which tainted beef had actually
been served to the troops during a war managed by Republicans.17
Charges of bad products added fuel to the heated complaints of farmers
about the management of the army's horses. The Henry Moss Company had
supplied many of the army's branding irons, and it was discovered that these
irons were adulterated with aluminum and zinc. This fact disclosed that the
supplier had used scrap copper instead of pure copper in making the imple-
ments, and the presence of these impurities meant that the irons had no resale
value whatsoever, even as scrap. Although this incident was minor in itself,
some saw it as another facet of a broad conspiracy to defraud the American
public through equipment of degraded quality.18
The complexity of the modern industrial economy was seldom so well il-
lustrated as in the process of settling outstanding war contracts that were in-
terrupted by the Armistice. Claims presented by contractors due to suspended
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defense contracts were adjudicated by the War Department's Claims Board,
which was the province of the assistant secretary of war, Benedict Crowell.
A debate developed within the government as to how carefully these claims
should be examined. The army preferred to settle outstanding claims promp-
tly, even if that meant generously, because to delay settlement until a careful
review was possible would be administratively difficult. Key witnesses would
disappear, and often the officers who were knowledgeable about the details of
contracts, particularly verbal contracts, would leave the service. Accordingly,
the army spent little time scrutinizing contractors' claims. By September 1919,
less than a year after the Armistice, Major General George W. Burr, the director
of purchase, storage, and traffic, testified that his office had already processed
24,000 claims for settlement of informal contracts. The army had about 30,000
"accountants and others" in the field to investigate the claims, and about 92
percent of the claims were approved.19
The army's haste at settling these claims kindled political opposition.
One charge was that Secretary Crowell had approved contractors' claims at the
rate of $35 million per day. Reacting to congressional and public criticism,
the army commenced a supplementary review of the process. This review
stretched into years, and its continuation provided an ongoing supply of fuel
for the critics. By 1922, Brigadier General Kenzie W. Walker, the chief of finance
of the army, reported that 17,000 contracts out of a total of 150,000 had been
audited. General Walker estimated that $46 million was due to the govern-
ment, but that only $15,138,000 had been collected. The War Department was
endeavoring to collect the remaining $26 million; of this amount, $4.4 million
in claims had been turned over to the Justice Department in hopes of recover-
ing the funds by litigation.20
These audits produced some substantial, although disputed, charges of
profiteering. One government auditor testified to a congressional committee
that he disallowed about fifteen to twenty claims a month, saving an average of
$500,000 during each period. The largest such disputes were in the aircraft in-
dustry, where wartime results had been highly disappointing. The chief of the
air service, Major General Charles T. Menoher, told President Harding's secre-
tary of war, John W. Weeks, that after auditing only six contracts he had found
$16 million in overcharges and asked for authority to expand the audit.
Eighteen months later, General Menoher reported that after auditing thir-
teen contracts he recommended the recovery of $28.9 million. The largest
claims for repayment were against the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company, for
$2,555,000, the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, for $4,706,000, and the
Lincoln Motor Company, for $9,188,561. The sheer size of these figures con-
vinced some of the accuracy of the charges of profiteering.21
In seeking to recover profits from war contracts, Justice Department
lawyers advanced an imaginative new concept of profiteering control. The
government admitted that it had signed binding contracts for the production
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of war materiel, but it now claimed that these contracts could be voided
retroactively. The grounds for such a suit were that contracts which produced
a profit defined as "extortionate" were not enforceable against the govern-
ment.
The test case for this concept was the Liberty motor contracts held by
the Packard Motor Car Company. The various Packard contracts had cost the
government $40.8 million, of which $28.9 million represented manufacturing
costs and $11.4 million were profit to the contractor, a margin of 39.4 percent.
After dispatching a corps of forty auditors to the Packard plant, the govern-
ment sought to recover $6.58 million of these "extortionate profits." This
would reduce the profit margin to 11.76 percent. Packard objected to the de-
scription of these profits as lavish, arguing that the firm's profits for the three
years of the Liberty engine contract were below those for the last prewar year
and the first postwar year. Packard also noted that it had been required to
accept a flat-price contract at $4,000 per motor, although it had requested a
cost-plus arrangement. The cost-plus contract that Packard preferred would
actually have yielded a profit that would have been $2,311,511 less than the
army's fixed fee system.22 The courts ruled in favor of Packard. In most such
instances, compromise solutions were found, with the companies usually re-
turning part of the payments.23 These compromises offered alluring opportu-
nities for the critics of military procurement to practice their trade, and they
seldom overlooked them. The performance of the Harding administration
presented many more such openings.
The profiteering issue became intricately entwined in postwar politics. In
1919 the Republican-controlled Congress launched several wide-ranging inves-
tigations that scored the Wilson administration for allegedly excessive spend-
ing and other mismanagement of weapons procurement.24 In their successful
presidential election campaign of 1920, the Republicans charged further that
the Democrats had failed to enforce laws that could have limited profiteering.
President Warren G. Harding, in a successful attempt to win the support of the
millions of former doughboys, promised to pursue the profiteers.
In his inaugural address in 1921, Harding deplored how the war had "un-
covered our portion of hateful selfishness at home." He added nobly but unre-
alistically that "if... war is again forced upon us . . . I can vision the ideal re-
public .. . where we may call to universal service every plant, agency, or facility,
all in the sublime sacrifice for country, and not one penny of war profit shall
inure to the benefit of private individual, corporation, or combination. . . .
There is something inherently wrong, something out of accord with the ideals
of representative democracy, when one portion of our citizenship turns its ac-
tivities to private gain amid defensive war while another is fighting, sacrificing,
or dying for national preservation." Harding called for "universal service" in
the next war so that there would be "no swollen fortunes to flout the sacrifices
of our soldiers."25 The new president's words perfectly described the hopes of
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the antiprofiteering forces for the next two decades. The performance of his
administration illustrated well the difficulty of achieving them.
Despite his brief tenure in office, Warren G. Harding denounced profiteer-
ing on many occasions. "In all the wars of all time," Harding grandiloquently
proclaimed at Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day in 1923, "the
conscienceless profiteer has put the black blot of greed upon righteous sac-
rifice and highly proposed conflict." However, the president promised a
Montana audience, "If war must come again—and God grant that it shall
not—then we must draft all of the Nation It will be righteous and just...
if we draft all of capital, all of industry, all of agriculture, all of commerce
When we do that, there will be less of war. When we do that, the contest will be
aglow with unsullied patriotism, untouched by profiteering in any service."26
Although Warren Harding yielded to few others in his eagerness to de-
nounce profiteering, the performance of his administration was considerably
less stirring than his rhetoric. The pursuit of profiteers became the bailiwick of
his attorney general, Harry M. Daugherty, who might have been a good choice
as he had denounced the Wilson administration for failing to investigate profi-
teering. But Daugherty proved to have little stomach for the task, although the
reasons for his timidity remain obscure. In part, Daugherty believed that the
squabbles of the war years should be laid to rest, and in part he believed that to
prosecute defense contractors aggressively would hamper recovery from the
business depression that struck the nation in 1921. He also had secret reasons
for delaying prosecution. "There are many things which I cannot talk about,
and may never be able to talk about, which interfered with the work we have
on hand," Daugherty wrote cryptically to a dissatisfied congressman.27
Nevertheless, Daugherty's foot-dragging angered congressional supporters
of the returned veterans. Two were known for their unswerving loyalty to the
political agenda of the American Legion, Royall D. Johnson of South Dakota
and Roy O. Woodruff of Michigan. Johnson once declared, "I came back
from France from a combat unit about two-thirds bolshevist myself." In
what became identified as the "Woodruff-Harding controversy," Johnson and
Woodruff called for Daugherty's impeachment and removal from office.
Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor echoed the veterans'
demands. Reacting to the criticism, the attorney general agreed to expedite
prosecution. In 1922 Daugherty obtained an appropriation of $500,000 to in-
vestigate 276 cases of profiteering, having a maximum potential recovery value
of $192 million. Johnson and Woodruff considered the half-million dollar sum
to be hopelessly inadequate, an election year ploy intended to head off a truly
effective investigation. Nevertheless, the Justice Department established a War
Transactions section that operated through 1926, pursuing profiteers. By 1923
the total of excess profits recovered was only about $4.4 million, and only
seven profiteers had been indicted (one pleading guilty). These sums were far
too meager to satisfy the indignant doughboys.28
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The investigation continued until 1926. The collection of claims was af-
flicted by weak evidence due to the passage of time and by the financial insta-
bility of companies suffering from the postwar economic depression. Perhaps
more serious yet, it suffered from a serious conceptual problem, the perennial
difficulty of defining profiteering. "The line of demarcation between a bad
bargain and an unconscionable sale is most difficult to draw," mused one in-
vestigator in 1924. "It is hard to better the general rule laid down in the leading
case, which defines unconscionable consideration as 'that which shocks the
conscience of the chancellor.' But such definition is most elusive when one
seeks to apply it to a particular case."29
The results of the two and a half years of the War Transactions Section's
work were meager. Of 25,000 total settlements entered into by the Army
Ordnance Corps, the Section selected 3,600 for careful scrutiny. Of this group
it chose 407 cases to consider for civil action. In eighty-five of these, the prose-
cutors decided the government had "no case." Forty-nine claims were compro-
mised, twenty-five were deemed uncollectible, and in forty-four the con-
tractors paid in full. Six cases were selected for criminal prosecution, resulting
in four verdicts of "not guilty" and two convictions.30
The war frauds inquiry had even less success when it looked into the con-
struction of cantonments, which had been the source of great wartime contro-
versy. The Justice Department had serious doubts about reopening the can-
tonment dispute, but did so as the result of congressional pressure. Justice
agents considered prosecution of the contractors who had built Camps Grant,
Sherman, and Pike, but in each instance they decided against further action.31
In 1926 the legal attack on profiteers concluded when its director happily an-
nounced that he could find only a "few instances of deliberate attempt to cheat
and defraud the government."32
This could not be said of the Harding administration, which was renowned
for its corruption, and the infamous Harding scandals involved the war profits
issue in at least two incidents. Charles Hayden, a partner in the brokerage firm
of Hayden, Stone and Company, wrote to Harding's secretary of war, John
Weeks, to ask that something be done to "inspire confidence in a legitimate
way" in order to bolster the stock market. Translated, Hayden hoped that
Weeks would expedite an unpaid claim by the Wright-Martin Aircraft
Company, of which Hayden was a director, for payment of $5.3 million for
making aircraft engines. Weeks told Hayden to ask the air service for the
money and hinted that if the army declined he would overrule it. Weeks may
have acted improperly, but he was not indicted when the Harding scandals
were prosecuted.33
A more serious matter concerned the attorney general himself. The
Japanese-owned firm of Mitsui and Company controlled two American firms,
the Standard Aircraft Company and the Standard Aero Company, through
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Mitsui's American agent, Henry Mingel. These companies received payments
during the war of $16.4 million, of which they could not account for $9.9 mil-
lion. The War Department asked Attorney General Daugherty to attempt to
recover $2.3 million of this. The Mitsui firm evidently attempted to evade pay-
ment by bribery. Gaston Means, a shadowy figure with a criminal record,
claimed that he acted as the intermediary between Mitsui and Daugherty.
According to the dubious Means account, he waited in a room in the Bellevue
Hotel in Washington until a Japanese representative handed him $100,000
in thousand dollar bills. Means claimed that he then gave the money to
Daugherty's agent, the scandal-plagued Jess Smith. The Justice Depart-
ment dropped the case against Mitsui, possibly as a result of bribery. Although
the details of this incident have never become fully known (Mingel was later
found dead and Smith committed suicide), the odor of corruption was strong
enough to leave the process of defense procurement permanently fouled.
Oswald Garrison Villard, who had professed the Merchants of Death theory a
decade earlier, now declared that "the postwar disposal of surplus army sup-
plies has oozed corruption and dripped mire."34
A far more sweeping decision by President Harding himself greatly inten-
sified the profiteering controversy. Beginning in 1920, the veterans of the
American Expeditionary Force began demanding additional compensation for
their war service. Officially known as the Adjusted Compensation Bill, this
plan was commonly known as the veterans' bonus or just "the bonus." The
American Legion was the most vocal supporter of this scheme, which in
theory would even out the economic sacrifice of the war. The Legionnaires
argued correctly that army privates had been drafted to serve for a nominal
wage of a dollar per day, while civilian workers had been allowed to earn
market wages, which were considerably higher. The Legion demanded that
each veteran receive an additional payment of a dollar per day of military ser-
vice, rising to $1.25 per day for overseas service. In 1922 the Congress approved
the bonus and sent it to President Harding for his signature.35
Harding was advised by his secretary of the treasury, Andrew Mellon, one
of the richest men in America, that he should veto the veterans' bonus. Mellon
argued that the $80 million cost of the plan was more than the United States
could afford. Mellon was supported in his opposition by the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Wall Street Journal, and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, which orchestrated the antibonus campaign. Further opposition
came from an organization called the "Ex-Service Men's Anti-Bonus League."
This group was bankrolled by prominent New York business executives who
feared that passage of the bonus would delay repeal of the heavy war taxes. The
American people were thus presented with the spectacle of ex-servicemen
being denied a bonus by business executives who, while exempt from military
service themselves, had spent the war years comfortably, safely, and in some
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cases profitably. Torn between his antiprofiteering rhetoric and his friendship
for business interests, Harding chose the latter. He vetoed the bonus, and the
Senate upheld his veto by a narrow four-vote margin.36
Infuriated by its loss, the American Legion intensified its campaign against
war profiteering, and the bonus matter became an issue in the congressional
elections of 1922. Four leading opponents of the bonus were defeated in sena-
torial campaigns. Of twenty-one new senators elected in 1922, eighteen were
pro-bonus and three were opposed. When the bonus was reintroduced in the
next Congress, it passed easily. Continuing Harding's opposition, President
Calvin Coolidge vetoed the bill, but this time Congress overrode the veto.
By 1924 a general reappraisal of the Great War was in progress. The cultural
ambience of the 1920s has been described as disillusioned, cynical, and embit-
tered, and this mood permeated its flourishing literature. At first, the theme of
wartime profiteering seldom appeared in the literature, as the early writers of
the Lost Generation preferred shocking portraits of the horrors of trench war-
fare.37 But by 1924 the war profiteering issue was creeping into the literary
imagination.
Two major literary works published in 1924 drew attention to the profiteer-
ing issue. The first was Laurence Stallings's novel, Plumes. As a marine lieu-
tenant, Stallings had been machine gunned at Belleau Wood. He had spent two
years in hospitals in agonizing pain before his right leg was finally amputated.
"The Plumes have been in this country two hundred and fifty years," Stallings
wrote, "and not one of them was ever worth as much as $25,000. 'Not one
of them,' said Richard, sometime after the Harding inaugural, 'had anything
to go to war about.'" Stallings caustically called the home front the "blood-
money hearthside." He angrily described how civilians had inquired about his
wounds. '"Did it hurt?' the blood-money hearthside asked the returning patri-
ots. And the patriots . . . shouted 'Naw!'" Stallings summed up a generation's
jaundiced view of the war when he said that "war is economic—political...
the suckers who die are the least of considerations . . . and there will always be
plenty of suckers."38
Stallings teamed up with the playwright Maxwell Anderson to write an
even more rancorous play, the classic What Price Glory? There is little resent-
ment of the home front directly expressed in the script, but economic themes
indirectly appear. The play's symbolic hero, Captain Flagg, declares that he has
no good reason for fighting Germans. He is paid but $8 per day. The
issue of poorly paid warriors and ill-gotten gains is again raised when a
stretcher bearer steals $800 and a gold watch from a wounded soldier.39
Although much of the civilian public was shocked by the play's bloody frank-
ness, ex-doughboys who saw the performance approved. The American Legion
Weekly called this candor "great stuff." Ironically, What Price Glory? made its
authors wealthy men. Anderson's income reached $1,000 per week in 1924, and
the first of three screen versions brought him $28,ooo.40
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In the election year 1924 the profiteering became a prominent political
issue. In part to soothe the wrath and win the votes of the returned veterans,
the House of Representatives held hearings to consider how better to share
the next wartime burden. Conducted by the Committee on Military Affairs,
these hearings were entitled Universal Mobilization for War Purposes. It was the
first of several inquiries having a similar goal, including the famous Nye-
Vandenberg hearings a decade later. The 1924 investigation was the result of
persistent efforts by Representative John J. McSwain of South Carolina.
McSwain, who considered himself a champion of rural America against the
evils of big business, had been forty-six years old when the United States de-
clared war and was therefore exempt from the draft. His younger brother,
at thirty-six, had served in France and had been gassed twice, deafened in one
ear, blinded in one eye, and returned with shattered nerves. The elder brother
thus had firm evidence of the inequities that war engenders, and he had sought
for three years to bring attention to the issue before he was finally successful
in 1924.41
Most of the participants in the hearings on universal mobilization de-
manded a more pervasive wartime sacrifice. If the suffering became truly gen-
eral, they reasoned, there would be a strong disincentive to go to war. This idea,
that war itself could be exterminated by eliminating war profit, was a prime
example of the continuation of the Progressive spirit into the 1920s. No witness
better expressed the mood of the times than did Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover. As the wartime food administrator, Hoover was an experi-
enced bureaucrat who understood the inequities of price inflation. In case
of another war, Hoover appealed, the president must be given authority to
fix prices, to commandeer private inventories, and even to "suspend habeas
corpus, and generally [have] complete and absolute control over the whole
population." In another dangerous declaration, Hoover said he was willing to
accept "instantaneous court-martial" of a war profiteer. "War is an unhappy
business," said Hoover, "and the great bulk of our ordinary safeguards of life
must be forgotten, and the more evident it is that the whole nation will be put
into the storm and made to bear its share of the sacrifice, the less likely we are
to go to war."42
It was undoubtedly good politics for Republican leaders to promise a
broader sharing of war burdens. Constant mention of the matter reminded the
voters that the Democrats had been in command when the alleged profiteering
occurred. Promises to repair the damage were sound ways of appealing to the
huge new veteran vote, as the 1922 elections had shown. In 1924, both major
parties endorsed "Universal Mobilization" in their platforms (meaning to draft
capital, labor, and manpower). The Democrats hailed universal mobiliza-
tion because it would "tend to discourage war by depriving it of its profits." In
1924, Calvin Coolidge, running for the presidency in his own right, charged
that "totally inconceivable amounts of money were raised and expended with
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a lavishness . . . which now seems like some wild nightmare. . . . The least
scrupulous became the greatest gainers."43 His assistant secretary of war,
Dwight E Davis, assured the Legionnaires that their views had been incorpo-
rated into War Department planning. "Financial burdens must be equitably
distributed and every resource utilized to the utmost to win the war," Davis de-
clared. "No man should be allowed to make a profit out of war while his broth-
ers are risking their lives in their country's service."44 Like Harding, however,
Coolidge's commitment did not extend much beyond mere rhetoric, as his
veto of the veterans' bonus demonstrated.
By 1924 a distinguished list of Americans from diverse fields supported the
concept of universal mobilization besides the American Legion. This group
included Bernard Baruch and Grosvenor Clarkson from the wartime mobi-
lization team, John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers, the lib-
eral Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the feminist Grace Wilbur Trout, the presidents
of Northwestern and Boston universities, and a variety of newspaper editorial-
ists headed by the Christian Science Monitor. The liberal Federal Council of
Churches also endorsed the idea.45
Despite the nearly unanimous desire of the witnesses who testified at the
hearings, the 1924 attempt to equalize the burdens of war produced no suc-
cessful legislation. Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur, a lawyer, argued that
the restriction of profit during peacetime was probably unconstitutional, as
were the severe restrictions on profit proposed for wartime.46 The prospect of
amending the Constitution during peacetime in order to restrict profits during
wartime was too enormous an obstacle for its many sympathetic advocates.
The conservative, uncritical public attitude toward business profits during the
New Era, moreover, was anything but conducive to such a sweeping reform.
Since the labor draft was unpopular with the American Federation of Labor,
the Democrats were divided in their support for it. (The Democrats dropped
the universal conscription plank in 1928, although the Republicans retained it.)
Perhaps even more important than any of these obstacles was the general lack
of interest in defense planning when there were no war clouds in sight. In the
1920s, Americans had at best a tepid interest in Utopian schemes to equalize
sacrifice. The mood of the times emphasized the acquisition and enjoyment of
consumer goods, the compulsive pursuit of leisure-time diversions, and lead-
ership by safe nonentities rather than serious consideration of the idealistic
plans of Wilsonian visionaries.47
In 1925 the cultural reappraisal of the Great War broadened. That year
marked the appearance of one of the most influential motion pictures ever
produced, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's The Big Parade. Based on Stallings's novel
Plumes of the previous year, the film offered a doughboy's view that struck a
responsive chord. Earlier cinematic attempts at portraying war themes had
proven modestly popular, but The Big Parade was wildly successful and im-
mensely profitable. It inspired dozens of examples of the new "war movie" for-
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mula, including such major films as What Price Glory? (1926), Wings (1927),
and The Dawn Patrol (1930).48
Most of these films were heroic action pictures that paid little if any direct
attention to the issues of the conflict. This studious disregard for the issues
nevertheless represented a subtle break with earlier depictions. Early films sim-
plistically portrayed the war as merely a campaign against German degeneracy,
a crusade to exterminate the venomous Hun. But the new motion pictures ex-
pressed a willingness to recognize the basic humanity of the enemy, thus con-
tributing to a reappraisal of the meaning of the war.49 Perhaps the best of
the critical films was All Quiet on the Western Front (1930). Filmed from the
German point of view, it was sympathetic to the enemy in ways that would
have been impossible a decade earlier. As a sound picture, it was enormously
more compelling than its silent predecessors. In one memorable line, a Ger-
man infantryman, pausing to ponder the meaning of the war, muses that "it
must be doing somebody some good."50 Millions of people attended these
screenings, which satisfied a desire to reconsider the experience of the war.
When viewers saw a supposedly monstrous enemy wonder who was gaining
from the war, they were prompted to ask themselves a similar question: Who,
indeed, did gain from the war?
Popular films were only one form of the reconsideration of the war, albeit
a potent one. Best-selling war memoirs, plays, and novels were another foun-
tain of criticism. The late 1920s and 1930s witnessed an outpouring of literary
aversion for war. Since war in general is profoundly uncivilized activity, and
the Great War with its submarine attacks, machine guns, and poisonous gas
was particularly heinous, postwar writers felt compelled to try to preserve civi-
lized life by indicting the conflict.51
There were many antiwar authors whose work displayed a loathing of
profiteering as the implied origin of the war. Upton Sinclair asserted the so-
cialist view in Jimmie Higgins (1919) that "all governments were run by capital-
ists, and all went to war for foreign markets and such plunder."52 In William
March's Company K (1933), a working-class soldier describes the views of his
better-educated comrades: "They'd been to college, and they could talk on any
subject that came up. But mostly they talked about war and how it was
brought about by moneyed interests for its own selfish ends. They laugh at the
idea that idealism or love of country had anything to do with war . . . . Fools
who fight are pawns shoved about to serve the interest of others."53 In Johnny
Got His Gun (1939), Dalton Trumbo warns that "when armies begin to move
and flags wave and slogans pop up, watch out little guy because it's somebody
else's chestnuts in the fire not yours."54 In the 1920s and 1930s Americans were
asking questions about whose chestnuts were really in the fire in 1917.
The pervasiveness of the skeptical attitude toward the war's purposes was
demonstrated by its appearance in at least one enormously popular newspaper
cartoon. In 1924 the ex-doughboy Harold Gray began drawing the comic strip
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"Little Orphan Annie." In October 1924, he introduced a fabulously rich—and
aptly named—principal character called Daddy Warbucks. Warbucks explains
to Annie that when war came, "I was too old to fight but I wanted to do my
bit so I made munitions—Well, I made a fortune, too, and everybody hates me
for it—Maybe I did wrong, Annie, but I did the best I knew." To this confes-
sion, Annie replies: "Don't you worry—I love you, 'Daddy.'" Ultimately Little
Orphan Annie and her guilt-stricken benefactor appeared in 345 newspapers
having a daily circulation of sixteen million copies.55 "Daddy's" effect on public
views, while not subject to measurement, could have been nothing less than
substantial.56
Although the 1924 attempt to establish the principle of universal sacrifice
failed in Congress, the festering memory of unseemly war profits affected for-
eign policy. The Covenant of the League of Nations included a statement that
obliquely called for public ownership of defense industries. This provision
vaguely declared that "the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and
implements of war is open to grave objections." The basis supporting these
"grave objections" was a widely shared assumption that private arms firms
would seek to stir up business by starting wars and indeed had already done so.
In 1924 Congressman Cordell Hull of Tennessee, who became famous later as
Franklin D. Roosevelt's first secretary of state, declared at the McSwain com-
mittee hearings, "I think a great many people believe that the last war had its
fundamental cause in the profiteering going on in the world."57
In France, Paul Faure, the general secretary of the French Socialist Party,
lent weight to the arms conspiracy theory by charging in the House of Dep-
uties that the Schneider arms factories at Creuzot opportunistically but uneth-
ically sold arms both to the French government and to its potential enemies.
According to Faure, a nefarious ring of bankers and munitions makers led by
Eugene Schneider controlled arms production in France, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. This ring supposedly supplied arms not only to these nations
but also to Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Turkey, Russia, Spain, Italy,
Argentina, and Mexico. When news of the French accusations reached Ameri-
ca, the charges served to confirm the plausibility of the existence of an interna-
tional arms conspiracy.58
In 1925 an international conference on the "Arms Traffic" met under League
auspices at Geneva, Switzerland. This conference sought to curtail the allegedly
provocative actions of the "arms traffickers" by calling for the prohibition of
arms sales except under license by national governments. Most of the
American arms industry was not adamantly opposed to licensing (which they
preferred to nationalization),59 but the arms makers wanted the licenses to
be issued by the pro-business Department of Commerce rather by than the
more restrictive Department of State.60 The arms makers further desired a
blanket exemption of pistols and revolvers (which were big sellers in Latin
America) from export licensing as war materiel. The United States, though not
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a member of the League of Nations, participated in the framing of the Arms
Control Convention by assigning Joseph C. Grew, its minister to Switzerland,
to attend the talks. Nevertheless, despite the urging of Presidents Hoover and
Roosevelt and (by then) Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the United States re-
fused to ratify the convention until 1935, because it would limit the American
ability to sell arms to Latin America.61
In the 1920s some Americans became concerned about the existence of a coop-
erative relationship between American industry and the American military. In
later years, this relationship would be labeled (with considerable hyperbole)
the "military-industrial power complex." Some cooperation dated from the
period of naval rearmament in the 1890s, but it was so limited as hardly to de-
serve the roguish reputation it later received.62 In the 1920s the dependency of
military strength on industrial might was tested by the growing military im-
portance of the airplane.
Although the lesson was imperfectly absorbed, the failure of the American
aircraft industry during the war demonstrated that modern warplanes could
not be designed and manufactured on short notice. In 1919 the air service
began campaigning for a national policy of government subsidies for the civil-
ian aircraft industry to ensure that in case of war a healthy, technologically
advanced aircraft industry would be available for conversion to military pur-
poses. As one Air Corps colonel argued, "Our aviation must be put on a com-
mercial basis so that it will never be jeopardized from now until eternity....
Then when you go to war, you will have your manufacturing facilities, etc."
The wisdom of this argument was clear to the farsighted congressman James
A. Frear, who warned: "In case of future war of the country, why it seems to me
it would be a tremendously important element, the supremacy of the air . . .
and the way I view it, instead of this Government being hindmost in this ques-
tion we should be foremost."63 In the 1920s, nevertheless, the U.S. government
only modestly subsidized the nascent aviation industry, in part to ensure its
availability in the event of war, but congressional qualms about profiteering
kept the aviation business from receiving as much assistance as it needed. This
lack of profitability stifled technological development during the interwar
period. In World War II the policy of subsidizing aircraft amply proved its
wisdom, but in the 1920s even limited assistance was unpopular in isolationist
circles.64
The history of the arms industry in the 1920s offers other examples of the
growing cooperation between government and private industry. In 1919 the Du
Pont Company, citing excess capacity in the industry, sought to abandon the
production of military ammunition, but army officers successfully pleaded
against this step. In 1920 Congress took further action to nurture the relation-
ship between industry and the military. The National Defense Act of 1920 gave
the War Department authority to plan for the mobilization of the economy
196 I W A R H O G S
in case of war. As a result, military officers visited thousands of American
factories, assessing their productive capabilities and assigning them hypotheti-
cal tasks in time of war. In 1926 the army asked Congress to assign many of
these firms "educational orders" so that they would know how to produce a
military component if the need arose. Educational orders would in theory also
provide a benchmark for determining reasonable prices. Between 1926 and
1928 a War Department Business Council operated, but it met only three times
and more than a third of its members were absent on each occasion. There
were other instances of military officers exhibiting their growing dependency
on civilian industry. In 1931 the president of the Electric Boat Company, the
nation's leading producer of submarines, declared his intention to retire. This
brought a flurry of objections from the secretary of the navy, admirals, con-
gressmen, and even the White House.65 In the absence of an immediate threat
from abroad, many Americans in the 1920s doubted the need for such a snug
relationship. Even Congressman Frear, who a decade earlier had endorsed the
plan of government subsidies of the aviation industry, in 1928 scoffed at
"Jingoes" in the military-industrial complex who concocted the fantasy that
Japan . . . "is prepared to come over and capture our country."66
The collaboration between the American military and American arms
makers led to several questionable practices. Since it was in the interest of the
army and navy to have a strong defense industry in wartime, military officers
had a parallel interest in encouraging its growth in peacetime. The needs of the
small peacetime forces maintained by the United States in the 1920s and early
1930s were inadequate to support a large arms industry, so military officers en-
couraged foreign sales to maintain its strength. The Curtiss-Wright Export
Company successfully solicited endorsements of its "Falcon" warplane from
Captain Ernest J. King (later a fleet admiral in World War II), and this helped
its sales in the Dominican Republic. The Driggs Ordnance and Engineering
Company arranged for the USS Raleigh to visit Turkey to demonstrate its
cannon to Turkish naval officers, and the New York Shipbuilding Company
arranged for the navy to send a cruiser built by the firm to Rio de Janeiro to be
inspected by the Brazilian navy in hopes of obtaining sales. These efforts met
with some success. By 1925 the United States, with 20 percent of the market,
was the number two exporter of arms in the world (behind Britain). To many
critics, the spectacle of American officers serving as unofficial sales representa-
tives of arms contractors was repugnant, since in this way they could indirectly
encourage an outbreak of war—the very thing they were paid to prevent.67
The modest doubts about the allegedly dangerous and improper influence
of the munitions industry were given a massive injection of vitality by a star-
tling revelation. In the 1920s a close working relationship developed among
the nation's three largest builders of warships: the Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Company, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, and the
New York Shipbuilding Company. These firms enjoyed an oligopolistic, semi-
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competitive control of the production of capital ships. They organized a
jointly owned, nonprofit subsidiary named the Marine Engineering Corpora-
tion, which designed a common set of blueprints for a six-ship class of cruis-
ers. Each firm then undertook to bid on the ship contracts in a way that
basically rotated the work among the companies as opposed to competing
head-to-head for the contracts.69 This would not have been greatly surprising
or of stunning significance but for the behavior of their jointly paid lobbyist,
William Shearer.
Shearer was an unstable, thoroughly unreliable person who possibly
suffered from mental disease. He was also flamboyant and outspoken in his
hatred of Britain and in support of an imperialist America. His personal life
was shady at best: he had been arrested for forgery in England, had received a
less-than-honorable discharge from the U.S. Navy, had been implicated in a
French jewel theft, had impersonated a naval officer, and had admitted under
oath that he was a plagiarist.69 Nevertheless, from 1926 to 1929 the Big 3 naval
shipbuilders paid him to lobby Congress for an accelerated schedule of mer-
chant and warship construction. Shearer received $7,500 for his lobbying ef-
forts, which, while somewhat questionable, were neither illegal nor highly
unusual.70
The irregular aspect of the Shearer affair concerned his appointment by the
shipbuilders to attend the Geneva naval disarmament convention of 1927. In
1929 Shearer filed suit against the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company, seeking
$258,000 in unpaid back wages.71 He presented a sensational claim that he had
been paid $25,000 to wreck the disarmament conference. The motive of the al-
leged plot was to prevent a cutback in warship construction. In reply, C. L.
Bardo, a vice president of Bethlehem Shipbuilding acting on behalf of the Big
3, stated that he had assigned Shearer to attend the conference as an "observer
only."72
Whether Shearer's original instructions were to act as an agent provocateur
or merely as an observer has never been firmly established. At the very least,
the shipbuilders wanted to measure the strength of the disarmament advo-
cates. Bardo and his associates were also evidently fearful that the Geneva con-
vention might endorse the nationalization of warship production. In any
event, Shearer's indiscreet and disruptive behavior drew the ire of Secretary
of State Frank B. Kellogg, who successfully demanded his dismissal. The suit
was ultimately settled out of court for $37,500, with the stipulation that the
amount be kept secret. The failure to contest the case in court left the truth of
Shearer's charges unresolved.73
Shearer's shocking claim that he was paid to obstruct the cause of peace
rightfully drew an outraged reaction. President Hoover demanded an explana-
tion from the shipbuilders, prompting a flurry of editorial comment. Shearer
delivered a lecture to four hundred New Yorkers in Carnegie Hall, was the sub-
ject of a congressional investigation, received extensive press coverage, and
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even appeared as a character in an antiprofiteering novel, The Budapest Mur-
ders.74 Although Shearer's claim that he destroyed the conference has not and
cannot be established,75 his audacious lawsuit and its secretive settlement lent
credibility to the string of conspiratorial accusations that emerged after the
war. For a decade after Shearer unveiled his claim, the affair would be cited reg-
ularly as compelling evidence of the infamous machinations of munitions
makers.76
The 1920s were a decade that gloried in scandal and sensationalism, which
was an ideal setting for the pursuit of profiteers. The profiteer hunt thus
thrived as a denoting feature of the politics and culture of the Jazz Age. In the
angry and frightened mood of the Great Depression, the antiprofiteering cam-
paign would go far beyond the comparatively mild effort of the early postwar
period. During the 1930s, the attempt to expunge war profits would take on a
life-or-death urgency that marked it as far more resolute than its predecessor.
Profits or Peace?
If we face the choice of profits or peace, the Nation will answer—must answer—we
choose peace.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, CAMPAIGN ADDRESS (1936)
The probe of war profits that surfaced periodically in the 1920s became a more
pressing matter during the troubled 1930s. Commencing in the first year of
the Hoover administration, a contentious debate on how to limit profits in a
future war proceeded throughout the Depression. The renewed scrutiny of war
profits was partially an aftershock of the Great War, but in the 1930s worldwide
economic collapse and the rising danger of American involvement in a new
and even more frightening European war gave the dispute fresh urgency.
In the 1930s there were two major focal points in the review of the extent
and effects of war profiteering. The two inquiries were the Hoover administra-
tion's War Policies Commission of 1930 and the more contentious Senate
Munitions Investigation of 1934-35 (the Nye-Vandenberg committee). Both
took place against the setting of the more general question of how the nation
should mobilize for war. Both investigations revealed the lingering effects of
the Great War, and both demonstrated the difficulty of reaching agreement on
national defense policy in its aftermath. The principles of that policy would be
shaped by the costs of each option, as well as by who would profit and who
would forfeit in each instance.
The problem of restricting the profits of munitions firms often reflected
other public concerns of the period in which it was considered. During the
Progressive era, the campaign against munitions profits had been an impor-
tant part of the struggle against the evils of monopolistic capitalism. In the
postwar period, Herbert Hoover's associationalist attempt to improve busi-
ness-government relations also addressed the issue of war profits in its man-
agement of reconversion. In turn, the problem of regulating defense profits
would be affected by the economic policies of the New Deal.
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt's limited Keynesianism included deficit
spending on public works as a countercyclical device. One aspect of Roose-
velt's recovery plan included an accelerated program of naval construction.
This inescapably raised the issue of how much the shipbuilders and other de-
fense contractors should properly gain from the New Deal's anti-Depression
medicine. The New Deal also featured a policy of redistributing wealth, and
the fact that some Americans had gained immensely as a result of the Great
War became a major justification for Roosevelt's redistributional policy.
The embittered veterans, committed pacifists, disaffected intellectuals, and
agrarian radicals who had long fought against war profiteering renewed their
efforts during the 1930s. They were joined in the Roosevelt years by a new
clamor of angry voices: dejected workers, determined isolationists, younger
feminists, and aggressive publicists all worked toward the idealistic goal of
constructing a defense policy that was completely unaffected by selfish interest.
They remembered the carnage in France, harbored grudges from countless
quarrels between capital and labor, and spoke and wrote with a biting style
fashioned in the acrimony of the Progressive era. The perennial struggle to
control war profits reached an angry crescendo in the 1930s. The campaign
against war profits was a striking example of the perseverance of the Progres-
sive voice in the New Deal setting.
The historian C. Hartley Grattan furnished clear evidence of the continu-
ation of the Progressive persuasion. Canadian-born and descended from a
Swiss-Scottish family with an antimilitary tradition, Grattan had studied at
Clark University under Harry Elmer Barnes, a leading revisionist scholar.
Grattan began writing as a literary critic with socialist affinities, and he deeply
admired the acid pen of H. L. Mencken. On 11 November 1929—exactly eleven
years after the Great War had ended unromantically on the eleventh hour of
the eleventh day of the eleventh month—Grattan published an important
book, Why We FoughV Commercially, Why We Fought was a dismal failure,
selling only about a thousand copies. But intellectually the book became a
seminal part of the reappraisal of the Great War. Its central argument that the
Great War had been fought for economic reasons became incorporated into
far more successful texts and eventually into the thinking of common citizens.2
By 1930 there were many signs that the nation was ready for such a reap-
praisal. In January a Conference on Causes and Cure of War convened in
Washington, D.C. As the title implied, the organizers thought of war as a kind
of disease. As with epidemics of bacterial origin, progress toward a treatment
might be made by the exchange of views of scientific experts. Senator Gerald P.
Nye told the conferees that wars are "caused by fear and jealousy coupled with
the purpose of men and interests who expect to profit by them."3 Nye would
lead a decadelong search for proof of this theory.
The renewed inspiration for the antiprofiteering campaign came from sev-
eral other developments. The most important of these was the world eco-
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nomic collapse that produced the subsequent strength of fascism in Germany,
Italy, Japan, and Spain. The Depression heaped anger on American business
and its supporters, and defense contracting attracted an extra share of the
wrath. In 1930 war between Japan and China began to produce sales of
American warplanes to China, prompting fears of American engagement. In
1931 the administration of President Herbert Hoover recommended spending
$30 million to repair three battleships while it opposed spending $25 million
on direct relief for the unemployed.4 Displaced workers resented Hoover's
spending priorities.
In June 1933, following Hoover's landslide defeat by Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Congress approved an administration proposal to stimulate the economy by
spending $238 million in Public Works Administration funds on the construc-
tion of twenty-four new warships. Roosevelt reasoned that 80 percent of naval
spending went to labor, and he also argued that a naval buildup was necessary
in the face of a growing Japanese threat. To the expanding pacifist element in
the United States, naval spending as an antidote to the Depression was ex-
tremely odious. It seemed likely to initiate a dangerous new naval arms race
with Japan and Britain, and it seemed wasteful and unworkable. The warships
constructed were hardly needed to defend Hawaii and the Panama Canal, and
they were far too few to defend the Philippines or to protect American interests
in distant Asia.5
A great but often unspoken fear of the Depression years was that defense
contractors would inflame a new war in hopes of restoring their firms' prof-
itability. This concern lurked behind both federal investigations of war profi-
teering of the 1930s. Senator Homer Bone of Washington, a close friend and
collaborator of Senator Nye, was a frank advocate of this position. Bone be-
lieved that because of the technical advance of weaponry a new world war
would spell the end of civilization. Bone was one war early, but his participa-
tion in the crusade to end war profiteering was inspired by nothing less than
an earnest belief that the future of the world was at stake. "There may be
a social explosion," warned the senator, "and just blow stable government all
to bits."6
Even if there had been no Depression and no Hitler, there would still have
been a searching retrospective on the Great War. Ten years had passed, which is
approximately the minimum period before an event can be assessed with at
least some degree of historical detachment. An event as devastating as the
Great War begged for historical analysis; a thorough examination by histori-
ans was inescapable, and their audience would surely welcome it with earnest
attention. The surviving veterans of the American Expeditionary Force had
begun to reach the stage of life in which they wished to rethink the actions of
their youth. Aided by willing writers eager to guide their reappraisal, many of
the men of 1917 came to the conclusion that their perilous adventure in France
had been a reckless act. The carefree doughboys of the AEF were now fathers
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raising children amid the hardships of the Depression. Many became deter-
mined that their own sons would not be sent into mortal danger.
The Depression was particularly harsh on American farmers, bringing
about a renewal of agrarian radicalism. This appeared in several different
forms, but one of these was a resurgence of isolationism in foreign policy.7
Agrarian radicals broadly believed that the United States government was un-
responsive to the interests of working people; that foreign trade principally
benefited big business; that eastern financial interests benefited improperly at
the expense of farmers and other working people; that the United States had
no need for colonies or military bases abroad; that the United States should
not intervene militarily in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Mexico,
Haiti, or Nicaragua; and that the eastern press was too influential and too
much under the control of financial interests. They also specifically discounted
any threat from Japan, and they saw little moral difference between English
and German societies. A particular annoyance was the decision of the United
States to reduce or reschedule debts owed by European governments; farmers
reasoned that they had gone into debt to aid the nation in the World War and
therefore their debts should be reduced as well.8
These factors combined to force a review of American defense policy in the
early 1930s. In those years, conventional military thinking held that the navy
was the first line of defense. Unless the United States became involved again in
a European war—which the various veteran, pacifist, intellectual, and radical
elements bitterly opposed—there was little need for more than a coastal fleet
and the nucleus of a modern army. On the other hand, if the United States in-
tended to protect its shipping lanes to Europe and Asia, then a powerful navy
would be necessary. This meant in practice a fleet as large as that of Britain,
supported by an extensive system of supply bases. In sharper detail, and with a
new sense of urgency, the old debate between "big navy" men and "little navy"
men reopened. Senator John S. Williams of Mississippi said that the alterna-
tives were either to employ a military force big enough "to whip anybody and
everybody" or to maintain minimal forces "and, when war comes, submit our-
selves to the immense strain necessary, with the extravagance of blood and
capital both necessary."9 In the 1930s, the nation chose the latter course, as the
predominant feeling was that large forces were not only needlessly expensive
but also dangerously provocative. This would prove to be a costly decision.
The essential practical question on which this debate turned was whether
the United States should build up its fleet. The goal of navalists was to main-
tain parity with the Royal Navy and to stay ahead of the Imperial Japanese
Navy, as provided by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1923. Naval critics be-
lieved that a smaller and much cheaper force was sufficient, and they were half
right. In 1933, following the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany, Britain
ceased all planning for a possible war against the United States. The War Office
informed the American military attache that the United States was no longer
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considered a threat to the British Empire. In 1933 the U.S. Navy was at 65 per-
cent of its permissible strength under the Washington Treaty, which would
have been sufficient to defend the Atlantic frontier now that the Royal Navy
was not credible as a potential enemy.10 Retaining the American fleet at its ex-
isting level seemed reasonable, and maintaining a "little navy" would certainly
be much cheaper than constructing a larger force. In the view of naval critics,
it would also be much less provocative.
In military planning, unfortunately, being only half right can have fatal
consequences. The deciding factor shaping positions on the question of naval
strength in the 1920s and 1930s was the extent of the area that the U.S. Navy
ought properly to defend. "Little navy" proponents saw the American defense
perimeter as continental in scope, meaning only the Western Hemisphere.
These continentalists believed that American defenses in the Pacific Ocean
should follow a line that extended from Alaska, through Pearl Harbor
in the Hawaiian Islands, to the Panama Canal. This was termed the "Nome-
Honolulu" line.11 The Atlantic line proceeded from Panama northward
through the Caribbean Sea via the Virgin Islands, finally terminating on the
coast of Maine. Prominent among the "little navy" counselors were the promi-
nent historian Charles A. Beard and the Socialist Party chieftain Norman
Thomas. President Herbert Hoover was less outspoken but still inclined
toward the "little navy" side.12
Their opponents, who wanted a larger or "treaty" navy, argued that the
United States must be prepared to defend distant sea frontiers in the western
Pacific. During the 1920s, American naval spending rose only modestly from
$322 million in 1923 to $374 million in 1930. Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese
Navy swelled to 95 percent of its quota under the treaty.13 Defending against
Japanese sea power would require a mighty fleet and supporting facilities suf-
ficient to defend the Philippines against Japanese attack. Navalists demanded
large vessels with long cruising ranges on the grounds that the United States
had few suitable naval bases.14 Strong advocates of a "treaty navy" included
Presidents Calvin Coolidge and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The latter, whose views
proved crucial, had been a navalist since his days as assistant secretary of the
navy during the Wilson years. The young FDR had fretted that his chief, Navy
Secretary Josephus Daniels, was unwilling to support the grand fleet that
Roosevelt felt the nation required. During the presidential campaign of 1932,
Roosevelt temporarily set aside his views to placate the powerful isolationist
publisher William Randolph Hearst, but soon after his election he returned to
his earlier position.15
This question of naval policy was closely related to the problem of control-
ling profiteering. "Little navy" proponents often questioned explicitly or im-
plicitly the motivation of the "treaty navy" advocates. Opponents of naval
spending argued that their hawkish adversaries were motivated by greed for
profit, not by patriotic purpose. Charles Beard, who could not imagine that
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Japan could successfully attack the Nome-Honolulu line, believed that there
was a conspiracy between the Roosevelt White House and Hollywood film
producers to propagandize for naval expansion.16 Unless these base motives
were meticulously exposed and brought under control, they might involve the
United States in another ghastly military blunder.
In 1929 Patrick J. Hurley, Hoover's assistant secretary of war, ordered a
review of how to mobilize for war. This study, under army auspices, was led by
Major General Van Horn Moseley, Hurley's executive assistant. Moseley had
been General Pershing's supply officer for the American Expeditionary Force
in 1917-18, and by 1930 he was deputy chief of staff of the U.S. Army. He was an
able if intolerant soldier, but he selected as his principal assistant one of the
army's most promising young officers, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower. Moseley
would write, accurately, of Eisenhower, "He has a remarkable mind and an
equally talented pen, enabling him to present a subject simply and clearly."
Always a careful observer, three decades later Eisenhower would term the rela-
tionships he studied in 1930 the "military-industrial complex."17
The army mobilization plan was far from satisfactory to everyone. Besides
Moseley, it was developed by General Hugh S. Johnson, who was an aide to
Bernard Baruch when Baruch chaired the War Industries Board. Moseley dis-
liked Democrats in general and Baruch in particular. General Johnson, like
Baruch, wished to bridle wartime demand by fixing prices, whereas Moseley
preferred to use the tax power. But the army plan also gave its officers sweeping
control over civilian industry. At least 14,000 civilian managers had been com-
missioned as reserve officers and 15,000 factories had been surveyed to deter-
mine their suitability for war production. Baruch saw this as a return to the
errors of the past; military officers were not businessmen, and to give them
control of the economy would hamstring production again. Mobilization was
now too important and too complex to be left to soldiers.18
Furthermore, the army plan paid scant attention to the problem of con-
trolling profiteering. General Douglas MacArthur, the chief of staff, argued the
timeworn military position again: "In our attempts to equalize the burdens
and remove the profits from war, we must guard against a tendency to over-
emphasize administrative efficiency and underemphasize national effective-
ness. . . . The objective of any warring nation is victory, immediate and com-
plete." MacArthur was correct that the immediate national objective was vic-
tory, but like generations of officers before him he failed to understand that a
secondary national aim was to win at an acceptable price. A victory that led to
a generation of backbiting, resentment, bitterness, and alienation was a hollow
triumph. The army plan rather simplistically assumed that all wars are popu-
lar, that a unified and committed civilian population would compel restraint
by subjecting profiteers to the glare of publicity, and that an efficient procure-
ment system would allow few opportunities for profiteering.19 By 1930, by con-
trast, there was a growing belief among some civilians that a mobilization plan
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that promised large contracts with little restraint on profits would serve to
invite the war that the nation was seeking to avoid.20
In 1930 Congress created the War Policies Commission, to be chaired by
Secretary Hurley, for the general purpose of placing planning for wartime
mobilization under civilian control. Its more specific purpose was to consider
mechanisms for restricting profiteering: commandeering of war materiel,
excess profits taxation, price fixing, and other means of restricting civilian
income. The creation of the commission was the realization of a principal goal
of the American Legion, which had sought such investigations since 1922 and
was unappeased by the hearings of 1924. By 1930, WWI veterans were an ever
more powerful political force, and it was probably not coincidental that
President Hoover approved the legislation establishing the commission on the
eve of the congressional election of 1930. Some veterans of the AEF were al-
ready in Congress, and six of the eighteen members of the War Policies Com-
mission were Legionnaires.21
The War Policies Commission was composed of political heavyweights.
Although chaired and dominated by Patrick Hurley, now promoted to secre-
tary of war, the commission included five Cabinet members, four senators,
four representatives, and five men from outside the government. Despite the
prestige of its membership, the commission labored under serious handicaps
that practically doomed its success in advance. In part, it was a commendable
(if unusual) attempt by the federal government to peer far into the distant
future, to anticipate a crisis, and to take responsible action in advance—in
other words, to plan for war while still at peace. In part, it was an attempt by
the civilian bureaucracy to prevent the army from controlling mobilization
policy. In part, it was an attempt to placate powerful interest groups (the
American Legion, the Disabled American Veterans, the liberal churches, and
peace activists), who wanted to redistribute wartime sacrifice, to nationalize
the defense industry, and/or to eliminate war profits. (The executive director of
the commission, Robert H. Montgomery, another protege of Bernard Baruch,
sought to restrain the more radical demands of the Legionnaires while also re-
stricting the army's ability to dominate mobilization.)22
The problem with these goals was that few Americans in 1930 were enthu-
siastic about planning for the next war, and some were dead set against doing
so. Except for a very few concerned individuals, such as Bernard Baruch, most
were content to let the army do whatever minimal planning was necessary.
Military planners, on the other hand, were initially suspicious of civilian inter-
ference in what they considered their area of expertise. The army concluded,
eventually, that the net effect of the investigation would be helpful to its insti-
tutional interest and so decided to be cooperative. Army leaders shrewdly ob-
served that the composition of the commission was largely conservative, and
therefore it was unlikely to threaten military prerogatives. For the commission
to appease the American Legion fully, Congress would have to vote to modify
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the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and the army judged correctly that
such a drastic change was unlikely. The army also hoped, incorrectly, that
the commission would attract national attention to the problem of mobiliza-
tion, and this would encourage civilian cooperation with military plans.23
Nevertheless, the army never abandoned its traditional reluctance to address
the question of war profits seriously.
The War Policies Commission was decisively limited by its charge from
Congress. Primarily the creation of the American Legion, the commission was
supposed to consider means for implementing the universal draft, a prime
goal of the Legionnaires since 1922. As Congressman J. Mayhew Wainwright, a
strong supporter of the commission, explained, there was a "burning sense of
injustice felt by those who served." The universal draft would mean not only
conscription of young men for the armed forces but also conscription of both
capital and labor for the next war effort. Fairness demanded, Wainwright said,
"no slackers, no inequalities, no special or financial advantage to anyone . . .
equality of compensation for the man with the rifle and the man in commerce,
business, or industry."24 The fundamental problem with the concept of the
universal draft was that conscription of capital and civilian labor was thought
to be constitutionally questionable. The War Policies Commission was there-
fore expected to consider whether a constitutional amendment would be
necessary to achieve equity. To block this possibility, the enabling act was
amended, at the request of the American Federation of Labor, so as to prohibit
the commission from discussing conscription of labor in any way.25 This pre-
cluded discussion both of the constitutional amendment and of a principal
method of achieving equity. If one device was not subject to consideration,
other related devices would be difficult to discuss if overall equity was to be the
final result.26
In 1933, following Hitler's seizure of power in Germany in the spring, the
collapse of the London economic conference in the summer, and the failure of
disarmament efforts in the fall, a war scare swept Europe. Prices of defense-
related stocks soared in France. Despite the depressed world economy, sales
and profits of English airplane manufacturers actually increased. At the same
time, prices of almost every other stock and commodity traded on world mar-
kets were falling precipitously. "Europe is again thinking and talking about
conflict as it did between 1905 and 1914," lamented Frank Simonds, an
American observer.27
The obvious peril of a new and terribly destructive war was profoundly
disturbing. The looming threat of a return to slaughter staggered again the old
nineteenth-century liberal belief that wars were only a temporary and aberrant
deviation from the ongoing advance of human civilization.28 The awful new
evidence indicated that war was rather customary human behavior, striking
periodically like a ghastly scourge. Its origins must then be found in mundane
matters—such as the endless pursuit of profit, the institutionalization of greed.
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In the autumn of 1930 the International Red Cross had circulated a warn-
ing that in the next war the civilian population would be the target of poison
gas attacks delivered from the air. Following the international publicity sur-
rounding the transatlantic air crossing by Charles A. Lindbergh, the frighten-
ing prospect of what one writer termed an "aero-chemical war" seemed
entirely plausible.29 American women had gained in political influence during
the 1920s, and in the 1930s their ability to have an impact on American foreign
policy was strengthened. As likely victims of an intercontinental aero-chemical
war, women had a vital new stake in the maintenance of the peace.
The development of modern weaponry meant that in the event of war
American women could reasonably fear a direct attack upon their homes. The
frightening possibility was that enemy planes would drop canisters of poison
gas on the civilian population, placing everyone at grave risk. "The civilian
population is going to be attacked," warned Dorothy Detzer, leader of the
International League of Peace and Freedom. "The defenseless women, the old,
the sick, the helpless are at the mercy of the new war method."30 It is a pecu-
liarity of modern warfare that poison gas inspires extraordinary alarm among
both soldiers and civilians. This apprehension considerably exceeds the reality
of the danger, but potential targets nonetheless tend to perceive poison gas as a
fearful menace against which there is no defense. The mustard gas of the Great
War had had appalling effects, but new compounds that were odorless, color-
less, and horribly effective had been developed. Poison gas was therefore addi-
tionally hateful as it symbolized a perversion of scientific knowledge.31
The war scare of 1933 provoked a new outpouring of pacifism. In the early
1930s there were so many manifestations of disgust at the prospect of a new
world cataclysm that no inventory of them would be complete. Any attempt to
gauge the extensiveness of pacifism can never be precise, but the historian
Robert Dallek estimates that the peace movement at its peak had about twelve
million participants and a following of between forty-five and sixty million
Americans.32 In the spring of 1933 the National Student Federation cast 22,612
ballots at sixty-five colleges in twenty-seven states. Most of the students de-
clared themselves to be complete pacifists or willing to fight only if the conti-
nental United States were invaded, and only 28 percent would support any war
declared by Congress.33
Pacifists vied to find clever ways of expressing their opposition. A group
called World Peaceways assembled a massive antiwar tome weighing more
than a ton and measuring seven and one-half feet square entitled War—The
Super Racket. College students organized units of the "Veterans of Future
Wars" and demanded advance payment of their bonus for future war service.
A companion organization of "Future Gold Star Mothers" asked for prepay-
ment of pensions for prospective war widows and trips to Europe to select
potential gravesites for their husbands and sons. The United Anti-War
Association of the University of Chicago collected six hundred signatures on a
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petition that read, "Whereas, we are the future cannon fodder for senile states-
men, capitalists, and generals—all of whom 'die in bed,' Be it resolved that
we . . . demand an immediate investigation." In November 1935, the New York
Herald-Tribune published a poll disclosing that 75 percent of the American
population favored a national referendum before the United States entered an-
other war. Only 10 percent of respondents wanted to use military measures
in association with another country in order to check aggression. There was
great sympathy for the slogan chanted by protesters at the annual meeting of
the Army Ordnance Association in Philadelphia in 1935: "2 + 2 = 4, Gun +
Gun = War."34
A particularly influential event was the publication in March 1934 of a dis-
dainful article entitled "Arms and the Men" in the influential magazine
Fortune. This periodical, the brainchild of the highly successful publisher
Henry Luce, intended to carve its niche in American journalism by dramatiz-
ing the inner world of American business. "Arms and the Men" (which took its
title from George Bernard Shaw's famous play Arms and the Man) was un-
signed but written by a young Fortune staffer, Eric Hodgins, with the supervi-
sion and suggestions of Luce himself. "Without a shadow of a doubt," wrote
Hodgins darkly, "there is at the moment in Europe a huge and subversive force
that lies behind the arming and counter-arming of nations.... The control of
these myriad companies vests . . . in not more than a handful of men whose
power in some ways reaches above the power of the state itself." Most of the ar-
ticle dealt with the European arms trade, but this point was lost on most read-
ers. When the powerful publisher of Time and Fortune placed his stamp of
approval on the call for arms control, the cause gained new respectability and
exposure. The article was reprinted extensively, appearing in such prominent
publications as Time, the New York Times, the New York Herald-Tribune, and
the Congressional Record. Fortune claimed that it was presenting objective jour-
nalism (even computing in businesslike fashion that the cost of killing each
soldier in the Great War was $25,000), but in fact it was presenting advocacy
journalism.35
The atmosphere of zealous pacifism of 1933-35 established the basis for the
most sweeping consideration of the war profits issue in American history. This
was the investigation of the munitions industry conducted by a special com-
mittee of the Senate. It was first called the Nye-Vandenberg committee after its
founders, Republican senators Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota and Arthur
Vandenberg of Michigan. After Nye was elected chair, it became known simply
as the Nye committee.
Although its fame has been dimmed by more recent inquiries, the Nye-
Vandenberg committee pursued issues of the gravest national consequence. It
was arguably the most earnest and influential political investigation of the first
half of the twentieth century. The hearings have been frequently reconsidered,
but the investigation's overall consequence remains unresolved. Writers have
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generally disagreed with the committee's findings while remaining sympa-
thetic to its purposes.36
The specific factors leading to the investigation of the munitions industry
included dissatisfaction with the work of the War Policies Commission, mis-
givings about American policy toward arms sales in South America and China,
disapproval of the Roosevelt administration's military expansion, disagree-
ment about the threat of war with Germany and Japan, and pent-up rage lin-
gering from the mobilization for and entry into the Great War. The probe was
supported by an unlikely coalition of city and farm, Right and Left, Republi-
can and Democrat. Religious groups such as the Federal Council of Churches
and the World Alliance of Friendship through Churches were prominent sup-
porters.37
The Nye-Vandenberg inquest resulted from a Senate compromise. Nye was
a former newspaper editor from North Dakota who initially supported
American intervention but came to oppose it. Nye shared the views of the
Non-Partisan League, which denounced the fixing of wheat prices at $2.20 per
bushel during wartime while industrial prices rose unchecked. He declared his
distaste for eastern bankers and war profits as early as 1920. In personal char-
acteristics, Nye resembled William Jennings Bryan—both were doctrinaire,
simplistic, and tended to personalize issues. Neither Bryan nor Nye was a
farmer, but both came from rural backgrounds and modest circumstances,
and both had powerful oratorical abilities.38 Born in Wisconsin and a longtime
admirer of Robert M. La Follette Sr., Nye was always a steadfast "little navy"
man. After reaching the Senate, he persistently inveighed against profiteers
whom he believed had brought on the Great War. His main interest in investi-
gating the munitions makers was to establish their culpability once and for all.
This would lead to a mechanism that would foil their yearning for another war
for profit.39
When the United States declared war on Wilhelmine Germany, Arthur
Vandenberg was, like Nye, a young and ambitious midwestern newspaper
editor. From Grand Rapids, Michigan, he spurned enlistment and never re-
gretted his decision to avoid service, although he often supported positions ad-
vocated by the American Legion. As a member of the Senate and friend of the
Legion, Vandenberg served on the War Policies Commission in 1931, and there-
after continually supported equalization of the burdens of war.40 Early in 1934,
when Nye proposed the establishment of a committee to investigate the muni-
tions industry, Vandenberg introduced a resolution endorsed by the American
Legion to take the profits out of war.
The Senate considered Nye's request for two and a half months. In the in-
terim, the Vinson-Trammell naval shipbuilding bill was approved, authorizing
the construction of 102 new ships. Nye and others sought to amend the naval
appropriation to limit profits to 8 percent of the cost of each warship con-
structed in a private shipyard and to force construction of half the ships in
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government shipyards. To placate these and other foes of defense spending, the
Senate agreed to create the special committee to investigate the munitions in-
dustry. In return, Nye withdrew his amendment to the shipbuilding bill.41
Credit for the plan to combine the Nye and Vandenberg resolutions and to
create the investigating committee went to Dorothy Detzer of the Women's
International League of Peace and Freedom, an organization founded by Jane
Addams which in the 1930s could legitimately claim to lead American secular
pacifism.42 Detzer's pacifist commitment was deepened by personal experience
with the carnage of war. Her twin brother was gassed in France and died in
1925, and two other brothers also served. A Hull House alumna, Detzer had
visited postwar Europe during three years' service with a Quaker relief organi-
zation, the American Friends Service Committee.43 She became a major figure
in the campaign against war profits, and in helping to create the pacifist feeling
of the 1930s, Detzer earned a place among the most important women influ-
encing American foreign policy in the twentieth century.
Detzer hoped that Senator George Norris of Nebraska would head the
probe, but Norris balked and recommended Gerald Nye. Norris chose Nye be-
cause there was no defense industry of significance in North Dakota and be-
cause Nye would not be up for reelection for four years. This would insulate
the chair from political pressures. Norris's decision to recommend Nye for the
leadership of the committee would have a fateful effect. Norris described Nye
correctly as "rash," adding optimistically, "but it's the rashness of enthusiasm."44
Besides Nye and Vandenberg, the Munitions Committee included five
senators, whose membership denned the orientation of the committee as
mostly western and mostly isolationist.45 Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri
and Homer T. Bone of Washington teamed with the cochairs to form a solid
isolationist majority.46 W. Warren Barbour of New Jersey and Walter F. George
of Georgia were moderates, and only James P. Pope of Idaho was devoted to
collective security.
The actual driving force behind the investigation was its chief staff inves-
tigator, Stephen Raushenbush. The son of Walter Raushenbush, a famous
Christian pacifist and political activist of the Progressive years, Stephen
Raushenbush had served as an ambulance driver during World War I. He had
come to believe that the Allied cause was no better than that of Germany
and that the United States had been fooled into entering the conflict.
Raushenbush's appointment came because he was an experienced, aggressive
investigator with few ties to government. He assembled a staff of young, deter-
mined, liberal lawyers that included Alger Hiss, who gained notoriety a dozen
years later because of his activities as a communist agent during the 1930s.47
Another special assistant, Josephine Joan Burns, who believed that U.S. par-
ticipation in the Great War was due to the House of Morgan, became Mrs.
Stephen Raushenbush. With her new husband, she would write an extended
defense of the committee's work.48
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The Nye committee could have made little impact were it not for at least
qualified support from Franklin D. Roosevelt. The president was a longtime
"big navy" man, but he was well aware of the national and international
strength of the pacifist-isolationist bloc. During the campaign of 1932, he
had temporarily abandoned internationalism in order to placate foes of the
League of Nations. Yet despite his passing bow to isolationism, the nation's
shipbuilders recognized that Roosevelt's basic friendliness to the navy con-
tinued. One shipbuilder, soliciting funds for Roosevelt's 1932 campaign
chest, commented that "if we are to have a treaty-strength navy, we must
have someone other than a pacifist in the White House," meaning Herbert
Hoover.49
Besides being a "big navy" advocate, Roosevelt was also a persistent foe of
war profiteering, among the most vigorous in American history. As early as
May 1917, while serving as assistant secretary of the navy, he had complained
about yacht and fishing boat owners who refused to lease their vessels to the
navy except at "outrageous prices." In 1918, while serving as acting secretary of
the navy, FDR disallowed as excessive several monetary claims submitted by
shipbuilding firms. When the contractors asked that their demands be referred
to the U.S. Court of Claims, FDR refused. Nearly twenty years later, these
events remained vivid in the president's memory.50
Although he remained determined to rebuild the fleet, Roosevelt was will-
ing at least temporarily to support the munitions investigation, and he assured
Nye and Vandenberg of his cooperation. In May 1934, FDR sent a message to
the Senate denouncing the arms race and endorsing the proposed investiga-
tion.51 By supporting the munitions inquiry, he hoped to win pacifist and iso-
lationist support for his domestic program, to which he gave top priority.52
Roosevelt also wanted the United States to approve the still unratified 1925
League of Nations agreement to suppress the international arms trade. In June
1934, an American delegation in Geneva presented a draft of a new convention
that would modify the original plan to make it acceptable to the United States.
The American plan would create a Permanent Disarmament Commission,
which would monitor, inspect, and license arms improvement and replace-
ment in each country. This concept was a near duplication of the League's suc-
cessful Drug Limitation Convention of 1931, suggesting that pacifists equated
arms with narcotics. The Nye-Vandenberg investigation would bring publicity
to the arms control issue, and this prospect served the president's purpose of
winning support for an initiative of the League of Nations, which remained
unpopular with the isolationist element. The Senate eventually ratified the
treaty on 17 June 1935, thereby endorsing by implication the theory that
unchecked private sales of arms for profit threatened the peace.53
There was ample reason for Roosevelt to become disenchanted with the
work of the Nye committee, however, and his early support for it was short-
lived. Politically, both Nye and Vandenberg were Republicans, both were
212 I WA EHOGS
believed to be ambitious, and both were being discussed as possible contenders
for the Republican presidential nomination in 1936.54 Besides furnishing pub-
licity to his potential rivals, the line of inquiry pursued by the Nye committee
became quite distressing to Roosevelt as the months wore on.
During the hearings, Raushenbush organized the munitions investigation
cleverly by focusing on a number of practices identified at the close of the
Great War by estranged critics of the international weapons procurement
system as improper. In 1919 these distasteful methods had been generally
labeled by the Covenant of the League of Nations as subject to "Grave
Objections." (It became a matter of considerable dispute later whether the
founders of the League believed these practices to be facts or simply assertions.
Critics of the weapons industry argued that Wilson intended the League
Covenant to prohibit the private manufacture of arms completely but that
his wording had been diluted at the Versailles conference to the "Grave Objec-
tions" expression. Although there were no official minutes or other documen-
tary records evidently Wilson's more stringent locution was changed at the
suggestion of British military commanders. They warned that Britain could
not depend on the United States government to sell them arms, but they sagely
advised of a potential need to obtain weaponry from private American firms if
another emergency developed.)
These "Grave Objections" were detailed by Philip Noel-Baker, formerly a
professor of international relations at the University of London and Labour
Party member of Parliament, and Manley O. Hudson, Bemis Professor of Law
at Harvard University. Noel-Baker and Hudson charged that munitions
makers kindled war scares, bribed government officials, spread false rumors,
manipulated public opinion, formed international cartels to foster the arma-
ments race, and conspired to fix prices.55 These allegations became known as
the "famous six,"56 and bearing the imprimatur of the League of Nations, they
formed a promising avenue of investigation for the Nye committee.
During the 1920s the accusations proliferated, and by the 1930s charges
against the arms industry were plentiful. The copious body of antiwar litera-
ture reached a peak in the early 1930s, and numerous charges against the
weapons makers wound their way back and forth throughout it. The investiga-
tors needed only to page through the many books and articles to find promis-
ing lines of attack. Even this effort was hardly necessary, as the Nye committee
employed as an adviser a leading critic of the arms industry, the deeply com-
mitted and extreme isolationist John T. Flynn.57
The various charges floated against the arms makers were that they main-
tained congressional lobbies so as to make unneeded and unmerited sales; that
they improperly influenced the press so as to frighten the public into purchas-
ing arms; that they engaged in commercial bribery to generate sales; that they
sold weapons to both sides in war, thus enabling and extending the bloodshed;
that the U.S. government served as sales promotion agents for the armament
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firms; that arms makers were guilty of collusive, anticompetitive behavior that
inflated prices; that profits on the arms trade were excessive; that the arms
makers had, for their own profit, duped the United States into entering World
War I; and finally and most important, that all of these malignant deeds fos-
tered an arms race that menaced world peace.58 Investigation of these many
charges was a task that would stretch the limited financial and intellectual re-
sources of the Nye committee.
One by one, the practices of the arms industry to which pacifists lodged
"grave objection" were discovered to be either inaccurate or nearly harmless.
An example of the weakness of the pacifist case was the charge that the arms
lobby was controlled by defense contractors and that it was darkly influen-
tial. The Nye committee repeated the charge made twenty years earlier by
Congressmen Henry Tavenner and Claude Kitchin and by the automaker
Henry Ford that the Navy League was financed by warmongers and profiteers.
Under close inspection, however, the committee investigators discovered that
the Navy League received but $1,785 per year from shipbuilders. Most of its
income came from members' dues and rental of real estate, and its member-
ship was drawn from many different walks of life. The expenditures of the
Navy League were nearly inconsequential when compared with the budgets of
leading pacifist organizations. The annual budget of the National Council for
the Prevention of War was $100,000, the National Peace Conference received
$15,000 per year from the Carnegie Endowment, and the Women's Interna-
tional League of Peace and Freedom budgeted $50,000 for its 1931-32 cam-
paign. Nye admitted that nothing adverse had been found against the Navy
League.59
It was true that some defense contractors maintained lobbyists in
Washington, but this was neither improper nor abnormal, if not entirely desir-
able. The principal builder of submarines, the Electric Boat Company, pro-
vided its lobbyist with a fifty-foot yacht, which he used to entertain naval
officers and congressmen. While this was a conspicuous and certainly ques-
tionable privilege, it was insufficient to establish a case that entertainment pro-
vided by the defense industry was exceptionally lavish. Other organizations,
such as the National Rifle Association and the industry-subsidized Inter-
national Congress of Gun Makers, lobbied against nationalization of arms
manufacture and restrictions on the overseas sale of sporting arms, but this
was hardly illicit.60
Another line of inquiry proved even less productive. Raushenbush as-
signed an investigator to determine the extent to which the arms industry had
exercised control over the nation's press to bring about intervention in Europe
in 1917. Editorials in sixty-nine papers in twenty-five midwestern and southern
states were evaluated for influence by the arms industry. The anonymous in-
vestigator reported confidentially, "I doubt seriously that any of these news-
papers were bought." Most midwestern papers favored preparedness before
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American entry. In Iowa (where military business was negligible), a Nye survey
discovered that there were eight times as many daily papers favoring prepared-
ness as opposing it. The fact was that there was almost no arms industry in the
United States in 1914-15, American public opinion became pro-Ally even before
arms sales surged, and most U.S. loans to Britain and France were to support
purchases of nonmilitary goods. There was also no evidence that the fledgling
munitions industry defended its stake in the Allies.61
Still another charge that proved to be weakly grounded was the claim that
in the 1930s the international arms trade fomented war for profit. In the first
place, the military trade was not a large part of most arms producers' business.
In the early 1930s, no major U.S. firm depended exclusively on military con-
tracts. The division of the Du Pont company that made powder for military
use was last in sales of the firm's ten divisions. Its sales constituted only 1.08
percent of its parent firm's sales for the decade 1923-32. Bethlehem Steel's mili-
tary sales were only .36 percent of total sales, although Midvale Steel sales were
12.74 percent military. In the second place, overseas sales were simply not a
major portion of the arms industry; only 3 percent of world arms sales were in
the export trade, only ten countries exported arms, and only three of them
(Britain, France, and the United States) controlled 75 percent of the world
market. Yet even Britain, the world's leading arms exporter, sold only 10 per-
cent of its arms production in foreign markets. Of American firms, the Colt's
Patent Fire Arm Company sold about 10 percent of its production abroad, and
the Remington Arms Company sold only .5 percent overseas. Of course, the
small present size of the world arms market did not preclude a greedy arms
maker from seeking to enlarge it by setting off a war, but evidence that this was
happening was missing.62
There was evidence, however, that some of the practices of arms salesmen
were suspect. During the early 1930s, American arms firms were busily serving
markets in places of international strife, most notably in Asia and in South
America. These brushfire wars abroad, now mostly forgotten, raised trouble-
some issues that have endured. Questions arose as to when, under what cir-
cumstances, and in what degree the United States should become involved in
disputes that originate abroad.
An early example was the conflict that developed between China and
Japan. This commenced with Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931, followed by
a decade of intermittent fighting. China moved to build up its military forces
to meet the Japanese threat, and this reopened opportunities for arms sales—
and profits—to American producers. (As early as 1915, a consortium of six
American firms contributed $l,ooo each to hire a former naval officer, Captain
I. V. Gillis, as their sales representative in China.)63
The question was what should be the American policy toward Japanese ag-
gression. Liberals, internationalists, and some pacifists demanded that trade
sanctions be imposed against Japan, and their views were voiced by the
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Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers. Farmers, importers, exporters, and fi-
nanciers opposed trade cuts, because they were disturbed about the detrimen-
tal effects of reductions in foreign sales on the depressed economy. They were
joined by religious pacifists, who worried that sanctions would invite military
retaliation.64 Their greatest fear was that the selfish interests of the arms ex-
porters would decide this issue of potentially great national consequence. In
December 1931, Representative Hamilton Fish Jr. of New York introduced a
resolution to embargo all sales of arms to belligerents, a move that was in-
tended to cut off sales to both Asian powers. In 1932 lobbying by the arms in-
dustry helped to kill the Fish resolution. In 1933 the U.S. Army Air Corps
cooperated with the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation to sell 122 warplanes
to China, and Curtiss-Wright began to build an aircraft factory there. This led
to the pacifist charge that American munitions makers were attempting "delib-
erately to exacerbate Japan's war psychosis."65
In the early 1930s fighting flared up in South America. The most notable of
the conflicts pitted Bolivia against Paraguay over control of the Chaco Boreal,
but in 1933 a second clash developed between Colombia and Peru. Since none
of these nations maintained a significant arms industry, all needed to purchase
arms abroad. These requirements tested American policy, as many Americans,
supported by the League of Nations' Chaco Commission, believed that a U.S.
embargo would throttle the belligerents and force an end to hostilities. It was
troublesome and embarrassing to discover that while the war raged, no fewer
than five American arms firms advertised in a single Bolivian newspaper in
search of arms contracts.66
The Chaco war led Congress finally and belatedly to ratify the Geneva
Arms Traffic Convention of 1925. This reversal also led to the establishment by
the Neutrality Act of 1935 of a National Munitions Control Board, which soon
began to issue licenses for arms sales abroad. Even with licensing going into
effect, the Nye committee suspected that American munitions firms opposed a
boycott of belligerents in order to enhance their profits. It began an all-out
effort to document the sinister practices of the arms industry by exposing its
behavior in South America. The Nye committee discovered a story that was
much more complicated than it had imagined.
In 1920 the United States had commenced a program designed to bolster
the defenses of South America by encouraging those nations to boost the size
of their fleets. The theory was that if South American countries maintained
powerful navies, the U.S. Navy could be relieved of part of the cost of defend-
ing the Western Hemisphere. Accordingly, on 5 June 1920, Congress formally
permitted officers of the U.S. Navy to accept payments from South American
countries. This would allow them to serve as advisers, while passing the cost to
the South Americans. Pursuant to a policy approved by Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes and by Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur, a United
States Naval Mission to Peru was appointed.
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These American officers were expected to serve as agents who would en-
courage the Peruvians to purchase U.S.-made ships (which could operate in
close collaboration with the U.S. Navy). The Peruvians were indecisive, so the
American naval representatives tried to arouse public interest, encouraging the
Peruvians to borrow to finance naval spending. American shipbuilders were
nevertheless reluctant to enter the Peruvian market, fearing (for good reason)
the strength of Peruvian credit. Thus the origins of American arms sales to
South America had come at the request of the United States government, not
the shipbuilders, who were in fact hesitant to enter the market.67
Even more disturbing than these and other conflicts of interest were some
of the sales practices used by the arms merchants.68 One such questionable
practice was the alleged willingness of American dealers to sell to both sides
in a struggle, which would needlessly amplify the carnage. Curtiss-Wright
was supposedly willing to sell warplanes to both Colombia and Peru, and
the Electric Boai Company was reputedly ready to sell submarines to both
Argentina and Brazil. On careful inspection, however, this double-dealing
was difficult to establish, since a belligerent nation was usually unwilling to
patronize a firm that also supplied its enemy. I. J. Miranda, a partner in
the American Armament Corporation, wrote that in the dispute between
Colombia and Peru, "We can't sell to both." He advised choosing Colombia,
"because they have money." (In 1930 Peru had purchased twenty-six military
planes from the United Aircraft Company for $745,000. When the Depression
struck, the Peruvian government defaulted, and United Aircraft was forced to
accept payment in the form of 60,000 tons of guano delivered over five years.
Miranda understandably did not want to be paid in guano.)69
Arms salesmen were also prepared to engage in commercial bribery and
scare tactics, Nye investigators learned. Bribery was so rampant in dealings
with South American governments that the only remarkable discovery was
that the United Aircraft Export Company alone refused to employ this strata-
gem. Meanwhile, a Du Pont agent bribed the son of the president of Argentina,
Federal Laboratories used bribery in Costa Rica, and Colt's Patent Fire Arms
firm employed bribery throughout Latin America. The Nye committee was
shocked when they learned that the American Armament Corporation repre-
sentative casually referred to bribery money as "palm oil" and used the verb "to
grease" when he meant "to bribe." American arms salesmen were also willing
to use the tried-and-true tactic of warning against enemy purchases. For ex-
ample, in order to sell airplanes to Peru, one firm told the Peruvians that the
Colombians were "still purchasing heavily."70
Although evidence of commercial bribery in any form was repugnant to
most Americans, the unpleasant reality was that it was the modus operandi in
much of the world. For that reason, it was not entirely inexcusable, as some
pointed out. To the moralists of the Nye committee, this was no justification.
They argued that the real danger loomed not from the act of bribery itself but
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from the creation of a class of people who lived by bribing governments into
augmenting their arsenals. This allegedly promoted arms races, which in turn
invited the outbreak of war.71
The Nye committee was unable to produce proof of this link and in fact
discovered evidence to the contrary. Nye summoned the president of Colt's
Patent Fire Arms Company, Samuel M. Stone, to testify and insinuated that
Colt's had known of the coming of the European war in 1914 and had encour-
aged it. When Colt's records were examined, however, they disclosed that Colt's
general sales manager had indeed spent the early months of the war attempt-
ing to drum up business on a long sales trip, but the expedition took him not
to Europe but to South America! In an August 1934 report to Arthur
Vandenberg, Raushenbush admitted the failure of his investigators to find the
proof they sought: "We have not yet found the man we are looking for, who is
going around the South American countries selling them wars . . . but we have
some good half-cousins of his." Unfortunately for Nye's reputation, half-truths
were the best they could ever collect.72
Another area in which Nye's hounds thought they caught a scent was in
price collusion among naval shipbuilders. The prime evidence of collusive bid-
ding, which had been often charged, was that contracts advertised for the con-
struction of destroyers and cruisers in private shipyards had yielded offers that
were suspiciously close in price. Bids submitted in the early 1930s by four sepa-
rate yards for the construction of cruisers varied less than 1 percent, which the
investigators assumed was due to collusion. Collusion was easy to infer but dif-
ficult to prove. To reduce costs, the U.S. Navy frequently ordered that several
ships be produced from the same design. Since the cost of materials was simi-
lar for each builder, and since the blueprints were the same, major differences
in construction costs were unlikely. Moreover, the existence of a market with
only one customer (the navy) and only three or four firms capable of building
large warships could never be perfectly competitive. These facts did not greatly
trouble the investigators, who searched industriously for bid-rigging. But a
confidential memorandum circulated within the committee reported that in-
vestigators found "no evidence of collusion on the bids for destroyers." The in-
vestigator added that "frankly, after reviewing all the material, it doesn't seem
to show PROOF of collusion, but it would seem that some general under-
standing was in existence." The basis for this allegation of informal collusion
was that each shipbuilder figured the cost of construction and then added an
identical profit margin—10 percent.73 This was a very weak reed on which to
hang a charge of conspiracy, but that did not bother the Nye committee, which
never reported to the public its failure to establish collusion.
The Nye inquiry did uncover the complexity of the issues of warship con-
struction when it determined that the average cost of constructing a cruiser in
a private shipyard was $1.3 million less than in a government-owned facility.
This was because wage rates in government yards were 20 percent higher than
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in private industry, the government granted twice as much vacation time, and
the machinery in government yards was obsolescent. When the private ship-
builders added on their profit margin, however, their prices exceeded the cost
of construction in government yards. It was far from clear, nevertheless, that
private shipbuilders had been overcharging the government, because in 1935
the government shipyards needed renovation in the amount of $23.6 million
because of their failure to include depreciation as a cost of construction. Nor
was lobbying for shipping contracts the sole province of private shipbuilders.
Workers in public shipyards aggressively lobbied their elected representatives
to obtain contracts. Complete nationalization of warship construction, as
most of the Nye group preferred, would not necessarily have eliminated super-
fluous building.74
The squall that finally capsized the Nye investigation developed early in
1935 when the munitions committee centered its inquiry on American entry
into the Great War. As developing events in Europe and Asia became increas-
ingly ominous, Nye directed the committee's attention toward preventing
American participation.75 The centerpiece of the plan was to establish that the
United States had been fooled into entering the war by greedy businessmen.
The chief obstacle to making this case was that it required a grave indict-
ment of the Wilson administration. Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose patronage
the Nye committee needed, was only one of many Old Wilsonians who still
participated actively in the nation's affairs. Woodrow Wilson had a legendary
ability to inspire affection among his subordinates, and their devotion was as
lasting as it was deep.76 Wilson loyalists rankled when the upstart Republican
from North Dakota criticized their captain.
Former secretary of war Newton D. Baker was among the first to point out
conspicuous flaws in the variant of the Merchants of Death theory espoused
by the Nye group. Baker noted that when war broke out in Europe there was
no munitions industry in the United States that could dictate policy. In fact,
one of Baker's main problems had been a major shortage in defense contrac-
tors capable of producing the implements of war that the nation required.77
Investigations by the Nye committee confirmed Baker's analysis, but this in-
convenient discovery was kept confidential.78
Not troubled by the absence of a munitions industry to impeach, the mu-
nitions committee turned to bankers, who were an easy target in the depths of
the Depression. The argument here was that the bankers had loaned millions
to the Allies, and the presence of these debts deterred Wilson from imposing a
trade embargo.79 It was an undeniable fact that the United States had accumu-
lated a huge credit against the Allies and that the British representative in the
United States, the House of Morgan (which Nye deeply distrusted),80 had ac-
tively encouraged the extension of these loans. The awkward aspect of this sce-
nario was that before the grant of credit (as Secretary of State Robert Lansing
noted at the time) public opinion had "crystallized in favor of [Great Britain]
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to such an extent that the purchase of bonds would in no way [compromise
neutrality] or cause a possibly serious situation."8' The Wilson administration
had thus considered the potentiality that the loans could commit the United
States involuntarily to the Allies, but it had rejected this danger because public
opinion already supported them. The bankers, moreover, were pro-British
before their profits began to rise due to war sales. Lansing argued in his mem-
oirs that American businessmen who were profiting from sales created by the
war in Europe opposed U.S. entry. This stood the Merchants of Death theory
on its head.82
The Nye committee uncovered additional embarrassing evidence that did
not fit its munitions-maker conspiracy thesis. Secretary of State Lansing had
published contemporary letters that revealed his state of mind at the time he
became an interventionist. "Everywhere German agents are plotting and in-
triguing," wrote Lansing. "From many sources evidence has been coming until
it would be folly to close one's eyes to it German absolutism is the greatest
menace to democracy." This confirmation that the Wilson administration was
doing in private exactly as it publicly stated was part of a confidential memo-
randum by Stephen Raushenbush circulated within the Nye committee. Since
it did not fit the munitions-maker hypothesis, it did not become part of the
committee's findings.83
The Nye committee's most serious blunder was its ad hominem attacks on
Old Wilsonians. The first person subjected to reproach was Bernard Baruch.
Since a major goal of the Nye committee was to destroy the view that the War
Industries Board had worked cooperatively with selfless dollar-a-year men,
Baruch as an obvious target. Baruch, moreover, disagreed with the fundamen-
tal direction of the Nye investigation. He testified that in his opinion high taxes
during wartime might interfere with war production, which was the view held
by most departments of the Roosevelt administration, including the War
Department. As a result, Nye investigators sought to examine Baruch's income
tax returns for 1917 and 1918, evidently in order to establish a claim that the
WIB chief was a war profiteer himself. The tax returns, which were almost two
decades old, had been destroyed. The Nye committee made this public, imply-
ing that Baruch had concealed his ill-gotten gains. Baruch denounced this tes-
timony appropriately as "cheap and unjust."84
Although Baruch was Nye's most prominent opponent in the defense con-
tracting debate, he was a minor personage compared with the major quarry,
Woodrow Wilson himself. Nye and Raushenbush hoped to demonstrate that
Wilson had lied to the American people about the reason for American inter-
vention in 1917. The committee released evidence purporting to show that
Wilson and Lansing had been informed in April 1917 of the existence of the
famous "secret treaties" linking victory to territorial gains for the British and
French empires. Since Wilson and Lansing later testified that they had been
unaware of the treaties' existence, this would establish that the Wilson admin-
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istration had lied to the American people about the fundamental purpose of
the war.85 If the publicly stated reasons for American entry could be demon-
strated to be untrue, Nye's revisionist explanation might be more acceptable.
Nye's charge of falsification was technically accurate (more recent leaders
have been indicted in federal courts for less flagrant falsehoods),86 but it was
nevertheless politically imprudent. Wilson's many living admirers, including
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, rallied to defend their fallen leader's reputa-
tion. The Old Wilsonians proved to be far more powerful than the brash young
Republican from North Dakota. Early in 1936 the Democratic leadership in the
Senate discontinued funding for the investigation, and Nye had no choice
except to wind up the inquiry.87
The bitter controversy over American entry into World War I obscured the
impact of the Nye committee on the central problem it was originally com-
missioned to investigate, namely, war profiteering. The Nye committee's rec-
ommendations on this question were, to use Nye's apt characterization,
"drastic."88 Based on the ideas of the isolationist author John T. Flynn (who
later was a leading member of such isolationist organizations as the America
First committee and the Keep America Out of War Congress), they called for
the enactment of no less than three constitutional amendments. The first
would have allowed the government to commandeer industry, the second to
tax without uniformity (so as to soak up war profits directly), and the third to
tax interest on tax-exempt securities in wartime. Flynn believed that the
prospect of heavy taxation would make American businessmen oppose war,
and they would exert their influence to keep the United States out of the
coming European conflict. His hopes were echoed by a liberal journal, the
Nation: "Business men would become our leading pacifists." The constitutional
amendments, as well as two bills to regulate profits in warship construction,
died in congressional committees.89
Despite its failure to gain congressional approval, the Flynn/Nye plan sug-
gests the fundamental radicalism of 1935, which was the high-water mark of
the antiprofiteering campaign. The main recommendation was that the high-
est personal income allowed during wartime would be $10,000. The federal
income tax would commence at an annual income of $1,000, gradually in-
creasing to 100 percent on income over $10,000. All business profits above
3 percent on invested capital were to be confiscated by a tax of 100 percent.
This tax plan, of course, was hardly new; it was very close to what Nye had ad-
vocated well before the investigation commenced.90
The most immediate effects of the Nye investigation came in 1935. The Nye
inquiry contributed to the national mood that produced the Neutrality Act of
i935> which established the National Munitions Control Board.91 Chaired by
the secretary of state but including representatives of the War, Navy, Treasury,
and Commerce Departments, the Munitions Control Board was granted au-
thority to license peacetime arms sales abroad. This innovation, which would
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eventually have passed without the Nye committee, was a variation of earlier
proscriptions against trading with the enemy in that trade with a potential
enemy was now impermissible. The Munitions Control Board held its first
meeting on 24 September 1935, and in the next two months approved 132 li-
censes for arms export to thirty-four countries, excluding Italy and Ethiopia.
In one instance, the Curtiss-Wright Export Company was denied a license to
sell pursuit planes to Bolivia. The firm was permitted to fly the planes with
bomb racks removed to Chile, from which they illegally flew on to Peru.
Curtiss-Wright was indicted, and when the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Munitions Control Board, the firm had to pay a $282,000
fine. Curtiss-Wright officials were fined $2,000 each, and some were jailed for
a year and a day.92
The long-term effects of the general inquiry into war profiteering during
the 1930s and of the Nye committee have proved more difficult to gauge. The
profiteering allegations touched off an impassioned national and even inter-
national debate on the causes of war. Millions of Americans joined Nye in em-
bracing the Merchants of Death theory of the coming of World War I.93 On
6 April 1935, the eighteenth anniversary of America's war declaration, 50,000
veterans paraded through Washington in a march for peace. Six days later,
175,000 college students staged a one-hour strike against war, and by 1935 the
groups and individuals endorsing the Merchants of Death theory to at least a
limited degree included the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the railroad unions, the
American Federation of Labor, the National Grange, the National Education
Association, the Women's International League of Peace and Freedom, the
Democratic Party, President Roosevelt, and the Congregational Church. Other
supporters included influential newspapers such as the Baltimore Sun, Chicago
Tribune, and the Hearst and Scripps-Howard chains, influential journals of
opinion such as the Nation, the New Republic, Living Age, the World Tomorrow,
and the Christian Century, and such prominent scholars as Charles Beard,
Charles Tansill, and Merle Curti. Of these, the most important was undoubt-
edly the Democratic Party, which pledged in its 1936 platform "to work for
peace and to take the profits out of war; to guard against being drawn, by po-
litical commitments, international banking or foreign trading, into any war
which may develop anywhere." Evidently seeking Nye's endorsement in his
campaign for reelection, President Roosevelt issued a ringing manifesto. "If we
face the choice of profits or peace," the president declared at Chautauqua, New
York, "the Nation will answer—must answer—we choose peace." One week
later, FDR met with Nye at Hyde Park, New York, but Nye, who had been
passed over as a potential Republican nominee because of his isolationism, re-
fused to endorse the Democratic presidential nominee.94
Against this powerful array of influence, a smaller group rejected the
Merchants of Death analysis. This included the War Department, the National
Rifle Association, Old Wilsonians such as Bernard Baruch and Cordell Hull,
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industry journals such as Business Week and Army Ordnance, business spokes-
men such as Pierre du Pont and Thomas Lamont (of the Du Pont Company
and the House of Morgan, respectively), and such prominent scholars as
Norman Angell, Charles Tansill, and Jacob Viner.95 Angell, a leading British
pacifist for twenty years, was the most vigorous spokesman, writing or reissu-
ing such volumes as The Great Illusion, The Fruits of Victory, The Unseen
Assassins, and Does Capitalism Cause War? as well as delivering numerous
addresses.
Pierre du Pont, however, presented the most concise and cogent rebuttal by
arguing that wars are fundamentally bad for business. They are short, and
therefore a business cannot depend upon war profits for survival. During
peacetime, only about 2 percent of Du Pont's gunpowder production was for
military purposes. During wartime, a firm must expand hastily and expen-
sively during a tight market for both credit and labor. Civilian production lines
will not produce military goods and must be scrapped. Heavy taxes absorb
profits. Thousands of untrained workers must be hired, although the quality of
their work is dubious and their accident rate is high. Extra security guards
must be hired to protect against sabotage. Wars end abruptly, causing the mili-
tary market to vanish almost overnight. The greatest gains go to raw materials
producers—Du Pont was least accurate on this point—who reap windfall
profits but are not blamed for stirring up the conflict, as are processors.96
Despite their weakness in numbers and prestige, Nye's opponents eventu-
ally carried the day, largely because the Merchants of Death theory implied
support for isolationism, which became increasingly out of vogue as the
danger of fascist aggression loomed closer.97 By 1939 German, Japanese, and
Italian belligerence offered ample evidence to persuade all but the most faith-
ful believers in the simplistic theories of Nye and others.
Although the devil theory of war did not hold up, the war profiteering
quarrel had other substantial effects, both in the United States and abroad. In
Britain, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald ordered the establishment of a
counterpart to the Nye committee called the Royal Commission on the Private
Manufacture and Trading in Arms. After holding hearings during 1935-36, the
Royal Commission rather cautiously reported that modern arms increased the
fear of war, that arms makers were sometimes cynical, and that they employed
too many former military officers. The commission also found that arms
makers did not foment war scares nor did they control the press. Since Britain
had desperately needed foreign arms in order to defeat Germany (and might
do so again), the commission concluded that it was best to keep the arms busi-
ness private.98
In France, the Chamber of Deputies also conducted a munitions investiga-
tion. Premier Pierre-Etienne Flandin argued, like Franklin D. Roosevelt, that
taking the profits out of war "is the best means to stop war."99 Although the an-
tiprofiteering, antiwar climate led to its action (rather than the munitions in-
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vestigation alone), France nationalized its arms industry. The unhappy effect
of that decision appeared in 1940: when Nazi armies invaded France, French
defenders were fatally impaired by underspeed planes and underweight tanks.
Investigations of defense contractors also followed in Canada, Argentina, and
Sweden, without decisive results.100
The war profiteering controversy of the 1930s and the Nye committee in
particular had some considerable effect upon the mobilization for World
War II. Unquestionably, the Nye inquiry and the general clamor for a reduc-
tion in war profits strengthened the determination—already great—of the
Roosevelt administration to thwart war profiteering as much as was practi-
cable. In fact, Roosevelt became the most frequent critic of war profits of all
American presidents.
The Nye/Flynn plan for preventing war profits eventually gave way to the
fundamental concepts advocated by Bernard Baruch and the U.S. Army for the
new mobilization. Baruch, the leading critic of the Nye/Flynn plan, argued that
taxation, while it should be high, should not be confiscatory, as that would
have disincentive effects. It would also be impossible for firms to pay 100 per-
cent excess profits taxes on profits deriving from appreciation of inventory and
raw materials, as that would force them to sell off their stock. Baruch likewise
pointed out that the Flynn plan would not allow high-cost producers to con-
tribute, although their products would be greatly needed. Finally, the Flynn
plan would favor companies with large debts over those with substantial cash
on hand. Baruch argued that price control was the indispensable ingredient to
the control of profiteering.101
Still, the Nye committee affected efforts to control war profiteering during
World War II. Among the Nye committee's most controversial qualities was its
self-righteous, crusading style. Although Nye's desire to avoid another horrific
slaughter was probably well intentioned, his committee's methods ap-
proached, if they did not exceed, the limits of propriety. Besides overlooking
embarrassing facts whenever truth was inconvenient, Nye and his committee
engaged in demagoguery and character assassination that were eerily close to
the methods of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, who investigated the U.S. Army
two decades later. Nye charged, for example, that "the munition-makers... are
welded in a shrewd and secret internationale of intrigue . . . without scruple or
conscience They can rule and ruin us." Nye claimed also that "in this inves-
tigation we are penetrating the heart of the competitive, profit-seeking busi-
ness system of the world." Whereas McCarthy investigated the army, Nye said
that he was placing the War Department on trial.102
Few if any speakers have exceeded McCarthy's skill at colorful tongue-
lashing, but Nye came close. Nye charged that munitions makers engaged
in "racketeering . . . it means going out and fostering war spirit, building the
spirit of hate and fear and suspicion among nations." He denounced "public
enemies . . . who threaten and kill for profit": "Public Enemy No. 1 should be
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the munitions maker who wants to sell his powder and poison gas.... Public
Enemy No. 2. is the banker who raises money to pay for the munitions.. . .
Public Enemy No. 3 is the industrialist who knows that the only way to get fas-
cism established in America is to get the country into a war.... Public Enemy
No. 4 is the American who goes into the war zones to make money."103
Just as McCarthy was not alone in abusing opponents, Nye's colleagues
were partners in misconduct. Senator Homer T. Bone called upon his associ-
ates to "assume an attitude of sportsmanship." Bone nevertheless referred to
Sir Basil Zaharoff as "the gentleman who has made mass murder the pastime
of the world."104 An angry exchange between Senator Bennett Clark and Iren£e
du Pont went as follows: "du Pont: Do you mean that President Wilson was
dragged into the war by the heels at the insistence of the munitions makers?
Clark: I do not. I mean you set in motion a series of events that led us into
war." When du Pont protested this allegation, the senator interrupted and re-
fused to allow him to defend himself against this most serious charge.105
Senator Bone remained the uncrowned master of hyperbole: "Everyone
has come to recognize that the Great War was utter social insanity, and was a
crazy war, and we had no business in it at all. Oh yes; we heard a great deal of
talk then about 'freedom of the seas.' Whose seas? The seas upon which were
shipped munitions of war which served only to enrich a comparatively small
group of men, and whose enrichment cost this country a staggering price
Freedom of the seas! Out with such nonsense! For the sake of this fantastic
theory that could at best serve the few and not the many, thousands have died,
and our hospitals are filled with insane boys who had a right under God's
providence, to live their lives in peace. What a distortion!... National interests!
In God's name, whose interests were they? They were the 'interests' of the busi-
ness profiteers and bankers. They were not the 'interests' of those boys who are
now in the insane asylums They were not the interests of the boys whose
broken bodies lie in French soil. They were in the potential interest, if not the
direct interest, of the 23,000 new millionaires whose fortunes were soon to be
coined from widows' and orphans' tears." Not to be outdone in the demagogic
defense of women and children, Nye added that "women and children who did
lose their lives were, in effect, camouflage for covering up shipments of muni-
tions of war."106
The arguments of the munitions committee and other Great War revision-
ists had a deep and lasting effect on public opinion. In January 1937, nearly a
year after the conclusion of Nye's investigation, the Gallup poll asked
Americans if they thought it had been a mistake to enter the Great War. A rous-
ing 70 percent of the respondents declared that it had been a mistake to par-
ticipate, and 82 percent favored prohibition of the sale of munitions by private
parties. More than two years later, the persuasive power of the Merchants of
Death theory was still very evident. In October 1939, after Europe's muskets
had begun to flame again, Gallup asked the question a second time. Sixty-eight
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percent of Gallup's respondents still said that fighting the Great War had been
a mistake. When Gallup asked why the United States had entered the war, only
18 percent of Americans said that it was in defense of a just cause. Thirty-four
percent of Americans answered that the nation was a "victim of propaganda
and selfish interests."107
Nye, his committee, and the Merchants of Death theory have not lacked
defenders. Dorothy Detzer, anticipating the defense of Joseph McCarthy,
claimed that "no Senate committee ever rendered to the American people a
more intelligent or important service. It was the nation's loss that it did not
comprehend it." Charles Beard chaired a committee supporting Nye's reelec-
tion campaign in 1938. More recent scholars such as John E. Wiltz, Charles
DeBenedetti, Anne Trotter, Paul Koistinen, and Anthony Sampson have treated
the inquiry sympathetically, if not uncritically. Robert James Leonard likened
Nye to Thomas Jefferson and William Jennings Bryan, who were allegedly
well-meaning supporters of "the cause of Agrarian Radicalism." In 1987 Joan
Hoff-Wilson maintained that the Nye committee findings confirmed the eco-
nomic analysis of the origin of war advanced by Jeannette Rankin, the con-
gresswoman who voted against American participation in both world wars.108
It was an ex-doughboy, however, who became the most notable student of
the Nye committee. During World War II, Senator Harry S Truman of Mis-
souri, who had served in France as a captain of artillery, headed a committee
bearing his name that investigated abuses in defense mobilization. Truman re-
viewed the Nye committee hearings, denouncing them with considerable ac-
curacy as "pure demagoguery." He became determined that the Truman
committee would not follow the disgraced path of Senator Nye. As a conse-
quence, the Truman committee was comparatively cautious in its investiga-
tions of profiteering during World War II, and it has generally received high
marks from historians.109
Finally, the findings of the profiteering inquiries of the early 1930s certainly
helped to form public support for the Roosevelt administration's antiprofi-
teering effort during the Second World War with its high nominal income tax
rates, but that was not quite the same thing as controlling profiteering effec-
tively. The massive mobilization for World War II caused profit-control prob-
lems that were far more complicated than the misguided investigators of the
1930s ever imagined.

10
Penning the Warhog
I don't want to see a single war millionaire created in the United States as a result of
this world disaster. I think everybody is entitled to a reasonable profit.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (1940)
By the late 1930s widespread military aggression gave warning to the world that
another deadly maelstrom was forming. In the United States, internationalists
and isolationists passionately debated the appropriate American role in the
coming misfortune, and the ongoing campaign against war profits came to
assume life-or-death proportions. Opponents of American military engage-
ment battled to eradicate what they believed was the most sinister danger
facing the nation—trading in arms for profit. Internationalists campaigned to
reinforce the nation's defenses against what they thought was the paramount
threat—open attack by malicious enemies.
As Americans debated participation in what would become the most ex-
pensive war in their history, circumstances were uniquely favorable for a suc-
cessful campaign against war profiteering. The social memory of profiteering
during the Civil War and the Great War still gripped the popular imagination.
The antiprofiteering constituency was large, determined, and well organized in
Congress. The White House was occupied by an experienced, able, and popu-
lar leader who spoke eloquently and often against profiteering. The reservoir
of support for antiprofiteering measures was therefore broad and deep.
Only twenty years had passed since new techniques of controlling profits
were developed for the Great War, and the experience remained fresh in the
memories of executives seasoned during that mobilization. During the inter-
war period, there had been ample opportunity to reconsider how to manage
sacrifice equitably, and the chance had not been entirely overlooked. Economic
knowledge was more advanced in 1941 than in 1917, and as the United States
prepared for battle the procedures for controlling wartime profits were be-
coming better developed than ever before. The United States could and did
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benefit from the experience of Britain and Canada, which had a head start in
learning to share the sacrifices imposed by mobilization.
The New Deal Congress and Profiteering
The campaign against profiteering during World War II may be dated from
a late-night session of Congress in March 1934. The issue once again under
debate was the appropriate size and cost of the nation's military forces. The
result was a compromise known as the Vinson-Trammell Act, which appropri-
ated $470 million for naval construction. This measure realized a long-standing
aspiration of Franklin D. Roosevelt and other internationalists for a treaty
navy. The U.S. Navy would finally become the full equal of the British navy as
provided by the Washington and London naval treaties of 1922 and 1930.1
The naval buildup was intensely disliked by the isolationist element in
Congress. Amid cries of excessive profits in naval and aircraft construction
contracts during the long session, the "little navy" faction, in alliance with a
leftist contingent known as the Mavericks, forced the inclusion of profit re-
strictions in the Vinson-Trammell bill. Designed to thwart profiteering, this
change limited profits on shipbuilding contracts to 10 percent of the cost of the
contract and profits on all aircraft construction contracts to 12 percent of the
cost. The limits applied to all contracts valued in excess of $10,000, and the un-
allowable profits were seized by means of imposing an excess profits tax of 100
percent on the compensation that exceeded the limits. This levy was the first
true peacetime excess profits tax in American history (disregarding the muni-
tions tax of 1916). The restrictions on profits on defense contracts became
known as the Tobey amendment after its isolationist author, Republican sena-
tor Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire.2
The discrepancy between the acceptable profit levels on ship and air-
craft contracts (10 versus 12 percent) resulted from a political compromise—
military critics in the House of Representatives wanted 10 percent on both
ships and aircraft whereas the Senate held out for the 12 percent figure for air-
planes. A faction of western senators, known as the Sons of the Wild Jackass,3
preferred spending defense funds on aircraft rather than on warships. They re-
garded airplanes as a cheap means of building a continental defense, and they
perceived naval vessels as expensive subsidies to northeastern financial inter-
ests. Warships were also judged undesirable because ships seemed more likely
to be employed in distant imperialist wars.
The Tobey amendment, hastily attached to the Vinson-Trammell Act
almost as an afterthought, was never debated by the appropriate congressional
committees. It proved to be exceptionally ill advised: one New Dealer later de-
scribed it aptly as "a snare and a delusion." It applied to only two industries—
shipbuilding and aircraft—leaving all other military contractors unaffected.
Hence a contractor could manufacture a machine gun for a tank without
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being subjected to a profit restriction, but if a machine gun were installed on
an airplane, the 12 percent limitation applied. The limitation on profit to a per-
centage of cost also encouraged wasteful charges. The higher the contract
price, the greater the allowable profit. The profit limitation bore no relation-
ship to the contractor's actual investment or risk, and it was an administrative
nightmare. Every subcontractor for minor parts on ship and aircraft contracts
had to establish an elaborate and expensive cost accounting system that could
differentiate between that part of his business which was covered by the
Vinson-Trammell Act and that which was not. He also had to admit to his fac-
tory a corps of federal auditors who would police his costs. In a perplexing
borderline case, there was even a question whether an amphibious aircraft
legally fell under the 10 percent restriction as a boat or under the 12 percent re-
striction as an aircraft. Finally, as an excess profits tax the Tobey amendment
was a poor producer of revenue. In its first six years of operation, the Treasury
Department recovered only $3,700,000 on a total of 2,577 contracts and sub-
contracts.4
Despite their clumsiness, the profit restrictions remained in effect until
1940. Although the restrictions partially satisfied the isolationist appetite, they
severely damaged American defense readiness. They did not seriously impair
the ship construction program, which proceeded on schedule, but the limita-
tion on profits did serious damage to the aircraft industry, as Jacob Vander
Meulen has shown and as the Roosevelt administration realized. Throughout
the 1930s the aircraft industry was starved for funds and basically survived due
to the dedication of its leaders and to export sales. This lack of support for mili-
tary aviation by the Congress exacted a terrible price; when the United States
entered the war, many brave pilots lost their lives in slow and obsolete aircraft.5
Only the Curtiss P-40 even approached the ability of state-of-the-art enemy
planes, and it arrived belatedly. For once in American history, profits in the de-
fense business were much too low.6
The lesson of the price of technological obsolescence during the Great War
was there for anyone to learn, but it was not the only lesson that was disre-
garded. In an extraordinary irony, the provision of the Vinson-Trammell
Act that allowed contractors a greater profit on sales of warplanes to foreign
governments proved to be counterproductive. Intended to rein in the "Mer-
chants of Death," the profit restriction actually encouraged military contrac-
tors to go abroad seeking markets for warships and warplanes. It invited
American firms to overlook the needs of the United States military in prefer-
ence for more lucrative foreign markets, often in Latin America.
Besides the Vinson-Trammell Act, the antiprofiteering campaign of the
late 1930s featured a continuation of the American Legion's campaign for
a universal draft. First approved by the Legionnaires in 1922, the universal
draft idea appeared in various forms for the next fifteen years. The versions
differed slightly, but the plan intended to equalize wartime sacrifice through a
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combination of excess profit taxes, price fixing, and conscription of man-
power, capital, and labor. The House Committee on Military Affairs held hear-
ings on the plan in 1924, and it remained before the Congress continually until
1938/ Although the excess profits taxes, price fixing, and conscription of man-
power and capital provisions were broadly acceptable, one aspect of the uni-
versal draft concept repeatedly led to its defeat. The American Federation of
Labor was resentful of the wartime inflation of 1917-18, and it used its consid-
erable political influence to thwart any form of the universal draft plan that in-
cluded conscription of labor.8
In 1935, at the peak of pacifist enthusiasm, the House of Representatives
voted to approve a variation of the universal mobilization concept that met the
AFL objection. The Legion plan emerged almost intact from the Committee
on Military Affairs, whose chairman, Congressman John J. McSwain of South
Carolina, was its longtime champion. But to placate the AFL, the House, after
a six-day debate, deleted the provision establishing a labor draft, enabling the
measure to win overwhelming approval. Without conscription of labor the
"universal draft" was hardly universal, so the plan died quietly in the Senate
Finance Committee. Although the universal draft never again came close to
passage (partly owing to McSwain's death), its continuing advocacy brought
publicity and support for its major features—excess profits taxation and price
fixing. These provisions formed the heart of the antiprofiteering campaign
during World War II.
FDR's Campaign against War Profits
During the prewar period Franklin D. Roosevelt led the nation with great po-
litical courage and exceptional wisdom. He rightfully called upon his often re-
luctant countrymen to resist the menace of fascism. He led a successful
campaign to begin to build the tools necessary to defeat the Axis—50,000
planes each year. But he also led in asking for the conversion of the economy to
be managed in such a way that no one gained an unfair advantage. If the sacri-
fices could be borne equitably, as a great democracy should, there would be no
bitter aftertaste when peace was restored. There would be no angry investiga-
tion by a second Gerald Nye.
By 1937 the emerging danger of war compelled increased attention to
American defenses. In January 1938, following new Japanese attacks in China,
Roosevelt asked Congress to accelerate the ship construction program by 20
percent. In October 1938, reacting to Adolf Hitler's announcement of increased
spending on fortifications, the president asked Congress to appropriate an
additional $300 million, to be spent mostly on aircraft. In January 1939, he
raised the figure to $500 million.9 These increases were only the beginning, as
expenditures rose massively in every year until 1945. Appropriations of this
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magnitude forced a general reconsideration of military contracting proce-
dures, which commenced before the United States formally entered the war.
Although Congress ultimately approved Roosevelt's requests, it did not do
so without opposition. The isolationist, continentalist, antiprofiteering per-
suasion held significant strength in Congress and the nation. The president
therefore mounted an exceptionally vigorous campaign to neutralize his
adversaries by promising to stop profiteering. He was ideally qualified to do
so. Of all American presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt had the greatest amount
of direct personal experience with the administration of military contracts,
having served for eight years as Wilson's assistant secretary of the navy. Only
Herbert Hoover, who was Wilson's food administrator, could rival Roosevelt in
experience.
Roosevelt's chief responsibilities as assistant secretary were to supervise the
navy's shore installations. He was much involved in purchasing commodities
consumed by the navy: coal, textiles, shellac, tobacco, and so forth. Roosevelt
became a foe of collusive bidding and sought in various ways to break it up.10
Charges that defense contractors had profited improperly were personally
damaging to Roosevelt and politically damaging to the Wilson administration,
and Roosevelt attempted to deflect them. In testimony before a congressional
committee, Roosevelt disagreed publicly with his immediate superior, Navy
Secretary Josephus Daniels, who was extremely suspicious of contractors' prof-
its. Roosevelt privately asserted that "nine-tenths of these allegations are en-
tirely false."11 Roosevelt took the position that profits were lower than Secretary
Daniels claimed. By World War II, however, Roosevelt had moved closer to
Daniels's position.12
To an astute politician like Franklin D. Roosevelt there were several lessons
to be learned from the Merchants of Death controversy of the early thirties.
He realized that the Senate munitions investigations were immensely popular
and that they could be used to defeat his political goals and to damage his repu-
tation. Roosevelt was determined not to let that happen. In a May 1934 mes-
sage to Congress pledging his cooperation with the leaders of the inquiry,
Senators Gerald Nye and Arthur Vandenberg, Roosevelt very nearly endorsed
the Merchants of Death theory. He declared that the arms race was a "grave
menace to the peace of the world . . . due in no small measure to the uncon-
trolled activities of the manufacturers and merchants of engines of destruc-
tion."13
Yet only six months later, Roosevelt preempted Nye and Vandenberg by an-
nouncing that he had formed his own committee to study war profits. He
commented that "those of us who served in the World War know that we got
into the war in a great hurry. . . . As a result, we muddled through the war and
did a lot of things we should not have done. . . . We have decided that the time
has come when legislation to take the profit out of war should be enacted....
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Everybody in the country knows what munitions profits and other profits
meant during the World War.... A good many things happened that, perhaps,
headed us for the unfortunate ten-year period [the Depression],... such as
overproduction, enormous salaries, enormous profits, and . . . unequal mobi-
lization."14
Roosevelt's distinct reasons for organizing his own study of war profits
remain obscure. He often veiled his real purposes, once remarking, "I never let
my right hand know what my left hand does." The White House munitions
"investigation" was a prime example of such practiced ambiguity. Conceivably,
Roosevelt was looking for jobs for Hugh S. Johnson and Bernard Baruch,
whom he appointed as the cochairmen, but more likely he aspired to undercut
and co-opt the Nye investigation. He almost certainly distrusted the direction
that the isolationists Nye and Vandenberg might take. Nye's ambition was to
nationalize weapons production, and the Senate investigation might build mo-
mentum for nationalization. Roosevelt opposed this, and therefore he resolved
to keep firm personal control over mobilization policy.15
Whatever his precise purpose, Roosevelt nevertheless helped the Nye com-
mittee obtain its initial appropriations, and he maintained that both the
Nye committee and his own committee were working toward a "common
objective—to take the profits out of war."16 Yet although Roosevelt had publicly
proclaimed his opposition to war profiteering, as early as 1934 the depth of his
commitment to controlling profiteering became suspect. The Baruch-Johnson
war profits investigating committee never met, nor did it issue a written
report.17
As the possibility of war increased in the late 1930s, Roosevelt developed a
new reason for opposing war profiteering. The immense popularity of the
campaign against war profits demonstrated to Roosevelt and everyone else
who thought about it that if the American people were to be persuaded to sup-
port larger military appropriations they would have to be assured that there
would be no repetition of the profiteering controversy of 1917-18. In vetoing a
1935 bill to satisfy the doughboys' demands for a postwar bonus, Roosevelt
wrote, "I have much sympathy for the argument that some who remained at
home in civilian employ enjoyed special privilege and unwarranted compen-
sation. That is true—bitterly true—but a recurrence of that type of war profi-
teering can and must be prevented in any future war." But although FDR
demurred, Congress was in a mood to rectify the error of the past war. When
the bonus bill was introduced in the election year of 1936, both the House and
Senate overrode the veto, and the doughboys finally got their cash bonus.18
FDR became convinced that the United States must assist England and
France in their stand against fascism. He also urged the nation to rearm in
hope of possibly deterring a future German attack. But he realized he could
never hope to win his countrymen's support for rearmament if they believed
that the sacrifices it would entail would be borne unfairly. Referring to the
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profits of the Great War, Roosevelt pleaded, "I invite the Congress and the vet-
erans to join with me in progressive efforts to root a recurrence of such injus-
tice out of American life."19
Throughout the prewar period, Roosevelt remained an articulate, forceful,
and frequent opponent of war profiteering.20 When he requested an increase in
defense spending in 1938, he asked for companion legislation for the "preven-
tion of profiteering and equalization of the burdens of possible war." In a state-
ment following the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands in 1940, Roosevelt said, "I
don't want to see a single war millionaire created in the United States as a
result of the war disaster."21 Shortly after the invasion of Norway, he declared in
a radio address that "our present emergency and a common sense of decency
make it imperative that no new group of war millionaires shall come into
being in this nation as a result of the struggles abroad. The American people
will not relish the idea of any American citizen growing rich and fat in an
emergency of blood and slaughter and human suffering." Almost every month
throughout the course of the war a similar sentiment emanated from the
White House. The president publicly declared his determination to arrest war
profiteering in press conferences, fireside chats, messages to Congress, execu-
tive orders, and public addresses—a total of at least thirty-four occasions.
Privately, he confirmed his distaste for profiteering to his personal aide and
close confidant, William D. Hassett.22
The president's antiprofiteering campaign had several effects. Every new
act of fascist aggression weakened the theory that arms "traffickers" were ma-
nipulating the United States into war again, and certainly Roosevelt's constant
assurances that war profits would not be allowed also contributed to the
demise of the Merchants of Death hypothesis. As Germany's army swept across
Europe and then launched a devastating air attack on Britain, a dramatic
change in public opinion took place. A Gallup poll taken in November 1940
found that the American people, by a margin of 41 percent to 39 percent, had
reversed their verdict of a year earlier: the Great War had not been a mistake.23
The increasingly clear danger posed by Nazi Germany undoubtedly accounted
for the switch, but Roosevelt's antiprofiteering policy helped to make his rear-
mament program more palatable to the numerous isolationists, pacifists, and
other doubters who opposed it.
In keeping with Roosevelt's words, and in deference to the political strength
of the antiprofiteering bloc in Congress, until 1940 the Vinson-Trammell Act
remained the centerpiece of the effort to control war profits, despite its glaring
deficiencies. In October 1939, Roosevelt successfully deflected an attempt by a
contingent of liberal congressmen led by Jerry Voorhis of California to
broaden Vinson-Trammell. The Voorhis plan would have made the Vinson-
Trammell profit restriction apply to all munitions manufacturers, not just
shipbuilding and aircraft. But in 1939 Roosevelt wanted neither to levy new
taxes nor to do anything that would inhibit the prosperity deriving from
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steadily rising sales of arms to foreign customers. As he told his chief poli-
tical aides early in 1940, "Let's be very frank. These foreign orders mean pros-
perity in this country and we can't elect the Democratic Party unless we get
prosperity and these foreign orders are of the greatest importance."24
The Demise of Profit Limitation
It is one thing to set forth noble ideas, another to put them into effect. Just as
the aircraft industry would strain mightily to fill the president's request for
new planes, the nation's political system would be greatly strained to fulfill its
democratic obligation of equal sacrifice. In 1940 Roosevelt's mobilization
policy included a comprehensive program that would eliminate the cumber-
some Vinson-Trammell Act, encourage business to enter defense production,
and establish a new excess profits tax to distribute the economic sacrifice equi-
tably. Such a program would be difficult to obtain at any time, but in 1940
Roosevelt's ability to achieve prompt action was hampered by two very impor-
tant factors: a multitude of voices were competing with little direct guidance to
shape the new antiprofiteering program, and it was an election year.
If the Vinson-Trammell Act had been an efficient encouragement to
American firms to produce military goods for Britain and France, it would
have been consistent with American policy, but it was ineffective even in this
respect. Two important provisions of Vinson-Trammell worked to discourage
military production for any market, domestic or foreign. The most important
stipulation concerned the depreciation of tools and facilities used for the manu-
facture of ships and airplanes—they could not be written off against tax lia-
bilities any more quickly than facilities used for the more stable civilian
markets. The second (and less burdensome) provision specified that all con-
tracts for ships and planes had to be let through competitive bidding.
During the National Defense period, American businessmen were hesitant
to expand or convert their plants to defense production. They nourished a rea-
sonable and well-founded resistance to the idea of tooling up to serve a tem-
porary market that would abruptly evaporate when the emergency ended.
This apprehension originated in unpleasant experiences after the Spanish-
American War and again after the Armistice of 1918. More recently, painful
memories of the thousands of business failures during the Great Depression
magnified their nervousness. In 1932, at the low point of the Depression, steel
production in the United States fell to only one-sixth of capacity. A steel execu-
tive who had experienced such a decline would be imprudent if he were not
cautious about building new mills. Although American businessmen generally
backed Roosevelt's internationalist foreign policy, they understandably did not
relish exposing themselves to new charges of being fiendish merchants of
death. Eugene Grace, who had been vilified by the Nye committee, remained in
charge of Bethlehem Steel. Along with other influential steelmen and most of
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the nation's industrial leaders, Grace was militantly hostile to Franklin
Roosevelt's social policies.25
The Vinson-Trammell Act presented several serious obstacles to conver-
sion. Military contractors regularly complained that under Vinson-Trammell
they could never bid a contract accurately because the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice refused to specify in advance which production costs would be accepted as
legitimate tax deductions. In particular, a provision of Vinson-Trammell speci-
fied that tools used for the production of weapons could not be depreciated
more quickly than those used to make civilian products.26 This restriction cre-
ated an odd bottleneck. Products covered by Vinson-Trammell tax rules were
frequently produced more slowly than those which were not encumbered by
Vinson-Trammell depreciation rates. Since a weapons system usually required
tools of both types, its components would often be finished at substantially
different rates, delaying final assembly until all elements were available. In
peacetime, this impediment was a costly and dangerous nuisance, but once
war was actually impending it became intolerable.
The problem of depreciation rules on defense contracts uncovered a seri-
ous deficiency in the Roosevelt administration's antiprofiteering program. The
ancient dispute between civilian leaders who wanted to manage wartime sacri-
fice equitably and military commanders who wanted to obtain war materiel
quickly reappeared in a new guise in the early mobilization for World War II.
This time it took the form of a bureaucratic clash between New Dealers in the
Treasury Department and more business-friendly executives in the War and
Navy Departments over control of depreciation policy.
The issue arose in November 1939 in respect to a request by the Consoli-
dated Aircraft Corporation to write off in a single contract two-thirds of the
$1,800,000 in new facilities needed to build patrol bombers for the navy. The
navy cut Consolidated's request to 60 percent of the cost of facilities, and then
asked the Treasury Department to approve the write-off. Treasury refused,
on the reasonable grounds that the new buildings would not deteriorate
into worthlessness after only one contract, and therefore to approve the accel-
erated rate of depreciation "would open the door to a negation of the Vinson-
Trammell Act." In a companion decision, Treasury rejected a request from the
Electric Boat Company to write off in one contract half the cost of a new
building to be used for the construction of twenty-three submarines.27
Shortly after Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. rejected the Con-
solidated request, he and Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison became en-
gaged in what Morgenthau described as "a very heated argument" in a cabinet
discussion of the matter. Roosevelt sided with the Treasury position, asking
Edison, "Charlie, what do you want to do, just give Consolidated a handout?"
Edison replied in a succinct statement of the services' oft-expressed willingness
to overlook law and equity when these considerations interfered with a press-
ing need to obtain weapons. "Well," the secretary protested, "I can't find any
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planes." Edison and the president continued to wrangle, but in such an un-
equal contest the naval leader could not prevail. The regular depreciation rules
remained in effect until the following year.28
Soon after declaring war on Germany, Britain and France attempted to
place large orders with American defense contractors. They found that Ameri-
can tax amortization requirements severely limited their ability to obtain con-
tracts. Arthur Purvis, the chief of the Allied Purchasing Mission, sought to
place a large order for gunpowder with the Hercules Powder Company.
In order to fulfill this contract, Hercules executives would have to invest
$1,600,000 in a new factory, and they were unwilling to do so unless they were
able to depreciate their investment quickly. Purvis asked Secretary Morgenthau
for help, protesting that "they [Hercules] say they will not take any risk what-
soever." Without congressional approval, the Treasury Department quite prop-
erly refused to suspend its depreciation rules, on the grounds that to do so
"would cut the heart out of the Vinson-Trammell Act."29
When the German blitzkrieg of May 1940 ended the limited fighting
known as the Phony War, the replacement of the Vinson-Trammell Act be-
came only a matter of time. One of its chief weaknesses was that its restrictions
on profitability applied only to sales of aircraft and ships to the American mili-
tary services. The restrictions on profits did not apply to arms sales abroad.
Initially, this discrimination in favor of foreign sales did not trouble the
Roosevelt administration greatly, because after 1938 it was American policy to
assist the British and French rearmament programs in order to deter German
aggression and to create jobs at home. But when the Wehrmacht smashed the
French army, the need to accelerate American production became more press-
ing. Meanwhile, Congress, in an election year mood, actually reduced the profit
margins allowable under the Vinson-Trammell Act from 10 percent to 8 per-
cent, thereby making the defense business even less attractive than before. By
early 1940, Vinson-Trammell was seriously interfering with the vital produc-
tion of ships and planes for the American military services.30
The President Compromises
The fall of France in the summer of 1940 followed by the impending invasion
of Britain persuaded most of the nation that all impediments that hampered
military production must be removed. In practice, this meant that the selective
profit limitations and the restricted depreciation rates of the Vinson-Trammell
Act had to go. Yet, as Roosevelt kept insisting, there was general agreement that
no new crop of warhogs should be propagated. In place of Vinson-Trammell,
Roosevelt demanded a comprehensive antiprofiteering program that did not
impede military production. The defense program should not be burdened by
unwieldy profit limitations or by restrictive amortization rules, but it also
should not allow defense contractors to make unfair profits.
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In 1940 a compromise that would embody these principles began to take
shape. The Vinson-Trammell Act would be replaced by a new, more com-
prehensive excess profits tax that would feature substantially heavier corpo-
rate income tax levies. In return, the depreciation period on tools, land, and
facilities used in defense production would be reduced to five years. This accel-
erated amortization rate would be an attractive incentive for business to con-
vert to defense production, since the normal rate of amortization was ten years
for tools and twenty for buildings. The five-year depreciation period was a
minor concession by the defense contractors, who had requested a four-year
write-off. They also surrendered on another point. They had hoped to simplify
the process of obtaining approval of the faster depreciation schedule by hav-
ing the War and Navy Departments issue the required certificates of necessity,
but the government insisted that the certifying authority be shared between
military officers and civilian administrators.31 The fabrication of this compro-
mise in 1940 established the basic policy that shaped both the achievements
and the shortcomings of Roosevelt's overall antiprofiteering program.
In 1939-40 Roosevelt approached mobilization policy cautiously. He
wanted to encourage defense production, but he hesitated to alarm the public
about the great disaster in the offing. During the early 1930s the War Depart-
ment had developed an "Industrial Mobilization Plan," which envisioned a
rapid conversion of industry from peaceful to military production. The IMP
recommended the establishment of a War Resources Administration that
would be granted broad powers after "M-Day," the day when war was de-
clared. But both the all-powerful superagency and the concept of M-Day were
unpopular in 1939 and 1940. The M-Day plan had been drawn up in consulta-
tion with business, but labor representatives had been excluded, and they
correctly feared and aggressively opposed its grant of power to the military.
The M-Day plan and the superagency were too drastic for a nation that re-
mained uncertain of its proper role in the world conflict, and Roosevelt
shelved them.32
Roosevelt preferred a less threatening strategy. A few days after the presi-
dential election of 1936, and fully five years before the United States actually
declared war, Roosevelt began to consider how to organize economic mobi-
lization. By 29 August 1939, three days before Germany invaded Poland, he had
already worked out in detail his own plan for managing the wartime economy,
which he presented to the cabinet.33 Its distinguishing feature was that the presi-
dent would retain for himself primary authority over mobilization policy. In
this decision Roosevelt departed from the precedent set by his mentor,
Woodrow Wilson, who delegated great authority to manage the wartime econ-
omy to Bernard Baruch and the War Industries Board. Until 1943, in fact,
Roosevelt remained unwilling to assign to any individual or any agency broad
powers to make mobilization policy. "I am not going to give it to one man the
way the newspapers want it," Roosevelt said. "It is too big a job."34 A cohort of
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new war agencies, organized mainly according to economic function, would
report directly to the president.
Until the United States actually entered the war, Roosevelt balked at fully
revealing his mobilization plan or attempting to implement it. In May 1940, he
cautiously reconstituted Wilson's Council of National Defense, composed
of six cabinet officers, and he appointed a seven-person board with the un-
threatening title of "Advisory Commission" as its operating arm. This agency
had the real authority for organizing mobilization and was soon known as the
National Defense Advisory Commission. The main advantages of the NDAC
were that it could be formed without consulting Congress (the enabling legis-
lation remained in place), it included no controversial M-Day to threaten a
dramatic expansion of federal power, and it had no potentially controversial
chairman. There thus appeared to be no danger of an all-powerful, unelected
czar of the American economy. The most important executives were safe ap-
pointments: William S. Knudsen, president of General Motors, its coordinator
of war production, and Leon Henderson, formerly of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, its price controller. Since all seven executives reported
to the president, Roosevelt remained in control, against the advice of Secretary
of War Henry L. Stimson and others who wanted a single executive in charge.35
The NDAC was short-lived, but it played an important role in antiprofi-
teering policy. The Council of National Defense was defined by statute to in-
clude six cabinet officers, but it excluded the secretary of the treasury. With the
secretaries of war and the navy as leading players on the Council, the NDAC
pressed for a shorter period of amortization of tools and facilities for tax pur-
poses. This was what Consolidated Aircraft, the Electric Boat Company, the
British-French Purchasing Mission, and Navy Secretary Edison called for and
what Treasury Secretary Morgenthau opposed. Morgenthau reacted to this
stratagem by agreeing to a shortened amortization plan only if it were com-
bined with the replacement of the Vinson-Trammell Act by a broad new excess
profits tax. As Morgenthau explained the politics of war profits taxation, "I
don't know any better answer to the criticism that we are the war party than to
take the profits out of war. That is the best answer I know." On this point,
Morgenthau obtained the support of the president, who despite doubts about
repealing the Vinson-Trammell Act during the election campaign, thought
that the excess profits tax was popular and would help to defeat his Republican
opponent, Wendell Willkie. The congressional leadership also supported the
replacement of Vinson-Trammell with an excess profits tax.36
The Excess Profits Tax
In the heat of the campaign of 1940, the Treasury, Congress, and other agencies
began to construct the tax program that would become the centerpiece of the
effort to restrict or eliminate wartime profits. In forming the new excess prof-
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its tax, there was no shortage of time, expertise, or imagination. In late 1939
the Treasury's tax experts had begun planning for a new war profits tax by
studying the systems used by fourteen foreign countries.37 Besides its own staff,
the Treasury Department also had the finest tax economists in the United
States available for consultation.38 Even if these experts made mistakes in for-
mulating the antiprofiteering strategy, there would be ample opportunity for
correction—the excess profits tax of 1940 would be followed by a second excess
profits tax in 1941.
The perplexing riddle facing the tax planners was how to distinguish
among large profits that arose as a direct result of war contracts, those that
arose incidentally as a result of the heated-up civilian economy, and those that
were derived legitimately from superior managerial ability. The object was
to discriminate against windfall or unearned profits without punishing supe-
rior performance, and this proved to be most difficult. In order to measure
the amount of increased profits that were defense-related, the Treasury De-
partment adopted a four-year peacetime base period. Earnings that exceeded
the average of those obtained during the base period (1936-39) were consid-
ered "war profits." But this method, which followed the contemporary practice
of Britain and Canada as well as that of the United States in 1917-18, introduced
a new source of inequity. Profits in some industries were more cyclical than
others; companies that had been in the trough of their cycle during the de-
pressed preemergency period (such as machine tools) would be unfairly pe-
nalized later when the economy strengthened.39
To avoid this difficulty, the Treasury constructed a second means of distin-
guishing between legitimate prewar profits and incidental profits that de-
rived from the unexpected emergency. This was the "invested capital" method,
whereby the legitimacy of a company's profits was related to the amount of
capital invested in the venture. Secretary Morgenthau's assumption was that 6
percent on investment was a "normal" profit, and anything above that was
an "excess" profit. There was some precedent for his choice: 6 percent was the
rate that regulated utilities were customarily allowed to earn. As one Treasury
staffer added, "six percent has a sort of a traditional sound that seems reason-
able." According to the concept of excess profits, cyclical companies would be
allowed to increase their profitability until they reached the normal (6 percent)
level. The invested capital method had also been used in 1917 and 1918, when
the definition of a legitimate profit was 8 percent.40
Unfortunately for this theory, some companies were managed better than
others. The better-managed companies produced a higher return on invested
capital during peacetime than did the less efficient. (An example of a highly
profitable, well-managed firm was the large retailer, J. C. Penney. Because it
rented all its stores, Penney regularly earned 30-35 percent annually on invested
capital.) If the government began to tax the well-managed firm at a higher rate
than the less efficient, it placed itself in the imprudent position of rewarding
240 I W A R H O G S
inefficiency and penalizing superior management. Younger, growing compa-
nies tended to have a higher return on invested capital than did older, more
mature firms. Consequently, the use of the invested capital method assisted
larger, mature firms at the expense of their younger, more dynamic competi-
tors. Roosevelt liked the invested capital method best; his preference was to
attach the earnings of any firm that "has had very high earnings on the money
actually invested," regardless of the reason.41
The quandary in which the government found itself is illustrated by table 1.
Fourteen representative firms were selected by the Treasury Department for
close scrutiny. They are listed in order of the percentage of their increase in
profits in 1940 over the average of the four preceding years. American Car and
Foundry, whose profits increased nearly twelve times in 1940 over the base
period, surrendered only 2.42 percent of its total profits to the Treasury as
"excess." The Chrysler Motor Company, which had been quite profitable in the
prewar years, increased its profits by another 55 percent in 1940, but paid excess
profits taxes of nearly 15 percent. In effect, the government was treating
the better-managed firm, Chrysler, more punitively than the less efficient com-
pany, American Car and Foundry. The tax treated American Woolen even
more generously. A relatively unprofitable firm in the late thirties, its profits
increased in the first year of defense production by four and a half times.
Although this was certainly a war-related gain, American Woolen nevertheless
paid no excess profits tax whatsoever. But in the case o*~ Curtiss-Wright, a huge
manufacturer of military aircraft, the tax worked approximately as intended.
Curtiss's pretax earnings multiplied sevenfold as military contracts prolifera-
ted, but the Treasury was able to reclaim 55 percent of the profits through the
excess profits tax. Smaller aircraft firms, more recently organized than Curtiss,
suffered a considerable competitive disadvantage under the system, however.42
The Treasury Department recognized this inequity and attempted unsuc-
cessfully to rectify it in both the 1940 and 1941 excess profits acts. The Treasury
plan was to limit the amount of its prewar earnings that a highly profitable
firm could use to evade an excess profits liability. A firm that was very prof-
itable in relation to its invested capital would face enormous outlays if all earn-
ings above 6 percent were subject to a 50 percent excess profits liability. For
such a firm, the 1936-39 base period was welcome news. Although a firm might
be extremely profitable, if its profits did not rise dramatically above the prewar
period the excess profits tax would not be unduly burdensome.
The company that was most frequently discussed in this respect, and that
played an important role in the politics of excess profits taxation, was the
Coca-Cola Company. In relation to its invested capital, Coca-Cola was among
the most profitable in the nation. In 1940 it earned $44 million on an $89 mil-
lion investment—a striking 49.3 percent return. Coca-Cola profits rose sharply
in that year—47 percent above the prewar average—but not nearly so steeply
as those of firms directly engaged in defense production (see table 1). If Coca-
Table 1. Effects of the 1941 Excess Profits Tax on Selected American Corporations
Average Net Percentage of Invested
Income, Income Increase Capital,
1936-39* 1940 (1940/1936-39) 1940
Net Income as Excess
Percentage of Profits
Investment, 1940 tax 1940
Excess Profits Tax
as percentage of
1940 Net Income
American Car and Foundry
Curtiss-Wright
International Paper
American Woolen
U.S. Steel
Binks Manufacturing
Du Pont
Colt's Patent Fire Arms
Indiana Steel Products
Dexter
Chrysler
Continental Can
General Alloys
Coca-Cola
512
5,615
4,083
719
48,227
56.2
45,985
1,299
63.0
50.3
41,811
7,964
44.9
31,187
6,579
45,070
23,184
3,958
155,830
147.6
112,529.
3,167
110.7
87.0
64,806
12.236
66.8
43,876
1184.96
702.67
467.81
450.49
223.12
162.63
144.71
143.80
75.71
72.96
55.0
53.64
48.78
46.69
88,953
46,184
184,625
66,554
1,589,396
727.1
706,825
16,039
582.6
732.8
188,785
101,580
375.3
88,953
7.42
97.59
12.56
5 95
J.7J
9.80
20.30
15.92
19.74
19.00
11.87
34.33
12.04
17.80
49.3
159
24,889
7,554
31,063
31.40
36,924
991
13.3
8.4
9,708
1,729
3.3
4,325
2.42
55.22
32.58
19.93
21.27
32.81
31.29
12.01
9.66
14.98
14.13
4.94
9.86
*A11 figures in thousands of dollars.
Source: Memorandum of Dave H. Morris Jr. to Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., 31 October, 1941, Morgenthau diary,
vol. 456, pp. 202-7, in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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Cola were required to expose as excess all its profits above a return of 6 percent
on its investment, its tax burden would be staggering. Therefore, the concept of
taxing only the rise in profits, rather than the percentage of investment, was
extremely attractive to large, well-managed firms like Coca-Cola.
On the other hand, if the excess profits tax did not harvest an augmented
portion of the considerable profits of a firm such as Coca-Cola, the concept of
equality of sacrifice in wartime would be compromised. While soldiers and
sailors were being required to give their lives by the hundreds of thousands,
was it appropriate for any person or corporation to escape with an increase of
only 10 percent in its taxes over its previous liability, as did Coca-Cola? The
Treasury Department thought not, and it recommended that a limit be im-
posed on a firm's ability to reduce its wartime tax liability as a consequence of
its prewar earnings record.
This introduced a novel concept of controlling war profiteering, one which
was original to World War II. Until 1940, the basic ethical assumption sup-
porting the limitation of war profits was that while others were sacrificing
their lives, no citizen should rise economically as a consequence of the misfor-
tune. Therefore, time-honored tax policy encouraged the recovery of gains
that arose due to wartime circumstances. But the question that was new to the
latest conflict was whether a person or company ought to receive an uncom-
monly large income during wartime for any reason whatsoever. Proponents of
imposing excess profits taxes on wealth per se argued that it was immaterial
whether the income was directly derived from the war or not related to it at all.
No one should live luxuriously while others sacrificed for the good of the com-
munity. As one assistant told Secretary Morgenthau, "You are... now going on
the assumption that anything over 10 percent of invested capital is abnormal
profit, [which] hadn't been previously made."43
During the Great War, the Wilson administration had imposed an excess
profits tax that applied to any profit that exceeded 7 to 9 percent of invested
capital. The primary purpose of that tax was to produce revenue rather than to
equalize sacrifice. It worked well in respect to its central purpose, bringing in
$2 billion in 1918, but it did not directly attach the gains of those firms whose
incomes soared due to the emergency (although the 1916 munitions tax did
so). The 1917 and 1918 taxes, in keeping with the precepts of New Freedom pro-
gressivism, struck a blow against monopoly capital rather than being clearly
redistributionalist, as was the 1916 tax.44
The approach of the New Deal antiprofiteering campaign was distinctly
different. Within the New Deal entourage there were many who wanted to use
the federal income tax as an instrument of wealth redistribution as well as of
revenue acquisition. This was particularly true of the Treasury Department,
which swarmed with liberals. Secretary Morgenthau and his chief aides de-
plored the inability of previous New Deal tax policy to do enough "to curtail
bigness" in American industry. Morgenthau wanted the 1940 excess profits tax
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to succeed where the New Deal had heretofore failed—by establishing "a tax
against big business."45
The Treasury tax economists therefore designed an imaginative method of
recapturing excess profits obtained by very large, highly profitable firms such
as J. C. Penney or Coca-Cola. Neither of these firms benefited directly from de-
fense contracts, so their profits would be unlikely to increase at the precipitous
rates of large aircraft firms. Their sales and profits would certainly rise during
the war emergency, but probably not dramatically in relation to the base years,
1936-39. These firms were very profitable in relation to their invested capital, so
they would prefer to calculate their tax liability under the base years method as
opposed to the invested capital method adopted by the Wilson administration.
The Treasury plan aimed to prevent these very large, highly profitable firms
from reducing their tax exposure by filing under the base years method. To ac-
complish this, Treasury recommended a provision that no corporation be al-
lowed to escape excess profits tax liability on any profits that exceeded 10
percent of invested capital.46
This ceiling on tax exemptions was the Treasury's method of establishing
the doctrine that in the midst of sacrifice and sorrow no firm should receive a
very large profit for any reason. This novel concept gained the approval of the
president, who recommended its adoption, but in the middle of the 1940 elec-
tion campaign it was too unconventional, too liberal, and too politically risky
for Congress.
In September 1940, very few congressmen wished to honor Roosevelt's re-
quest and vote for a new excess profits tax of any kind. The need to eliminate
the Vinson-Trammell mistake and to shorten the period of amortization of
new defense facilities was clear, but voting for the excess profits tax just before
election day was emphatically not popular. Some congressional leaders sought
to decouple the excess profits tax from the other measures, promising action
after the election, but Roosevelt refused, declaring that "he had seen many glit-
tering assurances that failed to materialize."47
Roosevelt was very anxious to obtain passage of an excess profits bill before
the Congress adjourned, and thus he was willing to compromise on the details
of the plan. This willingness sounded the death knell for the 1940 session for
the concept of an exemption ceiling of 10 percent profit on invested capital.
Powerful members of Congress, including the chairmen of the House Ways
and Means Committee, Representative Robert L. Doughton of North Carolina,
and the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi, op-
posed the ceiling. Indeed, both tax-writing committees had been bastions of
conservatism during the late thirties. Only liberal Representative Jere Cooper
of Tennessee, who chaired the Subcommittee on Taxation of the House
Ways and Means Committee, remained a firm advocate of the 10 percent ceil-
ing. Cooper had suffered multiple wounds in heavy combat in France as a cap-
tain in the AEF. He was subsequently elected commander of the Tennessee
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American Legion, and he was much more committed to arresting profiteering
than his more senior colleagues. In fact, Secretary Morgenthau once remarked,
"I see Jere Cooper foaming at the mouth about the fellow who made a couple
of hundred thousand dollars while he was overseafs] getting gassed four
times."48
The congressional leaders who opposed this plan argued that large profits
were not necessarily excess profits. In effect, they rejected the idea that large
gains obtained during a national emergency were ipso facto tainted. They pre-
ferred a narrower definition of war profiteering, one that limited recoverable
profits to those earned as a direct result of the emergency. But by adopting this
argument, they opened a large loophole in the excess profits tax through which
a large share of the profits of large, very profitable firms could escape.
Roosevelt made a second effort to obtain passage of the 10 percent ceiling
in 1941, but to no avail. Always a realist, Roosevelt harbored no optimism that
he could gain congressional approval in 1941, but decided to try anyway, ob-
serving, "I am a woodchuck and I keep digging when there is a chance to dig."
Meeting with Treasury officials, the president first stated that he would like to
tax all income above $100,000 at the rate of 99.5 percent, arguing "Why not?
None of us is ever going to make $100,000 a year." Roosevelt was surprised
when he was informed that there were 1,100 taxpayers who were already in-
cluded in that category.49
Then, at the Treasury's urging, Roosevelt complained to Ways and Means
chairman Doughton that certain corporations "may be making 20 or 30 or
50 percent on their equity capital. It is my definite opinion that they ought
to contribute to the cost of our great defense program far more heavily this
year than last year or the year before. But just because they happen to have
made equally large profits in recent years, they are called on to contribute no
more . . . than they did before. That seems to me clearly a discrimination in
their favor." When Roosevelt declared that "just because they happen to have
made equally large profits in recent years" they are not required to contribute
more, he was endorsing the principle that great wealth obtained in war was
wrong, no matter how legitimately it was gained in peace. Doughton presented
Roosevelt's request to the Ways and Means Committee, where it was again de-
cisively rejected.50
Although the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance Committee
had long been known for their disinterest in the New Deal's soak-the-rich tax
creed, in 1940 and 1941 there were more tangible and immediate reasons why
they were lukewarm about the 10 percent profit ceiling proposed by Treasury
for the excess profits tax. This provision would place in jeopardy the profits of
certain large, very profitable firms located in the states represented by power-
ful committee members.
Chairman Doughton of Ways and Means represented western North Caro-
lina, and he was a longtime ally of the tobacco economy that dominated his
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state. Large tobacco firms had been exceptionally profitable during the 1936-39
base period, and they were also very profitable in relationship to their invested
capital. As a consequence, they were certain to benefit substantially from the
opportunity to use the base period method of calculating their tax obligation,
and any ceiling imposed upon their ability to do so would be very costly.
Doughton understood that imposing the ceiling would work against his con-
stituents' financial interests.51
The tax exemption ceiling faced even stronger opposition from southern
conservatives in the Senate. The most unrelenting foe was Walter George of
Georgia, whose state was home to the highly profitable Coca-Cola Company.
After Harrison, Senator George was the ranking majority member of the
Finance Committee, and he endeavored to use his influence to protect Coca-
Cola's interests. Although a Democrat, George was also a longtime enemy of
the New Deal. Roosevelt disliked George personally, and in 1938 he publicly
and personally rebuked the unfaithful senator in a daring attempt to oust him
from the Senate.52
Roosevelt's attempt to purge Walter George and other conservative
Democrats in the congressional elections of 1938 had failed miserably. George
remained in office, and he never forgave the presidential affront. George had
some credentials as a foe of profiteering, having spoken against it during con-
gressional hearings in 1924 and having served as a halfhearted member of the
Nye committee. Nevertheless, George and Roosevelt differed profoundly on
wartime tax policy. Even early in the war, George believed that the tax burden
on the middle class was too high, but not high enough on the lower class. From
this perspective, George could and did use his considerable influence on behalf
of Coca-Cola.53
In 1940 Coca-Cola was very profitable, netting nearly $44 million before
taxes, and the presence or absence of a ceiling on excess profits tax credits was
extremely important to the firm. If there were a ceiling on credits, Coca-Cola's
total tax bill would be about $33.2 million, but without the ceiling it would fall
to about $25.6 million—a savings of at least $7.6 million.54 Senator George un-
derstood the great value of this loophole to profitable corporations like Coca-
Cola and successfully forced the exclusion of the ceiling on tax credits from the
1940 excess profits tax. Congressman Cooper attempted to enlist Roosevelt's
assistance in reestablishing the ceiling with a last-minute telephone call, but
he was not successful.55 In 1941 George became the chairman of the Finance
Committee, from which position he offered minimal assistance to the ad-
ministration's antiprofiteering program.
Roosevelt's Concession to Business
By mid-1941, as direct participation in the war neared, the Roosevelt adminis-
tration's early antiprofiteering program was essentially complete. Its main
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feature, the excess profits tax, imposed steeply graduated rates on corporate
and personal incomes, more steeply graduated estate taxes, and excise duties
on luxury items. In February 1941, Roosevelt added a comprehensive system of
price controls. By imposing steeply graduated corporate and personal taxes de-
signed to arrest war profiteering, the president and Congress testified to a
desire to continue or extend into wartime the redistributional policies that
were oft-stated tenets of the peacetime New Deal.56
Congressional approval of the excess profits tax exacted a price. In order to
gain its steeply graduated levies, Roosevelt had to surrender a much-shortened
amortization schedule as an incentive for business to convert to war produc-
tion. Each corporation could determine its liability by choosing the lesser of its
profits in relation to the 1936-39 base period or to its capital investment, and
there was no upper limit to the amount of liability that could be exempted
under this provision. Both the amortization schedule and the removal of an
exemption ceiling were significant concessions; the former reasonable and
necessary, the latter less so.
Although temporarily concealed, Roosevelt's willingness to compromise
the social goals of the New Deal in order to defeat the Axis eventually became
public knowledge. In a December 1943 press conference, Roosevelt candidly
admitted that "Dr. New Deal" had been replaced by "Dr. Win-the-War." Several
students of the wartime period, including Rexford G. Tugwell, Frances Perkins,
John Morton Blum, and Warren F. Kimball, have addressed the questions of
when Roosevelt decided to compromise with corporate America, how deliber-
ately he did so, and whether he gave up too much.57
As he often said, one of Roosevelt's social goals was the elimination of war
profiteering. He followed this policy consistently from his election through
1939, when his opposition to war profits first showed signs of weakening.
In July 1939, Roosevelt began planning for new war taxes, and by September 4
he had expressed his intention to use tax incentives to spur defense produc-
tion. On 9 November 1939, Roosevelt acted on his plan by directing Secretary
Morgenthau to "work out a policy of depreciation allowance by which abnor-
mal investment in plant expansion ... will be absorbed over the life of the con-
tracts or during the emergency period." By late September 1939, when asked if
he agreed that personal income taxes should be made less progressive by in-
creasing rates on incomes in the middle and lower brackets, Roosevelt replied,
"Perfect tax program; simple; perfect!"58 These statements, in combination
with his decision in 1939 and 1940 to appoint Republican businessmen to the
key civilian positions managing the war economy, confirm that Roosevelt's de-
cision to compromise with corporate America was taken quite promptly after
the European war opened and also quite deliberately.
Writing in 1952, Rexford Tugwell, the senior member of Roosevelt's brain
trust and hence a New Deal evangelist, was among the first to identify
and comment on the president's compromise on war mobilization. Tugwell
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was generally an admirer of Roosevelt, but he was deeply ambivalent about
Roosevelt's frequently evidenced penchant for compromise. Tugwell consid-
ered Roosevelt's peacemaking initiative to American businessmen in 1939-40
to be among Roosevelt's "more serious" departures from liberal precepts, and
he questioned whether the compromise was either fully necessary or justified
by the results it brought.
In any event, the new excess profits taxes of 1940 and 1941 produced a
bountiful revenue. But as Tugwell understood and as Roosevelt surely knew,
when defense contractors received tax incentives through accelerated amorti-
zation, and when very profitable firms were allowed to escape the full impact
of the tax, the lofty goal of abolishing war profit could not be fully realized.
Roosevelt never abandoned that goal; indeed, even as he signed into law the
excess profits tax of 1940 he requested a study of its deficiencies.59 In 1941 he at-
tempted unsuccessfully to remedy the failings he found, and he continued to
pursue his objective of restricting profits throughout the war years. Roosevelt
did not survive to evaluate his efforts, but Tugwell did, and he was disheart-
ened. Even a New Deal enthusiast could hardly have failed to feel some dis-
couragement by the number of warhogs who evaded Roosevelt's efforts to
send them to market.

11
A Prescription for Profiteering
If you are going to try to go to war, or prepare for war, in a capitalist country, you
have to let business make money out of the process or business won't work.
SECRETARY OF WAR HENRY L. STIMSON (1940)
As Admiral Yamamoto feared, the Japanese victory at Pearl Harbor awakened
a sleeping giant and filled it with an awful rage. The last of the dissension that
had disabled the United States melted away, and strong public support for the
war, mixed with a perceived danger of invasion, allowed the government to
expand its role dramatically. The limited Keynesianism of the later New Deal
gave way to a modified command economy, as the federal government ob-
tained a domination of the economy unprecedented in American history.1 The
sweeping grant of power to an experienced national leadership with an ex-
pressed commitment to limiting war profits augured well for the success of the
antiprofiteering effort.
Mobilizing American industry for World War II was an enormous task.
America's role in the second great conflict of the century was certain to exceed
its earlier participation by a large margin, but it was obvious that the United
States would rely heavily on its traditional strategy of overwhelming its ene-
mies with its vastly superior productive capacity. The economic problems as-
sociated with war mobilization would differ in degree, but they would
generally correspond to earlier experiences. Many of the techniques used to
equalize sacrifice and to prevent swollen fortunes during the Great War could
be used again. These included excess profits taxation, price controls, luxury
taxes, and rationing.
The junior executives of 1917 had become the senior officials of 1941.
Memories of the Great War and its bitter aftertaste remained vivid. In case
recollections dimmed, a host of doughboys and former mentors were only too
eager to remind their proteges of past mistakes.2 When the United States en-
tered into hostilities, moreover, its problems of mobilization resembled those
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that had faced its British ally for more than two years. Thus the generation of
Americans who managed World War II had a unique opportunity in American
wartime history to learn from the experience and mistakes of others.
This opportunity was only partially grasped, unfortunately, as mastery of
war profiteering proved to be more elusive than even the most resolute war
leaders realized. The United States economy during World War II was substan-
tially a command economy, but it was a democratic government that was in
command. The power to make profit limitation policy was shared by several
governmental agencies that differed in personnel, priority, and degree of com-
mitment. In an intricate, fully mature industrial economy, the regulation of
war profits was a problem of exceptional complexity. Although certain ancient
modes of wartime wealth enhancement had been virtually eliminated, such as
ransom and trading with the enemy, other familiar forms, such as price extor-
tion and quality degradation, were more unyielding.3 By World War II they
were joined by new techniques: large corporate salaries, tax evasion, and trad-
ing on the black market. Restriction of war profits proved to be a problem ca-
pable of thwarting the best efforts of the nation's most able and committed
economic planners.
Dr. Win-the-War
Although Roosevelt never directly renounced the goal of abolishing war profit,
his admission that "Dr. New Deal" had been replaced by "Dr. Win-the-
War" acknowledged implicitly that war profit would not be entirely elimi-
nated. Roosevelt's initial insistence upon retaining personal control of mobi-
lization planning proved to be a serious impediment to attaining his goal,
substantially because his administrative abilities did not match his mastery of
political leadership. Critics of the Roosevelt presidency have often pointed to
the administrative confusion that persisted throughout most of his tenure in
office. Henry Stimson, who held cabinet posts under two other presidents as
well as serving as secretary of war during World War II, described FDR's ad-
ministrative arrangements as "inherently disorderly." Bernard Baruch observed
that Roosevelt's mobilization plan of 1939 deliberately and conspicuously re-
jected the central concept that had been found successful during World War I,
namely, a chief of the civilian economy as developed in the War Industries
Board in 1918. Baruch noted disapprovingly that Roosevelt instead reconsti-
tuted an organization that had failed in 1917 (the National Defense Advisory
Commission), only to replace it with an organizational chart whose main fea-
ture was overall supervision by the president himself. In May 1943, Roosevelt,
belatedly bowing to congressional pressure, created a superagency, the Office
of War Mobilization. James R Byrnes was its chief, but although Byrnes was
dubbed the "assistant president" for the home front, his position never bore
that full responsibility. In effect, Roosevelt needlessly retraced Wilson's serpen-
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tine administrative path. Even Eleanor Roosevelt commented that after 1940
her husband had lost his "zest for administrative detail."4
Roosevelt allowed the responsibilities of his many agencies to overlap and
then failed to referee their dissension. This was conspicuously true of his at-
tempt to formulate and implement an antiprofiteering policy in 1940-41.5
Although Roosevelt spoke early and often about controlling war profits, he
never gave antiprofiteering policy a clearly designated home, and he never
identified a clearly recognized leader of the effort. Similarly, though he sought
to maintain personal control of mobilization, he was often reluctant to burden
himself with its details.
At various times in the war, several different agencies claimed a share of the
authority to make antiprofiteering policy, but none had limiting war profits as
its primary responsibility. This omission would have telling effect as the emer-
gency developed. Although Henry Morgenthau and the Treasury Department
seized an early lead, there were a number of late entries in the race to control
profiteering policy. One of these was Harold Smith, director of the Bureau
of the Budget. Smith's institutional responsibility was to limit the size of the
deficit, so his primary interest was in augmenting revenue collection. Smith
sought to enlarge his influence from how funds were spent to how funds
were raised, and he became a champion of a national sales tax, which would
have made the tax system even more regressive than it already was. Leon Hen-
derson, Roosevelt's anti-inflation chief, also backed the national sales tax be-
cause a tax increase would siphon away spending power. Jesse Jones, as head of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, was heavily involved in the con-
struction of new defense plants. Since this involved depreciation write-offs, he
too managed to force his way into tax policy, pleading for accelerated amorti-
zation. Other agencies, such as the War Department, and other personalities,
such as James F. Byrnes, the economic stabilization administrator, and World
War I economic coordinator Bernard Baruch, were also involved. A visitor to
Washington who asked the simple question, "Who is making antiprofiteering
policy?" would have had to do some searching to find an answer. The confu-
sion was not caused by a defect in the Constitution, however. In part, it was the
fault, as Warren F. Kimball has aptly dubbed it, of Roosevelt's "debonair" ad-
ministrative style. When in 1943 Henry Morgenthau complained to the presi-
dent about infringement on the Treasury's preeminence in tax policy, FDR
ignored the jurisdiction^ dispute. He simply replied, "Aw Hen: The weather is
hot and I am goin' off fishing. I decline to be serious even when you see 'grem-
lins' which ain't there!"6
Franklin D. Roosevelt had several good reasons for opposing profiteering
and a longheld interest in doing so, but he also encountered several impedi-
ments to achieving his objective. One was personal: Roosevelt had a weak un-
derstanding of advanced economics, and he was not deeply interested in its
details. Since control of war profiteering was largely a matter of tax policy, this
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deficiency was especially severe, because FDR found the intricacies of this
dismal aspect of the dismal science particularly tedious. His lack of interest in
the technicalities of tax policy appeared early and often.7
Roosevelt's most important tax adviser was his old friend, Treasury
Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., who consistently and continuously despaired
over the president's dislike of tax matters. After a meeting in November 1938 to
discuss a special tax for defense purposes, Morgenthau wrote, "I came away
from Saturday's meeting feeling that the president was rushing the whole thing
terribly and really wasn't giving it anything like the time or thought it de-
served."8 After a 1942 visit to Roosevelt, Morgenthau recorded in his diary, "I
could tell by the look on his face that he hadn't seen the budget, and didn't
know and didn't care. He gave me the usual thing, and I said, 'Now when do
you want to take this up, Mr. President?' He said, 'Not before Christmas.' You
know what that means."9 On another occasion Morgenthau reminisced about
the experience of a former Columbia University law professor who signed on
as a tax adviser: "I will never forget. I think that Roswell Magill must have
spent a minimum of three months getting a statement ready for the president.
He had fifteen items, and he never got further than one. He came to my bed-
room up at Hyde Park after the meeting, and he said, 'God, I might just as well
go back to teaching. This is terrible.' I said, 'No, this is just Roosevelt. You did
all right.' He says, 'I never got beyond number one.' I said, 'What did you think
you were going to do?' Gee, he felt awful."10
When Roosevelt did consent to discuss tax policy, he betrayed a weak grasp
of the intricacies of the subject. The president was fond of dramatic and cli-
mactic events, not of technicalities. In taxes, he relished simplicity. Mark Leff,
the historian of the New Deal tax credo, argues that Roosevelt substituted
"vague moral principles for a coherent tax philosophy."11 Roosevelt's expressed
preference was for a gross income tax rather than a net income tax (a gross
income tax would have overlooked the cost an individual incurred in earning
his income).12 The technical aspects of tax policy that did interest Franklin
Roosevelt were chiefly those with clear political overtones. When FDR became
determined to enact an excess profits tax in 1940, he did so because he believed
it would help him win reelection, and he paid scant attention to its details. This
haste introduced significant loopholes that weakened the bill.13
Another limitation on Roosevelt's ability to restrain profiteering, according
to some writers, was that throughout the war he was so preoccupied with mili-
tary and foreign affairs that he had little or no time for war finance and other
domestic matters. But Roosevelt's control over the military apparatus was
never complete, and the attention he accorded to matters of war strategy and
tactics was never total; in fact, until 1944, much of Roosevelt's foreign policy
was conducted by his closest adviser, Harry Hopkins. No person was more de-
voted to Franklin Roosevelt than his Judge Samuel Rosenman. In August 1942,
when Rosenman was seeking presidential approval for an executive order
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freezing wages and salaries, he grumbled that "the thing that worries me is the
President is so complacent. The President doesn't devote more than two days a
week to the war.... I have been up to Shangri-La three times and he sits there
playing with his stamps [War Production Board Chairman Donald] Nelson
never gets to see him." There was ample time to give attention to domestic
policy, if that had been Roosevelt's priority.14
A final—and perhaps the most important—constraint on Roosevelt's abil-
ity to restrain war profiteering was the mixture of goals the government pur-
sued. Although Roosevelt and others forcefully articulated the government's
determination to prevent excessive profits, they even more vigorously directed
attention to the competing goal of war production. Roosevelt and the nation's
military leadership understood that the victory depended primarily on filling
the oceans with warships, the land with tanks and trucks, and the skies with
planes. The question they now addressed was how to achieve an avalanche of
production if taxes drained away all incentive and rules encumbered each stage
of the process.
Wartime Politics
Even if Roosevelt had been a superlative administrator and willing to give
meticulous attention to economic management (which he was not), political
impediments would have barred a fully harmonious antiprofiteering program.
Authority for resolving issues of public finance resided in the Congress, which
had no intention of surrendering its role for the duration of the war. Although
historians have devoted copious attention to the actions of the executive
branch during World War II, the role of Congress has received comparatively
little attention. Although Congress loyally rallied behind the president in the
dark days after Pearl Harbor, it became increasingly independent as the imme-
diate danger passed.
An aggressive antiprofiteering policy would have required the unified
backing of Congress, but Roosevelt's support for such measures was fleeting.
The war and the prosperity it brought gradually diminished approval for the
pacifist and prolabor positions that would necessarily underpin an antiprofi-
teering campaign. The strength of the liberal Democratic bloc had begun to
wane by 1938, three years before the Japanese attacked, and the trend contin-
ued throughout the war.
In the congressional elections of 1938, American voters sent eighty-one
more Republicans to the House and eight to the Senate, destroying forever the
comfortable margins that had powered the legislative victories of the early
New Deal. The staunchly liberal bloc in the House was reduced by 50 percent.
Roosevelt easily gained reelection in 1940, but his margin of victory was
smaller than in his two previous efforts and he fully understood that the fun-
damental shift in the political climate compelled him to change his methods.
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His mobilization plan marked a substantial compromise with business leader-
ship. For the duration of the emergency, he toned down but did not entirely
eliminate the blistering attacks on business he made during the heyday of class
antagonism in 1936.15
After the congressional elections of 1942, the Republican comeback was
nearly complete. The GOP increased its strength from 162 to 209 seats in the
House, leaving the Democrats with only a thirteen-vote majority. When con-
servative Democrats were added to the Republican membership, the conserva-
tive bloc held a majority of both houses. Conservative Democrats controlled
the key committees that dealt with profiteering policy: the House Ways and
Means and Rules Committees and the Senate Finance Committee. Roosevelt's
relations with Congress became increasingly strained, and in 1944 he was close
to the mark when in disgust he described the national legislature as a "Repub-
lican Congress."16
The revival of the conservative opposition to the social policies of the
New Deal had tangible effects on the antiprofiteering program. In 1942 delays
by the House Ways and Means Committee temporarily blocked a Treasury
plan to make the income tax more effective through regular payroll deduc-
tions, the now familiar pay-as-you-go system. When the Revenue Act of 1942
finally passed, it made the tax structure more regressive by imposing a flat 5
percent gross income tax. In 1943 the Congress went even further. Against
Roosevelt's wishes, it approved the "Ruml Plan," which forgave 75 percent of
an entire year's personal income tax. And in 1944, when Roosevelt asked for
$10.5 billion in new taxes, Congress responded with only a minimal $2 billion
contribution. Congress preferred to defer payment of the costs of the war
until peace returned, when the nation's tax structure would be less progres-
sive. Although Americans paid lip service to their desire to share the war
burden equitably, as John Morton Blum has observed, they refused to tax
themselves at a rate as high as did the Allies, and they evaded price controls
more frequently.17
The interplay between the social goals of the New Deal, presidential preoc-
cupation and indifference, and entrenched congressional conservatism is illus-
trated by Roosevelt's failed attempt to establish a wartime limit on executive
salaries. The New Deal had often declared in favor of wealth redistribution (al-
though its seriousness has been questioned), and the concept of limiting execu-
tive salaries in wartime to $10,000 had been proposed in Congress as early as
1935.l8 When inflationary pressures mounted in early 1942, Roosevelt resolved
that he must seek a freeze on both prices and wages. Labor was naturally quite
reluctant to accept wage controls unless management compensation was also
frozen, and farmers would be more willing to accept controls on commodity
prices if business incomes were similarly restricted. With the backing of Walter
Reuther of the United Auto Workers and William Green of the American Fed-
eration of Labor, Roosevelt in May 1942 asked Congress for legislation that
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would limit executive salaries to $25,000 after taxes. But Roosevelt's support
for the idea was tepid, and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
rejected the plan.19
Following his defeat in Congress, Roosevelt acted boldly. In October 1942,
just before the congressional elections, Roosevelt issued an executive order
limiting salaries to $25,000 after taxes. (When it became apparent that this
would work a "hardship" on certain movie stars and corporate officers, the
regulations were amended to afford them relief.)20 But the powerful Senator
Walter George disliked the plan, arguing that it was "inadvisable for a liberal
government since it penalized earned income and did not touch unearned
income." It was also opposed by Senator George Norris of Nebraska, who
thought it would aid those who were accusing the New Deal of dictator-
ship, and by Senators John McCarran of Arkansas and Robert A. Taft of Ohio,
who thought it threatened the existence of Congress. Early in 1943, subsequent
to the Republican electoral victory, an aroused Congress emphatically repealed
Roosevelt's executive order. Henceforth, executive compensation could only be
limited by taxes imposed by the legislative branch.21
Excess Profits Taxes
In early 1941, and even more so in the alarmed atmosphere after Pearl Har-
bor, Congress was willing, even eager, to expand the tax system to provide the
revenue the war effort required. Although there was general agreement that
revenues must be greatly augmented beyond the excess profits tax of 1940,
Congress was much less willing to alter the tax structure sufficiently to make it
a fully effective antiprofiteering tool.
The disincentive effects of high taxes on war production remained a con-
troversial matter throughout the war. The question often raised was how high
taxes could be raised without interfering with production. Before the war dec-
laration, army and navy procurement officers complained of their inability to
place contracts. Although Henry Morgenthau scoffed at these claims, demand-
ing proof that any defense contracts had been impeded, the counsel of the mili-
tary services carried great weight.22 Following the outbreak of hostilities, gov-
ernment planners actually tried to calculate the highest possible tax rates that
could be imposed without destroying incentive. President Roosevelt suggested
that a rate of 100 percent be established and that a different incentive be de-
vised to replace the monetary one. He also suggested that defense contractors
be presented with a flag as sufficient reward for their efforts in the nation's
behalf.23 There was evidence, however, that a rate of 100 percent was indeed too
high. This was the rate Britain had imposed on the war profits earned by its
defense contractors, and many Britons believed that it had interfered with pro-
ductivity.24 American procurement officers agreed that the highest rate they
dared to impose without destroying incentive was 88 percent.25
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Another aspect of the tax question was enforcement. A theorem of public
finance is that the more tax rates rise, the greater becomes the incentive to
cheat. Compelling compliance with extremely high tax rates is a costly process,
and it conflicted with other wartime goals. During peacetime, defense contrac-
tors were subject to a long, time-consuming process designed to guarantee low
prices to the government. A contract had to be advertised, suitable formal bids
had to be prepared, bidders' qualifications had to be evaluated, performance
bonds often had to be posted, and pilot models commonly had to be submit-
ted, all before work could progress. In wartime there was a general and legiti-
mate demand that these and similar rules be relaxed. Little inclination existed
to support the assembly of a corps of auditors large enough to ensure that no
cheating occurred. Even if such an inclination did exist, there was doubt about
its feasibility. In fact, there may not have been a sufficient number of accoun-
tants in the entire country to audit all the nation's defense contractors thor-
oughly. (By the close of 1943, the War Department employed about 6,400
accountants for this purpose.) There was even doubt as to whether the coun-
try could spare enough typewriters (which were rationed) and filing cabinets
to enable the auditors to perform their functions.26
Price Controls
Price controls were a major tool employed in the struggle against swollen prof-
its. They were originally imposed in February 1941, even before the United
States declared war, and they remained in effect until well after the Japanese
surrender. Data assembled by the economist Hugh Rockoff indicates that price
controls were initially very successful. They arrested inflation without produc-
ing an excessive degree of regimentation or costly bureaucracy. In 1943, al-
though there were more than three million firms doing business in the United
States, federal prosecutors commenced action for price control violations
against only 5,010 companies. It seems evident that price violations were negli-
gible early in the war, when nearly all Americans shared a sense of peril and an
acute spirit of national unity existed.
By 1945, however, the number of prosecutions had risen to 33,036. By then
the considerable slack that had remained in the economy from the depressed
levels of the 1930s had totally disappeared. The threat of invasion and fascism,
though not eradicated, had plainly receded. These circumstances served to in-
crease inflationary pressures and to reduce compliance with price control
edicts. The effectiveness of the price control system gradually weakened, and
for the war as a whole, about one-eighth of all American firms were found to
be in violation of the price ceilings. The Prohibition era is usually cited as the
period when federal law has been most widely flouted, and by that standard
price control violations in 1945 were about half as frequent.27
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In addition to its role of directly overseeing price control, the Office of
Price Administration also monitored standards of quality, since producers
could obtain imputed price increases simply by cutting back quality. By 1945
the OPA employed 64,517 people, or about .12 percent of the workforce, but
even so it could only partially cope with the age-old tendency to trim quality as
a means of evading price controls. The American economy had become so
complicated in its industrial maturity that eliminating quality degradation
defied human ingenuity. Few companies knowingly shipped substandard
goods to the government, but there was much dispute about quality standards
under price controls.28
An illustrative example was the scrap iron industry, where war-induced
shortages led normally speculative markets to become exceptionally volatile.
The steel industry was of critical importance to war production, and since
about half of all steel forged originated in scrap iron, any price increase in the
form of quality degradation in this basic material would permeate the entire
economy. But what was good quality in scrap iron, and who could identify it?
In 1941 there were twenty different grades of scrap iron, twelve principal pro-
cessing points, 3,000 foundry customers, and between 100,000 and 150,000
peddlers selling scrap iron to some 12,000 to 14,000 scrap dealers. Important to
this complicated business were scrap brokers, who obtained widely varying
commissions from storing and processing the product for its ultimate use.
Scrap metal prices were highly sensitive to transportation costs, which proved
to be a difficult regulatory problem as operating railroads could transport their
own scrap without charge. Heavy war demand also led to the utilization of un-
conventional forms of transportation for transporting scrap such as switching
lines, electric interurban passenger systems, and street railways. The market
price for these unlikely carriers was untested in peacetime. By 1944 there were
thirty-four grades of steel scrap, thirty-three grades of railroad scrap, and ten
grades of cast-iron scrap. Only an experienced scrap grader, a trade which few
practiced, could tell the difference, and even he would have difficulty. Specu-
lators often resorted to "top-dressing," in which a carload of low-grade scrap
would be covered with a layer of the higher grade indicated in the bill of
lading. If the Office of Price Administration had ever solved the problem of
regulating prices in scrap iron—and it had only modest success-it would have
had to turn its attention to similarly unstable industries with equally problem-
atical quality levels such as scrap paper, rubber, glass, rags, and even bones.29
The Black Market
A novel governmental control intended in part as a means of spreading the
sacrifices of war was the rationing of consumer items.30 Inevitably (considering
the size of the program) there was some unevenness in the application of the
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rules. Black markets existed in a number of commodities, perhaps even most.
Since illegal activity cannot be measured accurately, it is difficult to estimate
the size of the black markets closely. Estimates have varied widely. In 1944 the
head of the Office of Price Administration estimated that only 4 percent of the
nation's food supply was sold outside the rationing system. But industry
sources challenged his figures. According to the meat industry, as much as 40
percent of the nation's meat supply was sold on the black market. The OPA ad-
mitted that 5 percent of the gasoline supply was purchased with counterfeit
coupons, and estimates of the amount of black market gasoline sold ranged
from 1 to 2.5 million gallons per day. The truth is probably somewhere between
these estimates.31
The persistence of black markets favored affluent consumers as their larger
buying power granted them access to scarce and prized goods. As a historian of
the Office of Price Administration admitted, "Certain commodities especially
in the luxury and variety store categories were pretty largely ignored and con-
spicuous violators dealing in them frequently went unmolested."32 This is also
illustrated by the black market in rationed meat. The cuts of meat that were
most likely to be traded outside the rationing system were the tender variety
preferred by the affluent.33
Another example was gasoline. Fuel was in short supply throughout the
war, but it was considerably more available to businessmen. The Office of
Defense Transportation had the authority to issue a "certificate of war neces-
sity" to a civilian who could establish a war-related need for extra gasoline. The
difference between war-related business travel and travel conducted strictly for
personal purposes proved very difficult to define in practice, and it was hard to
evaluate the legitimacy of thousands of requests. The government granted
exemptions so freely that according to its historian the entire system of gaso-
line rationing nearly collapsed. In any case, the evasion of gasoline rationing
during World War II was an extensive form of profiteering in terms of the
number of defendants prosecuted. By only the third summer of the war, 1,300
persons had been convicted, 4,000 filling stations had lost their licenses, and
32,500 drivers were forced to forfeit their ration books.34
Despite its reputation as an epoch of common sacrifice, World War II was
a time of flagrant evasion of price, rent, and ration controls. During the five
years of its operation, the Office of Price Administration instituted 280,724
sanctions against cheaters—an average of more than 55,000 cases per year. The
OPA employed a force of 3,000 investigators and 800 attorneys to prosecute vi-
olations, and still it was hopelessly understaffed. During the last two years
of the war, 10,813 persons faced criminal charges for violating the price con-
trol and rationing laws. For the entire period the OPA operated, 41,724 persons
lost their rationing privileges, and 16,153 were fined, imprisoned, or put on
probation for willful violations. This figure exceeded the total for all earlier
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American wars, and it excludes those cases which were settled informally. Only
2-3 percent of the cases reached the courts.35
The New Deal Subsidizes Corporate America
An example of the conflicting objectives pursued by the war managers was the
role played by the War Department in defense contracting. Robert Patterson,
the undersecretary of war charged with acquisition of war materiel, echoed the
president's words by avowing that there should be "no recurrence" of the spate
of war millionaires produced twenty years earlier. Yet Patterson also asked for
"some relaxation" of the excess profits tax rates "for the benefit of produc-
tion."36 Patterson's office was charged with protecting the government's inter-
est through the close pricing of defense goods. But military procurement
officers were also under heavy pressure to increase production. Assigned con-
flicting responsibilities, they usually leaned toward the production goal. In
fact, Patterson even established an agency whose sole purpose was to eliminate
government regulations that interfered in any way with defense production
(the legal division of the Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
War).37 The War Department was profoundly more concerned with produc-
tion than with cost. This perspective had been a fundamental military tenet
long before the War Department was formally organized; indeed, a similar at-
titude that persisted in Queen Anne's War was still recognizable three centuries
later.
When World War II opened, the United States leadership was shocked to
find that the American capacity to produce war materiel was woefully inade-
quate. In 1940, the entire stockpile of gunpowder was too small to meet the
needs of a single day of battle at 1943 levels. The rate of rifle production was so
slow that had it not been speeded up it would have taken fifty years to equip
the army.38 Conversion of existing civilian productive capacity was vital, but it
would never be enough to meet the nearly insatiable needs of the armed
forces. New facilities had to be built, but only the federal government was large
enough to raise the capital or strong enough to assume the risk this expansion
required.
To encourage the construction of new defense facilities, the government
devised innovative techniques. In 1940 the device of choice was generous tax
incentives. New defense plants received accelerated depreciation schedules:
they could be written off in just five years, which was far short of the probable
useful life of the factory. This program was large and lavish. Plant expansion
in the amount of about $6.5 billion received beneficial treatment, and approx-
imately 86 percent of all applications were approved. Of the plant expan-
sion carried out before Pearl Harbor, 57 percent was privately financed. The
program succeeded in stimulating construction, according to its historian,
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because of its "frank appeal to the profit motive."39 In accepting accelerated de-
preciation, the New Dealers in the administration reluctantly bowed to the de-
mands of the production managers and their friends in the military. The
liberals exacted as their price for this concession a counterdemand that the
terms of all defense contracts let under this program be open to public
scrutiny, and they successfully imposed excess profits taxes of unparalleled
severity.40
Despite its size, tax amortization was not enough, and the government
turned to direct reimbursement. Under the Emergency Plant Facilities con-
tract, a defense contractor built a factory or other facility and the government
paid him for it. When peace returned, the contractor, at his option, could
either buy the building from the government or require that it be demolished.
Quite evidently, in such an instance the government would have little or no
bargaining ability, and for this and other reasons the plan was abandoned.
There were forty-one contracts written under this program, including one for
the production of the famous B-29 bomber, but the total sum appropriated
was low by World War II standards—only $350 million. The system was cum-
bersome and starved of capital.
In June 1940, Congress created the Defense Plant Corporation, an ad-
junct to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Under this program the
Defense Plant Corporation could build an entire factory and then lease it to a
defense contractor. This approach solved a number of bureaucratic tangles
and enlarged the amount of capital available. The War Department alone
spent nearly $3 billion in financing plant expansions under this plan. A single
Chrysler factory cost nearly as much as the combined value of all the facilities
built under the Emergency Plant Facilities program, and in total the Defense
Plant Corporation was about forty times larger than its predecessor.41
The Defense Plant Corporation was so enormous that by June 1945 the fed-
eral government owned about one-sixth of the nation's industrial capacity.
The Defense Plant Corporation alone had financed about 30 percent of the
new facilities built during the war. The federal government owned 90 percent
of the synthetic rubber, aircraft, and magnesium industries and 55 percent of
the aluminum business. The federal inventory of machine tools was so large
that it amounted to about twenty-five years of peacetime production of the
American machine tool industry. As victory neared, the future of this huge
block of capital became a matter of intense public discussion.42
"Legal Profiteering"
In the afterglow of the Great War, disheartened veterans asked an angry ques-
tion: "Who got the money?" The divisive question of the late World War II
period was "Who will get the capital?" Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's secretary of
the interior and one of the staunchest devotees of the New Deal, proposed
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that government-owned factories be given to the returning servicemen. He
recommended that Congress establish a vast holding company with several
subsidiary corporations managing each facility. Veterans would own stock in
the holding company and would receive dividends from any profits distribu-
ted. In effect, a grant of capital to veterans would be the twentieth-century
counterpart to lands granted to veterans of the wars of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Max Lerner, a socialist critic of the New Deal, applauded the Ickes plan.
Like the Tennessee Valley Authority and its several Progressive era ancestors,
the great public holding company was appealing for its ability to serve as
a yardstick by which to measure—and thus to limit—profits earned in
America's large and monopolistic industries. American businessmen ex-
pressed no enthusiasm for the idea, which they considered more of the New
Deal's creeping socialism.43
Congress preferred an alternative plan authored by Bernard Baruch and
embodied in the Surplus Property Act of 1944. The principal objective of this
scheme was to return to a peacetime economy based on private enterprise as
quickly as possible. This would be accomplished by selling the federally owned
productive facilities to the highest bidder. Having this as its purpose, the plan
was endorsed by the National Association of Manufacturers and the United
States Chamber of Commerce. Its key backer was the ubiquitous conservative,
Senator Walter George of Georgia, who chaired a special Senate committee on
postwar planning. Senator Harry S Truman's Special Committee Investigating
the National Defense Program advocated a slower approach to ensure that the
government received a "fair" price.44
The program has been called a huge garage sale, and in that sense it was the
biggest such sale in history. Sales began even before the war ended and contin-
ued for several years. The most desirable property sold first; in 1946, factories
sold for 54 percent of their original cost. Over the life of the program, however,
war plants sold for only one-half to one-third of the cost to the government.
Machine tools were temporarily leased and then sold. Gerald T. White, the his-
torian of the Defense Plant Corporation, estimates that the cost recovery of fa-
cilities built under the program was not more than 35 percent.45
The effect of the surplus property disposal system was to create a buyer's
market—the capital market was glutted. Since many defense plants had been
built contiguous to existing privately owned factories, there was in practice
often only one customer available. Although the details of each transaction
may be disputed, there is little doubt that the decision to sell war plants quickly
created a market in which a shrewd purchaser could obtain a highly favorable
price. The decision to subsidize defense facilities lavishly was based on the as-
sumption that after the war they would be useless.46 But in practice, when the
war ended there was a large pent-up demand for consumer products created
by years of high wages and rationing. Good profits beckoned to the business-
man who owned the facilities needed to service this demand.
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Facilities built under "Certificates of Necessity" issued by army and navy
officers were eligible to receive full tax amortization, and these proved to be the
most lucrative postwar acquisitions. Through 1943 military officers routinely
certified that 100 percent of the new facilities were required for defense pro-
duction. Beginning in 1944, this figure was normally reduced to 35 percent. As
long as a machine tool or factory addition was fully certified as a necessity of
national defense, it could be written off against excess profits taxes. When the
war ended, the residual value of the government-financed asset represented a
windfall profit.47
Harry Truman denounced this form of gain as "legal profiteering." This
was a novel definition of a very old concept, and it was unique to World War
II. The full extent of these gains cannot be calculated precisely, but the best es-
timate is about 40 percent of the cost of the tax amortization program, or
roughly $3 billion. Of this amount, two-thirds would have gone to the nation's
largest corporations.48 When added to the gains posted through the purchase
of bargain-priced facilities constructed by the Defense Plant Corporation
(only 35 percent of the cost was recovered), the great gains of the Good War
were obtained in the postwar period, were paid in kind, and were entirely
legal.
By war's end, many firms were also swollen with surplus cash. The average
contingency reserve rose from 4.7 percent of profits before the war to 15.1 per-
cent. By 1945 half the firms were subject to renegotiation of war contracts, and
they retained another 4.0 percent of their profits to cover these costs. Although
the War and Navy Departments recovered 68.2 percent of excess profits by
renegotiating contracts during the war, contract renegotiation continued for
years after V-J Day. In the postwar period, with public opinion angry at labor
and grateful for the real contribution of war production to victory, businesses
negotiated from a much stronger position than during the conflict. Each con-
tract was reviewed by a business-dominated Price Adjustment Board, and its
rulings were routinely accepted.49
The Warhog Survives
The government's antiprofiteering program was nothing if not comprehen-
sive. It rested upon the inspiring words of a charismatic leader, upon a vast
base of experience, upon the regulatory power of a modern state, upon the
broadest possible exercise of the war powers of the chief executive, upon a
system of price controls more comprehensive than any in American history,
and finally upon a system of rationing that was broader than any Americans
had experienced. Nevertheless, the program failed to reach the ambitious goal
that Roosevelt repeatedly articulated—namely, of preventing the appearance
of a new crop of war profiteers.
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The nation's leading corporations weathered the national emergency quite
comfortably. In the last four years before the war, 1936-39, the 2,230 largest
American firms earned $10.2 billion after taxes. During the four war years,
1942-45, those firms reported earnings of $14.4 billion after taxes—an increase
of 41 percent. The net worth of those firms grew from $31.6 billion to $38.2 bil-
lion. After taxes, reported returns on net worth increased from 8.1 percent
before the war to 9.4 percent during the war. Most of the gain in profits (85.6
percent) came from the enormous rise in sales during the war, but not all of it.
Price increases yielded 14.4 percent of the rise in profit; in other words, about
one-seventh of the return came from price coercion. Firms that were directly
engaged in war production and could therefore benefit from the generous tax
amortization rules (29.4 percent) were able to understate their actual earnings
by about 20 percent.50
A slightly different picture forms when all American firms are considered
and a different base is employed. According to data assembled by Harold G.
Vatter, aggregate corporate profits before taxes were $9.5 billion in 1940, as-
cending to a peak $28.0 billion in 1943. But net profits after taxes rose less
rapidly, from $6.9 billion in 1940 to $12.2 billion in 1943. Thus while pretax
profits nearly tripled during the war, after-tax profits rose by 77 percent in the
first three years before stabilizing. In 1948, a good postwar year, after-tax prof-
its were a robust $22.5 billion, nearly double the wartime level.51
Yet although the rise in retained earnings after taxes for all American busi-
nesses was restricted to between 41 and 77 percent, depending on the base year,
the sample, and the reporting method, there is ample evidence that the success
of the antiprofiteering campaign was limited in the sense of denying excep-
tional gains to all defense contractors. The aggregate data for corporations per-
tains to intangible entities and includes companies that were both directly and
indirectly the beneficiaries of wartime prosperity. The first evidence of extra-
ordinary gains by individual defense contractors was compiled by the Treasury
Department to defend its record and to bring about compliance with its rules
by bringing violations to public attention.
Testifying before the joint congressional committee on taxation in mid-
1942, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. described the improper prac-
tices of a number of companies holding war contracts. The most flagrant
examples of profiteering came from the aircraft industry, which experienced
explosive growth during the war (its output increased by thirty to fifty times)
and which was the most profitable single industry when measured by after-
tax return to net worth.52 Morgenthau's examples of war profiteers (whom he
did not name) included Robert J. Cannon, the president of the Cannon
Manufacturing Company, a maker of spark plugs for aircraft. Cannon hired
himself as the company's sales manager at an annual wage of $1,656,000. By
this device he was attempting to evade corporate income taxes in the amount
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of $1,117,000. The head of the Switlik Parachute Company attempted to con-
ceal income by renting property from his wife at an exorbitant rate—an
annual rent of $31,104 for property which had originally cost only $45,412. The
brother of Switlik's principal stockholder, who had no special training or abil-
ity, was hired at the then handsome salary of $15,000. The stockholder's son
and daughter, recent graduates, were paid $7,500 each. Finally, two principal
owners of Link Aviation Devices, which made pilot trainers, increased their
salaries from $12,000 and $15,000 in 1939 to $72,000 and $90,000 in 1941. They
jointly held a patent on the Link Trainer and increased their royalties from
$87,000 in 1939 to $1,179,000 in 1941.53
Such scattered evidence is suggestive but not conclusive. To make a broader
estimate of the effectiveness of the government's antiprofiteering program,
corporate records of two dozen individual defense contractors have been
examined for the wartime period.54 The companies chosen represented a vari-
ety of defense-related industries. These included brass, steel, aluminum, and
rubber products, small and large engines, machine tools, and shipbuilding.
Except that the sample did not include aircraft construction, these firms were
typical of American companies that produced for the war effort. The focus was
on the individual who headed each firm, and the goal was to measure his eco-
nomic well-being in terms of salary, dividends, and gain in net equity during
the wartime period. It was not possible to estimate any gains that might have
accrued from the postwar purchase of tools and facilities intended for war pro-
duction.55
The data indicate that the average defense contractor prospered consider-
ably during the war, and some prospered enormously. In 1939, the last peace-
time year, the mean annual salary of the president of a corporation was $11,375.
By 1945, the wartime peak, the mean annual salary had risen to $29,430—an
increase of 159 percent (before taxes). One defense contractor reported that his
salary climbed from $7,500 in 1939 to $82,635 in !945- Another reported that
during this time his salary soared from $7,500 to $73,041. In 1946, when defense
contracts were cut back, these contractors saw their salaries fall to $72,500 and
$24,307, respectively. In 1946 defense contractors suffered an average decrease
in salary of 6.1 percent over the previous year (see table 2). Thus the govern-
ment's attempt to restrict swollen executive salaries as a form of profiteering
was but a qualified success.56
The data on dividends are less complete, but the pattern is similar. The
mean dividend income for the eighteen corporation presidents doing defense
work rose from $8,497 in 1939 to $15,739 in 1945, an increase of 85.2 percent
(before taxes). In 1946 after the war had ended, dividends fell an average of 5.73
percent to $14,836. One defense contractor who had earned $5,083 in dividends
in 1939 collected $82,522 in 1945. Another, who had received $2,854 in dividends
in 1939, obtained $66,509 in 1946.
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Income is an important measure of economic well-being, but wealth is
even more important. An analysis of the eighteen corporation presidents
reveals that their average net equity in their firms appreciated from $138,953
in 1936 to $355,084 in 1946—an increase of 155 percent. Again, very substan-
tial gains were possible. One defense contractor enjoyed an expansion in
his net equity from $610,209 to $2,156,449 between 1939 and 1945. Another saw
his equity expand from $81,951 to $435,328. Most corporate presidents volun-
tarily complied with injunctions intended to restrict gains, but a substantial
minority did not. Broadly speaking, the circumstance of most business leaders
cooperating with the national effort while a few seized the opportunity to ben-
efit unduly during the emergency replicated the home-front experience of pre-
vious American conflicts.
These data show that despite its best intentions, the Roosevelt administra-
tion was unable to fulfill its promise to restrict war profits. During the war the
simplistic analysis of "war profiteering" gave way to a new reality. The task of
restraining wartime profits proved to be vastly more difficult than had been as-
sumed by those who railed against the "greedy munitions makers" during the
heyday of isolationism. Restraint of war profits required more tenacious,
single-minded determination than the Roosevelt administration possessed. In
part, as the New Deal critic Rexford Tugwell understood, the reason for the
limited success of the antiprofiteering program was that Roosevelt consciously
compromised in the hope that more important production goals might be
achieved. National unity would also be promoted by toning down the charges
of war profiteering. Unity and productivity would in turn speed victory over
fascism and pave the way for American entry into the United Nations. But the
elimination of war profits was also a technical impossibility at a price that was
acceptable to the American people. The construction of an antiprofiteering
program that entirely eliminated the swollen profits of wartime without inter-
fering with war production, discarding the democratic process, or dramatically
expanding the police power of the state, exceeded the ingenuity of the nation's
most seasoned and resourceful leaders.
Table 2. Salaries of Presidents of Large Wisconsin Defense Contracting Firms, 1939-1946
Industry
1. Brass
2. Brass
3. Engines
4. Aluminum
5. Brass
6. Brass
7. Aluminum
8. Aluminum
9. Steel Fabrication
10. Battery
11. Rubber
12. Aluminum
13. Rubber
14. Steel Fabrication
15. Aluminum
16. Shipbuilding
17. Iron Castings
18. Engines
19. Engines
1939
12,000
10,000
N/A
12,335
5,200
N/A
3,840
7,920
4,079
12,647
15,000
8,400
7,500
20,000
12,000
3,600
N/A
33,000
5,625
1940
20,000
10,000
7,500
14,489
7,809
5,269
4,300
12,160
2,099
11,897
25,000
8,400
7,500
20,000
13,000
15,000
20,066
33,000
15,025
1941
21,000
10,000
9,925
19,902
14,018
10,848
6,000
15,000
5,109
12,874
27,500
8,400
18,261
30,000
20,000
15,569
30,000
33,000
15,905
1942
20,450
10,000
25,735
14,422
18,000
25,928
12,166
15,000
9,088
13,093
50,000
N/A
34,018
21,500
25,000
25,000
33,500
33,000
31,708
1943
20,400
10,000
25,508
19,901
18,000
11,907
21,479
15,000
21,741
13,440
50,000
N/A
39,106
20,200
25,000
25,000
33,500
33,000
29,750
1944
20,400
10,000
44,113
19,901
18,000
17,800
25,499*
15,000
17,396
14,040
50,000
13,566
62,815
20,200
25,000
25,000
33,576
33,000
33,750
1945
20,900
10,666
73,041
23,000
18,035
16,236
14,852*
N/A
18,578
23,040
50,000
15,600
82,635
20,700
25,000
25,000
33,510
33,000
33,750
1946
21,250
12,000
24,307
N/A
18,008
16,440
N/A
21,600
6,000
15,040
50,000
12,600
72,500
20,550
34,700
25,000
35,550
48,583
42,500
(continued)
Table 2 continued.
Industry
20. Engines
21. Machine Tools
22. Machine Tools
23. Machine Tools
24. Machine Tools
Mean Salary
% Increase
1939
10,000
14,046
14,082
24,000
3,600
11,375
1940
12,000
16,693
26,468
45,000
3,600
14,845
30.51
1941
12,000
28,410
18,850
86,000
8,600
19,882
33.9
1942
15,000
23,674
34,550
86,000
12,326
25,619
28.9
1943
17,250
23,674
38,800
86,000
11,663
26,547
3.6
1944
18,250
23,699
33,800
60,000
12,537
27,181
2.4
1945
28,512
24,130
33,800
N/A
18,484
29,430
8.3
1946
31,000
23,674
33,800
N/A
15,068
27,627
-6.1
Source. Corporate Income Tax Records, Wisconsin State Archives.
Table 3. Dividend Income of Presidents of Eighteen Wisconsin Defense Contracting Firms
Year
Mean Income
% Increase
1939
8,497
1940
10,932
28.7
1941
11,248
2.9
1942
10,076
-10.4
1943
12,033
19.4
1944
10,466
-13.0
1945
15,739
50.4
1946
14,834
-5.7
Source: Corporate Income Tax Records, Wisconsin State Archives.
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War Profits and Cold War Culture
I didn't know he was getting eight dollars a bag for it, Benjamin, a little bag.
Imagine taking money for other people's misery.
LAVINIA HUBBARD, IN LILLIAN HELLMAN'S
ANOTHER PART OF THE FOREST (1946)
Although the Second World War offered ample material to spark a new war
profits controversy, circumstances after V-J Day precluded an early renewal
of the old dispute. The nation rejoiced in the euphoria of victory, basked in
relief from danger, and took great pride in the production miracle that had
made those successes possible. But it also bore a deep anxiety that the hard
days of the Depression would return, and few were interested in disturbing a
prosperity that might turn out to be very fragile. The war profits controversy
subsided, where it would sleep deep in the social memory. Yet while the profi-
teering issue has often lain dormant for considerable intervals, it has a pen-
chant for awakening periodically to reveal again its characteristically stubborn
resistance to defeat. What began as plunder and ransom, then changed to
gouging and speculation, ultimately reappeared in thin disguise as a contestant
in the cultural politics of cold war America.
There were sound reasons why the Spirit of '45 did not include a biting re-
sentment of wartime gains. Of crucial importance was the war's fundamental
popularity. In October 1939, two years before the United States entered World
War II, 68 percent of the American public had considered participation in the
Great War to have been a mistake. Yet in September 1947, two years after World
War II ended, almost exactly an equal proportion judged that entry into the
second war had not been an error.1 A broad consensus held that the wartime
sacrifices were necessary, and this left little room for complaints about which
persons had borne them.
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Although the New Deal's management of the war economy fell short of the
standard it set for itself, most Americans realized that as measured by the stan-
dards of the Civil War or the Great War it was still a very respectable effort.
Prices doubled during the Civil War and increased by 81 percent between 1916
and 1920, but rose by only 38 percent from 1941 to 1946. Taxes paid for 28 per-
cent of the Civil War, 36 percent of the Great War, and 40 percent of World War
II.2 The tax structure, which featured sharply graduated personal income and
excess profits taxes, was fundamentally progressive, persuading most that,
broadly speaking, prosperous Americans had fairly borne their share of the
economic sacrifice. In 1943 and again in 1945, the Gallup poll found that no less
than 85 percent of the American public described the tax system as "fair."
Significantly, there was no difference in this estimation between persons hold-
ing blue-collar and white-collar jobs. Indeed, there was evidence that the
public preferred heavier taxes imposed on the lower income strata, less on the
upper stratum.3
The remarkable rate of production achieved during the war was a proud
national accomplishment, and businessmen rightfully claimed a major por-
tion of the credit. Business prestige, which had been sharply weakened by the
Great Depression, enjoyed a distinct (if incomplete) recovery. By contrast,
labor's reputation waned. In early 1941, when production was perceived to be
too slow, labor bore much of the blame. Fifty-two percent of the American
public blamed strikes for the lag, and only 2 percent attributed it to "profit-
seeking businessmen." As the war progressed, and after it ended, the antilabor
mood persisted.4
Very significantly, the war years saw a dramatic leveling of shares of income
and wealth in the United States. Although some business executives prospered
greatly during the war, persons in lower economic strata did even better. In
1939 the share of income received by the top 5 percent of income recipients in
the United States was 27.8 percent. By 1945, that share had fallen to 19.3 percent.
For the top 1 percent of income recipients, the share fell from 11.8 percent to 8.8
percent. Persons who had been severely disadvantaged in the prewar period—
farmers, blacks, southerners, and unskilled white men—reduced the income
differential partially.5 Although it can be argued that true economic well-being
did not improve during the war, when hostilities ceased 64 percent of
Americans reported that they had not made any real sacrifice for the war
effort. Of those who said they had sacrificed, most said that their misfortune
resulted from a relative entering military service, rather than from suffering a
financial loss.1 The flattening of the wealth curve served to reduce if not elimi-
nate resentment of business gains. The languid stock market played a role as
well. Since the Dow Jones industrial average did not return to its pre-
Depression level until 1954, there were few if any conspicuously large stock
market gains like those that marked the Great War.7
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The popularity of World War II translated into a popularity for its warriors.
During World War II the American people reached a sound decision to treat
their soldiers and sailors more generously than those of previous conflicts. The
minutemen of the Revolution had served for next to nothing, privates in the
Grand Army of the Republic received $11 per month, and the doughboys pock-
eted but $3O.8 During the Depression, a private's pay actually declined to only
$21 per month. Soon after Pearl Harbor, Congress wisely raised the minimum
wage of a recruit to $50 monthly. This was the first of several actions designed
to reduce the postwar anguish of sixteen million embittered veterans grousing
about unfair wartime sacrifice. Although nothing could stop soldiers from
grumbling, the fact remained that the United States forces were the best-fed,
best-dressed, and ultimately the best-equipped troops in the war.9
When hostilities ceased, the government expressed its gratitude in a fresh
version of the New Deal. Although Congress rejected Harold Ickes's idea of di-
rectly transferring government-owned tools and factories to the GIs, and John
Maynard Keynes's concept of a capital levy with proceeds going to the veterans
was never seriously considered, veterans of World War II received postwar
compensation of great value. This included mustering-out pay, legal rights to
old jobs, educational benefits, loan guarantees, preference for civil service jobs,
unemployment compensation, and a priority right to purchase surplus prop-
erty. By January 1947, former GIs had purchased $501 million worth of surplus
property—22 percent of the total. In the first decade after the war, 7,800,000
veterans undertook educational training. When polled ten years after the war,
73.7 percent of the nondisabled veterans pronounced their separation benefits
as "adequate."10 This general satisfaction with postwar treatment eased the bit-
terness that was common among other generations of veterans. The compara-
tive absence of anomie after World War II weakened the position of those who
would complain about excessive war profits.
In the 1920s the political attack on profiteering had featured congressional
investigations, a publicity campaign, and demands for a postwar bonus.
During and after World War II, the political climate could not nourish such a
campaign. The war was popular, but criticism was not. The restraint of the
Truman committee contributed to the perception that the Roosevelt adminis-
tration was successful in controlling profiteering. Indeed, an atmosphere ex-
isted under which serious criticism was informally proscribed. Paul Fussell has
called this semiofficial policy "obligatory goodness," and with mocking irony
Studs Terkel has memorably labeled the entire conflict "The Good War."11 Since
public opinion was unreceptive to direct criticism of World War II, during the
cold war period profiteering was assailed primarily on a cultural level. The ex-
ception was a shrill and generally ignored attack by a disgruntled New Dealer,
Bruce Catton (who later became a famed Civil War historian), in The War
Lords of Washington (1948).12
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Perhaps the earliest example of censure of war profiteering on a symbolic
level was the first major motion picture whose subject matter centered on the
war's legacy. Ironically entitled The Best Years of Our Lives, this touching film
won the Academy Award as the best picture of 1946. Focusing on the difficul-
ties faced by war veterans readjusting to civilian life, the film opens arrestingly
with a homeward bound Air Corps captain arriving at an American airport,
where he encounters a newly prosperous businessman. Stout but not obese,
the executive appears to have been eating well and living comfortably.
Equipped with a fine new set of clubs, he is leaving on a golfing vacation, and
he conspicuously dismisses the extra charge for carrying a golf bag as excess
baggage. Meanwhile, the highly decorated ex-bombardier pleads for a reserva-
tion on a flight home, only to find that the businessman has taken the last seat.
As the pudgy businessman wings away to relax on the links, the war hero is
obliged to endure yet another cramped and noisy military flight. Without
much help, the weary veteran must make his own way back to normal civilian
life. Golfing and air travel, powerful symbols of upper-class affluence, have
become available to the merchant but remain closed to the soldier. In the race
to enjoy life's amenities, the man of commerce has pulled well ahead of the re-
turning serviceman, who has not yet even reached the starting line.13
In December 1946, war profiteering in another form made a striking
appearance in Lillian Hellman's moving play, Another Part of the Forest. This
story unveils the secret, bloody path to wealth of Marcus Hubbard, an Ala-
baman who has made a fortune in the illicit salt trade during the Civil War. To
protect his favored trading position with the Yankee command, Hubbard has
led Union troops to a camp where his neighbors' sons are in training for ser-
vice in the Confederate army. Twenty-seven neighbor boys are massacred, and
only by lying about his crime does Hubbard escape a lynching. But his wife,
Lavinia, knows the truth, and she is despondent about the dead recruits and
guilt-stricken about her husband's trade and treachery. "I didn't know he was
getting eight dollars a bag for it, Benjamin, a little bag," she tells her son.
"Imagine taking money for other people's misery." But mostly she cannot
abide the luxury that Marcus's treason has provided, and she threatens to tear
up her family's "evil money" to expiate their guilt.14
Hellman's play was about an earlier time and an earlier form of profiteer-
ing, thus addressing the issue circuitously, but it resonated with the postwar
generation. A more direct censure appeared in 1947 when one of the most
touching literary symbols of profiteering ever conceived emerged in the form
of Joe Keller, the leading character in Arthur Miller's celebrated play, All My
Sons. Keller is a crude and grasping owner of a company that has thrived
during World War II from manufacturing engines for Air Corps pursuit
planes. His conscience is not bothered in the slightest by the wealth he has ac-
quired. "Jail? You want me to go to jail?" Keller chides defiantly. "Who worked
for nothin' in that war?... When they work for nothin', I'll work for nothin'.
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Did they ship a gun or a truck outa Detroit before they got their price?... Half
the Goddam country is gotta go if I go!"
The play reveals that a number of the engines made by Keller's firm were
known to have had cracked cylinder heads, but on Keller's orders they were de-
livered anyway. After twenty-one airmen are lost, Keller's pilot son learns of his
father's crime and deliberately crashes his own plane. In the play's powerful
conclusion, Keller learns of the circumstances of his son's suicide, and he too
takes his own life. All My Sons assails contemporary profiteering directly, but
the type of profiteering selected is the degraded quality form, which was un-
common during World War II. The thin factual underpinning weakens the
play slightly, but nonetheless it remains a compelling statement. The play was
also presented to the public as a motion picture, with Edward G. Robinson
starring as Joe Keller.15
In 1955 Miller's achievement was surpassed by the appearance of Joseph
Heller's Catch-22, which introduced Lieutenant Milo Minderbinder, perhaps
the best known of all fictional profiteers. Minderbinder takes profiteering
to the level of an ultimate absurdity. Milo obtains a personal squadron of
bombers, which he leases to the Air Corps. After agreeing to bomb a bridge for
a fee of cost plus 6 percent profit, Minderbinder is so colossally amoral that he
also charges an equal fee from the enemy for defending the target. He even
multiplies his gain by collecting a thousand-dollar commission for every
friendly plane he shoots down. He defends his dealing with the Germans with
transparent but engaging sophistry: "Maybe they did start the war, and maybe
they are killing millions of people, but they pay their bills a lot more promptly
than some allies of ours. . . . Can't you see it from my point of view?"
Minderbinder also denies the charge that he started the war and argues: "I'm
just trying to put it on a businesslike basis. Is anything wrong with that?"16
Heller's dark humor was a supremely effective challenge to the myth of
World War II as "The Good War." The book's absurdist, deeply cynical pes-
simism surpasses in intensity the legendary disillusionment of the veterans of
the Great War. A decade later the grim character of Catch-22 and its use of
profiteering as a vehicle of expressing it was carried forward by Kurt Vonne-
gut Jr. in God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater. Vonnegut described a symbolic Indiana
family whose wealth had been built during the Civil War by converting a saw
factory to make swords and bayonets for the Union army. The founder of the
fortune, Noah Rosewater, had "hired a village idiot to fight in his place," wrote
Vonnegut, who contended that "every grotesquely rich American represents
property, privileges, and pleasures that have been denied to the many."17
Marcus Hubbard, Joe Keller, Milo Minderbinder, and Noah Rosewater are
modern characters who followed by nearly a century the crooked Victorian
path of Charles Holt, the first war profiteer in an American novel.18 They are
far more complex figures than the shallow Holt, and the fictional appearance
of modern war profiteers in the early years after the allegedly Good War
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appealed to the American public, whose taste in culture, as in public affairs,
had become increasingly sophisticated and mature.
The historian Robert E. Osgood has termed the great transformation of
American thinking wrought by World War II as the New Realism. The most
important element of New Realist thought was a basic understanding and ac-
ceptance of America's new role as a world leader. A major implication of that
new status as a great power was that a vastly enhanced national defense estab-
lishment must become a permanent fixture of American life. A larger defense
component would demand massive expenditures, and this implied that mas-
sive profits would accumulate.19
But how much defense profit would a New Realist accept? The unpleasant
and unwelcome lesson taught by World War II was that the price of freedom
included a percentage of profit, and that profit was legitimate.20 Nevertheless,
the cold war confrontation opened a new and very long ledger. Some Ameri-
cans were ready to join William Shakespeare, a consummate Old Realist who
four centuries earlier despaired in Henry V to "spend our vain command" in
venturing to curtail profiteering.21 But while there was no attempt to reimpose
in the 1950s the profit restrictions of the Vinson-Trammell Act of the 1930s,
most Americans of the postwar period yielded to profiteers grudgingly.
Like their ancestors, Americans of the cold war era remained deeply suspi-
cious of wealth gained quickly and distrustful of wealth gained from arms.
Americans might be willing to accept the internationalist foreign policy that
their new position and overwhelming strength implied, but they found that
the enormous price of that status was difficult to swallow. The cost, unfortu-
nately, was exacted not only in economic terms (which were of an unprece-
dented scale) but also in other disturbing ways. The permanent existence
of an immense, profit-seeking national defense industry implied an end to
American exceptionalism. The American nation had been long spared the ex-
istence of a large standing army served by a colony of purveyors, but now those
days were a thing of the past. Like the great powers of old, Americans would
have to face the permanent and copious existence of war profit. Besides erod-
ing American exceptionalism, large, ongoing defense expenditures would raise
difficult new questions that would persist throughout the ethical twilight that
was the cold war. Finally, these expenditures would dictate an indefinite con-
tinuation of much of the extensive procurement bureaucracy that had regu-
lated defense profits during World War II.
Four decades of the cold war created new issues that redefined and veiled
the meaning of profiteering once again. How could a nation call for patriotic
waiver of "war" profits during a conflict, such as those in Korea or Vietnam,
that was not a legally declared war? How could defense contractors be called
to sacrifice if a conflict, like the cold war itself, was of indefinite dura-
tion? How could the claims of various sectors that are indirectly affected by
large-scale defense spending—such as farm prices, labor rates, and regional
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growth—be balanced against direct defense needs and legitimate interests
that are wholly unrelated to defense? The cold war blurred the difference be-
tween wartime and peacetime, and the rise of what some have called the
National Security State obscured the difference between war profits and civil-
ian profits.
Of the many numbing qualities of the cold war, one of the most desensitiz-
ing was its open-endedness. No private business can operate indefinitely if its
profits are subnormal, and during the cold war the defense industry was prof-
itable but not excessively so. During the 1950s investments in companies spe-
cializing in defense work were nearly twice as profitable as in nondefense
firms, but during the 1960s defense-oriented companies lost ground, doing
only about equally well as other New York Stock Exchange firms.22 Neverthe-
less, the appetite of advanced military technology for money was so voracious
that it inspired righteous wrath from claimants forced on a diet of restricted
appropriations. Technological progress meant that a new war might be de-
cided almost immediately. Having little need to prepare in advance for war had
always made Americans different from Europeans, and now that distinction
was gone. Americans struck out at the expensive shield that provided dubious
security while eroding exceptionalism. In frustration, they denounced it an-
grily but emptily as the "military-industrial complex."
During their centuries of military experience, Americans had slowly made
progress against the bane of war profits. One by one, several forms of profi-
teering had been eliminated or at least severely restricted. Scalp bounties, trad-
ing with the enemy, and plunder, types that had disgraced early American
history, had thankfully fallen into disuse, declined to insignificance, or been
isolated by legal and moral proscription (although the trading with the enemy
thrived during the Civil War and plunder made a brief return during World
War II).23 The religious proscription of Puritan days—declaring profiteering a
Provoking Evil—had been of limited effectiveness in curbing abuse, but it
formed a basis for the Revolutionaries' secular appeal to shun war profits as
poisonous to republican virtue.
Many of the practices that had outraged the mid-nineteenth century had
also declined or been largely corrected. The custom of employing private citi-
zens like W. W. Corcoran or Jay Cooke to fill the nation's war chest during the
Mexican and Civil Wars (to their great profit) had been replaced by the em-
ployment of equally competent but far less well compensated public servants,
such as William G. McAdoo and Henry Morgenthau Jr. The spectacle of unpa-
triotic stock and commodity speculation, which had tarnished the achieve-
ments of the Civil War generation, was moderated by the price control system
of World Wars I and II. The salary control system of World War II shrank the
bloated executive incomes that had disgraced the record of the Great War. The
success of the wage and price control systems in turn rested upon a basis well
276 I W A R H O G  S
established by the Civil War leadership: an appeal to fundamental patriotism
in time of national danger.
Yet, resistant to these many remedies, profiteering persisted. As the twenti-
eth century opened, war profiteering had become in the eyes of the Progres-
sives a particularly ugly example of monopolistic greed. By the mid-i93os,
profiteering had fallen to its deepest level of repugnancy. From the pacifist iso-
lationist perspective, its warmongering threatened the very future of civiliza-
tion itself. Indeed, war profiteering offered evidence for those consummate
pessimists who in despair had begun to believe in I'histoire immobile, the view
that nothing ever changes or can be changed. Would a refusal to surrender war
profits be the rock upon which the progress of civilization foundered?
But as a result of the Good War and the new menace of communist aggres-
sion, what had been a great issue in 1935 had become a matter of subordinate
though still serious concern by 1955. Eisenhower's admonishment about a
powerful military-industrial complex warned against a danger of fraud, dis-
torted priorities, and the entrenched interest of defense contractors, but not
about warmongering. The procurement issues of the cold war were significant
but by no means new; for example, domination of military provisioning
by contractors from large states was an issue as early as the Revolution and
continued throughout the early national period. Defense spending during the
cold war years clearly evidenced many flagrant examples of fraud and other
abuses, but Eisenhower's warning was different from the Progressives' call for
nationalization in order to avoid warmongering. The concept of a "military-
industrial complex" suggested a mysterious, clandestine conspiracy against the
public purse, but not a deliberate plot to stir up war to fatten profits. The al-
leged existence of a "military-industrial complex" was alarming, but it was not
as menacing as the supposed plotting of the merchants-of-death.
The cold war devoured wealth in previously unimaginable amounts, but
the methods of control worked out over the centuries were at last able to keep
profiteering substantially in check. In the 1960s military profits finally had
become "reasonable," in the sense that the gains of defense contractors were no
more lavish than those of their counterparts who served the civilian economy.
Profiteering had evolved into a matter of cultural interest rather than a leading
political and economic problem, which was a salutary and long overdue devel-
opment. After more than three centuries of effort, the American people had fi-
nally achieved an ability to manage economic sacrifice competently and
evenhandedly.
Yet history shows that while profiteering has often gone into remission for
long periods, like a resilient disease it has proven to be as persistent as it is per-
nicious. Only a foolhardy people would fail to remain vigilant against a
reemergence of new forms of this ancient affliction.
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July 1775
August 1775
August 1775
October 1775
November 1775
October 1776
April 1777
February 1778
March 1778
May 1778
June 1778
Name
Penuel Cheney
Oliver Parker
Jesse Saunders
David Brewer
Cornelius Hardenbergh
Israel Davis
Peter Vonk
Thomas Lucas
Neigal Gray
Rank
Surgeon's mate
Captain
Captain
Colonel
Lieutenant
Captain
Lieutenant
Captain
Quartermaster
Captain
Lieutenant colonel
Offense
Writing fraudulent drafts
on the commissary account
Defrauding troops of pay
Overdrawing provisions
Obtaining lieutenant's
commission for absent son;
overdrawing blankets
Defrauding troops of
blanket money
Defrauding his men
Converting public property
(horse) to own use
Withholding pay of
five soldiers
Misappropriating
rum and soap
Overdrawing pay; selling
discharge papers
Defrauding troops
Penalty
Allowed to resign
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered and ordered
to make restitution
Ordered to refund money
from own wages
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered, with name,
(continued)
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July 1778
August 1778
August 1778
September 1778
October 1778
February 1779
April 1779
August 1779
September 1779
October 1779
Name
James Davidson
Benjamin Flowers
Cornelius Sweers
Samuel Brewer
Nathan Nutall
William Jenkins
LCWca
Jotham Loring
William Godman
Benjamin Ballard
Rank
Quartermaster
Commissary general
of stores (colonel)
Deputy commissary
general
Colonel
Quartermaster of stores
Lieutenant
Commissary sales
to troops
Lieutenant colonel
Captain-lieutenant
Assistant commissary
Offense
of supplies
Defrauding soldiers of
provisions and embezzling
property
Fraud by inflating prices
of muskets
Accomplice to above
Misapplying cloth
Embezzling public stores
Embezzling and making
false pay vouchers
Profiting on rum
Embezzling flour
Embezzling a tent
Selling public property
Penalty
crime, and place of abode
published in newspapers
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered
Cashiered and ordered
(continued)
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October 1779
October 1779
March 1780
June 1780
July 1780
August 1780
September 1780
October 1780
Name
Philip Gibbons
Francis O'Neal
Theophilus Parke
Isaac Coren
c
owain
Peter Manifold
Thomas Thomson
Albert Chapman
Rank
Lieutenant
Surgeon stores
Captain-lieutenant
Captain
Clothier general
Captain
Forage master
Major
Offense
Presenting fraudulent
claims for $2,425
Selling hospital
Fraud and forgery
Overdrawing provisions
for three men
Fraud
Selling government horse
Trading government oats
for bridles
Embezzlement
Penalty
to make restitution of
$526.75
Cashiered
Cashiered
Dismissed "with infamy"
(sword broken over head
before troops, charge
published in newspaper,
prohibited from holding
public office)
Cashiered
Cashiered
Reimbursement of
horse of equal value
Cashiered and ordered
to make restitution
Forced to resign
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Name Rank Offense Penalty
December 1780
March 1781
May 1781
Thomas Dewees
John Collins
John Bingham
Barrack master
Deputy commissary
of stores
Lieutenant
Selling public wood
Pilfering saltpeter; stealing
saddle in escape
Misapplying bounty money
Cashiered, name to be
published three times in
English- and German-
language newspapers
Forfeit pay; make
restitution; name
published; prohibited from
holding public office;
assigned to man-of-war
without furlough
Cashiered
Source: Philander C. Chase, ed., The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series, vol. 1 (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1985); John C. Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington (Washington, 1936).

Appendix B: Profits of Selected Defense
Contractors, 1911-1920
i. Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Company
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
Total
Gross
Sales
$9,728,780.41
10,539,442.67
9,713,061.71
13,033>493-I6
22,488,313.98
37,636,881.71
45>313»978.67
117,051,153.41
32,531,954.65
23.532,446.73
321,569,507.10
Net
Income
$892,346.03
799,615.19
684,140.13
1,694,847-03
4,117,564.84
(5,942,780.35)
4,988,970.75
5,646,803.14
(n,945,772.O7)
(116,377.41)
819,357.28
Income
Tax
- 0 -
$708,031.55*
663,874.25*
- 0 -
- 0 -
1,371,905-80
Invested
Capital
$6,477,339-46
7,094,014.37
7,006,480.12
8,754,136.40
9,248,435.05
43,231,816.03
41,191,565.15
46,450,132.60
38,604,841.23
28,885,288.53
Percentage
of Net Income
to Invested
Capital
13-78
11.27
9.76
19.36
44-52
- 0 -
12.11
12.16
- 0 -
- 0 -
Dividends
Paid
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
* Includes excess profits tax.
2. Colt's Patent Fire Arms Company
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
Total
Gross
Sales
$1,417,478.85
1,902,936.92
2,190,073.41
2,238,421.66
5,308,903.90
10,034,508.52
14,694,623.39
32,109,910.55
11,282,779.44
4,859,271.33
86,038,907.97
Net
Income
$322,930.38
569,458.76
659,272.40
794,646.47
2,615,755-09
5>799.586.38
5,797,793-87
5,693,152.17
980,844.08
843,599.o8
24,077,038.68
Income
Tax
$3,109.67
3,148.21
5,613.11
7,946.46
26,157.65
115,991-73
2,171,412.95*
3,744,474-40*
95,249.28
80,506.56
6,253,610.02*
Invested
Capital
$1,473,394-26
1,341,976.20
i,693,53i-95
N/A
N/A
9,628,756.46
8,932,106.15*
11,113,685.68
13,308,669.69
10,516,615.22
Percentage
of Net Income
to Invested
Capital
21.92
42.43
38.93
N/A
N/A
60.23
64.91
51-23
7-37
8.02
Dividends
Paid
$315,966.91
200,000.00
250,000.00
262,500.00
600,000.00
1,575,000.00
4,900,000.00*
1,800,000.00
1,000,000.00
1,000,000.00
11,903,466.91*
* Includes excess profits tax.
#A stock dividend of $1,000,000 was paid in April 1917.
3. Winchester Repeating Arms Company
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
Total
Gross
Sales
$2,787,029.11
3,197,846.35
10,590,816.53
11,453,753-25
19,436,869.14
26,441,074.60
28,471,861.62
61,257,937-95
25,185,940.56
18,263,224.16
207,086,353.27
Net
Income
$1,165,500.60
1,394,255-27
1,258,132.92
1,826,630.60
3,538,980.50
2,339,018.75
(432,831.23)
4,934,032.21
3,828,848.44
(116,260.02)
19,736,308.04
Income
Tax
$11,605.01
13,892.55
12,581.33
17,908.26
35,389-8i
N/A
- 0 -
2,523,149-46*
934,429.28*
- 0 -
3,548,955-7O*
Invested
Capital
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$18,878,085.88
21,627,741.09
22,102,929.91
30,238,258.19
Percentage
of Net Income
to Invested
Capital
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
(2.29)
22.81
17-32
(0.38)
Dividends
Paid
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
* Includes excess profits tax.
4. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Company
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
Total
Gross
Sales
$6,781,853.78
7,835.634-35
8,347,149-93
7,503,640.30
10,098,694.54
11,506,201.54
23,846,732.94
39.744.ioo.oo
39,412,740.43
37,962,853.52
193.039,601.33
Net
Income
$428,113.76
501,632.76
328,838.08
431,208.24
817,365.42
814,891.04
3,298,601.13
3,990,311.37
4,916,655.58
5,764,089.69
21,291,707.08
Income
Tax
$4,281.13
5,016.33
3,288.38
4,312.08
8,173-65
16,297.82
1,074,169.63
2,493,369-67
i,789,O74-43
1,576,211.05
6,974,194-17
Invested
Capital
$4,345,237-02
4,454,506.88
4,7i3,O53-27
4,735,165-45
5,952,531-45
4,222,557,-45
3,822,549.44
5,500,091.76
6,932,791.21
7,667,134.10
Percentage
of Net Income
to Invested
Capital
9.85
11.26
6.98
9.11
13-73
19.30
86.29
72.55
70.92
75.18
Dividends
Paid
296,210.00
290,210.00
300,000.00
300,000.00
600,000.00
600,000.00
300,000.00
300,000.00
1,400,000.00
2,300,000.00
6,686,420.00
5. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
Total
Gross
Sales
N/A
N/A
$8,527,477.82
32,402,075.67
44,431,034.71
77.353.OO9.29
132,570,498.83
148,943,706.65
119,129,200.58
175,567,789-58
738,924,793.13
Net
Income
$2,263,656.36
1,705,296.63
4,629,033.80
2,638,028.24
6,593,394-24
20,254,737.65
48,869,577.22
29,654,130.20
16,970,731-57
32,288,372.27
165,866,958.18
Income
Tax
$22,586.36
17,002.97
46,290.34
26,380.28
65,933-94
405,094.79
19,636,202.90*
17,090,598.92*
3,011,235.38*
8,935,689.02*
49,257,014.90*
Invested
Capital
$67,342,279.52
68,863,729.19
69,625,512.57
N/A
N/A
95,356,723-6i
103,057,128.74
139,540,274.53
151,008,060.66
153,486,461.85
Percentage
of Net Income
to Invested
Capital
3-36
2.48
6.65
N/A
N/A
21.24
47-42
21.25
11.24
21.04
Dividends
Paid
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
* Includes excess profits tax.
6. Semet Solvay Company
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
Total
Gross
Sales
$1,062,557.52
1,033,920.21
7,953»464-29
8,016,080.06
16,455.590.40
36,971,464.90
38,087,860.64
44,179.486.37
18,682,187.73
28,515.693-91
200,958,306.03
Net
Income
$534,944-53
4O9.155-46
604,329.59
579,115.30
5,157,254.98
10,476,198.56
6,783,122.36
1,362,528.78
574,317.15
1,475,621.06
27,956,587-77
Income
Tax
$5,349-74
4,091.55
6,043.29
5,791-15
5L572.55
209,523.97
1,370,628.24
158,692.26
49,772.51
169,721.60
2,031,186.86
Invested
Capital
$2,846,477.42
3,028,306.70
3,736,372.52
N/A
N/A
22,997,497-29
23,910,684.21
13,799,332.45
13,630,671.61
16,456,504.58
100,405,846.78
Percentage
of Net Income
to Invested
Capital
18.79
13-51
16.17
N/A
N/A
45-55
28.37
9.87
4.21
8.97
27.84
Dividends
Paid
$176,000.00
200,000.00
200,000.00
220,000.00
600,000.00*
1,900,000.00*
3,779,996.oo*
1,305,583-98
1,357,944-00
1,358,310.88
11,097,834.86*
Source: M. J. La Padula and H. C. Iller to Stephen C. Raushenbush, 16 August 1934, Records of the Special Committee Investigating the
Munitions Industry (Nye committee), box 154, RG 46, National Archives. The information was taken from records of the Internal Revenue
Service.
* In addition, the firm paid stock dividends in the amounts of $4,000,000 (1915), $319,996 (1916), and $652,791.99 (1917), for a total of
$4,972,787.99.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The sources used in this study include the records of numerous governmental
investigations, both published and in manuscript, the personal papers of crit-
ics of war profits, and an extensive selection of contemporary and recent
books, articles, and pamphlets. Each source used in this study is cited fully in
the first reference in each chapter in which it is used.
Books
No previous book that has come to my attention deals expressly with the topic
presently considered. Nevertheless, the research and insights of three genera-
tions of scholars who have examined various aspects of the subject have made
substantial contributions to this work.
War profits emerged as a scholarly issue in America when the muckraking
journalist Gustavus Myers published his seminal History of the Great American
Fortunes (1909). Myers intended to smudge the luster of the Civil War, and
he accomplished this by attributing the origin of J. P. Morgan's immense for-
tune to profits gained during the Civil War. The Myers thesis was shattered by
R. Gordon Wasson in The Hall Carbine Affair: A Study in Contemporary Folk-
lore (1941,1948,1971).
It was generally not until the issue of war causation arose after World War
I, however, that war profits inspired the earnest attention of professional histo-
rians. The most comprehensive early treatments of what became known as
"profiteering" were by European scholars, Richard Lewinsohn's The Profits of
War through the Ages (1936) and Philip Noel-Baker's The Private Manufacture
of Armaments (1936). A variety of texts generally seeking to link profit seeking
with warmongering and other abuses found a ready market in the 1930s. A se-
lection of titles in this lurid genre includes Seymour Waldman, Death and
Profits (1932); Fenner Brockway, The Bloody Traffic (1933); Helmuth C.
Engelbrecht and Frank C. Hanighen, merchants-of-death (1934); George Seldes,
Iron, Blood, and Profits (1934); and Stephen and Joan Raushenbush, War
Madness (1937).
The merchants-of-death literature of the early 1930s was vintage
Progressive history. Although most authors were well-trained scholars, the
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books were alarmist, carried Marxist overtones, and sought to proselytize.
After World War II, this scholarly disposition evolved into a more careful study
of civil-military relations that focused on a search for the origins and charac-
teristics of what became commonly known as "the military-industrial com-
plex" (often abbreviated as MIC). Unlike the nefarious arms traders, the
military-industrial complex was not explicitly condemned as a bringer of war,
but was indicted on lesser charges as a bloated wastrel and a disturber of the
peace. The concept originated with C. Wright Mills's influential and contro-
versial book, The Power Elite (1956), and it gained great respectability when
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a professional soldier with impeccable credentials, in-
cluded it in his 1961 presidential valedictory address.
The concept of a military-industrial complex, like the merchants-of-death
theory, was heavily freighted with ideology. In some degree, most of the writ-
ing on war profits during the cold war had the flavor of an expose. This is evi-
dent from some of the titles of books devoted to the subject, which rivaled
their ancestors in grisliness. The genre includes Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State
(1964), Richard J. Barnet, The Economy of Death (1969), Richard F. Kaufman,
The War Profiteers (1972), and Ivan Melada, Guns for Sale (1983), to cite a few.
These books seem intended more to disturb than to inform, and a reader can
become numb to the message.
Scholars who have written about the military-industrial complex have
been considerably more restrained than were the writers of the merchants-of-
death school, but an echo of the earlier outrage can still be heard. Benjamin F.
Cooling, who searched diligently for the origin of the military-industrial com-
plex in Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy (1979), reported that "the process was
certainly not complete by 1893, but the first tentacles of a modern military-
industrial complex were there." Paul A. C. Koistinen, one of the most resolute
scholars who have probed the topic, asserted in The Military-Industrial
Complex (1980) that "this MIC has helped to perpetuate Cold War tensions."
Much of the military-industrial complex literature discloses that progressive
history, although toned down, has not entirely disappeared. A more recent
book by Gregory Hooks, Forging the Military-Industrial Complex (1991), while
thoroughly researched and clothed in scholarly objectivity, still blamed the
MIC for "postwar conservatism" and "the New Deal's failure to culminate in a
social democratic breakthrough."
There is a third school of thought. In the 1930s the merchants-of-death
theory was broadly accepted, but not unanimously. Its foremost critic was
Norman Angell, a prolific British pacifist who argued in The Unseen Assassins
(1932) that nationalist impulses were far more important as war causatives
than profit seeking. In a classic study, The Soldier and the State (1957), Samuel
P. Huntington pointed to the strong tradition of business pacifism and noted
the irony of portraying businessmen as warmongers. Huntington regarded
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the alleged dangers of military-business cooperation as exaggerated and un-
proven, and in any case he expected this cooperation to be both limited and
temporary.
By 1972 the idea of a military-industrial complex had attracted numerous
other critics. Robert H. Ferrell wrote in the Journal of International Affairs
(1972) that the concept was so vague that it "could not stand by itself," and
Carroll W. Pursell Jr. complained in The Military-Industrial Complex (1972)
that it has no "theoretical framework."
The present study has benefited vastly from the work of those scholars who
have questioned the utility of the notion of a military-industrial complex.
Besides Huntington, Ferrell, and Pursell, the civil-military relations school—a
variant of the "New Military History"—includes James L. Abrahamson
{America Arms for a New Century [1981]), Dean Allard ("The Influence of the
United States Navy upon the American Steel Industry" [1959]), Robert D. Cuff
("An Organizational Perspective on the Military-Industrial Complex" [1984]),
Terrence J. Gough ("Soldiers, Businessmen, and U.S. Industrial Mobilisation
Planning between the World Wars" [1991]), Stephen Skowronek {Building a
New American State [1981]), Jacob Goodwin {Brotherhood of Arms [1985]), and
Jacob Vander Meulen {The Politics of Aircraft [1991]). Rather than seeking to
discredit the MIC, the New Military History concentrates less opprobriously
on understanding civil-military relations.
Governmental Records
While this study is thus indebted to the insights of three bodies of historical
interpretation—the merchants-of-death school, the military-industrial com-
plex school, and the civil-military relations school—its toil was greatly eased
by the existence of a wide variety of published sources and manuscript collec-
tions relating to the subject. For the early period, there is now available a rich
selection of published records of the various colonial governments. The colo-
nial records of Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts Bay, and Rhode
Island were particularly helpful, as was Great Britain's Calendar of State Papers,
Colonial Series. For the Revolution, the papers of George Washington,
Nathanael Greene, Robert Morris, and John Sullivan were indispensable.
For the early national and Jacksonian periods there is much to be gained
from careful inspection of Niles' Weekly Register and Niles' National Register.
This is also the period when very useful governmental reports and congres-
sional investigations become available. In particular, these included the reports
of the commissary general of subsistence (1847), of the quartermaster general
(1847-48), and of the secretary of war (1848). Investigations by both Congress
and state legislatures proliferated during the Civil War and were indispensable
to this study. The most useful were those by New York and Ohio, by the House
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committee on government contracts, and by Senate committees on ordnance
contracts, heavy ordnance, traffic with rebels, naval supplies, and the Banks ex-
pedition. The records of the joint committee on the conduct of the war were
also of considerable help.
The post—Civil War controversy can be traced in the Senate's Sale of Arms
by Ordnance Department (1872) and the House's Sale of Arms to France (1871).
The naval rearmament controversy of the 1890s is discussed usefully in Robert
Hessen, Steel Titan: The Life of Charles M. Schwab (1975) and in Cooling, Gray
Steel and Blue Water Navy (1979). Pacifist views of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries are best developed in the papers of David Starr Jordan and
the Women's International League of Peace and Freedom.
Opposition to preparedness is well described in various issues of La
Toilettes Weekly Magazine (1912-14) and in Anne Trotter's articles and disserta-
tion. The controversy over supplies for World War I is best addressed by exam-
ination of congressional investigations by the Thomas, Graham, and Nye
committees and by the House Committee on Military Affairs. The published
records of the Nye committee should be supplemented by inspection of its
archives. Also invaluable are records of the war transactions section of the
Justice Department (1922-24) and of the War Policies Commission (1931). The
scholarship of Robert D. Cuff is particularly rich and insightful.
The hearings of the War Policies Commission and of the Nye committee
are important for the 1930s, but they should be supplemented by the opposing
views expressed in the journal Army Ordnance. Liberal journalists were very
active in this period, and their views are best examined in such journals as the
Nation, Literary Digest, Christian Century, New Republic, and World Tomorrow.
For World War II, the diaries of Henry Morgenthau Jr. are both volumi-
nous and indispensable for understanding the attempt to control wartime
profits. Reports of the Office of Price Administration are also thorough and
pertinent to the same problem. The records of the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue supplied valuable inside data, but unfortunately they have now been
closed to researchers. John Morton Blum's V Was for Victory (1976) remains the
most useful treatment of the World War II home front.
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